

# Regent University

*By authority of the Board of Trustees  
and on recommendation of the faculty,*

**The Robertson School of Government**

*has conferred upon*

**Harry David Candela**

*the degree of*


**Master of Arts in Public Policy**

*with all the rights, privileges and responsibilities thereto pertaining.*

*Acknowledging God as the fountainhead of all wisdom and His Son  
Jesus Christ as the source of all truth, we affix the seal of the  
University and bestow this honor at Virginia Beach, Virginia, on this the  
7th day of August, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-eight.*

*Conrad M. ...*  
Chairman, Board of Trustees

*M. J. ...*  
President of the University



*Paul H. ...*  
President of the University

*Harry C. ...*  
Dean of the School

11 Timothy 2:2 - "And the things that thou has heard of me among many witnesses,  
the same commit thou to faithful men, who shall be able to teach others also."





# REGENT UNIVERSITY

1000 Regent University Drive, Virginia Beach, VA 23464-9800

Harry David Candela

183-64-8799 02/28/01

Previous Degrees:

BS 001037

## Fall 1992

PPHS	521	Principles Of History	B	3
PPLW	511	Principles Of Law	BC	4
PPPR	LRW	Library Research Workshop	P	0
PPSC	531	Foundations Of Natural Science	B	4

	CR ATT	CR COMP	CR CALC	G PTS	GPA
SEM/CNV	7.33	7.33	7.33	20.67	2.818

+++++ Placed On Academic Probation +++++

## Winter 1992

PPEC	551	Principles Of Economics	BC	4
PPGV	541	Principles Of Government	AB	4
PPLW	512	Constitutional Law	AB	3

	CR ATT	CR COMP	CR CALC	G PTS	GPA
SEM/CNV	7.33	7.33	7.33	23.00	3.136

SEM/CNV 7.33 7.33 7.33 23.00 3.136

## Spring 1993

PPEC	552	Modern Economic Analysis	B	3
PPGV	542	Citizenship in Society	AB	3
PPSC	532	Science & Technlgy Policy	AB	3

	CR ATT	CR COMP	CR CALC	G PTS	GPA
SEM/CNV	6.00	6.00	6.00	20.00	3.333

+++++ Removed From Academic Probation +++++

## Fall 1993

PPGV	546	Race, Sex and Politics	A	3
PPPR	561	Research & Communication	B	2
PPEC	553	Welfare & Community	B	4
PPIN	503	Middle East Politics	B	3
JOJR	551	Desktop Publishing	B	4

	CR ATT	CR COMP	CR CALC	G PTS	GPA
SEM/CNV	10.67	10.67	10.67	34.00	3.188

SEM/CNV 10.67 10.67 10.67 34.00 3.188

\*\*\*\*\* No Entries Below This Point \*\*\*\*\*

## Winter 1993

PPGV	545	Politics in Education	A	3
PPGV	543	Family & Society	B	3
PPPR	569	Policy Analysis Methods	AB	3

	CR ATT	CR COMP	CR CALC	G PTS	GPA
SEM/CNV	6.00	6.00	6.00	21.00	3.500

SEM/CNV 6.00 6.00 6.00 21.00 3.500

## Spring 1994

PPHS	522	Modern Events	B	4
PPPR	564	Quantitative Methods	BC	3

	CR ATT	CR COMP	CR CALC	G PTS	GPA
SEM/CNV	4.67	4.67	4.67	13.00	2.786

SEM/CNV 4.67 4.67 4.67 13.00 2.786

## Fall 1994

PPP	599	Thesis	NP	0
-----	-----	--------	----	---

	CR ATT	CR COMP	CR CALC	G PTS	GPA
SEM	2.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	

SEM 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

## Fall 1996

PPP	599	Thesis	P	2
-----	-----	--------	---	---

	CR ATT	CR COMP	CR CALC	G PTS	GPA
SEM	2.00	2.00	0.00	0.00	

SEM 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00

## Summer 1997

PPP	595	Internship	P	2
-----	-----	------------	---	---

	CR ATT	CR COMP	CR CALC	G PTS	GPA
SEM	2.00	2.00	0.00	0.00	


SEM 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00

	CR ATT	CR COMP	CR CALC	G PTS	GPA
CUM	48	46	42.00	131.67	3.135

\*\*\*\*\* No Entries Below This Point \*\*\*\*\*

**ISSUED TO STUDENT**

Harry David Candela  
c/o PO Box 1777  
Andrews, NC 28901



Page: 1 of 2  
Certified by:

*Gilda B. Hargis*

Registrar

TRANSCRIPT GUIDE PRINTED ON BACK

BROWN STAINS INDICATE UNAUTHORIZED ALTERATIONS

THE FRONT COVER OF THIS TRANSCRIPT IS NOT OFFICIAL

A BLACK AND WHITE TRANSCRIPT IS NOT OFFICIAL



\*\*\*\*\* No Entries Below This Point \*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* Mstr Arts/Pub Policy GRANTED, AUG. 1998 \*  
\* PROGRAM OF STUDY - Public Policy \*  
\* CREDITS - 46 GPA - 3.135 \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\* No Entries Below This Point \*\*\*\*\*



Page: 2 of 2  
Certified by:

*Linda D. Hargis*

Registrar



---

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Recommendation Letter  
for

Harry David Candela

Mr. Harry David Candela came to Regent University in the Fall of 1992. I interviewed him for admission to the graduate School of Public Policy (now called the Robertson School of Government). I was Associate Dean at the time.

We accepted him based on his obvious intellect and drive for achievement, coupled with his intense interest in public policy issues, particularly with respect to international affairs and national security.


As with many students over the years, our rigorous attention to every facet of academic and professional performance disclosed areas for Mr. Candela to work on. But much more than most other students, Mr. Candela worked long and hard on gaining in every area.

His persistent hard work paid off in the policy classes he took with me – science policy foundations, science and technology policy, and war & peace. His writing expression improved greatly. By the time he began writing his masters thesis, I was convinced he could write well and do research well. If you examine his thesis, it is obviously a long tome for a masters degree. His organizational skill and writing ability made its length acceptable for me, his thesis advisor. He thoroughly examined the influence of Sun Tzu, ancient Chinese military strategist, on the teaching curriculum in the U.S. Marine Corps academy.

His cultural and teaching experience in Korea since graduating with the masters degree has no doubt added immensely to his capacity. He has cross-cultural communication skills, experience in the U.S. Marines, classroom teaching experience, and a background of thinking and writing about fundamental values in a security-conscious international environment.

He is personally honest, forthright, gentle of spirit, intellectually alive, and a hard worker.

I heartily recommend him for a wide variety of teaching positions, research opportunities, and cross-cultural international assignments, particularly for his insights, research ability, and professional integrity based on principles and real-world knowledge of their application.



Dr. John C. Munday Jr.

former Interim Dean, Robertson School of Government, Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA

1204 Murray Drive  
Chesapeake, VA 23322  
757-482-5709

April 16, 2002

---



June 21, 2002

Walter W. Davis, Ph.D.  
287 Caldwell Dr.  
Maggie Valley, NC 28751

To Whom It May Concern:

Since I have been residing out of state for several months, I am just now reading mail held for me and beginning to catch up with my correspondence.

Of major importance was a request from a former graduate student – Mr. Harry Candela – for a recommendation. I am very happy to accommodate him, because he always put forth a maximum effort. As a student, he entered readily into classroom discussions, often offering perceptive and sometimes unusual insights. He has a very curious and inquiring mind and doggedly persists in pursuit of evidence. He is extremely diligent in fulfilling assignments, manifests a love for learning, and is well-read on a number of subjects. Genuinely enthusiastic about his studies, Mr. Candela worked equally well on his own and with a group. For the latter reason, perhaps, he was, not only accepted, but well-liked by his peers. His deportment was invariably above reproach, and I am convinced he would be a distinct asset to an employer. I recommend him without reservation.

Sincerely,

*Walter W. Davis*

Walter W. Davis



## REFERENCE LETTER

### TO BE COMPLETED BY THE CANDIDATE:

Name Harry David Candela

Position Alumnus

Organization Regent University

Address P.O. Box 1777, Andrews, NC 28901

Phone (828) 321-0077

Email Address HD Candela@hotmail.com

Signature Harry David Candela Date 2-18-2002

### TO BE COMPLETED BY THE EVALUATOR:

Name Joseph N. KICKASOLA

Position PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL Policy

Organization REGENT UNIVERSITY

Address 1006 REGENT UNIVERSITY DRIVE, VIRGINIA BEACH, VA 23464

Phone 757-226-4312

Email Address JOEKICK@REGENT.EDU

Period Candidate Known 1990 - 1995

Comments *The dates I gave for knowing Harry are not precise since my memory fails me here, but I do remember Harry very well. I remember well his unbelievable capacity for hard work, as illustrated by his huge thesis on the law of war. Most of all I remember his politeness and integrity. I followed, a bit, his wonderful work in Korea. Whatever this reference is for, Harry can do it, or he will find a way to do it. He is a true gentleman, scholar, and friend.*

Signature Joseph N. Kickasola Date Feb 26 Mar 02



SUN TZU'S *THE ART OF WAR* IN UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
OFFICER EDUCATION

By

HARRY DAVID CANDELA  
B.S., WEST VIRGINIA WESLEYAN COLLEGE, 1992

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts in Public Policy

Robertson School of Government

Regent University

Virginia Beach, Virginia

1998




## APPROVAL SHEET


This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment


of the requirements for the degree of


Master of Arts in Public Policy

  
Harry David Candela

Approved August, 1997

  
John C. Munday Jr., Ph.D.  
Chairman

  
Hubert Morken, Ph.D.

  
Joseph M. Kickasola, Ph.D.



# CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
ABSTRACT	vii
I. INTRODUCTION	2
II. SUN TZU AND <i>THE ART OF WAR</i>	6
A. WHO WAS SUN TZU THE PHILOSOPHER	6
B. WHAT HISTORICAL RECORDS CONFIRM ABOUT THE AUTHORSHIP OF <i>THE ART OF WAR</i>	8
C. WHAT <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> TEACHES	17
D. THE VALUE OF <i>THE ART OF WAR</i>	39
E. <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> IN THE ORIENT: HISTORIC MILITARY INFLUENCE	41
F. <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> IN THE WEST: HISTORIC MILITARY INFLUENCE	46
III. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS'S MINOR EDUCATIONAL USES OF <i>THE ART OF WAR</i>	51
A. THE DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSEFUL REFORM OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY AND ITS EARLY USE OF <i>THE ART OF WAR</i>	51
B. THE MARINE CORPS PROFESSIONAL READING PROGRAM	56
C. THE STAFF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ACADEMY	58
D. THE OFFICERS CANDIDATE SCHOOL	60
E. THE BASIC SCHOOL	60
F. THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SCHOOL	62
IV. THE MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY'S MAJOR EDUCATIONAL USES OF <i>THE ART OF WAR</i>	63
A. THE MARINE CORPS WAR COLLEGE: FOUNDATION, PURPOSE, AND STRUCTURE	63
B. <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> IN THE "RELEVANCE OF SUN TZU AND CLAUSEWITZ TO THE POLITICAL, STRATEGIC, AND	65



OPERATIONAL LEVELS OF WAR" CLASS (MARINE CORPS WAR COLLEGE)	
C. ADDITIONAL TEXTS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CONTENT OF "THE RELEVANCE OF SUN TZU AND CLAUSEWITZ TO THE POLITICAL, STRATEGIC, AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS OF WAR"	74
D. THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE: FOUNDATION, PURPOSE, AND STRUCTURE	88
E. THE COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE NONRESIDENT PROGRAM: FOUNDATION, PURPOSE, AND STRUCTURE	89
F. <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> IN THE "THEORY AND NATURE OF WAR" COURSE (COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE NONRESIDENT PROGRAM)	94
G. THE THEORY AND NATURE OF WAR CLASS: FOUNDATION, STRUCTURE, AND PURPOSE	105
H. <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> IN THE "THEORY AND NATURE OF WAR" COURSE (COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE RESIDENT PROGRAM)	109
I. <i>THE ART OF WAR AND WARFIGHTING FMFM 1</i>	150
J. <i>THE ART OF WAR AND CAMPAIGNING FMFM 1 - 1</i>	200
V. CONCLUSIONS ON THE USES OF <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> IN THE EDUCATION OF MARINE CORPS OFFICERS	254
APPENDICES	259
A. THE CONCERN	259
B. THE WORLDVIEW OBSERVED IN THE UNITED STATES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE LITERATURE	260
C. THE USMC WORLDVIEW: RESTRICTIONS	266
D. THE USMC WORLDVIEW: CONCLUSIONS	269
E. THE SLOWING EFFECTS OF BUREAUCRACY VS. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROGRESSION OF COMMANDANT GRAY'S REFORMS	271
F. THE CONCLUSION	275
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY BY CATEGORY	277
VITA	281



## ABSTRACT

After providing an in-depth introduction to *The Art of War* and the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Professional Military Educational System, this study details in respective order, beginning with that which is minor and ending with that which is major, all of the significant uses of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* by the USMC University's Colleges, Schools, and Programs. The evaluation of the Marine Corps War College's "War Policy and Strategy Course[s]" class titled "The Relevance Of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic, and Operational Levels Of War" and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Nonresident and Resident "Theory and Nature Of War" courses, in addition to the Marine Corps's most foundational manuals, *Warfighting FMFM 1* and *Campaigning FMFM 1 - 1*, provide the most in-depth understanding of the reasons why Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is used.

Today, *The Art of War* (among other competing philosophical strategic works) is a large part of the philosophical framework that structures The Marine Corps' understanding and approach to war. That way of war has been appropriately named "Maneuver Warfare." *The Art of War* may even be a larger part of "Maneuver Warfare" than is normally willingly or unwillingly recognized. This goes far beyond the fact that *The Art of War* has chapters and *Campaigning* has sub-chapters titled "Maneuver" and "Mobility." While between different translations the language used in *The Art of War* varies, be it implicitly or explicitly *The Art of War* recognizes, considers, and teaches most of the philosophical points that are most logically, clearly, and eloquently detailed in *Warfighting* and *Campaigning*. The ability to recognize that depends upon the depth to which one studies *The Art of War*.

At root, this study was prompted by a concern for the United States Marine Corps' best defense of America. Based on an understanding of military history and the degree to which *The Art of War* is used, various policy recommendations have been made in the hope of supporting improvements that have been made in United States Marine Corps fighting philosophy, doctrine, and education since 1989 in addition to preventing the neglect and misuse of *The Art of War*. Those suggestions are for: the better integration of the American political identity into the approach that the Marine Corps takes to teaching the foundations of war; a more honest understanding of military history, particularly American military history; and maintaining balance in the appreciation and application of those philosophies that have contributed to the Marine Corps way of war in order to avoid the dangers and expenses commonly associated with the adoption of "Attrition Warfare."



## SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY BY CATEGORY

### Books

- Ames, Roger T. *Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare*. New York: Ballentine Books, 1993.
- Amos, Gary T. *Biblical Principles of Government: America a Case Study*. Virginia Beach, Virginia: Regent University, School of Government, 1987.
- . *Defending The Declaration: How the Bible and Christianity Influenced the Writing of The Declaration of Independence*. Brentwood, Tennessee: Wolgemuth and Hyatt, 1990.
- . *Inalienable Rights and Liberties, Class Handout*. Virginia Beach, Virginia: Regent University, School of Law, 1995.
- Bassford, Christopher. *Clausewitz in English: the Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- . *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus AY 1994–1995*. Quantico, Virginia: USMC Command and Staff College, 1994.
- Cleary, Thomas, ed. *The Art of War: Sun Tzu*. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1988.
- , ed. *Mastering The Art of War: Zhuge Liang's and Liu Ji's Commentaries on the Classic by Sun Tzu*. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1989.
- Commandant of the USMC. *Marine Corps Association Book Service, Marine Corps Professional Reading Program*. Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Association, 1995.
- Fehrenbacher, Don E., ed. *Abraham Lincoln: A Documentary Portrait Through His Speeches and Writings*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987.
- Flexner, James Thomas. *Washington: the Indispensable Man*. New York: Nal Penguin, Inc., 1984.
- Gray, General A. M., USMC (ret.). *Campaigning: FMFM 1–1*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1990.
- . *Warfighting: FMFM 1*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, USMC, 1989.
- Griffith, Samuel B. *Sun Tzu: The Art Of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Handael, Michael I. *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War Compared*. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1991.
- Hanzhang, General Tao, translated by Yuan Shibing. *Sun Tzu's Art of War: the Modern Chinese Interpretation*. New York: Sterling Publishing Company, Inc., 1990.



- Huang, J. H. and C. J. Phillips. *Sun Tzu: The New Translation: The Art of War*. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1993.
- Liddell Hart, B. H. *Strategy*. 2d ed. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.
- Millett, Allen R. *Semper Fidelis: The History of the USMC*. Revised and expanded. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
- North, Gary, ed. *The Theology of Christian Resistance: A Symposium*. Tyler, Texas: Geneva Divinity School Press, 1983.
- Osanka, Franklin Mark. *Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961*. New York: The Free Press, 1962.
- Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Phillips, T. R. *Roots of Strategy: The five Greatest Military Classics of All Time*. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1985.
- Pye, Lucian W. *The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988.
- Rossiter, Clinton, ed. *The Federalist Papers: Hamilton, Madison, and Jay*. New York: Penguin Books, 1961.
- Sawyer, Ralph D. *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1994.
- Schlossberg, Herbert. *Idols for Destruction: The Conflict of Christian Faith and American Culture*. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1990.
- Summers, Colonel Harry G., Jr., US Army (ret.). *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War*. New York: Dell Publishing, 1992.
- Strange, Joseph. *War Policy and Strategy, Course Syllabus*. Quantico, Virginia: USMC War College, 1994.
- Thibault, George Edward, ed. *The Art and Practice of Military Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1984.
- Titus, Herbert W. *God, Man, and Law: The Biblical Principles*. Oak Brook, Illinois: Institute in Basic Life Principles, 1994.
- Tuomala, Jeffrey C. *Just Cause: The Thread That Runs So True, Class Handout*. Virginia Beach, Virginia: Regent University School of Law, 1994.
- Turner, Robert F. *Repealing The War Powers Resolution: Restoring the Rule of Law in US Foreign Policy*. Riverside, New Jersey: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1991.
- Tse-tung, Mao. *Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung*. Beijing, Peoples Republic of China, 1979.



Willis, Major Jeffrey, Tactics Instructor, Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School.  
Interview by author, 25 October 1994, Quantico, Virginia.

Wyly, Colonel, USMC (ret.). Ex. Vice President, Marine Corps University, Professor of  
history, American Military University. Interview by author, 5 April 1995,  
Heartland, Maine.



considering all that has been omitted by the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* and presented from *The Art of War*, it may be concluded that Sun Tzu understood that in any conflict one may find the guiding factors are a balance of reason, will, and emotion.

Beyond emotions, in revolution, resistance, and counter-revolution, there is the fighting. The *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* takes the position that the earliest employment of politically motivated "people in arms" (more commonly referred to as the militia) and the militia's employment of guerrilla warfare was a French innovation. Owing to the philosophically and historically integrated approach that this course's lesson takes, mentioning such is not beyond the scope of this study. Bassford's belief, however, ignores much of Chinese history in addition to the knowledge that the militia and political motivation were significant parts of the American Counter Revolution of 1776. The Boston Tea Party, a politically motivated and well planned guerrilla action, and resistance at Lexington and Concord (two lessons in gun control) are well known; this does not mean they were exceptions to the norms of the American Counter Revolution of 1776.

General George Washington argued for and used politically motivated "people in arms," and the militia's employment of guerrilla warfare in the war of 1776.<sup>496</sup> The American fighting force maneuvered like water.<sup>497</sup> In a cyclical method, turning attack into retreat and retreat into attack, they would: move quickly and quietly; surprise the enemy; fight using captured resources; and withdraw and evade.<sup>498</sup> Washington positioned his

---

<sup>495</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>496</sup> Learning from experiences gained in the French and Indian War, General George Washington argued in favor of and implemented the "Indian" way of war in the American Counter Revolution of 1776. James Thomas Flexner, *Washington: The Indispensable Man* (New York: Nal Penguin, Inc., 1984) 14, 21-25, 92-94.

<sup>497</sup> When the English General, Howe, tried to turn one of the first engagements of the American Counter Revolution into a trap, one evening Washington's forces quietly withdrew "flow[ing] around obstacles and away as easily as a stream of water." Ibid., 82.

<sup>498</sup> Let us not forget Washington's Christmas attack which included the crossing of the Delaware River, a surprise encirclement of the enemy, captures of material and men, and a quick withdraw. Further realizing the speed, maneuverability, and stealth his forces possessed, Washington immediately re-entered Delaware, continuing to employ successful flanking maneuvers: repeatedly catching the English and



base of operations in the mountains, where he could retreat into the wilderness, descend to cut enemy supply lines, and reach out to attack any of the enemy's encampments.<sup>499</sup>

Washington used unpredictability to make it costly and difficult for the British to hold on to any city.<sup>500</sup>

At this point it should be clear that much of what Washington's regular and irregular forces did could be considered very similar to what Mao and the Chinese communists did and was in agreement with many of *The Art of War's* recommendations. Probably the biggest example is *The Art of War's* position that "... the enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few."<sup>501</sup> Perhaps this can be explained with the knowledge that in undertaking his Long March, repositioning of his Chinese communist forces to China's mountains, and devising and articulating his guerrilla warfare doctrine, Mao Tse-tung

---

Hessians off-guard, seemingly coming from nowhere and then repeatedly withdrawing when the tide of battle turned. Ibid., 94-97.

<sup>499</sup> Such was the way Washington operated. After the war was well underway, Washington repositioned his forces and conducted surprise hit-and-run raids at every opportunity from an operations base in the New Jersey highlands near Morristown for an extended time period. It was from that point that he reached out and hammered one British attempt to thrust into (and possibly past) Trenton. From that point, expeditions were sent forth to strike enemy supply and communications lines. If a more detailed study of American counter revolutionary guerrilla activity is interesting one may consider *The Dutch-American Guerrillas of The American Revolution* by William Marina and Diane Cuervo. Flexner, 99; North, *The Theology of Christian Resistance*, 242.

Even though at different times the British held a few cities, including Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Charlotte, North Carolina, it was temporary and they could not safely venture out of those cities. New York was the only stronghold that the English maintained. North, *The Theology of Christian Resistance*, 243-245. While Washington's troops focused on major British movements, farmers (who at night became militia guerrillas, particularly those that operated in New Jersey from positions between the two opposing armies) defended their towns, neighborhoods, farms, homes, and families. At first, these militia guerrillas focused on resisting British, Cession, and Tory foragers. Later, they freely led and conducted raids. Flexner, 130-131; North, *The Theology of Christian Resistance*, 251, 254-257.

<sup>500</sup> In the course of this conflict, after the British captured Charleston, South Carolina, Washington wrote, "The enemy, by attempting to hold conquests so remote, must dissipate their force, and, of course afford opportunities for striking one or the other extremity." Flexner, 139.

<sup>501</sup> Griffith, 98.



sought "association with Chu Teh," another communist strategist and leader. Chu Teh studied both the recommendations of Sun Tzu and the tactics of George Washington.<sup>502</sup>

While Bassford does not say it, with all that has been submitted concerning this lesson's first and second issues, one can state the declared American Counter Revolution 1776-1787 was an ideologically-driven protracted war bearing similarities to other ideologically driven protracted wars.<sup>503</sup> Ideologically-driven revolutionary and counter-revolutionary conflicts in which guerrilla warfare was employed have been present since early recorded history.

The third issue's answer consists of excerpts from *Makers of Modern Strategy* that focus on some of Marx's and Mao's views of desirable productive action, the importance of strategic re-evaluation, and the superiority of "... political over military concerns ...." They leads up to the description of the general vicious cycle of events that many socialist revolutionaries have attempted to create and in many cases have created within various nations en route to world socialism. While many countries, especially superpowers, may not engage in a large scale conventional war because of a fear of mutually assured destruction, they can contribute to each other's political, social, and economic destabilization. In undermining a system, Marx held that conviction, calculation, and courage coupled with efficient use of force against particular government targets is of greater importance in winning the favor of the masses than is terrorism. Those who rule would supposedly do anything to disarm those who are labeled "revolutionaries" and the common people, so that they may be pressed into submission and are no longer a threat to

---

<sup>502</sup> Osanka, 150, 166-167.

<sup>503</sup> Even further, as detailed in *The Dutch-American Guerrillas of The American Revolution*, by William Marina and Diane Cuervo, with closer study one finds that the general strategy of American counter-revolutionary guerrillas (particularly those of Dutch ethnicity and that operated in the north-eastern areas of the United States) bear similarities to the general strategy employed by the Vietcong during Vietnam. North, *The Theology of Christian Resistance*, 251-263. Admittedly, perhaps long ago, they were more implicitly understood rather than explicitly articulated. As will be further discussed, answers as to how the United States military should view and participate in such conflicts can, may, and will be decided only by them and the civilian authorities they are responsible to.



those who rule. In turn, the more oppressive a state becomes, the more those revolutionaries and common folk would be driven to fight that particular state, certain laws, and particular policies in order to replace them with others based on "revolutionary" philosophies.<sup>504</sup>

Contrary to that cycle, Bassford states that "... a great many revolutions met little or no resistance, at first ... when the ruling class has simply lost faith in its own legitimacy, in its own ability to rule effectively." Bassford's example is the French Revolution.<sup>505</sup>

An additional problem is addressed in this third issue. When confronted with destabilization sponsored by interest of a non-domestic origin, it becomes tougher to determine if a revolution is a revolution. To enable the understanding of when a war is a revolution, the study of revolution, and how to be victorious therein, distinct analytical systems and techniques have been developed, some of which employ the process of elimination. In other words, "revolutions" and "revolutionary warfare" have been defined by what they are not. In defining, studying, and fighting a revolution, theory is not enough. Of particular importance is knowledge and understanding gained from experience with a particular movement and its actors. In accord with the view of *Makers of Modern Strategy* it may be stated that the victor will be the one that out-adapts the other.<sup>506</sup>

While it may not have been mentioned in this *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, at this point in this lesson it is important to recall the hypothetical that Bassford used to study Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. If you remember, he asked what if two equal Sun Tzuian monolithic opponents opposed each other. *The Art of War* states the following:

---

<sup>504</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 131.

<sup>505</sup> Ibid. With his reliance on the grouping of "class," Bassford may appear to be captive to Marxist thought himself. If one studies the given examples of the French Revolution and the 1917 Soviet Revolution, one will find that some, if not many, of the Czarists who were in particular positions of power and authority may not have taken particular actions for reasons other than classism.

<sup>506</sup> Ibid., 130-131.



Having paid heed to the advantages of my plans, the general must create situations which will contribute to their accomplishment. By 'situations' I mean that he should act expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so control the balance.<sup>507</sup>

It continues, "... [O]ne able to gain the victory by modifying his tactic in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine."<sup>508</sup> The human being that makes the first and/or worst mistake would lose. Depending upon the situational circumstances that mistake could be anything.

Without going into a lengthy discussion as to why, in the third issue's question, the qualifying term "modern" is placed before "revolutionary war theory," other significant concerns raised by that issue and its answer should be addressed. Perhaps, as Bassford suggested, in answering this issue, "... a change in our frame of reference" is necessary.<sup>509</sup>

As mentioned throughout this paper, *The Art of War* seems to present no problems in accepting the fact that war is wide in scope and should be studied in depth. In fact, while it is not found as part of an answer to this issue, *The Art of War* states those who are "skilled" have "infinite" "resources," and possibilities. Those not using those resources to shorten war are inhumane.<sup>510</sup> In *The Art of War*, a wide variety of social, economic, and political, and particularly, military recommendations are made. This is done to improve the relative measurements of advantages and strengths in one's favor, for the purposes of achieving temporary successes and turning temporary successes into overall military victories, while maintaining the health and longevity of a particular people and geopolitical entity.<sup>511</sup>

---

<sup>507</sup> Griffith, 66.

<sup>508</sup> Griffith, 101.

<sup>509</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 130. In doing so, one should question what theorist determines what is "limited" as opposed to "unlimited," patriotic as opposed to revolutionary, and conventional as opposed to unconventional are. In order to truly study, know, understand and apply something, one cannot, because of bias, dismiss factors of importance in and principles that govern it as unusual, unlikely, and insignificant.

<sup>510</sup> Griffith, 63, 70-71, 91, 100-101, 144.



*The Art of War* is so complete that recommendations are made for the advantageous use of political negotiations, diplomatic gifts, friendly relationships, economic production, free trade, division, diversion, chaos, position, conditions, logistical support, intelligence, deception, surprise, timing, tempo, speed, maneuver, concentration of force, powerful weapons, and many more factors in addition to the employment of straight forward, guerrilla, division, flanking, entrapping, among other strategies and tactics.<sup>512</sup> Whether one's forces are currently numerous and strong or neither, all possible advantages and strengths should be used in strategies and tactics.<sup>513</sup> "It is sufficient to estimate the enemy situation correctly and to concentrate your strength to capture him. There is no more to it than this. He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him."<sup>514</sup>

As shown in Bassford's answer to this issue, similar to Sun Tzu in many respects, Mao demonstrated his understanding of war's broad scope of activities, that all available strengths and advantages should be used, and that establishments as well as opposition establishments can employ the same methods, when he stated that guerrillas should be fought with guerrilla warfare and political indoctrination.<sup>515</sup>

In the fourth issue's answer, additional emphasis is placed on Mao's doctrine and the *Makers of Modern Strategy's* evaluation thereof. Here again, not only does Mao hold that "revolutionary guerrilla movement" maintains a monopoly on ideology, but also the fighting preparation that occurs before fighting in general and particular during "patriotic partisan resistance" is more of a reflex. In accord with the conduct of guerrilla warfare, Mao mentions the great value of "distracting," "attention," and "concentration" of force in

---

<sup>511</sup> Ibid., 64, 66, 68, 73, 76-77, 79-80, 82, 85, 87, 100-101, 113, 128-129, 140.

<sup>512</sup> Ibid., 64, 67-69, 72-74, 77-79, 85, 87, 91-93, 95-96, 101-102, 106, 111, 119-120, 123, 128-131, 137, 139-141, 145, 149.

<sup>513</sup> Ibid., 63, 66, 73, 82, 85, 100, 113, 122.

<sup>514</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>515</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 132.



attacking at a time and place "least" expected. Those excerpts from the *Makers of Modern Strategy* (some of which have also appeared earlier in this *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*) hold the following: (1) Mao and his comrades developed a new doctrine of rural common folk based on revolutionary guerrilla warfare; (2) revolutions are power grabs made with the support of many, if not the majority, of the people for political change; (3) many people mistakenly conclude that revolution and guerrilla warfare are the same; (4) guerrilla warfare is not always employed in the service of revolutionary politics; and (5) revolutions can employ not only guerrilla warfare but also evasion, concealment, political resistance, social provocation, economic agitation, and more.<sup>516</sup>

Contrary to the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*'s answers as set fourth by Mao's views on this issue, while "partisan patriotic resistance" may in certain situational circumstances be a defensive reflex in nature, this following is subject to debate: (1) based upon intelligence, plans and contingencies are not made; (2) in accord with design, equipment, supplies, and training not are obtained; and (3) with due haste pre-emptive, repelliatory and retaliatory strategies, operations, and tactical actions are not implemented.<sup>517</sup>

Unmentioned in this issue's answer, however, as found in *The Art of War*, using or taking advantage of a politicized rural populace, surprise, diversion, concentration, and particular vulnerabilities are not new innovations, nor are they exclusive privileges of revolutionaries and/or guerrillas.<sup>518</sup> This is because "... numbers alone confer no advantage."<sup>519</sup> Being large as opposed to small, well-equipped as opposed to needy, entrenched as opposed to mobile, among other contrasting states, present different

---

<sup>516</sup> Ibid.

<sup>517</sup> Griffith, 63, 65-71, 77, 79-80, 84, 100-101, 113-114, 119-120, 144, 149.

<sup>518</sup> Ibid., 64, 66, 68-69, 71, 73-74, 84-85, 96, 98, 100-102, 104-106.

<sup>519</sup> Ibid., 122.



pressures and difficulties to which a force must adapt.<sup>520</sup> Remember that the "... supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."<sup>521</sup> "... [T]he general must create situations which will contribute to their accomplishment. ... [A]ct expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so control the balance."<sup>522</sup> "... [A]s water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions. ... One able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine."<sup>523</sup>

Further reflecting its focus on strategy with a reason among *The Art of War's* recommendations, one may find the following: "It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather rely on one's readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack ... ." <sup>524</sup> "Anciently the skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and waited for the enemy's moment of vulnerability."<sup>525</sup> Therefore, "when the enemy presents an opportunity, speedily take advantage of it. Anticipate him in seizing something he values and move in accordance with a date secretly fixed."<sup>526</sup> "He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious."<sup>527</sup>

While acting, remember, "[a]ll war is based on deception."<sup>528</sup> "Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of

---

<sup>520</sup> Ibid., 72, 78-81, 87, 90, 93, 100, 102, 113.

<sup>521</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>522</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>523</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>524</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>525</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>526</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>527</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>528</sup> Ibid., 66.



forces."<sup>529</sup> "Those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him with something he is certain to take ... "<sup>530</sup> "He wearies them by keeping them constantly occupied, and makes them rush about by offering them ostensible advantages."<sup>531</sup> Sun Tzu's point is, "[h]e who intimidates his neighbor does so by inflicting injury upon them."<sup>532</sup>

In concluding this study's supplementation of the fourth issue's answers, answers neglecting much of *The Art of War's* direct insight for one reason or another, it may be said that offense and defense are rigorous endeavors not accomplished by any party lacking commitment, awareness, uncommon genius, and kinetic energy.

In the fifth issue, it has been stated that solutions for countering this said "new form of warfare," revolutionary guerrilla warfare, are hard to find and only partly successful. Americans and the French learned from their experiences in Indochina that foreign military assistance must be provided in the proper form, time, place, and amount as detailed by political, strategic, and tactical demands, in respective order. As partly aforementioned, Mao believed guerrillas may be defeated through a combination of political conversion, guerrilla warfare, and creative, bright, and courageous leadership.<sup>533</sup> As is detailed in *Makers of Modern Strategy* with the contribution of United States aid, the government of the Philippines has had very good, but not completely perfect, results in combating a socialist insurgency. Some American leaders now believe that counter-revolutions are winnable, "... correct attitudes and tactics."<sup>534</sup>

---

<sup>529</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>530</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>531</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>532</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>533</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 132.

<sup>534</sup> Ibid., 133. Perhaps, at this point, a pragmatist would state that the ends justify the means.



While the aforementioned excerpts from Marine Corps documents, footnotes, and insights provide evidence that a philosophical and doctrinal worldview is held in common by the Marine Corps, USMC University, USMC Command and Staff College, and USMC War College, stereotyping that worldview under one scholar's name could be misleading because, as stated, it is the result of the combination of the works and teaching of many scholars. It is clear that the existing philosophical and doctrinal worldview: is commonly known and probably held by most Marine officers and Marines; may contain an evolutionary pragmatic paradigm that establishes a changing foundation for deciding exactly what military concerns and studies are relevant; and may condone activities stretching the limits traditionally considered within the scope of the United States military's responsibilities.

#### *D. The USMC Worldview: Conclusions*

Some agreement may be found with Bassford of The Command and Staff College in that,

Everyone has a theory or set of theories about war ... . The problem is, few of us explicitly understand our own theories, much less those of our leaders, peers, and subordinates. It is the major purpose of doctrinal schooling to insure that all of our national security professionals share a common set of theoretical concepts—not so that they will all see the world the same way, but rather so that they can communicate their differing views more easily to one another. The Command Staff College Curriculum provides that necessary common ground.<sup>1225</sup>

Some disagreement, however, may also be found. It needs to be stated that all Marines, especially officers, are not so lacking in insight, education, or wisdom that they fall into the category of failing to "... explicitly understand our own theories, much less

---

<sup>1225</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 8.



those of our leaders, peers, and subordinates." Additionally, "... shar[ing] a common set of theoretical concepts ..." requires faith in the view from which they originate.<sup>1226</sup>

The notion that many Marine leaders and Marines will not, knowingly or unknowingly, partly or fully adopt the philosophical worldview that supports the Marine Corps' theoretical framework through which they are taught to communicate is faulty. In expanding on the earlier-mentioned theme of the development of the Marine psyche, if Marine leaders and Marines have not defined their own "theoretical concepts," do not hold intellectually inferior "theoretical concepts," or are repetitively required to use the Marine Corps "theoretical concepts," then those Marines and Marine leaders are likely to eventually adopt those Marine Corps "theoretical concepts," much like learning the language of the country that one lives in. Furthermore, it may seem to be common sense that, Marine Corps theoretical concepts, together as a system, were chosen for use because they are considered the best framework developed and available at this time. If another framework becomes viewed as superior according to Department of Defense criteria, it will be adopted by the Marine Corps. An important question is how criteria controls the selection of the military instructional framework chosen.

Knowingly or unknowingly, all human beings have some theoretical framework through which they may define that which is around them and get things done. When an individual has enough faith in a theoretical framework to adopt it for making sense of reality, then that individual also adopts, implicitly or explicitly, the presuppositions or axioms, worldview, and reasoning that supports that specific theoretical framework. If that were not the case, then defining one's surroundings and achieving within it could not only be harder than need be, but also many, if not all, conclusions drawn could be subject to an extremely high level of doubt. Marine Corps Officer training emphasizes quick, strong decision making in the accomplishment of a mission, in which doubt could be fatal.

---

<sup>1226</sup> Ibid.



It would be wrong to believe the USMC and any of the Marine Corps' University's colleges, schools, or programs institutionally hold or train their Marine officers and Marines to hold presuppositions, worldviews, reasoning processes, and theoretical frameworks that differ significantly. Such disunity would be dangerous to a fighting force for rather obvious reasons, some of which would be confusion concerning that fighting force's overall purpose, restrictions, and immediate goals. While union of vision is necessary for a military, micro-management is not. Micro-management by strategic commanders of Marine officers and Marines on the operational and tactical levels of war could deter the duty-bound application of American military artistic proficiency to a degree that greatly jeopardize a country.

*E. The Slowing Effects of Bureaucracy vs. The Importance of the Progression of Commandant Gray's Reforms*

Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* makes it quite clear that a command's particular view and training of its troops is at the root of success. In order to gain the best result, soldiers are to be treated as sons and provided with strategic advantages. Success and failure is the burden of command.<sup>1227</sup> One must also consider that, since Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine plans on the use of smaller, faster forces against a larger enemy, a Marine is only as victorious as his mind is developed and God's providence allows him to creatively out think and out fight his enemy. Hence, it is important to require extensive study, allow academic freedom, and foster communication in the Marine Corps University.<sup>1228</sup> It would be distressing to find that anything other than uncommon genius and open communication of resulting insights is expected from Marine leaders.

---

<sup>1227</sup> Ames, 150; Griffith, 123, 125, 128, 134-135.

<sup>1228</sup> Wyly, interview by author.



In correspondence and interviews with: Ex. Vice President of the Marine Corps University under General Gray, Colonel Wyly USMC (ret.), Professor of history at the American Military University of Manassis, Virginia; Ex. Instructor at the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, Major Jim Etter USMC (ret.), Founder and CEO of the American Military University of Manassis, Virginia; and Educator, Bruce I. Gudmundsson at the Institute for Tactical Education of Quantico, Virginia, and who, in respective order, envisioned, participated in, and witnessed the Marine Corps University's 1989 reformation, it has been made clear that while the 1989 reformation may have been completed, it may have not been entirely maintained. A number of factors may be in competition with the importance of military educational responsibility in various colleges at the Marine Corps University. In the case of completing the transition to maneuver warfare doctrine, not only must new ways be learned but old ways must be unlearned. In some cases it may need to be understood that universities are not commands that exist for the purposes of passing time or obtaining promotions by undermining necessary educational reforms and facilitating what may be termed by some as the expansion of the body of knowledge. Adapting to change to secure victory requires extra effort. As will be further discussed, any failure to maintain or advance Commandant Gray's reformation may result in relative losses of academic freedom at, and Corps-wide influence on the part of, The Marine Corps University.<sup>1229</sup>

It is possible that Bruce Gudmundsson is correct when he says that, "When General Gray left office in 1991, the reading program was ignored. It is still on the books, but no one is pushing it. Thus the notion of 'required reading' doesn't really exist anymore."<sup>1230</sup> Bassford's assessment that educators in the Command and Staff College's "Theory and Nature of War" course should not have to "... turn soldiers into scholars" and that there is a

---

<sup>1229</sup> Gudmundsson, letter to author; Major Jim Etter USMC (ret.), Ex. Instructor, Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, Founder and CEO, American Military University, interview by author, 5 April 1995, Manasses Park, Virginia; Millett, 634; Wyly, interview by author.

<sup>1230</sup> Gudmundsson, letter to author.



need to "... teach soldiers to make practical use of scholars' honest products" is partly true. It is interesting that the word "honest" seems to be inserted in the passage for the sake of drawing a distinction between actual history with as little a bias as is humanly possible, as opposed to fictional or revisionist history.<sup>1231</sup>

It arguable the differentiation between "scholars" and "soldiers" is not as distinct as Bassford, the author of the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, attempts to make it appear. A soldier is a scholar and a scholar is a soldier. Any Marine or Marine leader who wants to survive and be victorious will undoubtedly spend great time and effort studying those things which have made other warrior leaders victorious or dead. Marines and Marine leaders should possess the desire and will to turn themselves into scholars. Even though the reading may not, therefore, be required of all Marines or Marine leaders, it is most likely that aspiring Marine Corps officers, current Marine Corps officers, and others who take the duty of being a Marine most seriously have read, are reading, or plan to read Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, not only because *The Art of War* is still on the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) recommended reading list, but because it may quickly enable Marines to win in battle. If not required, it is possible that a training and combat experience may prompt individual reading.<sup>1232</sup>

The importance of the aforementioned points has not been overstated. Excessive restrictions on the academic freedom to explore and debate other approaches to strategy, operations, and tactics may be or may become restrictions on communication and other forms of action throughout a system. This jeopardizes that system's possession of superiority in cause, tempo, and initiative. A clear example of this importance in tempo and initiative may be observed in the success of the German Army's Blitzkrieg and the failure of the Italian Army's use of the same type of strategies. Among the factors that made the Blitzkrieg successful were some recommendations shared by Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*

---

<sup>1231</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 12.

<sup>1232</sup> Commandant of the USMC. *Marine Corps Professional Reading Program*, 2, 4.



and maneuver warfare doctrine's OODA loop. Those similarities are as follows: having good information on all that is around you, especially your enemy; gaining strategic advantage through emplacement and orientation; and striking with such speed that your enemy does not have time to respond properly.<sup>1233</sup>

It is said that the Second World War German Army was a people's army (i.e., very democratic). To a large degree their lightning speed was maintainable by the ability of soldiers to communicate with their superiors and in turn take action based on battlefield judgments.<sup>1234</sup> In other words, there was a good interface between their battlefield and their headquarters.<sup>1235</sup> Many German successes, even in France, were achievable because they made successive strategic moves so quickly that their opponents were pushed off and kept off balance. The Italian Army failed because its own bureaucracy inhibited lateral communication as well as the expression of uncommon genius on the battlefield, both of which stood in the way of lightning-fast strategic adaptation.<sup>1236</sup>

As *The Art of War* states and may be found throughout this thesis, "... as water has no constant form, there are, in war, no constant conditions, [and] ... [o]ne able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine."<sup>1237</sup>

We know and understand that "... the general must create situations which will contribute to their accomplishment. ... [A]ct expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so control the balance."<sup>1238</sup> "... [B]y taking into account the favorable

---

<sup>1233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1234</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1235</sup> The importance of the interface between the battlefield and headquarters was emphasized in the phone interview with Major Jeff Willis at the AWS. Willis, interview by author.

<sup>1236</sup> Wyly, interview by author.

<sup>1237</sup> Griffith, 101.

<sup>1238</sup> Ibid., 66.



factors, he makes his plan feasible; by taking into account the unfavorable, he may resolve the difficulties."<sup>1239</sup> However, on their own levels of war's hierarchy, his officers must be delegated that authority also.

When *The Art of War* states that the "... skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates,"<sup>1240</sup> it is clear that "[h]e selects his men and they exploit the situation."<sup>1241</sup> "It is sufficient to estimate the enemy situation correctly and to concentrate your strength to capture him. There is no more to it than this. He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him."<sup>1242</sup> It may be said that in most cases capture and use does have advantages over destruction and waste.

#### *F. The Conclusion*

While the political reasons for fighting may not be discussed in their pages, it may be said that together *Warfighting* and *Campaigning* are a balanced philosophical doctrine of war. Among many other philosophers, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu have made significant contributions to the Marine Corps' way of war. However, the over emphasis of what is thought to be Clausewitzian over the contributions of Sun Tzu and Hart could be self-defeating. With its ideal being "total war" and its goal being the "total destruction," of (among other things) the enemy's military, Clausewitz has traditionally been thought to support "attrition warfare." While some people may say a mentality of the crude application of force and direct frontal attack accompanies the adoption of Clausewitzian

---

<sup>1239</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>1240</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>1241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1242</sup> Ibid., 122.



philosophies, considering recent breakthroughs in the understanding of Clausewitz, this may or may not be true. However, it may certainly be said that Clausewitzian philosophies depends less on delegating authority within a common vision and more on the singular control of a military by a higher ranking military genius. This is dangerous. Noone has a monopoly on insight. Everyone makes mistakes.

The Marine Corps has traditionally been referred to as a brotherhood. The Marine Corps' motto is "Semper Fidelis" (always faithful). It is that spirit and character of cooperation and dependability that makes the philosophical doctrine of "maneuver warfare" particularly well suited to the Marine Corps. Every Marine officer and Marine who understands his duties also understands that Marines must develop as scholars in order to have the mental ability to be victorious at the right time and place on their respective levels of war's hierarchy. However, if there is a lack of trust in the judgment of subordinates: the proper authority that is needed in order to accomplish in war will not be delegated to those subordinates; intelligence gathered by those subordinates will not be well used; and there would be significantly less economy of effort. "Attrition warfare" is the most expensive form of warfare.

Being a Marine officer and a Marine is about working with other Marine officers and Marines in order to overcome adversity and adversaries. Marine officers and Marines are serious about their survival and success. Commanders will get what they expect from Marine officers. Marine officers will get what they expect from Marines. If the philosophical balance of Gray's reformation is maintained then Commanders, Marine officers, and Marines will be morally motivated, self-respecting, uncommonly bright, quickly adaptable, and devastatingly effective in hostilities (war and other conflicts not quite considered war). If not, then the inverse will be true.