

SUN TZU'S *THE ART OF WAR* IN UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
OFFICER EDUCATION

By

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
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
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I thank and praise you God, Jesus Christ and Holy Spirit for Your Word as well as for working through me and others to produce this work. While much may seem to have changed since the beginning of this work, the principles have not.

## CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
ABSTRACT	viii
I. INTRODUCTION	2
II. SUN TZU AND <i>THE ART OF WAR</i>	5
A. WHO WAS SUN TZU THE PHILOSOPHER	5
B. WHAT HISTORICAL RECORDS CONFIRM ABOUT THE AUTHORSHIP OF <i>THE ART OF WAR</i>	6
C. WHAT <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> TEACHES	14
D. THE VALUE OF <i>THE ART OF WAR</i>	32
E. <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> IN THE ORIENT: HISTORIC MILITARY INFLUENCE	33
F. <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> IN THE WEST: HISTORIC MILITARY INFLUENCE	38
III. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS'S MINOR EDUCATIONAL USES OF <i>THE ART OF WAR</i>	42
A. THE DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSEFUL REFORM OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY AND ITS EARLY USE OF <i>THE ART OF WAR</i>	42
B. THE MARINE CORPS PROFESSIONAL READING PROGRAM	46
C. THE STAFF NON—COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ACADEMY	47
D. THE OFFICERS CANDIDATE SCHOOL	49
E. THE BASIC SCHOOL	49
F. THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SCHOOL	50
IV. THE MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY'S MAJOR EDUCATIONAL USES OF <i>THE ART OF WAR</i>	52

A. THE MARINE CORPS WAR COLLEGE: FOUNDATION, PURPOSE, AND STRUCTURE	52
B. <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> IN THE “RELEVANCE OF SUN TZU AND CLAUSEWITZ TO THE POLITICAL, STRATEGIC, AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS OF WAR” CLASS (MARINE CORPS WAR COLLEGE)	54
C. ADDITIONAL TEXTS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CONTENT OF “THE RELEVANCE OF SUN TZU AND CLAUSEWITZ TO THE POLITICAL, STRATEGIC, AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS OF WAR”	61
D. THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE: FOUNDATION, PURPOSE, AND STRUCTURE	75
E. THE COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE NONRESIDENT PROGRAM: FOUNDATION, PURPOSE, AND STRUCTURE	75
F. <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> IN THE “THEORY AND NATURE OF WAR” COURSE (COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE NONRESIDENT PROGRAM)	79
G. THE THEORY AND NATURE OF WAR CLASS: FOUNDATION, STRUCTURE, AND PURPOSE	90
H. <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> IN THE “THEORY AND NATURE OF WAR” COURSE (COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE RESIDENT PROGRAM)	93
I. <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> AND <i>WARFIGHTING FMFM 1</i>	131
J. <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> AND <i>CAMPAIGNING FMFM 1 — 1</i>	174
V. CONCLUSIONS ON THE USES OF <i>THE ART OF WAR</i> IN THE EDUCATION OF MARINE CORPS OFFICERS	220
APPENDICES	225
A. THE CONCERN	225
B. THE WORLDVIEW OBSERVED IN MARINE CORPS' COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE LITERATURE	225
C. THE USMC WORLDVIEW: RESTRICTIONS	231

D. THE USMC WORLDVIEW: CONCLUSIONS	233
E. THE SLOWING EFFECTS OF BUREAUCRACY VS. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROGRESSION OF COMMANDANT GRAY'S REFORMS	235
F. THE CONCLUSION	239
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY BY CATEGORY	240
VITA	245

## ABSTRACT

After providing an in-depth introduction to *The Art of War* and the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Professional Military Educational System, this study details in respective order, beginning with that which is minor and ending with that which is major, all of the significant uses of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* by the USMC University's Colleges, Schools, and Programs. The evaluation of the Marine Corps War College's "War Policy and Strategy Course[s]" class titled "The Relevance Of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic, and Operational Levels Of War" and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Nonresident and Resident "Theory and Nature Of War" courses, in addition to the Marine Corps's most foundational manuals, *Warfighting FMFM 1* and *Campaigning FMFM 1 — 1*, provide the most in-depth understanding of the reasons why Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is used.

Today, *The Art of War* (among other competing philosophical strategic works) is a large part of the philosophical framework that structures The Marine Corps' understanding and approach to war. That way of war has been appropriately named "Maneuver Warfare." *The Art of War* may even be a larger part of "Maneuver Warfare" than is normally willingly or unwillingly recognized. This goes far beyond the fact that *The Art of War* has chapters and *Campaigning* has sub-chapters titled "Maneuver" and "Mobility." While between different translations the language used in *The Art of War* varies, be it implicitly or explicitly *The Art of War* recognizes, considers, and teaches most of the philosophical points that are most logically, clearly, and eloquently detailed in *Warfighting* and *Campaigning*. The ability to recognize that depends upon the depth to which one studies *The Art of War*.

At root, this study was prompted by a concern for the United States Marine Corps' best defense of America. Based on an understanding of military history and the degree to which *The Art of War* is used, various policy recommendations have been made in the hope of supporting improvements that have been made in United States Marine Corps fighting philosophy, doctrine, and education since 1989 in addition to preventing the neglect and misuse of *The Art of War*. Those suggestions are for: the better integration of the American political identity into the approach that the Marine Corps takes to teaching the foundations of war; a more honest understanding of military history, particularly American military history; and maintaining balance in the appreciation and application of those philosophies that have contributed to the Marine Corps way of war in order to avoid the dangers and expenses commonly associated with the adoption of "Attrition Warfare."



SUN TZU'S *THE ART OF WAR* IN UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
OFFICER EDUCATION

## INTRODUCTION

*The Art of War*<sup>1</sup> is both a statement of fact and the title of one of the most read texts on war philosophy and strategy. Written in China by the philosopher strategist Sun Tzu sometime after 1000 B.C., *The Art of War* contains such insight that it deserves study on its own. However, at root, this study was prompted by a concern for the United States Marine Corps' best defense of America. Today, *The Art of War* is a large part of the philosophical framework that structures The Marine Corps' understanding and approach to war. That way of war has been appropriately named "Maneuver Warfare." *The Art of War* may even be a larger part of Maneuver Warfare than is normally willingly or unwillingly recognized.

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) Professional Military Educational System and the instruction that system gives to Marine officers and Marines have changed over the years. However, they continue to retain great importance in shaping the minds of Marine officers, and in, turn other Marines. It is with respect for a number of factors that establish what it means to be an American, a Marine officer, and a Marine that this study details the contemporary use of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* in Marine officer education at today's USMC University in Quantico, Virginia.

In respective order, beginning with that which is minor and ending with that which is major, all of the significant uses of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* by the USMC University's Colleges, Schools, and Programs have been included in this study. This provides a broad perspective of the specialization of the University's departments in addition to the degree to which Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is used. The evaluation of the Marine Corps War College's "War Policy and Strategy Course[s]" class titled "The Relevance Of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic, and Operational Levels Of War", the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Nonresident and Resident "Theory and Nature Of War" courses, and the Marine Corps's most foundational manuals, *Warfighting FMFM 1* and *Campaigning FMFM 1 — 1*, provide the most in depth understanding of the reasons why Sun Tzu's text is used.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Roger T. Ames, *Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare* (New York: Ballentine Books, 1993).

<sup>2</sup> General A. M. Gray, USMC (ret.) *Campaigning: FMFM 1—1* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1990); General A. M. Gray, USMC (ret.) *Warfighting: FMFM 1*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1989).

While the actual number of references to Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* are limited and a number of other philosophers (especially Carl Von Clausewitz and Basil Liddell Hart) have had large roles in helping to form the Marine Corps' philosophical doctrine, there are a great number of similarities between *The Art of War* and those two manuals, *Warfighting* and *Campaigning*. This goes far beyond the fact that *The Art of War* has chapters and *Campaigning* has subchapters titled "Maneuver" and "Mobility." While between different translations the language and words used in *The Art of War* varies, be it implicitly or explicitly *The Art of War* recognizes, considers, and teaches most of the philosophical points that are most logically, clearly, and eloquently detailed in *Warfighting* and *Campaigning*. The ability to recognize that depends upon the depth to which one studies *The Art of War*. For a better understanding of the great number of philosophical points that includes consider the following.

*Warfighting FMFM 1* is divided into four chapters. Each chapter is divided into sub-chapters. They are: (1) "The Nature of War," which includes "War Defined—Friction—Uncertainty—Fluidity—Disorder—The Human Dimension—Violence and Danger—Moral and Physical Forces—The Evolution of War—Art and Science of War"; (2) "The Theory of War," which includes "War as an Instrument of Policy—Means in War—The Spectrum of Conflict—Levels of Warfare—Offense and Defense—Styles of Warfare—Combat Power—Concentration and Speed—Surprise and Boldness—Exploiting Vulnerability and Opportunity"; (3) "Preparing for War," which includes "Planning—Organization—Doctrine—Leadership—Training—Professional Military Education—Equipping"; and (4) "The Conduct of War," which includes "The Challenge—Maneuver Warfare—Philosophy of Command—Command—Shaping the Battle—Decision Making—Mission Tactics—Commander's Intent—Focus of Effort—Surfaces and Gaps—Combined Arms—Conclusion."<sup>3</sup>

*Campaigning FMFM 1—1* is divided into four chapters. The first three chapters have their own sub-chapters. They are: (1) "The Campaign," which in "a conceptual discussion" includes "Strategy—Tactics—Operations—Strategic—Operational Connection—Tactical—Operational Connection—Interaction of the Levels—Campaigns—Battles and Engagements—Strategic Actions—The Marine Corps and Campaigning"; (2) "Designing the Campaign," which in a description of essential "mental process[es]" and "strategic vision" includes "Strategic Aim, End State and Operational Objectives—Identifying Critical Enemy Factors—The Concept—Conceptual, Functional, and Detailed Design—Sequencing—Direction—Campaign Plan"; (2) "Conducting the

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<sup>3</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, unmarked contents page.

Campaign," which in essential "operational considerations" includes "Strategic Orientation—Use of Combat—Perspective—Maneuver—Mobility—Tempo—Intelligence—Surprise—Logistics—leadership"; and (3) "Conclusion".<sup>4</sup>

Additionally, based on an understanding of military history and the degree to which *The Art of War* is used, various policy recommendations have been made in the hope of supporting improvements in United States Marine Corps fighting philosophy, doctrine, and education in addition to preventing the neglect and misuse of *The Art of War*. Those suggestion are for: the better integration of the American political identity into the approach that the Marine Corps takes to teaching the foundations of war; a more honest or better understanding of military history, particularly American military history; and maintaining balance in the appreciation and application of those philosophies that have contributed to the Marine Corps' way of war in order to avoid the dangers and expenses of "Attrition Warfare."

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<sup>4</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, foreword, unmarked contents page.

## II

### SUN TZU AND *THE ART OF WAR*

#### A. *Who Was Sun Tzu the Philosopher*<sup>5</sup>

According to the *Shih Chi* (historical records that were finished by Ssu-ma Ch'ien in 91 B.C.) the military strategist Sun Tzu, originally named Sun Wu, was born into the Chen clan during the 6th century B.C. The Chen clan, as most other noble clans in China, was engaged in and troubled by tyranny.<sup>6</sup>

Following his emigration to Wu, China around 514 B.C., Sun Tzu's teachings found favor with Helu, the King of Wu. In the King's test, Sun Tzu was tasked to develop the military skills of 180 concubines. First Sun Tzu gave those concubines weapons and made sure that they understood the simplest of drill instructions. When Sun Tzu shouted drill instructions the concubines laughed. Sun Tzu's proper first conclusion was that if commands are misunderstood it is the commander's fault. After repeating his instructions Sun Tzu gave those drill commands again. Again in noncompliance they laughed. Sun Tzu detailed that if a commander's orders are understood and not obeyed it is the officer's fault. Sun Tzu had the company leaders of both columns beheaded and replaced by those who were next in line. With the justification that he was a general commissioned to protect the state, Sun Tzu did not show mercy to the company leaders.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> This introduction is of importance for it details the reformation of what has been traditionally considered, particularly by military establishments and personnel, to be the origin of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and the lessons found therein. It is written with the understanding that it is difficult to know and understand where you are going unless you know who you are and where you have been. Throughout this thesis, whenever one encounters the name and title Sun Tzu, it is to be understood that this author is referring to Sun Wu Tzu. Additionally, whenever reference is made to the views found in *The Art of War* as Sun Tzu's views, Sun Tzu is to be taken to include all of those who had a hand in the overall development and editing of *The Art of War*.

<sup>6</sup> Before they moved to the kingdom of Qi, the Chen clan lost the Chen kingdom to the Chu clan and Chu kingdom. In the kingdom of Qi, the Chen clan seized greater power by allying themselves with the enemies of Qi and murdering the ruling Qing clan on a religious holiday, when that family was drunken and disarmed. Soon thereafter, Sun Tzu's father's older brother, Chen Qi, threatened Sun Tzu's father, Chen Shu. This may have prompted Sun Tzu's relocation from the kingdom of Qi, China, to the kingdom of Wu. Ames, 18; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, *Sun Tzu: The New Translation: The Art of War* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1993) 15-17; Samuel B. Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art Of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) ix.

<sup>7</sup> J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 18, 269, 270; T. R. Phillips, *Roots of Strategy: The Five Greatest Military Classics Of All Time* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1985) 15-17.

After the execution the other concubines followed orders quite well and completed their training. Sun Tzu informed King Helu that his concubine soldiers now possessed discipline, were ready for inspection, and could be used for military applications. The King, still upset about the executions, declined the inspection invitation and ordered everyone back to their quarters. Due to the King's indulgence in emotional weakness over the executions of his two favorite concubines, Sun Tzu stated that Helu lacked the strong will that was required to properly employ an army for the protection of a state.<sup>8</sup> However, Helu retained Sun Tzu's services and commissioned him to help General Wu Zixu build, train, and lead Wu's military. With Sun Tzu's advice Wu was prepared and able to conquer the oppressive Chu kingdom through a prolonged six-year guerrilla war that was finalized by a large scale invasion in 506 B.C.<sup>9</sup>

Despite Helu's demise while leading troops in an action to maintain control over the satellite state of Yueh, under the leadership of the new king Fusha, Wu won that conflict. In their success Fusha and his closer associates became hubris and exclusionary of General Wu Zixu and his associates. Then, while Wu was preparing with Lu for a joint invasion of Qi, Wu Zixu relocated his son to Qi. For doing that Wu Zixu was required to kill himself. The kingdom of Qi fell, Chen Shu of Qi was taken prisoner, and Sun Wu Tzu lived the rest of his life alone in anger. Toward the end of that life Sun Tzu's clan, the Chen clan, finally gained enough power to again take over Qi.<sup>10</sup>

### *B. What Historical Records Confirm About the Authorship of The Art of War*

As detailed by Samuel Griffith, Brigadier General USMC (ret.) in his translation of and commentary on Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, there has been some doubt as to the validity of Sun Tzu's life story and authorship of *The Art of War*.<sup>11</sup> Some scholars believe that Sun Tzu was fictional, that *The Art of War* was most likely a compilation of the works of a number of philosophers, and that it was most likely written from 453 to 221 B.C. Among the evidence used to support these conclusions, it has been detailed that

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<sup>8</sup> T. R. Phillips , 17; Sawyer, Ralph D. *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1994) 82.

<sup>9</sup> J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 17-18; Sawyer, 82, 90-91.

<sup>10</sup> However, that reign also ended. J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 18-20.

<sup>11</sup> One 11th century Chinese scholar even believed that due to the perspective of *The Art of War*, it had to have come from the Warring States period.

references to Sun Tzu cannot be found in certain historical annals that detail the events that occurred in Lu from 721 to 481 B.C., and that clan armies were believed not commanded by hired generals until the Warring States period in China because there supposedly were no great problems with controlling the military until that time.<sup>12</sup> Griffith also details that disbelief was further supported by the unlikelihood of the events said to have occurred in Helu's test of Sun Tzu and Sun Tzu's theories.<sup>13</sup>

However, the omission of Sun Tzu proves little, because other significant Chinese historical figures are not mentioned in Tso Ch'iuming's comments on the historical records of Lu. In addition to the Shih *Chi*'s record one may find another slightly different record of Sun Tzu in the *Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yueh*.<sup>14</sup>

Today, the authors J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips hold that the terror tactics used in the tale of Sun Tzu's test are contrary to some of *The Art of War's* teachings. Sun Tzu stated that: excessive fear and terror of superiors encourages mutiny; battle ready soldiers are made through the development of familial bonds in which reward and punishment are in a balanced manner given according to the merit of actions; and, if treated as sons, soldiers will follow their leaders unto death. J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips further detail that Sun Tzu's justification for disobeying orders was a Warring States period development that has caused problems in China. Throughout Chinese history standing rulers have been threatened by subordinates that aspired to take control.<sup>15</sup>

In response it must be understood that a significant part of *The Art of War* focuses on the psychology needed at the right time and place, not just to win a tactical action but a war also. The Griffith translation of and commentary on *Sun Tzu The Art of War* includes lessons on: tiring an enemy through constant harassment (68); directing rage against an enemy (75); treating prisoners decently (76); harnessing enthusiasm in an attack (108); not increasing an enemy's resolution to survive (109-110); intimidating neighbors (113); avoiding and taking advantage of dangerous character flaws (67 and 114); determining vulnerability based on an enemy's physical, mental, and spiritual conditions as shown in their actions (119-122); diagnosing and avoiding problems in command (125-129);

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<sup>12</sup> Griffith, ix, 1, 2, back cover.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 2-3.

<sup>14</sup> Sawyer, 79-80, 151-152. When considering the rationalized disbelief of the story of Sun Tzu's test, one should understand that the fear of a more immediate death can prompt outstanding achievement in military training.

<sup>15</sup> J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 269-271.

preventing problems, some of which are psychological in nature, encountered while operating on various territories and terrain (132-134); the fear of war (135); and avoiding superstition (136-137).<sup>16</sup>

In addition to contradictions said to exist between the tale of Sun Tzu's test and *The Art of War*, and in response to what may seem to be further unjustifiable contradictions within *The Art of War*, it is possible that many of those seemingly unjustifiable contradictions are a result of the following: ambiguity in the various Chinese languages, ambiguity intentionally constructed into texts for the sake of teaching a multitude of lessons in one passage; traditional Taoist and/or Buddhist literary context; and/or for one reason or another, misconstruing passages.<sup>17</sup> From within the Taoist, and even the later, but highly influential, Buddhist perspectives, it is believed that understanding and/or solving struggles between competing and/or contradicting factors or conditions can allow a reader to become transcendent. This creative process is seen as evolutionary. These struggles can range from conflicts between what Christians would consider right and wrong to the process of choosing how to spice a meal.<sup>18</sup>

While Samuel Griffith holds that "Sun Tzu's belief" in "constant mutation" (which may perhaps be better understood through the saying "... the only constant in war is change..." and is illustrated by the example of interaction between the "... elements [of] ... earth, wood, fire, metal, and water ...") is indicative of the "Warring States" time period, he insinuates rather than states that such is proof of the later composition of *The Art of War*.<sup>19</sup> Considering, however, that other deeply philosophical and highly regarded Taoist texts, that in many places are similar to *The Art of War*, existed earlier than *The Art of War* was written, it is worth noting that Griffith's statement may be wrong.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Griffith, 67-68, 75-76, 108-110, 113-114, 119-122, 125-129, 132-137. Although it is arguable, it may additionally be stated that throughout history, in a multitude of different nation states, if they were under checks and balances or not, tyrants, statesmen, and generals have often used their prerogative to defend their states and nations during times of "crisis" in ways that may have been, or may be by some, considered inconsistent with the principles that are essential for long-lasting civil behavior.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas Cleary, ed., *The Art of War: Sun Tzu* (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1988) VII, VIII, 9, 13, 17, 29-34.

<sup>18</sup> Ames, 42-45, 49-58. To some degree this belief in that which is immediately at hand is kept from being crudely materialistic by balancing it with the belief that things, beings, and happenings, or if you prefer, all matter and all that matters in the world, are composed of energy expending itself, harmony, or as some scientists might say, seeking a less excited state.

<sup>19</sup> Griffith, 10, 91, 101.

<sup>20</sup> Thomas Cleary, ed., *Mastering The Art of War: Zhuge Liang's and Liu Ji's Commentaries on the Classic by Sun Tzu* (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1989) 3; Cleary, *The Art of War*, 1-4. Additionally a belief does not necessarily have to be codified and/or written to be held in common, by theory and/or



In his translation of and commentary on *The Art of War*, Thomas Cleary points out that possible similarities between various Taoist religious texts and Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* could be the result of philosophical collaboration, research continuation, and/or borrowing. As evidence of this, Cleary details similarities between Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and others: the ancient Taoist text *The Yin Convergence* (which condemns greed as a motive for war); the famous Taoist text *Tao Te Ching: The Way and The Power* (which describes the skilled warrior's subtlety, power, and depth); the *I Ching: Book of Changes* (which details the principles of constant change, balance, and seeking council on war); and the second century B.C. Taoist compilation of *The Masters of Hunan* (which teaches that supplying a force far away impoverishes a people, that humble rulers are best, that when differences are taken to the point of violence, much has already been lost, and in the violent winning of a war the winners and the losers do lose more than they truly know).<sup>21</sup>

Within the Taoist religious context, Confucian theory competed and coexisted with Sun Tzuian theory, yet resulted in no truly successful stabilizing political effect in China. No matter what their earned or given social, economic, and political responsibilities may have been, Chinese tyrants and aspiring tyrants, for the most part, opportunistically did as they pleased. Despite Chinese society's emphases on relationships, order, and productivity, the essentials for civil coexistence (that are based on an express knowledge, understanding, and deep conviction that each and every individual human being is, by a Creator, created with the particular inalienable rights of life, liberty, pursuit of happiness, and defense) including the rule of law and the understanding that governments are legitimate and just only if they derive their authority through the uncoerced consent of the governed, were for the most part missing. *The Declaration of Independence* and *The Constitution of the United States of America* guarantee every person those fundamentals. As implied earlier, but necessarily said again in other words for emphasis, in spite of, if not in most cases because of Confucianism, one finds that in China, justice was replaced by situation ethics and reverence for power.<sup>22</sup> We might say that Sun Tzu simply focused on being efficient with that power.

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practice, by the people at large. Such may be particularly evident in cultures that lack written laws, where leaders fear a literate populace, and/or in which laws are applied relativistically and/or situationally with respect for power.

<sup>21</sup> Cleary, *The Art of War*, 1-27. For the most part, early in his commentaries, Cleary specifically introduces his readers to a number of classic Taoist texts by name. More similarities and Taoists texts are mentioned in Cleary's commentaries than need be further mentioned for the purposes of this thesis.

<sup>22</sup> Steven Warshaw, *China Emerges: A Concise History of China From its Origin to the Present* (Berkeley, California: Diablo Press, Inc., 1990) 90-95, 137-140; Lucian W. Pye, *The Mandarin and the*

Griffith seemed to overlook the fact that, despite technological progress, human nature does not change and human beings are rational, when he detailed that *The Art of War* exhibits evidence of higher rationality in cause, reason, and structure than is often attributed to China's Spring and Autumn period. Griffith recognized the beauty of Sun Tzu's text. The work is subdivided into chapters. Each chapter is well developed and provides insight on a specific component that must be considered for military success. Rather than a king's greed, caprice, or pride, survival justifies the ordered investigation of what composes military power and success in addition to a state's obligation to engage in a war.<sup>23</sup> In fact, in the text a rather large checklist is provided to help one make the decision as to whether or not to go to war. The concerns include such relative measurements as political support, leadership ability, strategic advantages, strength, military professionalism or training, justness, and benevolence.<sup>24</sup> Chapter 13 of *The Art of War* details that the victor in a battle is established due to espionage, unseen operations, and mobility, but not superstition or luck.<sup>25</sup> That last chapter leads readers back to the first chapter.

Considering many objections, Griffith allows for the possibility that *The Art of War* may have been revised during the Warring States period when private schools, independent authorship, and competing intellectuals were said to be greater in number and authors were said to be less afraid to sign their work.<sup>26</sup> Faith may be given to Griffith's declaration that scholarship expanded during China's Warring States period, but, if it was not safe to own books and/or contradict a state's view during China's Spring and Autumn period, one may wonder if it would have been safer to do the same in China's Warring States period, a time of greater military activity.<sup>27</sup> Other factors such as population increases, technological advances, educational opportunity, and writings lost may be of significance in refuting the use of records on scholarship to date the original composition of *The Art of War*.

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*Cadre: China's Political Cultures* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988) 2-8; Griffith, 22-29; Sawyer, 156.

<sup>23</sup> Griffith, 2-3.

<sup>24</sup> Sawyer, 130.

<sup>25</sup> Griffith, 8-10.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>27</sup> Griffith, 27-29; Sawyer, 60-61.

In attempting to date *The Art of War*, Griffith also held that some of the advances in warfighting mentioned in *The Art of War* are not indicative of China's Spring and Autumn Period. During the Spring and Autumn period, peasants farmed and the nobility dueled. Supposedly, due to moral, logistical, and structural limitations, large professionally-led armies and prolonged conflict were not the norm until the Warring States period.<sup>28</sup>

The aforementioned moral distinctions between the duties of commoners and nobility and aversions to prolonged wars may have existed during the Spring and Autumn period. However, when considering the state of Chu's persistent offensive attempts to expand and Wu's retaliatory six-year guerrilla war and final decisive invasion of Chu, one may question the application of those values.<sup>29</sup>

According to Griffith, the wide use of tactically separate but coordinated units, specialized professional shock troops that could carry out highly mobile or covert operations, crossbows (which greatly changed Chinese warfare) and chariots with hard armor worn by combatants other than nobility are further evidence that shows *The Art of War* was written in the Warring States period. The presence of these aforementioned innovations, coupled with the absence of commentary on the use of cavalries in the first thirteen chapters of *The Art of War*, has been used to date the text somewhere between 400 and 320 B.C.<sup>30</sup>

With new archeological finds, however, there is now an older version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. This version distinctly separates the previously known text from the five newly discovered chapters that seem to have been written at a later date.<sup>31</sup> One of those newly found chapters deals with cavalries.<sup>32</sup> Additionally it is believed that crossbows may have existed in China at an earlier date.<sup>33</sup> Further, it is now known that compound bows, chariots, bronze-edged weapons, bronze helmets, leather armor, and shields were used earlier and far more widely in China's Spring and Autumn periods than they were

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<sup>28</sup> Griffith, 6-8.

<sup>29</sup> Sawyer, 85-93.

<sup>30</sup> Griffith, 11.

<sup>31</sup> Ames, 16, 30.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 258.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 24.

once thought to have been. Technology may not date Sun Tzu and/or *The Art of War* to the Warring States period in China.<sup>34</sup>

Rather than accepting in the past the authenticity of Sun Tzu (his test, his accomplishments, and his authorship of *The Art of War*) Griffith, among other critics, suggested that *The Art of War* was possibly written by the Warring States period strategist Sun Pin. The development of the story of his test, his accomplishments, and his authorship of *The Art of War* was suggested to be the result of Sun Pin's work being attributed to Sun Wu.<sup>35</sup>

This notion that Sun Wu Tzu and Sun Pin Tzu were one and the same found popularity despite the fact that the aforementioned *Shih Chi* details that they were two distinct characters.<sup>36</sup> Admittedly the lives of Sun Wu Tzu and Sun Pin Tzu were very similar. One was the contemporary of Confucius. The other was the contemporary of the Confucian scholar Mencius. Both moved to locations within the state of Wu, were great strategists, held the title of Tzu (master) and published texts titled *The Art of War*.<sup>37</sup> According to the "Record of Literary Works (Yi-wen chih)" of the *History of the Han Dynasty* (a catalog of the imperial library completed during the first century A.D.), Sun Wu Tzu's text contained eighty-two chapters, eighteen of which are currently known. According to the same historical record, Sun Pin Tzu's text contained eighty-nine chapters, sixteen of which are known today. Additionally, each strategist is mentioned in Liu Hsiang's *Intrigues of the Warring States*, written about 77 B.C.<sup>38</sup>

In his translation of and commentary on *The Art of War*, Roger Ames explains that it has been suggested that Sun Pin Tzu's *The Art of War* was lost sometime between 300 B.C. and 600 A.D. He uses the following as evidence: early Warring States period records detail that the Ch'in and Han clans distinguished between the texts of Sun Wu Tzu and Sun Pin Tzu; there is no mention of Sun Pin Tzu in post Warring States period Sui clan literary records; and Cao Cao, the Three Kingdoms period ruler of Wei, never mentioned Sun Pin Tzu's text.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Sawyer, 33-36.

<sup>35</sup> Griffith, 11-12; Sawyer, 155.

<sup>36</sup> Ames, 16-19; Sawyer, 152.

<sup>37</sup> Ames, 18-19.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 19-20.

Roger Ames has further eased many of the doubts concerning Sun Wu Tzu and his *The Art of War* by discussing, with consideration of that which has been known for some time, the significance of recent archeological finds made in two Western Han burial sites. Those discoveries were made in 1972 and 1973 close to present day Linyi in the Shangtung province and at Ch'ang-sha in the Hunan province respectively. Of the many different military texts and few yin-yang materials, discussions of government, and other miscellaneous materials saved from the first of the two Linyi tombs, the most important to this thesis are Sun Wu Tzu's *The Art of War*; the five additional chapters of Sun Wu Tzu's *The Art of War* previously unknown, and the sixteen chapters of Sun Pin Tzu's *The Art of War*. From the second of the Linyi tombs, a calendar dated 134 B.C. was saved.<sup>40</sup>

A number of factors have been taken into consideration in attempts to date the texts discovered in the first tomb. Textual comparisons have been made between various writing styles: from older, simpler, and economical to newer, complex, and more uniform in language symbols. Despite whatever dates are given, the existence of both authors' texts on war alone is important. At the very least, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* was a classic established in content and form by the time of the Western Han Dynasty, around 202 B.C. to 8 A.D. Additionally, after a review of the five newly discovered chapters of Sun Wu Tzu's *The Art of War*, it has been determined that parts of those chapters may have been altered and edited into the tale of Sun Tzu's text. Finally the discovery of Sun Pin Tzu's *The Art of War* in the same Western Han tomb as Sun Wu Tzu's *The Art of War* discredits the claim that there was only one *The Art of War*, clears any confusion as to the separate identities of the two philosopher strategists, and helps scholars to conclude when Sun Pin Tzu's text may have been lost.<sup>41</sup>

Of all that is now known about Sun Wu Tzu's *The Art of War*, it is still not definitively known when and by whom it was first recorded. For what was, according to a Han imperial library account, an eighty-two chapter text and according to other records, a work that originated during China's Spring and Autumn period, Sun Wu Tzu's *The Art of War* today contains only eighteen chapters and many hints that would suggest that it was recorded, if not rewritten, later in China's history.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 13-15.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 15-20; Sawyer, 161. This commentary is not to be taken to say that Sun Pin Tzu's text is completely unrelated to Sun Wu Tzu's text. In fact in certain places, Sun Pin Tzu's text seems to be an attempted improvement of his ancestor's classic.

<sup>42</sup> Ames, 18-19. It is possible that Sun Wu Tzu's theories were originally transmitted by Sun Wu Tzu to nobility, philosophers, students, officers, and combatants. Those theories could also have been transferred orally from generation to generation. Then, in one generation, they may have been collated,

### C. What *The Art of War* Teaches

Differences exist between popular versions of *The Art of War*. While the thematically focused, inner, core, or primary part of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is always logically structured into the same thirteen chapters, there are large differences in the terminology, outer chapters, and various commentaries of each text.<sup>43</sup> Even though some differences may exist between the older Samuel Griffith version and newer versions of *The Art of War*, the Griffith version, used by the USMC Command and Staff College, is very valuable for the purposes of study and application.<sup>44</sup>

The following lessons of *The Art of War* may be grouped into the category of Preparation: first chapter, "Estimates," "Surveying," and "Assessments"; second chapter, "Waging War," "Battle," and "Mobilizing for Armed Conflict"; and third chapter, "Offensive Strategy" and "Planning the Attack."<sup>45</sup>

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expanded, clarified, trimmed, and recorded into the text entitled, *The Art of War*. Perhaps the text was originally lecture notes that were edited over generations in the way that the teachings of Confucius were. This may explain why of those eighteen chapters, the first thirteen have been traditionally viewed as the main text. The recently discovered last five chapters appear to be part of a separate commentary that could be marked as part two—a later written text (each chapter begins, "Master Sun said"). Simple subtraction should lead one to ask what happened to the other missing "said" chapters. It could be that the missing chapters were the less than salvageable bamboo slats found in the Han tombs; or a compilation of some, many, most, or all of the texts found in that first Linyi tomb; or edited out of the text in much the same way as Mencius' works were cut. Despite these questions, with all that has been detailed by Roger Ames, it is clear that the traditional Chinese account of Sun Tzu is the most reliable. Ames, 21-22, 24-26, 31-33, 38.

Further discussion of the validity of the traditional Chinese record of Sun Tzu and the authorship of *The Art of War* is not within the scope of this thesis. That discussion was only taken to this point for the sake of demonstrating that once "in vogue" views on those topics have been largely discredited.

<sup>43</sup> J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 22.

For the most part, our focus is on the newer translations of *The Art of War* as authoritative sources for the purposes of detailing the lessons that each chapter teaches.

<sup>44</sup> Christopher Bassford, *Command and Staff College, Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus AY 1994-1995* (Quantico, Virginia: USMC Command and Staff College, 1994) 24; USMC Command and Staff College and USMC Institute, *Command and Staff College, Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus 1994-1995* (Washington, DC: USMC Institute, 1994) 2.

Providing more insight into the depth of the lessons found in *The Art of War*, the Griffith version includes comments and historical accounts made by many other renowned Chinese scholars, strategists, and philosophers integrated into the first thirteen chapters that may not be found in the other versions of *The Art of War*. Of most importance in this thesis, however, is the more prevalent common ground found between the different versions of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. In no way is the following summary of *The Art of War* to be considered all-inclusive of the lessons that may be learned therein.

<sup>45</sup> Ames, x; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 22; Griffith, contents. While the use of large numbers of troops by some may be indicative of the Warring States period, such is not absolute proof that the text was written at that time. Despite the controversy as to when *The Art of War* was written, it is important to keep in mind that the use of large troop numbers, quantities of supplies, necessary levels of funding, and

Chapter One focuses on how the state and personal survival depend on the proper study and planning before war. Comparative assessments of *our* as opposed to *their* relative strength and weakness must be made of the following: a ruler's support by and control over his people; climate, seasons, and weather; terrain that would give or take away advantages such as bottlenecks, high ground, or expanse; the virtue of leaders such as "wisdom, integrity, humanity, courage, and discipline"; and "organizational effectiveness, a chain of command," and a "structure for logistical support."<sup>46</sup> The chapter offers several imperatives. The cardinal one is that it is important to be stronger than one's own enemy. Sun Tzu also advises, "Do not only build yourself, undermine your enemy also . . . . Warfare is the art (Tao) of deceit . . . . When [you are] strong seem weak. When [you are] weak seem strong . . . . Keep your opponents confused and off balance."<sup>47</sup>

In the Griffith version of *The Art of War*, some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's first chapter (many of which are historical accounts) detail instances of and/or serve to support the importance of the following: seeking religious council before going to war if not using the "temple's" confidentiality to make plans and keep them secret; the blessing and greatness of justice of rulers and troops; providing proper but not excessive rewards for actions; allowing achievement to suppress fear; terrain-conscious troop travel plans; adapting to the unexpected; being accommodating to encourage your neighbor to drop his guard; using well-trained guerrilla forces when and where it is unexpected; dividing and then conquering enemies; and understanding that each conquest is gained by taking advantage of mistakes that are distinct to each conflict.<sup>48</sup>

Chapter Two focuses on the expenses of war. The ideas following are among those detailed. Short wars, undertaken only when necessary, and to a lesser degree than long wars sometimes deplete good standing with constituencies, troop moral and the military strength needed to further defend a country after a war has ended. A leader should,

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particular ratios in examples for the purpose of teaching particular lessons, whether or not the numbers and ratios are historically real or hypothetical, does not discredit the principles of those particular lessons. Logistics are important in preparation, transport, positioning, posturing and war. The Chinese made considerations for logistic quite early in their history. However, some scholars might say that no matter if they were or are explicitly written, or not, such considerations are quite natural, and on a larger scale a result of common sense. Sawyer, 160.

<sup>46</sup> Ames, 103.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 104-105.

<sup>48</sup> Griffith, 63-71.

therefore, go to war and conquer enemies when they are conquerable. Wars should be paid for with excessive savings (so as not to tax the life out of your own people), by living off your enemy's resources and supplies, and through using weapons liberated from your enemy. One should make his men angry enough to kill while rewarding those who make captures.<sup>49</sup> One should treat prisoners decently. "... [T]he commander who understands war is the final arbiter of people's lives, and lord over the security of the state."<sup>50</sup>

In the Griffith version of *The Art of War*, some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's second chapter support the importance of the following: solving the problem of profiteers that take advantage of troop presence and impoverish a country; avoiding the resentment of male and female separation and sorrow of poverty caused by extended wars and stalemates; soldiers used to deliver supplies; the 25 per cent of an army that administrates; the warning that he who lives by the sword dies by it; superior speed in assaults when plans are imperfect; motivation through the loss or gain of material and/or honor; killing an enemy when able; and understanding and considering character concerns in commissioning and fighting a commander.<sup>51</sup>

Chapter Three of *The Art of War* is written from the view that one is either a friend or an enemy and even friends may be enemies. Consider a few passages: "... [T]he highest excellence is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all. It is best to keep one's own state ... army, battalion, company, or five-man squad intact; to crush the enemy ... is only a second best. ... [A]ttack strategy"<sup>52</sup> While some critics may have their doubts, a utilitarian motive for attacking may be found in the idea that it is preferred to capture the enemy whole rather than damaged.<sup>53</sup>

In respective order from the greatest to the worst military policy, a state attacks an enemy's "strategies," "alliances," "soldiers," and "walled cities." Seizing walled cities takes too long, depletes resources, causes excessive casualties, and leaves one exposed.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Ames, 107-108.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 109.

<sup>51</sup> Griffith, 72-76.

<sup>52</sup> Ames, 111.

<sup>53</sup> General Tao Hanzhang, *Sun Tzu's Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation*, trans. Yuan Shibing (New York: Sterling Publishing Company, Inc., 1990) 99; Griffith, 77; Sawyer, 177.

<sup>54</sup> Ames, 111.



The following ideas are also developed. One should always keep conditions in his favor. When one has ten fold, five fold, two fold, equal, less than, or much less than the amount of strength that his enemy has, then in respective order, encircle, attack, fight, "... be able to divide, ... be able to defend against ...," or avoid him. One should avoid confusing and frustrating the military by leaving the regulation of that military and the defense of one's state to the commanders commissioned to do so.<sup>55</sup> "[R]isk" is inversely proportional to knowledge of oneself and the enemy.<sup>56</sup>

In the Griffith version of *The Art of War*, some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's third chapter detail the importance of the following: not prizing killing excessively; capturing things intact; generals of character plan well in advance; alliances for security and victory; eliminating the advisors who rally an enemy and then allowing that enemy to surrender; in a stalemate (provided that no further political rivalry is intended) allowing an inadequate force to flee and disperse in an area where they may be easily taken later; small forces sidestepping a direct blow or withdrawing and then hitting an enemy's weak point; taking advantage of an enemy's disorder; division through diversion; not allowing anger to precipitate mistakes; allowing those on the battlefield to do what they see needs to be done; not losing sight of military purpose; and the idea that armies are to be run and wars are to be fought pragmatically while states are to be run justly and mercifully.<sup>57</sup>

The fourth chapter ("Dispositions" or "Control"), fifth chapter ("Energy," "Combat Power," or "Strategic Advantage") and sixth chapter ("Weakness and Strength") may be grouped into the category of "Capability."<sup>58</sup>

With the acknowledgment that defense is stronger than offense, Chapter Four of *The Art of War* focuses on gaining and maintaining invulnerability. The proper order of operations is as follows: (1) because it is your own responsibility, make yourself invincible; (2) wait patiently, stay on guard, and maintain your advantage; (3) when your enemy goes on the offense recognize his flaws and weak spots; (4) if able, attack your enemy's flaws and weak spots; (5) if overrun and not able to attack, then defend.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 112-113.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>57</sup> Griffith, 77-84.

<sup>58</sup> Ames, x; Griffith, contents; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 22.

<sup>59</sup> Ames, 115.

Further recommendations follow. The best defense is hidden. The best offense is made from outside of the enemy's reach. Because winning a war is based on taking advantage of mistakes, winners confidently enter a war having already won—it is not the greatest accomplishment and it comes in its own time. To control the outcome of a conflict one must build political support, maintain military discipline and readiness, possess greater expanses of navigable land, make better calculation and projection, be well supplied, and have overwhelming confidence and drive.<sup>60</sup>

In the Griffith version of *The Art of War*, some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's fourth chapter serve to support the importance of the following: accounting for the unpredictability of others; victories with minimal bloodshed; the superior motivation that comes from having no way out or room to fall back; economy of movement and force; knowing one's own capabilities; dependable intelligence; and soldiers having a respect for life.<sup>61</sup>

Chapter Five discusses military effectiveness. When one and one's personnel are skilled in recognizing weak and strong points, of great speed, and possessing proper timing, then together "straightforward" and "surprise" operations may produce crushing engagements and quick victories in respective order. The forces used in these operations are interchangeable and can be used in countless creative combinations. Efficiently organized chains of command and clear understandable communications allow those forces to move effectively, with less resistance, and as if they were fewer in number. Additionally, one should use strategic advantage-expecting success without it is unreasonable. Efficient leadership and "logistics" bring order, "strategic advantage" brings courage, superior "position" brings strength, and an enemy that takes visible bait is exposed. An enemy is driven to panic by those who are not.<sup>62</sup>

Those forces referred to by Roger Ames as "straightforward" and "surprise" are titled "normal" and "extraordinary" in Samuel Griffith's as well as General Tao Hanzhang and Yuan Shibing's translations of and commentaries on *The Art of War*.<sup>63</sup> Ralph Sawyer refers to those forces as "orthodox" and "unorthodox."<sup>64</sup> Clearly, the interchangeable use

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 115-116; Griffith, 88.

<sup>61</sup> Griffith, 85-88.

<sup>62</sup> Ames, 119-121.

<sup>63</sup> Griffith, 90-91; Hanzhang, 103.

<sup>64</sup> Sawyer, 187.

of the two groups of soldiers with like training for the purposes of delay and surprise differs significantly from the use of specially trained elite forces for similar if not greater endeavors. There seems to be significant disagreement as to what the passage relevant to this lesson was meant to convey. Due to this disagreement, a concern for what is actually written, and a concern for what Sun Tzu is popularly understood to teach, the broadest interpretation is appropriate in this case. Far more than some inconsequential double speak of Taoist inspirational origin, this lesson not only teaches that these distinct forces (as types collectively possessing the same training and skill or not) precipitate and conserve each other and are interchangeable for use in countless clever tactical actions, but also that their use is to serve campaigns and in turn strategies.<sup>65</sup>

In the Griffith version of *The Art of War* some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's fifth chapter detail instances of and/or serve to support the importance of the following: not demanding more than is humanly possible from soldiers especially from those who lack skill; understanding armies are not enough because one needs an easy opportunity; flanking uses of extraordinary forces, preemptive defensive strikes, faking injury to surprise an enemy, and understanding that advantages and disadvantages are not fixed.<sup>66</sup>

Chapter Six of *The Art of War* places an emphasis of the importance of not being duped. To be rested and generally better prepared for battle one must be first at a chosen battlefield, the location of which one's enemy may not suspect prior. One should entice the enemy to come, since traveling diminishes his energy. One should keep the enemy away or slow him with obstructions. Obstructions may be anything, including some of one's own soldiers. Deplete the enemy's supplies and tire him by traveling and attacking where and when he is weak and unaware. Even a small force, by recognizing, knowing, and understanding the enemy's plans, strengths, and critical flaws, can engage when and where their tactical, and even overall, victory is more likely. As water flows downhill an armed force flows from its enemy's strong points to its enemy's weak points, it is said to be formless and unstoppable. In a different light, consider that water builds great speed and force as it rolls down a hill and that one small stone thrown with accuracy and precision can penetrate and crush a multitude of eggs. Such should be the enemy's consequences.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 147-150; Cleary, *The Art of War*, 95-96.

<sup>66</sup> Griffith, 90-95.

<sup>67</sup> Ames, 123, 125-126.

In the Griffith version of *The Art of War*, some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's sixth chapter serve to support the importance of the following: making weaknesses appear as strengths and visa versa; finding an enemy's most jeopardizing weaknesses; holding key point of passage to stop an enemy; and striking supply lines to halt advances.<sup>68</sup>

The seventh chapter ("Maneuver," "Armed Contention," or "Armed Contest"), eighth chapter ("The Nine Variables" or "Adapting to the Nine Contingencies") and ninth chapter ("Marches," "Troop Maneuvers," or "Deploying the Army") may be grouped into the category of "Operations" (referring to coordinated military action).<sup>69</sup>

Chapter Seven of *The Art of War* seems to emphasize the less than obvious movement and use of troops during a war, as opposed to Chapter Six's focus on the time before a war. When comparing the different translations of *The Art of War*, one will find the interpretation of Chapter Seven differs significantly. With attention to detail, one may find that there is a difference between the focus on "Maneuver" and "Armed Contest."<sup>70</sup>

Transitioning from strategic disadvantage to strategic advantage during a battle or war requires both maneuver and fight. The Ames and Sawyer texts detail that this transition is achieved by making an enemy's quick and easy path long and painful. The strategic advantage lost by a late departure may be gained back by enticing an enemy in wrong directions. One should remember that losses result from several things: trusting an unknown alley; failing to protect a base camp; leaving armor and other supplies behind to travel quickly; the tardiness caused by attempting to bring all of an army to a battle; keeping an invading and/or expeditionary force in one place for too much time; and exhausting forced marches before an engagement.<sup>71</sup> In the latter matter, Griffith translated the text significantly differently. His version of the text allows the employment of forced marches if the strongest of a force lead and allow others to catch up at the battlefield encampment before battle.<sup>72</sup>

The balance of advantage fluctuates. One should patiently wait for an enemy's disorder, clamor, fatigue, hunger, and carelessness, then being in the opposite condition

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<sup>68</sup> Griffith, 96-100.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., contents; Ames, x; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 22.

<sup>70</sup> Ames, 129; Hanzhang, 108; Griffith, 102-103; Sawyer, 195, 197.

<sup>71</sup> Ames, 129-132; Sawyer, 197-199.

<sup>72</sup> Griffith, 103.

attack. If an enemy has (1) high ground, (2) his best soldiers, (3) faked retreat, (4) obviously exposed himself, (5) no way out, and/or (6) set his mind on going home, then do not attack. Otherwise, one should attack. One should prevent confusion and direct soldiers in unison with loud and visible methods of communication.<sup>73</sup>

In the Griffith version of *The Art of War*, some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's seventh chapter detail the importance of the following: using scouts; knowing a terrain's advantages and dangers; keeping an army supplied at the end of a forced march; remaining cool under pressure; maintaining military discipline in battle; striking at the right moment to decide a battle; holding strategic points such as crossroads; being rested for night defense; "harassing" an enemy with guerrilla tactics until they lose their will to fight; and not pressing an enemy that is desperately on the run and unaware of the geographic advantage he possesses.<sup>74</sup>

While Chapter Eight of *The Art of War* details the appropriate position and actions to be taken on different types of terrain in the context of mobilizing for war, it also contains some warnings. Weigh positives and negatives and accordingly adapt to changes in land. On land where one may be trapped do not camp, and have a contingency plan ready. Work with allies on strategically important or intersecting land.<sup>75</sup> Griffith refers to "intersecting land" as "communicating ground."<sup>76</sup> Spend little time on isolated or cutoff land.<sup>77</sup> Griffith refers to "isolated land" as "desolate ground."<sup>78</sup> When there is no way out attack your enemy.<sup>79</sup> The best way, however, is to avoid being put in a place where there is no way out alive. Do not travel some roads, attack some armies, attack walled cities, lay claim to some territories, follow some orders.<sup>80</sup>

The warnings alluded to focus on doctrine and leadership. "Do not depend on the enemy not coming; depend rather on being ready for him. ... Do not depend on an enemy

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<sup>73</sup> Ames, 129-132; Sawyer, 197-199.

<sup>74</sup> Griffith, 103-110.

<sup>75</sup> Ames, 135.

<sup>76</sup> Griffith, 111.

<sup>77</sup> Ames, 135.

<sup>78</sup> Griffith, 111.

<sup>79</sup> Ames, 135.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.; Sawyer, 203; Hanzhang, 111.

not attacking; depend rather on having a position that cannot be attacked."<sup>81</sup> Use threat or pain to keep neighbors away. Keep neighbors busy through competition for possible advantage or profit.<sup>82</sup>

Leaders who are reckless or value life little, get killed. When they are set on living or cowardly, can be taken alive. When quick to anger or proud of purity, they can be set up through provocation or insult. When compassionate or concerned about the people, they can hit when not expecting it or be tormented with guilt. Often those traits dangerously cloud the judgment that is needed to win a war.<sup>83</sup>

In the Griffith version, some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's eighth chapter serve to support the importance of the following: not attacking special forces that bait traps; allowing generals to take advantage of opportunities to win expediently; understanding that generals in honoring their duties must be pragmatic; never attacking a desperate enemy if it is ready to fight to the death; not laying siege to fortified cities; using all forms of subterfuge imaginable (including the encouragement of over-indulgence) to destroy an enemy's ability to plan strategies or fight a war; not hesitating to act when appropriate but not being impulsive; and not sacrificing long-term victory to obtain short-term comfort.<sup>84</sup>

Chapter Nine of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* focuses on the strategic deployment of an army. The following recommendations or commands are given. Valleys are used to cross over mountains. Camp on sunny high ground to avoid disease and prepare for battle. Quickly and with the current cross only slow rivers—do not fight in them. Hide on the other side of the river, attacking when half of your enemy's force is across. Travel through swamps as quickly as possible, taking cover in grass with the forest to your back if forced to fight there. When fighting on the plains, keep your right flank on high, your central force on good ground, bad ground in front of you, good ground to your back. It is possible that this recommendation may enable closure of a flank on the down hill, striking an enemy that is slowed down, and if all fails then one may withdraw. Stay away from, but face dangerous terrain so that your enemy must use it in his approach. To avoid ambushes and deny the enemy intelligence, investigate your flanks.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Ames, 136.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.; Sawyer, 204.

<sup>83</sup> Ames, 136.

<sup>84</sup> Griffith, 111-115.

<sup>85</sup> Ames, 139-141.

Additionally this chapter offers a checklist designed to allow one to properly size up, understand, and in turn respond to the enemy. Included are the following. In discovering intent, actions speak louder than words. When you receive gifts from them, your adversaries are resting. Never travel to your enemy but allow him to come to your strategically advantageous position. Disturbances of nature warn of an approaching enemy. Watch an enemy's regimentation and the temperament of officers to find if they are tired or divided. If they eat their animals, their supplies are low and/or they may not be planning to eat another meal. Observe and be prepared against an enemy who approaches but does not attack. Superiority in numbers is not enough. To win, know your enemy, be able to move the many as one, have plans, be rested, possess your strength, and maintain military discipline.<sup>86</sup>

In the Griffith version, some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's ninth chapter detail instances of the following: not charging a hill; attacking an unprepared enemy; not being caught by natural terrain traps; using scouts to navigate; distinguishing between the dust clouds made by chariots as opposed to infantries; calling a truce and/or feigning weakness when planning and/or carrying out an attack; understanding that sometimes a call for peace is a sign of weakness; not tiring your own troops with busy work; and reading when the enemy is going to try to make one battle the particular battle that wins a war.<sup>87</sup>

The tenth chapter ("Terrain" or "Configurations of Terrain") and the eleventh chapter ("The Nine Varieties of Ground" or "The Nine Kinds of Terrain") may be grouped into the category of "Geographic Factors." These chapters and even Chapter Eight on the surface may seem redundant. The concerns that each chapter address, however, are interdependent yet different.<sup>88</sup>

Chapter Ten starts by defining six terrain configurations. When terrain is navigable by all parties to a conflict it is "accessible." The sunny side is preferable. Terrain on which forward movement is easy but pulling out is not, is "suspended"—therein be prepared and willing to win. Terrain where no opponent has an advantage is "staleminated." Do not be deceived into attacking on that land. If one will begin what seems to be a withdrawal and then attacks, when the enemy has moved forward to pursue,

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid., Sawyer, 207-210.

<sup>87</sup> Griffith, 116-123.

<sup>88</sup> Ames, x; Griffith, contents; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 22.

then significant gains may be made. Terrain that gives natural advantages is "constricted." It is most likely that this refers to gorges, bottlenecks, and other features that are potentially costly. On wet "precipitous" terrain, prepare for battle on the sunny side of mountains or pull out. On "expansive" terrain, making the first move is dangerous and enticing enemies may not be successful.<sup>89</sup>

Terrain use is guided by six rules that should be of a commander's concern. In summary they are as follows: (1) problems arise from weakness in enlisted and/or officers—both must be strong in the broadest sense of the term; (2) rebellion, cowardice, and actions based thereon are the commander's weakness and failure; (3) when most other factors are balanced, an attack against a larger enemy army will end in "flight"; (4) "if the commander, unable to assess his enemy, sends a small force to engage a large one, sends his weak troops against the enemy's best, and operates without a vanguard of crack troops, the result will be a rout."<sup>90</sup>

Hopeless and defeated are those armies whose commanders do not study and use terrain advantages and that serve a commander's and/or their own pride and/or fear, rather than the survival of the nation and state. Even if it is contrary to the ruler's orders, if battle will bring victory, then attack; inversely if battle will not bring victory then do not attack. If a commander treats his soldiers as children and sons and then administers rewards and punishments justly according to the merits of their behavior, then those soldiers will go to places of extreme danger and fight unto death for, and alongside, that commander. One will win if one knows his military's abilities, his enemy's weaknesses, the terrain, and the weather conditions.<sup>91</sup>

In the Griffith version, some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's tenth chapter detail the importance of the following: faking a withdrawal and then intercepting half of the enemy's forces in an effort to sway the odds in one's favor; taking strategic ground before an enemy does; not being held in contempt by those one is commissioned to lead; not allowing oneself to be provoked to use troops wrongly; using special forces composed of the best fighters as shock troops at the point of one's formations; being kind and gracious to one's soldiers while employing proper discipline; and sharing the same burdens, conditions, and experiences as one's troops.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Ames, 147-149; Sawyer, 213.

<sup>90</sup> Ames, 149, 150.

<sup>91</sup> Ames, 150-151; Sawyer, 214-215.

<sup>92</sup> Griffith, 124-129.



Chapter Eleven deals with types of terrain and the methods of deploying troops thereon. The types are as follows: "dispersive," defined as your own land; "frontier," "light," or "marginal," defined as not far into your enemy's land; "key" or "contentious," defined as land that gives an advantage; "open" land is "available" and defined as land navigable or usable by all parties to a conflict; "focal," defined as land that borders three states and can be used to gain support from those states; "serious" or "contentious," defined as land that is deep inside an enemy's state; "difficult," defined as land that is hard to cross; "constricted," defined as land that is easy to defend because of natural features, and "desperate," defined as land that offers no way out but to fight to the death.<sup>93</sup>

Chapter Eleven has a checklist of preferred actions, some being terrain specific. They are as follows: (1) in enemy territory keep moving; (2) allow your enemy to come to you on advantageous terrain; (3) do not get cut off from the rear or supply lines of your military on advantageous terrain; (4) if at a disadvantage, capture something your enemy needs; (5) live off your enemy's land to save on logistical burdens; (6) when building, moving, and/or attacking a force do not let it be known that you are doing so; (7) prohibit superstitious activities to gain cooperation from your men; (8) when soldiers are quickly put into a tactical engagement in which their only hope for survival is to fight hard, they will do so; and (9) combat—train other parts of the army to rise up and defend any part that is attacked. An outstanding general whose plans are not easily figured out will achieve military success on various terrains.<sup>94</sup>

Chapter Eleven focuses on understanding the soldier's mentality when one is on different types of terrain. Some of the cause and effect relationships listed as important are as follows: togetherness and strong resolve come from being alone as a group well inside enemy territory; realize before it is too late where a trap or guerrilla attack may be placed inside enemy lines, and inform your troops when they are on land that offers no way out, to gain greater fighting will.<sup>95</sup> It is also equally important in advance of a war to know your possible allies' intentions, discover your enemy's plans, find out what your enemy needs and cannot lose, learn your enemy's terrain, expect to employ local guides, seek council in making plans, review your plans repeatedly, pay your people rewards before, and offer even more tentative rewards afterwards, appear well-intentioned and then when your enemy relaxes his guard, strike him swiftly before he can raise it again.

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<sup>93</sup> Hanzhang, 119; Sawyer, 219.

<sup>94</sup> Ames, 155-158, Sawyer, 219-221.

<sup>95</sup> Ames, 159-161; Sawyer, 222-224.

When ready, declare war, cut off all travel routes, stop all friendly association with your enemy, deprive your enemy of that which he needs to win, and in conquering, adapt to your enemy's responses. If extremely well planned and quickly implemented, your enemy's allies will not rescue him.<sup>96</sup>

In the Griffith version, some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's eleventh chapter serve to support the importance of the following: keeping soldiers together when only slightly into enemy territory; not getting caught between two strategically advantageous natural features; keeping supply lines intact; giving gifts to encourage alliance formation; allowing an enemy to think that there is a way out of his predicament (even though there may not be); using more than one deception and diversion at a time to confuse an enemy; the value of speed in surprise assaults; the value of a particular battle to establish the winner of an entire war; and using new and innovative plans to avoid defeat brought on by predictability.<sup>97</sup>

The last two chapters stand on their own, not as miscellaneous chapters, but as chapters important enough to deserve independent consideration. Both chapters encourage preparation and outline a suggested course of action in accord with the strategic advantages provided by two devastating tools. Chapter Twelve, "Attack by Fire" or "The Incendiary Attack," could possibly stand on its own, since such assaults may allow a force (be it weaker, equal, or stronger) not only to weaken but also to possibly destroy hardened strongholds. Chapter Thirteen, "Employment of Secret Agents," "Espionage," or "Using Spies," stands on its own, since it is on the information obtained and/or disseminated through spies that most, if not all, war plans depend.<sup>98</sup>

Chapter Twelve starts by detailing the targets or "types" of incendiary assault. They are as follows: "personnel," "armories," "provisions," "transport vehicles and equipment," and "installations."<sup>99</sup> When warm seasons make such feasible, keep fuel on hand for the use of fire and water to contain and direct it. When using incendiary attacks, be able to adapt to the unexpected. For example, if an enemy maintains his grace under pressure when his camp has been set on fire do not invade his camp. Allow him to roast and then,

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<sup>96</sup> Ames, 161-162; Sawyer, 223-224.

<sup>97</sup> Griffith, 130-136.

<sup>98</sup> Ames, x; Griffith, contents; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 23.

<sup>99</sup> Between the Ames, Hanzhang, and Sawyer interpretations of *The Art of War*, there appears to be significant disagreement over the five types of fiery attack. Ames, 165; Hanzhang, 124; Sawyer, 227. Griffith lists the employment of flaming arrows as another distinct type. Griffith, 141.

when and if it is possible, attack or set fire to his camp's exterior. Do not attack from down wind and compensate according to changes in its direction. If used properly, fire will maintain your force's strength by reducing your losses. War is a very serious activity in which people are killed and things are destroyed.<sup>100</sup> "Thus the farsighted ruler approaches battle with prudence, and the good commander moves with caution."<sup>101</sup>

In the Griffith version, some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's Chapter Twelve detail instances of the following: having fires set within an enemy's camp by your enemy's own soldiers; having incendiary devices ready before battle; and attacking at the right moment.<sup>102</sup>

Chapter Thirteen details the importance of spies. It is stated that spies, rather than superstition, establish the winner of a war. Five types are mentioned: (1) "local" or outsider spies recruited from an enemy's towns and cities; (2) political or "insider" spies recruited because of their closeness to an enemy within his own government; (3) "double agents" are your enemy's spies who work for you; (4) "expendable" spies disseminate misinformation to the enemy; (5) and "living" spies bring information to you. Certain rules allow for the effective use of spies. To recruit and keep spies, one should do the following: be just, kind, wise, and most importantly "subtle"; pay them well; and know the enemy's important personnel, including his spies' positions and names. If one's secret plans are exposed, kill the spy who discovered them and all who heard them. One who does not use espionage effectively stands in the way of civilian productivity (defined as agriculture), throws a state into debt (due to the cost of running a war), is inhumane (because war costs lives) and eventually becomes a loser.<sup>103</sup> It is notable that the last paragraph of Sun Tzu's thirteenth chapter differs significantly between older and newly discovered texts as to which leaders, strategists, and spies established certain dynasties.<sup>104</sup>

In the Griffith version, some of the supplemental commentaries that surround Sun Tzu's thirteenth chapter detail instances of the following: realizing how many people it takes to support one soldier in the field (a seven to one ratio in those days); taking advantage of dissension in your enemy's ranks to hire spies; feeding your own spies

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<sup>100</sup> Ames, 165-166; Sawyer, 227-228.

<sup>101</sup> Ames, 166.

<sup>102</sup> Griffith, 141-142.

<sup>103</sup> Ames, 169-171; Sawyer, 231-233.

<sup>104</sup> Ames, 22-23.

misinformation in preparation for when they are caught; using agents to negotiate a treaty and then attacking; recruiting intelligent spies who wear a guise of stupidity well; really knowing who your spies are; and knowing as much as possible about your enemy's personnel, especially their fighting abilities and strategic concerns.<sup>105</sup>

Those versions of *The Art of War* that were reviewed for this thesis contain significant differences over that which is offered in addition to the core thirteen chapters.

The Griffith version of *The Art of War* not only includes largely discredited theories on Sun Tzu's life and authorship of *The Art of War*, but also commentary on Mao Tse-tung's use of Sun Tzu's theories, Wu Ch'I's *The Art of War*,<sup>106</sup> a discussion of the Japanese adoption of Sun Tzu's text, numerous commentaries and historical accounts made by ancient Chinese philosophers, strategists, and generals for the purpose of specifically demonstrating the application of the principles found within many of the passage's lessons, and more.<sup>107</sup> The Griffith version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is used by The USMC Command and Staff College.<sup>108</sup>

The J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips version of *The Art of War* offers reinterpretation and commentary on Chinese history, Sun Tzu's life story, the five newly discovered chapters of *The Art of War*, and other materials. J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips' translation of the text's first thirteen chapters, however, is quite hard to read in that it requires nonstandard eye movement because of its arrangement.<sup>109</sup>

The Thomas Cleary version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* includes an introduction to Taoism's role in the shaping of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu's life story, and the commentary of many other philosopher strategists integrated with a fairly limited number of excerpts from the first thirteen chapters of *The Art of War*.<sup>110</sup>

The Ralph D. Sawyer version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* includes excellent commentary on the Chinese worldview, Chinese dynasties, historical development of Chinese warfare, the life of Sun Tzu, core chapters of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, some of

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<sup>105</sup> Griffith, 144-149.

<sup>106</sup> Due to the textual similarities between their works, Wu Ch'I, who was born about 430 B.C., has traditionally been renowned as Sun Tzu. Griffith, 150; Sawyer, 156-157.

<sup>107</sup> Griffith, contents, 184-186.

<sup>108</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 24; USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 2.

<sup>109</sup> J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 11-13, 37.

<sup>110</sup> Cleary, *The Art of War*, contents.

the recently discovered outer chapters of Sun Tzu's text, and more. Excluding, however, the places in which it was necessary to resolve interpretation conflicts, the Sawyer version of *The Art of War's* first thirteen chapters is based on the interpretation of a later Sung dynasty version of Sun Tzu's text, not the recently discovered but older Linyi chapters.<sup>111</sup>

Of particularly great importance may be an understanding of the contemporary significance of Sawyer's excellent historical commentary on Chinese employment of chaos and flanking maneuvers for victory in war around Sun Tzu's day.<sup>112</sup> The review of the specific strategies (guided by principles that Sun Tzu recognized and included in his text) applied in Wu's conquest of Ch'u, and Yueh's attack on Wu, are enlightening.<sup>113</sup> The first strategy that was used against Ch'u harnessed the "chaos" that is created by an enemy's "panic" as a result of their retreating first line clashing with their own second line when that second line was not ready to carry out an attack.<sup>114</sup> The second strategy was employed against Wu, consisted of a two flank diversion to split the enemy in a three flank assault apparently coupled with the extra motivation that comes from knowing that a quick retreat is not possible because a river is at the initiating adversary's rear.<sup>115</sup>

Comparable to the Sawyer version (due to an expanded approach to related topics and simplicity in form), the Roger Ames version of *The Art of War* offers insights into the following: the distinctions between what is said to be the dominant western and eastern worldviews;<sup>116</sup> important factors in translation, contemporary scholarship on Sun Tzu's text and its origin; historical development of Chinese warfare, the recently discovered Linyi chapters of *The Art of War* that are supplemented with excerpts from the Sung version of *The Art of War*, in his text; meticulously collated Sun Tzu or his teachings that may be found as miscellaneous references in other Chinese texts; recently discovered archeological finds; and more.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Sawyer, 9, 19, 23, 24.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 31-127.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 93-127.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 94-97.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 122-126.

<sup>116</sup> Regrettably, Ames combines the Christian and Greek philosophical worldviews which are actually quite different. There are distinctions between power and authority, the state's jurisdictions and duties, and man's limitations. Gary Amos, *Biblical Principles of Government: America, A Case Study* (Virginia Beach, Virginia: Regent University School of Government, 1987); Herbert Titus, *God, Man, and Law: The Biblical Principles* (Oak Brook, Illinois: Institute in Basic Life Principles, 1994).

<sup>117</sup> Ames, ix-xiii, 97-99.

Finally, there is the contemporary version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* that was written from the Chinese socialist perspective by General Tao Hanzhang who participated in Mao's great march and has managed to maintain favor to this day. This version is supplemented with commentary on a number of historically famous tactical actions, operations, and strategies including a large number of illustrated Chinese battles. This excellent text seems designed for easy reading, comprehension, and application.<sup>118</sup> It is easy to understand why the General Tao Hanzhang and Yuan Shibing version of *The Art of War* is used by the USMC War College.<sup>119</sup>

As found in the Ames version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* the recently discovered outer text Linyi chapters of *The Art of War* consist of the following. Chapter One is a question and answer dialog in which Sun Tzu explains to his King that of the leaders who divided up the Chin kingdom, in time only one possessed it all. The other five lost because their governments had too many bureaucrats who wasted money on lavish lifestyles, burdened their citizens with too much taxation, and carried out too many military campaigns.<sup>120</sup> "The way ... of the true king is ... [to] love the people generously."<sup>121</sup> Chapter Two, titled "The Four Contingencies," is to a large degree a reiteration of Chapter Eight of Sun Tzu's core text.<sup>122</sup> Chapter Three further explains the way to extend and maintain a kingdom by detailing The Yellow Emperor's campaigns against his four neighbors—a story that in some respects resembles Helu's. The method is benevolence: allowing the people freedom to prosper from their own endeavors, allowing adequate productive time to pass between military ventures, harnessing the terrain's strategic advantages, and not allowing an enemy to survive.<sup>123</sup> The fourth chapter emphasizes the importance of understanding the types of terrain and human character necessary for gaining success in war. It seems to be a combination of the lessons taught in *The Art of War's* core text, particularly Chapter Eleven.<sup>124</sup> The fifth

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<sup>118</sup> Hanzhang, 5-9.

<sup>119</sup> Joseph Strange, *War, Policy, and Strategy Course Syllabus* (Quantico, Virginia: USMC War College, 1994) 4.

<sup>120</sup> Ames, 175-176.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 176.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., x, 179-180.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 183-184.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 187-188.

chapter of the outer text is another form of the story of Sun Tzu's test. It differs from the text found in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's historical account in that Sun Tzu is described as being more serious about his role as a teacher.<sup>125</sup> Of further significance is Ames's third section on Sun Tzu's teachings that have been excerpted from many other younger texts. Within this large section one may find a multitude of specific strategies and discussions further explaining the lessons taught in *The Art of War's* core chapters.<sup>126</sup> This section is very valuable for integrating and applying Sun Tzuian principles.<sup>127</sup>

Ralph Sawyer's version of *The Art of War* offers one section titled "Tomb Texts and Lost Writings."<sup>128</sup> It is comparable to Ames's second and third sections, that in respective order, focus on those chapters of *The Art of War* that follow the first thirteen chapters and excerpts from other Chinese texts. It covers some of the best material that may be found in the Ames version's second and third sections on Sun Tzu's works. Sawyer's chapter includes the Linyi tomb's outer second chapter on four contingencies and the outer fifth chapter that details the different version of Sun Tzu's test.<sup>129</sup> Mixed in with those chapters are significant excerpts from the T'ung-tien, a compilation of laws and organizations in the T'ang dynasty (c. 618-907).<sup>130</sup> The first of those T'ung-tien chapters, thought to come from Sun Tzu or an associated school, is the "Nine Configurations."<sup>131</sup> It is composed of specific ordered strategic recommendations believed to be replies given by Sun Tzu to Helu's questions. In content it seems to consist of a combination of lessons found in the core text's Chapters Eight, Ten, and Eleven.<sup>132</sup>

Among its many answers may be found a recommendation of what a force should do when surrounded and with seemingly no way out. The steps suggested are as follows. Make moats and crossways more treacherous. Calmly make your armor inspection ready and weapons battle ready. Make a last feast from all of your supplies and animals.

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 191-196.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 196-260.

<sup>128</sup> Sawyer, 235.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 244, 246.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., 238, 245.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., 237.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 237-238.

Everything that has no battle use must be burned. Help your officers to gain the rage and mentality of knowing that if they are going to die they will take as many of the enemy as they can with them. With great rage, noise, and coordination attempt to break out and assault your enemy's two flanks and rear. This excerpt may be found not only in Sawyer's text on pages 243 through 244 but also in the Ames text on pages 217 through 219.<sup>133</sup> When surrounded and without an escape, forces are distressed, and when the distressed do not fight they are dead.<sup>134</sup> In the second chapter taken from the T'ung-tien, titled "Two Questions," the question is asked, what if one is under threat or attack from a larger or greater force or one that is well prepared and holds the high ground. Sun Tzu gives two replies: (1) appease them to encourage their arrogance, wait until they travel some place, and then unexpectedly strike their flanks, hitting the less skilled troops found in the middle of their formations; (2) isolate the enemy by holding crossroads and key terrain, make their supply lines inefficient, entice them to come out of hiding for attack, and then when they are cold and tired, crush them.<sup>135</sup>

#### *D. The Value of The Art of War*

With all that has transpired from the days that Sun Tzu's theories were first spread until now, it has become the view of many scholars that Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is the oldest, most well thought out, comprehensive, evolved or refined, widely applied, and yet most simply elegant training text for confrontation.<sup>136</sup> The text is so useful and esteemed that despite the passage of years, changes in languages, directions of political winds, and the progression of technology Sun Tzu's theories have persisted throughout all of China's totalitarian seasons and other geopolitical dynasties throughout the world.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Ames, 217-219; Sawyer, 243-244.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Sawyer, 245-246. The summary of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, found herein, is far from comprehensive. There are other important but more subtle lessons that can be learned from the text if it is read in its entirety rather than summarized.

Due to the economy of words that may be found in the text it may require that a reader undertake several readings, question Sun Tzu's beliefs about the nature and character of human beings, and review Sun Tzu's components for success in order to gain significant insight into the wealth of knowledge found in *The Art of War*. It may be said that the text should be read like one reads the Bible. Those who read the Bible superficially may gain knowledge of historical accounts but miss an understanding of their salvation and the deeper moral lessons.

<sup>136</sup> J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 20-21.

<sup>137</sup> Cleary *Mastering The Art of War*, 72-74; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 281-282. Those totalitarian seasons include the: Spring and Autumn Era (720-404 B.C.); Warring States Era (403-221



As Colonel Pratt, the current Director of The Marine Corps University's Command and Staff College, detailed, "Sun Tzu is superficially easy to read and understand. Perhaps the old Chinese proverb, '... no man can wade into the same river twice, for on the second occasion both the river and the man are different ...' applies to this state of being and in each situation." Colonel Pratt continues,

Sun Tzu can and should be read by officers as they rise in rank, experience, and responsibility, for although his words remain the same, the officer does not. As he reflects upon what Sun Tzu says, he continues to draw upon his own experiences and responsibilities to derive new insight, i.e., value from his endeavors ... . [Sun Tzu] requires a life of study.<sup>138</sup>

Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* retains its value. While the text is titled *The Art of War*, one should not be so narrow-minded to insist that the text is limited in application to military affairs. Because of the principles that it highlights some people believe that it may be applied to most, if not all struggles. Among other things, those principles include: developing good character, fostering personal relationships, performing scientific research, being productive if not advancing in business, participating in sports, political campaigning, enforcing the law, and more.<sup>139</sup>

#### *E. The Art of War in the Orient: Historic Military Influence*

Due to the lessons that it teaches, *The Art of War* has been read, appreciated, expounded upon, and implemented by many philosophers, strategists, scholars, generals, statesmen, and tyrants.

With assistance from General Sun Quan, Cao Cao, the Three Kingdoms period General, ended the Han Dynasty and defeated Liu Bei (a Han who tried to recapture the

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B.C.); Qin, or if you prefer, Ch'In Dynasty (221-207 B.C.); Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.); Three Kingdoms Era (220-280 A.D.); Jin Dynasty (265-420 A.D.); Northern and Southern Dynasties (420-589 A.D.); Sui Dynasty (581-618 A.D.); Tang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.); Five Dynasties (907-960 A.D.); Song, or if you prefer, Sung Dynasty (960-1280 A.D.); Yuan Dynasty (1281-1368 A.D.); Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.); Qing, or Ch'ing, Dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.); and more recently numerous Chinese Socialist Dynasties.

<sup>138</sup> Colonel A. N. Pratt, Director, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, letter to author, 18 October 1994, Quantico, Virginia.

<sup>139</sup> Ames, 40-42, 73, 78; Cleary, *The Art of War*, 33-38; Hanzhang, outside cover; Sawyer, 14-18, 31-32.

throne and is the primary character of *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, by Luo Guanzhong). Cao Cao, whose Wei dynasty came into being around 100 to 220 A.D., is famous for publishing an official military manual version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. This included his own commentaries and the input of quite a few honored scholars. That publication was revised and expounded upon further in the late 18th century by the scholarly critic Sun Hsing-yen. For quite some time the revised Cao Cao version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* was required military reading in China. Some might say that it became the standard.<sup>140</sup>

The Hans also studied Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* as has been made evident in the Linyi tomb discoveries. During the aforementioned Han clan's fall from power, Liu Bei commissioned Zhuge Liang to fill the role of an upper-level military and civil advisor and leader. Zhuge Liang made many commentaries on *The Art of War* which are still published today, as for example in Thomas Cleary's *Mastering The Art of War*. Upon Liu Bei's death Zhuge Liang temporarily ran what was left of the Han empire. When Zhuge Liang died he requested that the Han heir rule with restraint and that his son farm his land and develop character, wisdom, and relationships with decent people.<sup>141</sup>

As seen by the numerous versions of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* found in early Japan, it may be said that the study of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* was important especially in building military doctrine. This may have been particularly evident the Second World War. The Japanese employment of successive high-speed, deep-penetration flanking maneuvers in Malaya and northern China are the first example.<sup>142</sup> Admiral Yamamoto's Pearl Harbor strategy seems to be a second example. In Pearl Harbor, the Japanese arrived through an indirect approach from the north, used a naval-air force that, if surprise had been properly applied, could have destroyed the American Pacific Ocean capability. As a result, the Japanese gained temporary Pacific Ocean superiority in one battle.<sup>143</sup>

Those general Second World War strategies in some degree reflect Sun Tzu's ideas. *The Art of War* states, "Anciently the skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and awaited the enemy's moment of vulnerability. ... [T]he possibility of victory [is] in

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<sup>140</sup> Griffith, ix, 1; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 20; Warshaw, 44.

<sup>141</sup> Cleary, *Mastering The Art of War*, 35-38.

<sup>142</sup> B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968) 271-272; Griffith, 177.

<sup>143</sup> Hart, 268-271.

the attack."<sup>144</sup> "Anger his general and confuse him."<sup>145</sup> "When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, make it appear that you are near."<sup>146</sup> "Thus, march by an indirect route and divert the enemy by enticing him with bait. So doing, you may set out after he does and arrive before him."<sup>147</sup> In battle, "the momentum of one skilled at war is overwhelming, and his attack precisely regulated."<sup>148</sup> "... [T]he potential of troops skillfully commanded in battle may be compared to that of round boulders which roll down from mountain heights."<sup>149</sup>

Of those leaders in the Orient that utilized or even took to full conclusion many of the lessons that may be found in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, no study would be considered credible without discussing Mao Tse-tung, the socialist Chinese strategist and general credited with the refinement of modern guerrilla warfare. Mao Tse-tung alleged that his writings were based on Marxist dialectical principles and utilized what some people refer to as "protracted struggle." Mao Tse-tung, however, quoted and paraphrased *The Art of War* often. His military doctrine reflects more of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* than he may have liked to admit.<sup>150</sup> This is not to say that Sun Tzu's theory and socialist doctrine are polar opposites or mutually exclusive. As aforementioned, one of the versions of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* used in this thesis and studied in The USMC War College is written by a Chinese communist general who was with Mao from his early days.<sup>151</sup>

History is clear that in ancient, early modern, and today's China, power was and still is considered the route to authority. Chinese history has taken the composition of constant, what may be termed serial, civil wars. China is such a vast land with varied terrain. Perhaps it was only a matter of time before someone (in this case Mao Tse-tung) concluded that the winner of a war was not established by the concentration of force at a particular time, but by gaining time, which was achieved by gaining space. Protracted

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<sup>144</sup> Griffith, 85.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 95.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., 45, 50-53; Franklin Mark Osanka, *Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements 1941-1961* (New York: The Free Press, 1962) 132-134.

<sup>151</sup> Hanzhang, 5-7; Strange, 4.

war was and is a strategy taken when weak, that involves escaping, building one's forces, and gaining strategic advantages while depleting those of the enemy—such also includes the employment of guerrilla warfare.<sup>152</sup>

Admittedly, Sun Tzu recommended against wars of long duration and possibly to some degree against forced marches.<sup>153</sup> Mao's Long March, however, seems to exhibit an understanding of *The Art of War's* lessons on determining action according to a force's relative size, attacking an enemy's strategy, achieving survival and victory when surrounded, creating a unified crushing solid force, mobility on open and mountainous enemy terrain, captures of war equipment and supplies, and making oneself invincible.<sup>154</sup>

Among other things, both Mao's and Sun Tzu's teaching are similar in the following ways: (1) principles that were strategically employed in China's ten-year communist revolution and the aforementioned accounts of how Wu conquered Chu in a five-to-six-year guerrilla war; (2) the notion of the dialectic, explained as taking one step backwards to be able to take three steps forward, and Sun Tzu's recommendations that retreats be used to bait traps; and (3) Mao's emphasis on winning war through political indoctrination and activism and Sun Tzu's concern for building the support of the people which includes not only one's own soldiers and populous, but also the enemy's soldiers and populous.<sup>155</sup>

Interestingly, despite the fact Sun Tzu held that protracted wars are not good for a people and state together, the following recommendations may in sum provide the rational needed to win a protracted war.<sup>156</sup> "Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."<sup>157</sup> "... [S]killful warriors first made themselves invincible and waited the enemy's moment of vulnerability." "Invincibility depends on one's self ...."<sup>158</sup> "... [T]he general must create situations which will contribute to their accomplishment. ... [A]ct

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<sup>152</sup> Osanka, 134-138.

<sup>153</sup> Griffith, 72-73; Sawyer, 173-174.

<sup>154</sup> Ames, 218; Griffith, 64, 69, 76, 77, 79-80, 83, 87, 91, 102, 110, 124, 128-129, 133-134; Osanka, 149-158.

<sup>155</sup> Griffith, 48-49, 51, 53, 64, 66-69; Osanka, 134, 136-137; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 18-19.

<sup>156</sup> Griffith, 73.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 85.

expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so control the balance."<sup>159</sup> "[B]y taking into account the favorable factors, he makes his plan feasible; by taking into account the unfavorable, he may resolve the difficulties."<sup>160</sup> "... [W]hen those experienced in war move they make no mistakes; when they act, their resources are limitless."<sup>161</sup> "To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place that the enemy does not protect. To be certain to hold what you defend is to defend a place the enemy does not attack."<sup>162</sup> "He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious. ... He who understands how to use both large and small forces will be victorious."<sup>163</sup> "Keep him [your enemy] under a strain and wear him down."<sup>164</sup> "If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing ... ." "... [I]f in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him ... ." "<sup>165</sup> "Although I estimate the troops of [the enemy] ... as many, of what benefit is this superiority to the outcome?" <sup>166</sup>

In summary, always remember that "[i]n war, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance relying on sheer military power. ... It is sufficient to estimate the enemy situation correctly and to concentrate your strength to capture him. There is no more to it than this. He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him."<sup>167</sup> "... [A]s water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions [and] ... [o]ne able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine."<sup>168</sup> Such is an exercise of will and stamina.

After Mao Tse-tung, many of the lessons found in *The Art of War* were developed, transmitted, and used in other conflicts. Among the less recent of those military actions

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 129.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid., 80.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., 101.

that may come to a culturally literate American's memory, recall and may at least exemplify an understanding of some of the lessons found in *The Art of War*, is the North Vietnamese Army's use of The Ho Chi Min Trail and Tet Offensive. In the first case, the importance of supply and staying out of an enemy's reach was recognized.<sup>169</sup> In the second case, the importance of keeping an enemy under a physical and more importantly psychological strain by hitting that enemy where and when he does not expect to be hit was recognized.<sup>170</sup> American, British, and French military strategists have experienced the employment of long term guerrilla strategies by Vietnamese communist General Giap, Malayan Communists, the Filipino Peoples Liberation Army, and other forces.<sup>171</sup>

#### *F. The Art of War in the West: Historic Military Influence*

As detailed by Brigadier General Samuel Griffith USMC (ret.) it is known that at an early date, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* spread into Asia and then Europe.<sup>172</sup> It is rumored that Napoleon may have even studied a version of the text that was translated in 1772 by a Jesuit priest named J. J. Amiot who served King Louis XV.<sup>173</sup> The earliest known Russian translation was in 1860. In Tokyo a Royal Air Force Captain named Calthrop translated and published from a Japanese version of *The Art of War* in 1905 and again in 1908. This version was improved in 1910 by L. Giles, a British Assistant Museum Curator who specialized in Oriental writings.<sup>174</sup> The first German translation of *The Art of War* was available in 1910 and an essay on *The Art of War* was published in German in 1937. Griffith, however, believes that those documents were overlooked by the German leaders in those days.<sup>175</sup> Agreeably Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and/or the principles and lessons found therein may not have been applied by World War II Germany.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 72-73, 84.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 69-70.

<sup>171</sup> Osanka, 142-146, 175-183; Pratt, letter to author. At this point it should be easy to understand that the historical accounts, found herein, are not to be thought of as a complete listing of all those leaders who have applied Sun Tzu's teachings.

<sup>172</sup> Jesuit Amiot was in the service of Minister of State M. Bertin who answered to King Louis XV. While it is flawed with redundancies and misleading commentary, J. J. M. Amiot's version of Sun Tzu's text is still the earliest European translation known. Griffith, 179-180.

<sup>173</sup> J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 25-26.

<sup>174</sup> Griffith, 182.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., 182-183.

In the post Second World War era, interest in and exposure to Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* seems to be exponential in increase. The East Germans received a reinterpretation of the text from the Russians. In 1944, *The Art of War*, as translated by L. Giles, was published and made more available to Americans as part of a compilation of strategic works titled *Roots of Strategy*.<sup>177</sup> Then in France, Amiot's version of *The Art of War* was revised and revived in popularity in 1948 and 1956.<sup>178</sup> Unfortunately, while *The Art of War* was included in the *Roots of Strategy*, no in-depth inclusion of study of *The Art of War* is included in the ever popular *Makers of Modern Strategy*. With the passing references it does contain, the *Makers of Modern Strategy* could hardly be considered complete. Evidently filling scholastic, military, and free market demands of one form or another, Samuel Griffith's version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* was published in 1963.<sup>179</sup>

Perhaps some of the principles from lessons in *The Art of War* were not as overlooked in the West as it seems they were before Griffith published. It is significant that in the foreword of Griffith's version of *The Art of War*, Sir Captain Liddell Hart details that he first noticed Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* when Sir Duncan, the commander of the Defense Forces in Shanghai China, called his attention to it in 1927. An excerpt from Duncan's letter is further detail that as Liddell Hart did in past discourses on strategy, *The Art of War* highlights the importance of being like water in flowing to an enemy's weak points and winning strategically with minimal bloodshed.<sup>180</sup> Two years later in 1929 "Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart doctrine of the, 'indirect approach' was first published ... under the title *The Decisive Wars of History*." Those and other strategies of Liddell Hart's have been further refined and detailed numerous times in many of his following publications. His *Strategy of the Indirect Approach* was published in 1946 and again in

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<sup>176</sup> While doubting the World War II German use of Sun Tzu, it should be noted that the Blitzkrieg was quite successful because it coincidentally took into account many of the same factors that Sun Tzu detailed should be considered in an attack. Those considerations included taking advantage of weak points, speed of attack, and accurate, precise, and timely information from the battlefield. Colonel Wyly, USMC (ret.) Vice President, Marine Corps University, Professor of history, American Military University, interview by author, 5 April 1995, Heartland, Maine.

<sup>177</sup> Griffith, 183.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., 181. One may wonder if that French revival of *The Art of War* was to some degree prompted by problems in Vietnam among other places.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., 182-183; Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986) 800, 801, 814, 823.

<sup>180</sup> Griffith, vi, vii.

better form in 1954. Published in 1967 and 1968 Liddell Hart's second revised version of *Strategy* opens with a page of key doctrinal quotes from Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*.<sup>181</sup>

Further evidence of *The Art of War's* influence, be it direct or indirect, may exist in the historical record of strategies implemented by the United States military. In the Second World War the Japanese lost the Pacific because of three reasons: (1) the Pearl Harbor attack unified America against them; (2) the Japanese fought to keep all of the ground that they held; and (3) Americans with their allies employed a strategy of island hopping often avoiding excessive and costly engagements. America and her allies attacked Japanese strategy (and, it might be added, with a great deal of providential help).<sup>182</sup> In 1950, during the United Nation's police action in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur made his famous high tide landing at Inchon. This amphibious landing out flanked the North Koreans and, when combined with the northward push of allied land forces, made it possible to drive the North Koreans and Red Chinese back for a time.<sup>183</sup>

While to a degree those instances may exhibit the application of principles in lessons that are part of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, no proof has been found, that they were the result of his teachings being taught in the USMC Educational System, even though passing references to Sun Tzu have been made in some of the USMC Command and Staff College's courses since Korea.<sup>184</sup>

It is known that Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* gained greater attention during and after the Vietnam conflict. Evidence might be found in the justification of the American strategy of attempting to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people. United States Army General William Westmoreland, leader of American ground forces there, "... considered himself an expert on Sun Tzu ... and even lectured at the Taiwanese National Military College. History, [however] tells a different tale. [Ho Chi Mihn's top general General Giap was] ... the real student of this Chinese master's philosophy."<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> Hart, inside cover, publication page, 11-12.

<sup>182</sup> Griffith, 177-178; Hart, 269-274.

<sup>183</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 65, 76; Thibault, ed., National Defense University, *The Art and Practice of Military Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1984) 248-249; Pratt, letter to author.

<sup>184</sup> Pratt, letter to author.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.



Many of the improvements in the United States military's way of fighting could be considered responses to problems experienced in Vietnam.<sup>186</sup>

Admittedly, the United States military's application, and more specifically, the USMC's understanding and precedent-setting application of principles distilled from lessons found in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* may, with the weighing out of the various successes and failures, be highly questionable. The availability of some form of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, however, and the fact that the text is presently taught in Marine Corps University colleges, schools, and programs is not questionable. Today, numerous books containing various translations of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* reflect the expansion and application of his teaching; studies that compare and contrast Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* to the works of other strategists have and are being published in the United States. The few of those versions of Sun Tzu's text that may be found listed in this paper's bibliography have been chosen for two reasons. They are either excellent for comparing to those texts that are used in the USMC University or they are themselves used in the USMC University.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., US Army (ret.), *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992) 242-243; Major Jeffery Willis, Tactics Instructor, Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, interview by author, 25 October 1994, Quantico, Virginia.

<sup>187</sup> Bruce I. Gudmundsson, educator, Institute for Tactical Education, letter to author, 16 October 1994, Quantico, Virginia; Pratt, letter to author.

As stated there are many versions of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* currently available in American bookstores. They have often been translated by, edited by, comment on, and/or written by authors that have served as military personnel and are largely read by what some would term the core of government professionals in both civil and military service. Just as the task of accounting for all of the versions and variations of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* that are published in contemporary America would involve a great deal of effort, so also detailing and critiquing the entire United States military's use of the various translations, expansions, and comparative texts would be a great a task. Even if, due to this thesis's primary concern with combatant training, it were to be limited to the Army's, Air Force's, Navy's, and Marine's War Colleges, related Service Universities, and training centers in addition to The National Defense University, it would still be difficult for one author to complete in timely manner and with significant impact. Partly for those reasons and in appreciation of the USMC, this thesis attempts to detail and critique that information that was available to the author concerning the Marine Corps' use of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* within the USMC University at Quantico Virginia. Hopefully, this thesis will encourage other scholars to invest effort studying the Marine Corps University and Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*.

### III

#### THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS'S MINOR EDUCATIONAL USES OF *THE ART OF WAR*

##### *A. The Development and Purposeful Reform of the United States Marine Corps University and Its Early Use of The Art of War*

According to a letter from Colonel A. N. Pratt of the Command Staff College, the Marine Corps Professional Military Education system was founded in 1891; its first school, called the School of Application (now The Basic School or TBS) was for newly Commissioned Second Lieutenants. A three-tiered system was established after the First World War, with the Field Officers Course (now Command and Staff College or CSC) welcoming its initial class in 1920 and the Company Officers Course (now the Amphibious Warfare School or AWS) convening the next year, 1921.<sup>188</sup>

The Marine Corps Professional Military Education system has lost records of past course curricula, and therefore, it is not known when Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* first received the Marine Corps Educational System's attention in part or whole. As stated, "... since Korea, passing reference in various classes have been made to Sun Tzu at the Command and Staff College." It is highly likely that the Marine Corps Professional Military Education system's early use of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* may be accounted for "... in the personal papers ... of Marine officers who served in China." Many of those papers may be found in collections in the Marine Corps Historical Center at the Washington D.C. Navy Yard or in the Marine Corps Research Center at Quantico, Virginia. Of those officers who have served in China, it is clear that "... the personal papers of Brigadier General Sam Griffith would be an important source ..." that may yield some answers detailing the first official or even unofficial Marine Corps Professional Military Education System's use of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*.<sup>189</sup>

Some people, however, would consider this inquiry into Brigadier General Griffith's personal papers unnecessary because of the published record he has left us. For a long time since its first publication in 1963, the Samuel B. Griffith translation of Sun

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<sup>188</sup> Pratt, letter to author.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid.

Tzu's *The Art of War*, with its foreword written by the B. H. Liddell Hart, has been highly regarded.<sup>190</sup> Whether it was before or after its first copywritten publication, it is very possible this translation of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* was required and/or recommended reading of those under Griffith's command. This was before it was adopted by various Marine Corps colleges, schools, and/or programs at Quantico, Virginia, as well as recommended reading for the entire Marine Corps.

The Formal Officers Schools, today's Marine Corps University, in Quantico, Virginia, was founded, in accord with orders by General Gray, the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, on August 1, 1989. As an institution "[r]esponsible for creating and implementing a Corps-wide program of professional military education, the University has become a center for learning and innovation."<sup>191</sup> In 1990, a fourth school was added to the system, the Marine Corps War College.<sup>192</sup> The founding of that college "... highlights the Marine Corps' commitment to professional military education."<sup>193</sup> As explained prior, in doing so the Marine Corps War College employs *Sun Tzu's The Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation* written by Chinese communist General Tao Hanzhang and translated by Yuan Shibing.<sup>194</sup>

With the understanding that there will always be threats that demand the Marine Corps' attention, the first post Cold War Commandant of the Marine Corps 1987-1991, General Alfred M. Gray did much more than simply add the Marine Corps War College and create the Marine Corps University. This real life John Wayne had extensive experience in Korea and Vietnam among other places around the globe and did not like it when bureaucrats soiled the Marine Corps uniform by wearing it. He reformed the entire Marine Corps with a focus on educating the Marine Corps for the sake of expeditionary ability and mission readiness. The USMC University was the point of origin in that educational process.<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> Griffith, 183.

<sup>191</sup> USMC War College, *Marine Corps War College Academic Catalog, 1994-1995* (Quantico, Virginia: USMC War College, 1994) 1.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.; Pratt, letter to author.

<sup>193</sup> USMC War College, *Marine Corps War College Academic Catalog*, 1.

<sup>194</sup> General Tao Hanzhang, translated by Yuan Shibing. *Sun Tzu's Art of War: the Modern Chinese Interpretation* (New York: Sterling Publishing Company, Inc., 1990), as referenced in Strange, 4.

<sup>195</sup> Allen R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the USMC*, rev. and ex. (New York: The Free Press, 1991) 632.

In his post-cold war efforts to make the Corps tougher, faster, and ready for smaller but higher intensity expeditionary conflicts, among other things, he did the following: (1) eliminated many artillery positions by putting cannons into storage; (2) reduced the number of tanks in service to the Corps while bolstering the infantry with additional "TOW units" (a portable high tech anti-tank rocket); (3) added more men to infantry battalions; (4) increased the number of recon and explosive demolition experts (the Marine Corps version of special forces) to the Fleet Marine Force (the FMF has the duty of protecting Navy ships); and (5) added "Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Groups" to each Marine Amphibious Force (in order to find the particular strong and weak points in enemy lines before the carrying out a tactical action).<sup>196</sup>

While increasing the amount of infantry training and practice required of Marines before being permitted to study anything else, General Gray emphasized that every Marine is first and foremost a grunt (infantryman) who should expect to be used, not only in amphibious operation, but in any conflict anywhere at anytime. According to Allen Millett, "he wanted officers who had no interests beyond finding better ways to smite the nation's enemies."<sup>197</sup> To test and develop stamina, General Gray preferred that Marines train on bivouac, carrying weapons, and through long hard high-speed marches.<sup>198</sup> A man of substance, General Gray demanded introspective evaluation and improvement of the Corps and "... let the image problems take care of themselves."<sup>199</sup> All Marines were to be "warriors."<sup>200</sup>

General Gray brought about those changes in the hearts, minds and bodies of the Marine Corps from Quantico, Virginia, his chosen base of power and authority. While there, he did the following: (1) created the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command headquarters to direct all procurement activities; (2) reformed the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, which fused the Education Center and the Doctrine Center with several new centers dedicated to wargaming, intelligence

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<sup>196</sup> Ibid., 633.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid., 632.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid., 633.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., 632. With the character and love of a mature mind and heart, in addition to an honest consideration for one's own successes and failures, this author can say that being in the USMC at this time was a very enlightening and personal growth experience. Therein our fiber was tested and our fabric developed.

collection and analysis, training, and information technology; (3) changed "the formal officers schools" into the "Marine Corps University," complete with its own research library and "civilian" professors; and (4) placed high value on immersion in "military literature" and "intellectual performance" while pushing for faster curriculum reforms at the Marine Corps University.<sup>201</sup> During the time that all this happened, General Gray also had his recommended military literature reading list published. He assigned Captain John F. Schmitt to write two foundational handbooks, *Warfighting FMFM 1* and *Campaigning FMFM 1—1*.<sup>202</sup> Both manuals contain excerpts, principles, and lessons from Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*.

Core colleges, schools, and programs that followed General Gray's reformation are currently found under the University's umbrella and are the Communication Officers School, Officer Candidates School, Basic School, Amphibious Warfare School, Staff Non-Commissioned Officers Academy, Marine Corps War College, Command and Staff College, and Marine Corps Research Center. The University's Non-Resident Program and School of Advanced Warfare are two semi-autonomous parts of the Command and Staff College. Advanced training, known as "The Commanders Program" and the "Advanced Logistics Officers Courses," are also offered at the Marine Corps University—on the headquarters level, however. The support organs also located at Quantico are the Administration, Operations and Policy, Law of War Detachment, Logistics Instructional Branch, Information Technical, Logistics, Joint Combined Services Support, and International Military Student Management Office. While the University's colleges, schools, and programs answer directly to the President of the Marine Corps University, the support organs answer to the University's Vice President. The Vice President, Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, and Education Advisor answer to the University's President.<sup>203</sup>

Of those courses and lessons offered at the post-General Gray Marine Corps University, the most significant are those that actively teach principles distilled from, key doctrinal excerpts quoted from, and/or even the complete text of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. Each is discussed proportionately to the degree studied in each college, school, and program. This especially includes the War College and the Command and Staff College.

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid., 633-634.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid., 634.

<sup>203</sup> Bonnie Oliver, Education Plan Administrator, Marine Corps University, interview by author, 18 October 1994, Quantico, Virginia.

In a phone interview with Marine Corps University Education Plan Administrator Bonnie Oliver, a list was established of Marine Corps University colleges, schools, and programs to be initially investigated.<sup>204</sup>

### *B. The Marine Corps Professional Reading Program*

The simplest explanation of the Marine Corps' recent official adoption of Sun Tzu's text is that General Gray ordered it so. Such simplicity, however, ignores the question of why he ordered it so. In 1989, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), General Alfred Gray, designated Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* as the "Commandant's Choice" in reading for that year. It was introduced for the reasons that immediately follow.

... [H]e wanted all Marine leaders to read the book. He did not specify which edition ... . The purpose for reading Sun Tzu, like the purpose of the reading program as a whole, was (1) to tell Marines it was OK to be

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<sup>204</sup> Ibid. All of the University's colleges, schools, programs, and organs that are not further reviewed in this thesis have been deemed to not teach Sun Tzu's theories significantly enough to warrant further study. However, despite this paper's focus, it should be noted that the impact of what is taught in any of the Marine Corps University's colleges, schools, and programs is likely not limited only to those few who run, teach, and/or learn therein. It is likely that, to some degree, the impact extends outward to all of those who are associated with, influenced by, and wish to emulate its graduates.

To avoid any confusion over the significance of that which is taught to various ranks in each of the USMC University's "thesis pertinent" colleges, schools, and programs, it should be understood that, for the most part, in respective order of increasing authority the Marine Corps hierarchy of rank is as follows: Non-Commissioned Officers are sergeants, staff sergeants, gunnery sergeants, first sergeants or master sergeants, and sergeant majors or master gunnery sergeants. Officers are second lieutenants, first lieutenants, captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels, brigadier generals, major generals, lieutenant generals, and generals. USMC Officer Candidates School, *Candidate Regulations* (Quantico, Virginia: USMC Officer Candidate School, 1989) J-1.

To understand the significance of that which is taught in the USMC University, a second hierarchy must be understood. War consists of many levels. From the largest in spectrum to the smallest (but certainly not the least important) those levels are as follows: (1) the political level (which in actuality consists of a greater spectrum of activities and weapons than will be mentioned in this thesis and may be understood to be the negotiations and/or psychological warfare that occur between politicians and citizens, be they countrymen and/or foreigners before, during, and/or after a war with the aim to ultimately change and/or establish thought and/or resolve for some policy or legal end); (2) the strategic level refers to the upper level on which presidents, kings, and/or generals direct vast masses of military materials and personnel in order to, with a compound of actions, create overall offensive and/or defensive fronts for the purposes of achieving political demands in particular theaters of engagement (larger general geographic areas that conflicts occur in, some past examples of which are detailed by the titles of Pacific, European, and Indo-Chinese); (3) operational level (the level that exists between the strategic and tactical levels and is the level at which corresponding and consecutive tactical actions are planned and coordinated for the purpose of achieving strategic demands); and (4) the tactical level (the lowest level on which combat occurs and blood is shed). Gray, *Campaigning*, 3-7; Michael I. Handael, *Sun Tzu & Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War Compared* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1991) 17.

smart (i.e. undermine the anti-intellectuals) (2) to get Marines to be more 'Oriental' (i.e. crafty) in their approach to war (3) to support the transition to maneuver warfare (which has a lot in common with Sun Tzu) ... . Lord Acton wrote, 'reading makes the full man, writing the exact man, and conference the ready man.' Those ... who advocate the reading of Sun Tzu are not looking for an immediate pay off. Rather, we are interested in getting leaders to think seriously about their business.<sup>205</sup>

Currently the CMC reading list, also known as the "Marine Corps Professional Reading Program," recommends that Staff Non-Commissioned Officers and Company Grade Officers read the Thomas Cleary and the Samuel Griffith versions of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*.<sup>206</sup> With a simple "1-800" telephone call, The Marine Corps Association readily provides the six-page CMC recommended reading list to interested parties, and therefore, the availability of the list is not a factor that discourages Marines from reading of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. Individuals, however, who order any texts will have to pay for them.<sup>207</sup> The Marine Corps Association is a support organization that exists not only for Marines currently or not currently serving in the Marine Corps but also for personnel in other branches of the United States Military and civilians who choose to join and pay its dues.<sup>208</sup>

### *C. The Staff Non-Commissioned Officers Academy*

One popular saying is that enlisted personnel are the backbone of the military. Between the lower ranks of enlisted personnel and the lower ranks of officers exist those

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<sup>205</sup> Gudmundsson, letter to author.

<sup>206</sup> Commandant of the USMC, *Marine Corps Association Book Service, Marine Corps Professional Reading Program* (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Association, 1995) 2, 4.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>208</sup> While the Marine Corps Association is worth mentioning it should be kept in mind that the Marine Corps Association is not a division, department, or branch of the Marine Corps University. This is not to say that the Marine Corps Association is not valuable. It is very valuable. As detailed earlier, however, the major focus of this thesis are colleges, schools, and programs under the Marine Corps University that use Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. In the October of 1994 during a visit to Quantico, Virginia this author further found that Thomas Cleary's translation of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, Thomas Cleary's *Mastering The Art of War*, Ralph D. Sawyer's translation of *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, and Ralph D. Sawyer's *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* were on the shelves of the Marine Corps Association's Bookstore.

ranks referred to as Non-Commissioned Officers. Often in the past, in addition to instructor responsibilities for standardized lower-level military training, these Non-Commissioned Officers have been responsible for the tactical success of campaigns. Their training, therefore, is important.

There are a number of courses and seminars offered at the Staff Non-Commissioned Officers Academy. Respectively, those courses and seminars are listed in the order of their educational level and the ranks to which they are offered. The Staff Non-Commissioned Officers resident professional military education courses include the "Sergeant's Course" for sergeants, intermediate-level Career Course for staff sergeants, and the upper-level Advanced Course for gunnery sergeants. Additionally, two five-day seminars are offered. The "First Sergeants/Master Sergeants Seminar" consists of informative lecture/topics on professional military education. The "Sergeant Majors Symposium" consists of "... informative lectures/topics/philosophy on enlisted professional military education by the senior enlisted rank."<sup>209</sup>

Lessons in tactics that have been learned through battlefield experience and scholarly study are taught to Non-Commissioned Officers in the Staff Non-Commissioned Officers Academy's courses and seminars. According to Sergeant Major Bennington, the Director of Staff Non-Commissioned Officers Academy, staff sergeants are required to read Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* in addition to about sixty other books (presumably those on the Marine Corps Professional Reading Program, also known as the CMC reading list). These texts are not taught but are discussed in guided discussions on theory. War theory is only part of the curriculum. In Battlefield Studies Classes, gunnery sergeants are taught many types of offensive and defensive tactics, taken on trips to various Civil War battlegrounds in Virginia, and then expected to discuss similarities and distinctions in tactics that transcend a specific time and/or place. Additionally gunnery sergeants discuss the proper way of calling in air strikes and other forms of support.<sup>210</sup>

The material covered in the aforementioned courses and discussions of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, as well as American Civil War tactics, and the interdependence of air and

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<sup>209</sup> Bonnie Oliver, Education Plan Administrator, Marine Corps University, letter to author, 17 February 1995, Quantico, Virginia.

<sup>210</sup> Sergeant Major Bennington, Director, Marine Corps Staff Non-Commissioned Officers Academy, interview by author, 6 April 1995, Quantico, Virginia.



ground forces, are intimately related in the Marine Corps' foundational doctrinal texts *FMFM 1: Warfighting* and *FMFM 1—1: Campaigning*.<sup>211</sup>

#### *D. The Officers Candidate School*

The Officers Candidate School (OCS) is significant because all potential Marine Corps officers must attend and graduate from it in order to gain their commissions. Officers Candidate School programs exist "... to train, evaluate, and screen candidates ..." for the competitive and also cooperative leadership capabilities of future Marine Corps officers. According to Ginnie Ramsden, the Curriculum Analysis Officer, "Sun Tzu is not an integral part of the curricula at Officer Candidate School."<sup>212</sup> This does not mean, however, that *The Art of War* goes entirely unread in OCS.<sup>213</sup>

#### *E. The Basic School*

The Basic School (TBS) has two levels of classes. After graduating from Officers Candidate School and accepting their commissions, officers, now having attained the rank of Lieutenant, attend the "entry-level training/education" courses offered at The Basic School known as Basic Courses. The Basic School's second level courses are Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) courses directed toward teaching captains to be combat/infantry officers and other occupational specialties.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> The significance of that which is taught therein is discussed in greater depth later in this thesis.

<sup>212</sup> Oliver, letter to author; Pratt, letter to author.

<sup>213</sup> Despite the fact that reading Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is not required at Officers Candidate School, this author's first serious professional interest in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* was kindled in the July of 1989 while enrolled in the Platoon Leadership Course (PLC) offered at Officers Candidate School. Platoon Leadership Classes are offered to college students in the form of two six-week terms. The first, titled Juniors, is scheduled after the freshmen or sophomore collegiate years; the second, titled Seniors is scheduled after the junior or senior collegiate years. The same demands are made of students in Platoon Leadership Classes as in standard Officers Candidate School courses. This author noticed that in the platoon to which he was assigned the James Clavell and Samuel Griffith versions of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* found numerous readers. Much of the readers' interest was the result of knowing that Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* was Commandant Gray's book of the year, part of the Professional Reading Program, and able to empower us to become "mean green amphibious monsters." Upon being informed by numerous Marine Corps officer candidates that Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* could help one become more powerful, this author read the text and to a degree integrated it into his worldview.

<sup>214</sup> Oliver, letter to author; Ginie Ramsden, Curriculum Analysis Officer, Marine Corps The Basic School, interview by author, 25 October 1994, Quantico, Virginia.

At one time, The Basic School had its own Professional Military Education Reading List that competed and coexisted with the CMC reading list. Now the CMC reading list and The Basic School's Professional Military Education Reading List are one and the same.<sup>215</sup> In 1994, Sun Tzu was not required reading at The Basic School, but part of a recommended reading program. According to Colonel Pratt of the USMC Director Command and Staff College, "Sun Tzu is included on the CO's [Commanding Officer's] approved reading list for [TBS] Company Commanders to select from for their Lieutenants to read. Each Company Commander selects five books [in addition to] ...the *Marine Officers Guide and Service Etiquette*. Whichever books the Company Commander chooses, will have a directed discussion/book review."<sup>216</sup>

Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* may or may not be required by some of those commanders, according to Ginie Ramsden, a Curriculum Analysis Officer for The Basic School. However, the Marine Corps *FMFM 1, Warfighting* manual is used in the Basic School's courses on tactics, specifically, "The Theory of War," "The Conduct of War," and "Discussions on Warfighting" for the purposes of philosophical introductions to subject material.<sup>217</sup> The significance of this text will be discussed further.

#### *F. The Amphibious Warfare School*

As seen in the Second World War, at Normandy and the Korean War at Inchon, amphibious warfare is much more complicated than simply landing on a beach somewhere. When planning to overtake an opposing force many factors must be taken into consideration on strategic and tactical levels such as: tides, shorelines, inland terrain, and weather conditions; weakness and strengths in enemy lines; traps and weapons capabilities; and needs for and capability of equipment. It can be supposed that the Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) employs advanced training texts to teach Marines how to deal with those factors and more in the process of accomplishing their missions. The purpose of the Amphibious Warfare School is as its name suggests to teach what is necessary in order to direct and carry out amphibious warfare.<sup>218</sup> The usual rank of Marines attending this school is captain.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>215</sup> Ramsden, interview by author.

<sup>216</sup> Pratt, letter to author.

<sup>217</sup> Ramsden, interview by author.

While Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is not a required text in the Amphibious Warfare School, it may be read independently, while *FMFM 1 Warfighting* is required reading. Major Jeff Willis, an Amphibious Warfare School Tactics Instructor, stated that while the *Warfighting* manual contains excerpts from both Carl Von Clausewitz's *On War* and Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, the Marine Corps method of war is closer to the eighteenth century (assumed to be Clausewitzian) method of war than that of ancient China. This does not reduce the importance of Sun Tzu's theories. For example, Sun Tzu's emphasis on being as fluid as water in tactical movement to target an enemy's weak points is very important in the Amphibious Warfare School.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Willis, interview by author.

<sup>219</sup> Oliver, letter to author.

<sup>220</sup> Willis, interview by author.

#### IV

### THE MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY'S MAJOR EDUCATIONAL USES OF *THE ART OF WAR*

#### *A. The Marine Corps War College: Foundations, Purpose, and Structure*

On August 1, 1990, the Marine Corps War College was created as the Corps' senior—service college.<sup>221</sup> Then in August of 1991 it was given the, "... equal and autonomous status [of an] ... independent college... [within the Marine Corps University and] ... permits the faculty to participate fully in all aspects of the academic agenda of the University."<sup>222</sup> "The War College was designed to be a cornerstone of the Commandant's plan to revamp the Marine Corps' professional military education system. [The establishment of the college,] ... highlights the Marine Corps' commitment to professional military education and helps to ensure the Corps' ability to fulfill its role within the Nation's Armed Forces." The War College:

... prepares its graduates for senior leadership positions and staff responsibilities on joint and combined staffs ... . The mission of the Marine Corps War College is to educate selected officers in the nature of, preparation for, and conduct of war ... . The focus of the Marine Corps War College curriculum is on national policy and strategy and the employment of the Nation's Armed Forces in the joint and combined environment.<sup>223</sup>

The Marine Corps War College's educational philosophy is one of expanded freedom and accountability in a small group.<sup>224</sup> During the 1994-95 academic year, its nine student officers (six Marines who are of lieutenant colonel rank and three officers of equivalent rank from the other United States military services) were responsible not only to their supervisors but also each other in a 2.25:1.0 student-to-faculty ratio setting.<sup>225</sup> In

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<sup>221</sup> USMC War College, *Marine Corps War College Academic Catalog*, 1.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

this setting and in accord with the War College catalog's "Statement on Academic Freedom," academic freedom is necessarily afforded within the confines of subject study relevant to the War College's "Educational Objectives." The War College's "Educational Objectives" are to accomplish the following: (1) from within the Marine Corps philosophy of warfighting, "[p]rovide an encompassing and pragmatic intellectual foundation ... [for the assessment of] national and military strategies ..." of any time era; (2) from "... within the global context of national security issues ... [examine, assess,] and apply the relationships among policy and strategy, ... [in addition to] political, economic, and social forces"; (3) produce and improve "... officers sensitive to and skilled in the employment of joint military forces to achieve national objectives"; and (4) "[p]rovide top level education focusing on combining operational competence with sound military judgment and strategic thinking."<sup>226</sup>

Those stated objectives are attained through the emphasis of a number of "Recurring Themes" such as the following: (1) "Nature and dynamics of war/military operations other than war," (2) "Application/Relevance of military theory," (3) "Causes of war/conflict termination," (4) "National elements of power in the domestic and international environments," (5) "Principles of War ... strategic and operational levels of war," (6) "The continuum ... the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war," (6) Joint/Combined/Coalition warfare/campaigning," (7) "Role of the USMC in national security," (8) "Maritime expeditionary warfare/Marine Air Ground Task Force operations in the joint environment," (9) "lessons learned for future development," and (10) "Military leadership and professional ethics" that may be found throughout The War College's courses: "War, Policy, And Strategy," "Marine Air Ground Task Force Operations," "National Security and Joint Warfare," "Regional Studies," electives, and a relevant "Research Paper."<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> Ibid., 2-3.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid., 5-8.

*B. The Art of War in "The Relevance Of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz  
to the Political, Strategic, and Operational Levels Of War" Class  
(Marine Corps War College)*

In the Marine Corps War College, the study of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* has been combined with the study of the works of the military philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz in the class "The Relevance Of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic, and Operational Levels Of War." While this class is only part of the War College's War, Policy, and Strategy Course, it is of foundational significance in developing the theoretical framework of many upper level Marine Corps officers.<sup>228</sup> This should come as no surprise since the Clausewitzian philosophies that were published in his work *On War* account for a large part of many military doctrines. Despite or possibly because of the fact that ever since Clausewitz's *On War* was first published it has been often intentionally misconstrued if not misunderstood, he has enjoyed great readership worldwide, including within the United States of America. It is note worthy, however, that, to a degree, the pronounced American military establishment's acceptance of Clausewitzian philosophy was prompted by the need for military leaders of uncommon genius as seen in the Second World War, Korea, and "... the crisis of self-confidence wrought by Vietnam." It is possible that those same factors contributed to the official acceptance and study of Sun Tzu also.<sup>229</sup>

The purpose of "The Relevance Of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic, and Operational Levels Of War" class is to do the following:

- (1) Examine and compare the theories of war of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz as they relate to the political, strategic and operational levels of war. (2) Compare Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to FMFM 1, Warfighting and FMFM 1—1, Campaigning; and appraise the relevance of all four to the present and future study, preparation for, and conduct of war.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> Strange, 3-4.

<sup>229</sup> Christopher Bassford, *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and American 1815-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) inside cover and introduction, 3-8.

<sup>230</sup> Strange, 3.

In order to accomplish its detailed purposes, specific readings are required in the following: General Tao Hanzhang's and Yuan Shibing's translation of *Sun Tzu's The Art of War — The Modern Chinese Interpretation*, Michael I. Handael's *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared*, derivatives from Dr. Christopher Bassford's *Clausewitz in English*, Clausewitz's *On War*; *FMFM 1, Warfighting*; and *FMFM 1—1, Campaigning*.<sup>231</sup> Some, but not all, of the further readings recommended in this class may be found in the following: Samuel B. Griffith's translation of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*; Karl W. Eikenberry's *Military Review* article titled *Sun Bin and His The Art of War*; the *Richmond Times-Dispatch* article titled *A War of Deception*; Col. Harry G. Summer's *Air University Review* article titled *Eastern and Western Approaches to War*; USAF Captain Kenneth L. Davison Jr.'s *Airpower Journal* article titled *Clausewitz and the Indirect Approach*; USAF (ret.) Col. George M. Hall's *Military Review* article titled *Culminating Points*; and many more other works that focused on Clausewitz.<sup>232</sup>

In order to further focus the readings for this class numerous "Educational Objectives" and various lectures have been set. The following can be found among the objectives: "Analyze the theories of war of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, and ... their relevance to military effectiveness at the political, strategic and operational levels of war." "Compare the intent, philosophy, and principle tenets ... [of both strategists to the Marine Corps'] principles of war."<sup>233</sup> "Analyze and compare" each strategist's attached priority to the following: (1) relationships "... between wartime policy, politics, and strategy ..."; (2) wholistic pre-hostilities considerations and preparations including ends and means correlation and more; (3) maneuvering, force concentration, and battles that establish victory or defeat; (4) the strategic and operational level "... use of intelligence, surprise, and deception ..."; (5) how to achieve "... quick victories and short wars ..."; and (6) on the theater and strategic levels what is a military commander's role and what is military genius.<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>231</sup> Ibid., 4-6.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid., 12-13.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid., 3. Arguably Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, wrote what they intended, because each was highly educated and writing with purpose. However, the "Intent game" often amounts to the warping of a treatise's tenets to fit some personally and/or conventionally preferred disposition. The only legitimate answer is focuses on literal meaning with those words being defined by their historical context.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid., 3.

As the Educational Objectives continue, they seem to become more Clausewitzian in focus. The fourth objective asks students to examine and sum up how relevant to today's and tomorrow's ways of war are certain Clausewitzian theories on war and their relationships to each other. Some of those mentioned are as follows: (1) war's nature, laws, principles, and rules on the strategic and operational levels; (2) "... war, policy, and politics ... including the object of war," politics' or policy's superiority in times of war, and war's trinity of war ; (3) "[c]enters of Gravity", "Critical Vulnerabilities," and "Critical Capabilities" in addition to "identifying an enemy's center"; (4) the purpose, character, and strength of "attack" and "strategic attack" as opposed to "defense" and "strategic defense"; (5) "... the 'Art' and 'Science' of war"; and (6) "... the purpose, function, and value of military theory and the nature and importance of 'critical analysis.'"<sup>235</sup> Most of those Clausewitzian terms are common knowledge but can be further defined.

The superiority of politics in war represents an understanding that military goals are driven by politics, "The trinity of war" is an understanding of the need for the support of and cooperation between the populace, general, and government. Finally, to push an enemy off balance one must know where that enemy's center of gravity is.<sup>236</sup> The fifth and sixth objectives, however, are seemingly more balanced in the study of, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and foundational Marine Corps publications. These objectives are:

Analyze the relationship of campaigns to the political and strategic levels of war, and analyze basic principles for planning and conducting campaigns as related in FMFM 1—1, *Campaigning*, and in Clausewitz and Sun Tzu ... .  
Compare Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to FMFM 1, Warfighting, and FMFM 1—1, *Campaigning*.<sup>237</sup>

The educational objectives of "The Relevance Of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic, and Operational Levels Of War" class are further expanded and defined through "Reading Topics For Study And Discussion." Among the "Reading Topics For Study And Discussion" there are additional topics that have been taken from Sun Tzu's text but not mentioned with the "Educational Objectives." Excluding the

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<sup>235</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>236</sup> Handael, 12, 20.

<sup>237</sup> Strange, 4.



discussions of particular ancient Chinese battle strategies provided in this class's texts, some of those "Topics for Study and Discussion" not mentioned as "Educational Objectives" are included in the following: winning through strategy rather than overwhelming force; in determining if cases of insubordination on the part of generals directed toward a king is justifiable; "The Art of Direction"; the use of an army's "posture," "extraordinary forces," and "combined energy"; and Sun Tzu's two "contradictions" of (1) not attacking an enemy who is on his way home, as opposed to other teachings that would promote such an attack, and (2) the emphasis placed on "speed" as opposed to recommendations to not use "forced marches."<sup>238</sup> While the answers to those said contradictions were not given, answers were constructed and presented.

As discussed, when addressing what have been said to be Sun Tzu's "contradictions" one must remember the Taoist context in which the text was written. Balance demands flexibility. "You must avoid absolutes and ... should be flexible in applying them [*The Art of War's* principles]."<sup>239</sup> To further add context and enable one's understanding of these, the terms may be further defined: "directional art" is the ability to move a force as one, quickly in any direction for any purpose needed. "Posture" refers to whether a military is on the offense or defense and "combined energy" can refer to the energy of special and regular forces in addition to a navy, army, and air force.

The first claimed contradiction concerning attack on a retreating enemy is not a contradiction at all. In accord with *The Art of War* it may be said that attacking an enemy who is retreating is not recommended when that retreat is the bait in a trap. The attack helps the enemy realize that, passing through an easily defensible terrain, will give the enemy a false psychological advantage, with actually a slim or no chance to survive.<sup>240</sup> Then let us not forget the importance of the unexpected and in turn the unprepared. When on the verge of crushing your enemy, do not allow him to know his own defeat is coming.<sup>241</sup> Finally, there is a difference between defeat and destruction; do not forget the value of making captures, a skill which is enabled through superior strategy.<sup>242</sup> These

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<sup>238</sup> Ibid., 7-11.

<sup>239</sup> Hanzhang, 43.

<sup>240</sup> Griffith, 66-69, 110.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid., 76-78.

factors are dependent upon the quality of your and your enemy's leadership, military education, will, and intelligence.

The second contradiction concerning speed is not a contradiction either. In accord with *The Art of War*, it needs to be remembered that forced marches on the way to battlefields are different than engaging in quick coordinated maneuvering on a battlefield. Whether having finished either a forced march or a battle, an army is better to enter the next, if not all, battles well rested after having deceived the enemy to come to you and knowing that you have strength to spare. If in a position of having to make or having made a forced march, using the enemy's land, supplies, and weapons may help overcome logistical problems, allow an army to travel longer distances faster, and fight with greater advantages.<sup>243</sup> There is some disagreement between scholars as to whether or not Sun Tzu recommends against the employment of forced marches.

Two other discussions required in "The Relevance of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic and Operational Levels Of War" class are also very important. This is so because they examine the views of not only Sun Tzu but also General Tao Hanzhang and each student. The first deals with the "Views of Sun Tzu and General To Hanzhang regarding the relationships between generals and sovereigns, and occasions when generals should not obey sovereigns."<sup>244</sup> Even though no official answers have been provided for those questions, they have been constricted in such attempts.

As gathered from actual history, the account of Sun Tzu's test, *The Art of War's* text, and the interwoven historical accounts and commentaries that are part of the Griffith version of *The Art War*, Sun Tzuian theory holds that sovereigns have control over the appointment of generals, establish the expansionist and/or defensive goals of their state's military, and may, if skilled, lead in battle.<sup>245</sup> For survival and success, however, *The Art of War* recommends that sovereigns allow generals to do their jobs which include training, planning for, coordinating, and the leading military for the most part unhindered.<sup>246</sup>

In fact if a sovereign gives a wrong order that jeopardizes state security or military victory, a general is (and possibly other officers are) justified in disobeying that order. In

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<sup>243</sup> Ibid., 72-74, 91-92, 102-106, 134.

<sup>244</sup> Strange, 7.

<sup>245</sup> Griffith, ix, 58-59, 67-70, 184-186; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 18-19, 30.

<sup>246</sup> Griffith, 65-66, 81-84.

*The Art of War* the following criteria justify such action (note that inaction is action also): (1) when such is ordered by commissioned officers pursuant to their duty to preserve the state to the best of their ability<sup>247</sup>; (2) in the process of disciplining belligerent soldiers, whose belligerence brings about disorder in the ranks and/or lack of preparedness for war, resulting in an increase in the level of threat to the state on account of weakness<sup>248</sup>; (3) when it is clear that immediate success in battle and long-term victory in war are both certain with prompt action because of some great advantage that has been taken for granted by a king<sup>249</sup>; (4) when the loss of a battle and/or war will assuredly result from obeying a king's command; and (5) when a king orders incorrect travel or deployment on certain forms of terrain that will grant an enemy an advantage or expose one's combatants to ambush.<sup>250</sup>

General Tao Hanzhang has come to the conclusion that, due to the "almighty" state's compelling interests and today's great communications technology, disobeying orders due to questions of just cause, preferred local interests, and/or tactical and operational wisdom "... as a common rule of war ... is now obsolete."<sup>251</sup> General Tao Hanzhang takes this position even after acknowledging that the socialist notion of a "just" rebellion may be reflected in some ancient Chinese feudal wars.<sup>252</sup> He also fails to recognize other problems: (1) What if the Chinese communist military is given orders that are out of line with the tenets of communism, the will of the people, and/or the demands of socialism; and/or (2) What if one or more forms of communication break down?

General Tao Hanzhang's conclusions concerning the obsolescence of justifiable disobedience to orders are not written with the understanding that human nature is fixed, and therefore would not necessarily apply to American military personnel. Therefore his conclusions do not hold true in the American context. First and foremost, in the United States of America, *The Declaration of Independence*, *The Constitution*, and *The Bill of*

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<sup>247</sup> Griffith, 58, 63; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 30, 135.

<sup>248</sup> Griffith, 58, 126-127; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 30.

<sup>249</sup> Griffith, 128, 139; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 104, 262-264.

<sup>250</sup> Griffith, 111-113; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 202, 269-271.

<sup>251</sup> Hanzhang, 91-92.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, 91.

*Rights* guarantee the individual's Creator-given inalienable rights, and law enforcement and military personnel take oaths of constitutional loyalty. If any government combatants, be they officers and/or enlisted personnel are given an unconstitutional order, they are as servants of the people prohibited from following that order and as citizens morally obligated to stop those who issued and have complied with that order. Also, USMC Maneuver Warfare doctrine is a doctrine of delegated authority that demands the taking of initiative. After American congressmen have declared their just cause and political goals to be reached, American generals enact their presidentially approved plans for taking strategic objectives. In taking those objectives, Marine Corps combat commanders are required to, with innovation, employ their combatants on the operational and tactical levels of war.<sup>253</sup>

The last relevant discussion in this part of "The Relevance Of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic and Operational Levels Of War" class focuses on General Tao Hanzhang's and Yuan Shibing's version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. The discussion centers around the topic of "The relevance of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* to the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war in past and likely future conflicts."<sup>254</sup>

With an understanding of human nature, of the nature of war, and the fact that war is first won in the heart and mind, it may be said that Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* will continue to be relevant. This remains true at any level of technological development.

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<sup>253</sup> *The Constitution of the United States of America*, art. I. sec. 8.; Wyly, interview by author.

Be they Marxist or not, General Tao Hanzhang's commentaries on the "obsolescence" of some of Sun Tzu's principles and lessons may encourage further discussions of deeper questions and issues, some of which hopefully would include just cause and the duty owed to a Creator as detailed in *The Declaration of Independence* and/or the understanding that in principle nothing is new. *The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America*; Ecclesiastics 1; Hanzhang, 90-93.

Although not furtherly discussed in this thesis and appendixes, it is unfortunate that the texts in this course do not contain a comparison between Sun Tzu's and Clausewitz's views of God and just cause. Perhaps this is because *The Art of War* and *On War* do not focus on those issues. *The Declaration of Independence* and *The Constitution* are in respective order a civil covenant and its by-laws. All United States military personnel must take an oath to uphold *The Constitution*. A discussion, therefore, on the American view of God as well as the Sun Tzu and Clausewitz views of God, along with their perspectives on the notion of eternal principles, power, authority, and just cause, might be appropriate in Handael's thesis. Might does not make right. The doctrine of civil covenant that underlies America's founding documents may be found in Amos, *Biblical Principles of Government*, 256; Herbert W. Titus, *God, Man, and Law: the Biblical Principles*, 169-170. "Just cause" is explained in Jeffrey C. Tuomala, *Just Cause: The Thread That Runs So True* (Virginia Beach, Virginia: Regent University School of Law, 1994) 44-81. The moral and motivating value of just cause is alluded to in Abraham Lincoln's *Gettysburg Address*, *Emancipation Proclamation*, and *Letter To Henry L. Pierce*. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed., *Abraham Lincoln: A Documentary Portrait Through His Speeches and Writings* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press) 119-121, 210-212, 244-245.

<sup>254</sup> Strange, 7.

Technology can be taken away, often break down, and/or be counter measured. "According to Samuel Griffith, 'strife is not a transitory aberration but a recurrent conscious act and therefore susceptible to rational analysis. Sun Tzu believed that the moral strength and intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war.'"<sup>255</sup> Griffith continues, "... [T]he victorious situation, [is] a product of his creative imagination. The wise general cannot be manipulated. ... [E]ntice the enemy, to unbalance him, and to create a situation favorable for a decisive counter-stroke. They are, paradoxically, offensive."<sup>256</sup>

While in quantity the "Topics for Study and Discussion" favor Clausewitz by about four pages as compared to the one page that is spent on Sun Tzu's text, *The Art of War* is still an integral part of the class.<sup>257</sup> The final part of this class requires that comparisons be made between *The Art of War*, *On War*, *Warfighting*, and *Campaigning*. In respective order, those comparisons are made of the following: (1) " [t]he purpose (or intent), philosophy, and principle tenants ..."; (2) " [t]he essence of 'Conducting the Campaign' within Marine Corps doctrine as opposed to the two other philosopher strategist's [sic]"... views of ... maneuver, intelligence, surprise, combat and decisive battle by a commander to achieve victory"; and (3) " [S]imilarities and differences between the Principles of War ..." enumerated by each of the three doctrines.<sup>258</sup>

*C. Additional Texts For Understanding The Content of "The Relevance of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to the Political, Strategic, and Operational Levels of War"*

The previously discussed General Tao Hanzhang's and Yuan Shibing's text is an excellent text for a number of reasons. It is recommended, however, that any American student choosing to study the text do so only after having gained a firm grasp of the differences between the foundational philosophies of Marxism and those supporting *The*

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<sup>255</sup> Thibault, 46.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>257</sup> Strange, 7-11.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid., 11-12.

*Declaration of Independence* and *The Constitution of the United States of America* in addition to John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*.<sup>259</sup>

While there may be more places in which a Marxist bias may be found in General Tao Hanzhang's text, those that were most apparent and significant to this author follow. In his text, General Tao Hanzhang quotes Mao Tse-tung:

Where do correct ideas come from? Do they drop from the skies? No. Are they innate in the mind? No. They come from social practice, and from it alone. They come from three kinds of social practice: the struggle for production, the class struggle, and scientific experiment.<sup>260</sup>

The general goes on to say, "Truth develops constantly with the progress of time. Mao Tse-tung pointed out in his writing *On Practice*, 'The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so is man's cognition of truth through practice.' ... [W]hen ancient academic works are assessed, it is not wrong to affirm or negate something by saying: 'Because of limitations of time and class ...'."<sup>261</sup> In a chapter titled "Naïve Materialism and Primitive Dialectics" one will find "the rule of historical development." It states, "From a philosophical point of view, 'materialism is man's practical knowledge of the objective world which has been developed on the basis of his social practice.'"<sup>262</sup>

On the topic of religion, General Tao Hanzhang wrote, "It is the pride of our national culture that Sun Tzu was an atheist even more than two thousand years ago."<sup>263</sup> Admittedly Sun Tzu stated that the general "... prohibits superstitious practices and so rids the army of all doubts." He states that, "Until the moment of death there can be no

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<sup>259</sup> It is hard to truly defend something that you do not believe and hold dear. A clear introduction to and explanation of the conflicts between those worldviews, with a focus on unchanging human nature, generational intellectual failure, and social theory's assumptions, may be found in Roberto Mangabeira Unger, *Law In Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory* (New York: The Free Press, 1976) 1-6, 243-248, 262-268. Ours is the only just cause in defense of each person's Creator given rights. Justice is justice and will never change.

<sup>260</sup> Hanzhang, 70.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid., 90.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid., 77.

doubt."<sup>264</sup> Sun Tzu's spiritual beliefs are indicated in a reference to spies. He adds, "... foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation."<sup>265</sup> Despite disagreements about the laws of nature and nature's God, General Tao Hanzhang's version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* deserves intensive study.

The primary part of General Tao Hanzhang's version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* consists of historical accounts and commentaries. They are divided into two sections with eleven chapters total. The work is prefaced with the comment that *The Art of War* "... should be studied from the modern point of view, selecting the essences and discarding the irrelevancies, making the past serve the present in order to develop it." In that light, the chapters found in Part I are as follows: "Strategic Considerations"; "Posture of Army"; "Extraordinary and Normal Forces"; "Void and Actuality"; "Initiative and Flexibility in War"; "Use of Spies"; and "Geography." Then, in respective order the chapters found in Part II are: "Historical Background of Sun Tzu's Art of War"; "Naive Materialism and Primitive Dialectics"; "Universal Laws of War"; and "Obsolete Ideas in Sun Tzu's Art of War"<sup>266</sup>. The thirteen chapters of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* are included as an appendix.<sup>267</sup>

Many, but not all of those, chapters in the first section of General Tao Hanzhang's and Yuan Shibing's version of *The Art of War* contain historically specific campaign and battle strategies that demonstrate the application of principles found in *The Art of War*. Of significance to this thesis are those mentioned in "The Relevance of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic and Operational Levels of War" class.<sup>268</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> Griffith, 136-137.

<sup>265</sup> Ibid., 145. No one possesses conclusive evidence, however, that unequivocally proves or disprove that Sun Tzu held to any religion, particularly atheism. Not all religion equates to superstition. The answer to Sun Tzu's spiritual beliefs can be and has been clouded by the religious proclivities of many commenting authors.

<sup>266</sup> Hanzhang, 6, 9; Strange, 3.

<sup>267</sup> Hanzhang, 94.

<sup>268</sup> Admittedly, most early versions of *The Art of War* may have included the story of Helu's test of Sun Tzu in the original form. However, the central thirteen chapters did not include the multitude of recorded historical conflicts and surrounding scholarly commentary for the purposes illuminating the proper application of principles found in its passage's lessons found as part of today's versions of the text. Ames, 191-196; Griffith, 57-59; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 269-273; T. R. Phillips, 15-20; Sawyer, 80-82.

The 1763 B.C. battle for Ming Tao of Anyi (in the present Shansi Province) is important not simply because it receives attention within "The Relevance of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic and Operational Levels of War" class.<sup>269</sup> It is important for the superior strategic thought, both in initial planning and re-evaluation, that its victor, Yi Ying, demonstrated. Yi Yang was the "... equivalent to a prime minister and chief of staff of the army ..." who served Sung Tang, a noble. In accord with Yi Ting's "suggestions," Sung Tang tested Xia Jie, the top tyrant of the day, by refusing to pay tributes. When Xia Jie, in response to the first non-remittance, mobilized the militaries of many nobles, Sung Tang (in accord with Yi Ying's recommendations) yielded, apologized, and paid larger tributes. The second year Tang again refused to pay tributes. This time, when in response to non-remittance Xia Jie was only able to mobilize the one third of the military that he had before (due to the costs of the earlier mobilization), in accord with Yi Ying's assessment "... that Jie had lost his popularity, fighting capacity and the morale of the troops sent ... was low," Sung Tang made alliances and went to war "... with the troops of other sovereigns ... ." Sung Tang's and his troops ambushed and defeated Xia Jie and his army at Mong Tao.<sup>270</sup>

The 383 B.C. battle at Feishui River (also mentioned on page seven of the *War, Policy, and Strategy Course Syllabus*) holds significance because of the superior strategic thought its victors, the two generals Xie Xuan and Xie Shi, demonstrated. A former member of the Qin Dynasty, General Fu Jian led an army of greater than 300,000 soldiers south against East Jin which was defended by the eight-thousand man army commanded by Xie Xuan and Xie Shi. Originally the forces of Jin were prepared to defend against those formerly Qin forces as or after they crossed the Feishui River. Then after observing the enemy on the other side of the river, Xie Xuan saw that the Qin front line were not acting as one. The Qin armies: "... had [made] no strategic considerations ..."; did not have a unified command; mixed their "infantry and cavalry" together; and front line and secondary elements "were far apart." The battle could be won if the Qin front line were confused. Xie Xuan's envoy relayed a request to General Fu Jian that he move his forces away from the river a specified distance in order to allow the Jin forces to cross the river and "fight a decisive battle."<sup>271</sup> During the confusion that was created by the Qin movement, "Zhu Xu a Jin officer who had surrendered to the Qin ..." created even more

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<sup>269</sup> Strange, 7.

<sup>270</sup> Hanzhang, 19, 21.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid., 25.



confusion by telling the secondary Qin elements that "The Qin army is defeated." All of this disorder allowed the Jin forces that had put the river to their backs to attack and run off the Qin forces.<sup>272</sup>

The *War, Policy, and Strategy Course Syllabus* requires discussion of Sun Tzu's principle of winning through "... strategic considerations, not by force...." In this context, one may wish to study the strategies implemented in breaking up the alliance of the states of Jin and Qin (770-476 B.C.).<sup>273</sup> The conflict involved four states — the large neighboring states of Jin and Qin and the two smaller states of Zheng and Cu. Zheng and Cu were allies; however, when Jin moved with Qin's support against Zheng, Cu was too afraid to help protect Zheng. Zheng did not fall to Jin that time because Zheng's "veteran official" was able to convince the King of Qin that adding to Jin's size and strength was not in Qin's best interest. Jin's record, after all, almost spoke for itself. Earlier, Qin had helped establish Jin and then Jin threatened Qin. Also, Jin had once offered Zheng certain lands and then recanted. If in the future Jin were to move against Qin, Zheng, if still in existence, could and would be Qin's ally. Qin could even have and maintain its own military bases in Zheng. Seeing this as preferable, Qin withdrew its military assistance from Jin. Jin, now in fear of Zheng and Cu, stayed in its place.<sup>274</sup>

One may also wish to study the strategies implemented in breaking up the alliance of the states of Cu and Qi (475-221 B.C.). Involved were the states of Cu, Qi, and Qin. Qin sent an envoy to Cu who gave lavish gifts to Cu's queen and promised both Cu's King and Queen great concessions in territory in exchange for "... friendship and non-aggression... ." For three reasons, it had its own desire to invade Qin: (1) Qi became an enemy of Cu; (2) it discovered that the King of Cu promised to be friendly to Qin; and (3) it believed that Cu and Qin were conspiring together. When the Qin concessions of territory to Cu turned out to be one per cent of what was promised, Cu went to war against and lost to Qin.<sup>275</sup>

The education of an army is not just constricted to its territorial boundaries, but by the effectiveness of the education system implemented. General Tao Hanzhang's use of history is not confined to ancient China. For example, he uses the following: to

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<sup>272</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>273</sup> Hanzhang, 23; Strange, 7.

<sup>274</sup> Hanzhang, 23, 25.

<sup>275</sup> Ibid., 22-23.

emphasize the importance of spies, Nazi Germany's framing of a Soviet general through misinformation disseminated to Soviet spies; to emphasize the importance of focal ground, the competition between the United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for canal, docking, and base privileges; to emphasis the importance of conserving one's own strength while waiting "for an exhausted army" to arrive, he uses the naval war between Japan and Russia; to emphasize the importance of flexibility and deception, the Second World War allied "Invasion of Normandy."<sup>276</sup>

General Tao Hanzhang's and Yuan Shibing's version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is an excellent companion to Handael's *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared* for use in the Marine Corps War College's "Relevance of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic and Operational Levels Of War" class. General Tao Hanzhang's accounting of and commentary on Sun Tzu's principles of and lessons on warfare, "The Battle Of Ming Tao," "The Battle Of The Feishui River," and the additional twenty or more historically specific battle strategies that General Tao Hanzhang included in his text, are valuable in that they may enable and encourage artistic understanding and application. In other words, General Tao Hanzhang dispels the "neo" Clausewitzian excuse that Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is too abstract for one to understand, let alone apply.

Of those studies used as texts for this class, one stands out as being particularly instrumental in understanding what many military professionals currently believe are similarities between Sun Tzuian and Clausewitzian doctrine. The work is Michael I. Handael's text, *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared*. Among other things this work compares both philosophers' views on the following: "... methodology and style; frameworks; positions on the primacy of politics in the formulation of strategic policies and the decision to go to war; responsibilities and position of the field commander as compared with those of the political leader"; "... evaluations of intelligence and deception; quantitative superiority; the relationship between offense and defense; friction, chance, luck, and uncertainty in war; the rational calculus of war; and the problem of attrition vs. maneuver."<sup>277</sup>

Handael believes the conclusions found in his text may be unexpected by some individuals for a couple of reasons: (1) incomplete reading or understanding of Clausewitz on account of *On War's* length and "Newtonian" or "dialectical" (point and counter point) argumentation as opposed to Sun Tzu's quickly readable conclusionary

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<sup>276</sup> Ibid., 64, 66-69, 86, 89.

<sup>277</sup> Handael, 2.

statements that are short in structure, while vast in content; (2) faulty attempts to compare Sun Tzu's broader interpretation as opposed to Clausewitz's narrower interpretation of what war and its scope actually are; and (3) failure to take into account that Sun Tzu and Clausewitz approach many of the same factors of war from different angles.<sup>278</sup>

Some of his conclusions may be surprising for other reasons. It should be noted that *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared* was published in 1991. It does not, therefore, include more recent discoveries, translation, commentaries, and insights, some of which have been discussed in this thesis. However, because of the large degree of commonality between the many different versions of Sun Tzu's text this does not present a significant problem. This is why for the sake of clarity, most differences with Handael's *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared* have been relegated to the footnote of this subchapter.

In *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared*, Handael reports that Clausewitz uses experiences gained from the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars to undercut Clausewitz's "ideal" and teach what he sees as "realistic."<sup>279</sup> Then, Handael states that a key to understanding Clausewitz's *On War* lies in understanding its first chapter and all subsequent chapters in respective order since they are all building blocks in a logical progression. In contradiction, he holds that each of the chapters of *The Art of War* is not so interdependent and may be understood even if they stand alone.<sup>280</sup> Handael holds that

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<sup>278</sup> Ibid., 3-5.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid., 3-8, 19. Handael fails, however, to mention that the Griffith version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is filled with real historical applications of principles and lessons taught in *The Art of War*. Despite the fact that they were not Sun Tzu's own experiences they are as historical applications, "realistic." Due to Handael's many failures to detail the specifics of *The Art of War's* balanced and comprehensive theory, his omissions of historical events, framing of comparison points largely in Sun Tzu's some scholars may conclude that Handael possesses a greater depth of knowledge in or even preference for Clausewitzian theory.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid., 2-4. As found, however, in J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips' commentary on the content of *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* has a logical progression in which each chapter adds to the prior chapters to establish a progressive understanding of war, its scope and its detail. Additionally it assists readers in the construction of a philosophically based theoretical framework, or if you prefer, an order of operations to analyze, decide, and carry out when faced with military responsibilities. J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 22-23.

The reader's overall understanding of war would suffer if any of Sun Tzu's core thirteen chapters were misinterpreted, misunderstood, or omitted. This holds especially true when considering Sun Tzu's first chapter. That chapter establishes a relative measurement of "us" compared to "them" in the fields of who appears to have and who has greater strength, reason, virtue, and leadership in society and the state. One might also wonder if the thirteenth chapter of *The Art of War* was intentionally placed at the end of the inner text in order to bring readers back to the beginning of the text. Intelligence gathering is important when making comparative measurements in the strength of opponents. Ames, 103-105; Griffith, 63-66; Hanzhang, 14.

Clausewitz valued the learning process most and Sun Tzu valued his own "conclusions" most.<sup>281</sup>

Keep in mind that those immediately stated "conclusions" are used to set the stage for Handael's comparative study. Among other things, according to Handael, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are similar in nine specific ways. However, Handael's own conclusions are arguable. His conclusions are the following:

(1) They (Sun Tzu and Clausewitz) both employ the use of an "ideal." Clausewitz, however, undercuts his own ideal of "total war," explicitly acknowledging the limitations placed by conditions and available resources which are mostly physical. "Total war" is defined as focusing one hundred percent of a country's efforts on a war. Sun Tzu is said to undercut his ideal of the "bloodless battle" "implicitly" with *The Art of War's* focus being armed confrontation. The ideals of each of the two philosopher strategists, however, are polar opposites. Clausewitz aims at total destruction while Sun Tzu aims at total capture and productive use.<sup>282</sup>

(2) The works are similar in their recommendation for using what has been termed a pure rational decision-making model to determine whether or not to go to war, and to decide what means to use in war, by weighing if the ends are worth the means. In Sun

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<sup>281</sup> Handael, 4. This belief, however, fails to consider the depth of Sun Tzu's text. It is arguable that those who compiled and edited his writings had such a concern for the learning process that they edited *The Art of War* in a way designed to encourage readers to quietly contemplate and mature. The seeming contradictions in its lessons demand to be understood. In understanding those "conclusions" one will question the nature of man, war, and victory. Human beings must learn basic math before they are able to learn how to calculate probability. In the case of *The Art of War*, however, a reader may study the simple and the more complex in one text. Readiness and encouragement to re-evaluate Sun Tzu's "conclusions" is exhibited in the text itself and Chinese history. For example, within Sun Tzu's perspective, "... the only constant in war is constant change..." Consider the following: in *The Art of War* Sun Wu Tzu first states, "War ... the field on which life and death is determined ... must be examined with the greatest care"; the differences between Sun Wu Tzu's text and Sun Pin Tzu's texts, especially when discussing the viability of taking a walled city; and the many other Chinese commentaries on war. Ames, 13-21, 27-31, 103; Griffith, 10, 91, 101.

Taking Sun Tzu's text too rigidly exhibits a misunderstanding or distortion of the context in which it was written and/or an understanding of dialectical strategy. Ames, 39-40, 49-50; Hanzhang, 43. Dialectical strategy is a pragmatic view of strategic accomplishment that embraces the use of real and/or staged delays in order to make further progress toward a specific end possible if not also easier.

<sup>282</sup> Handael, 4. Converse to Handael's view of what is "realistic," Sun Tzu's ideal may be morally superior and even more prudent than Clausewitz's ideal. Sun Tzu's conservative view simply requires greater metaphysical strength among which is included wisdom, will, and patience.

More specifically, what has been said to be Sun Tzu's "bloodless battle" is not bloodless. It is more than a battle. It may be explained as making plans and moving so subtly. Subtle is taken to the point that an enemy may be convinced to coexist peaceably in cultural, economic, and/or other exchanges, in addition to the further point of weakening an enemy by encouraging him to become used to excessive material comfort, a slave to his passions, and then capturing that enemy's possessions quickly and intact. Ames, 111; Griffith, 68, 77, 114; Sawyer, 32.

Tzu's case, decision making is exhibited by the quote, "[n]ow the elements of the art of war are first, measurement of space; second, estimation of quantities; third, calculation; fourth, comparisons; and fifth, chances of victory." Consider also the statement, "Quantities derive from measurement, figures from quantities, comparisons from figures and victory from comparisons."<sup>283</sup> Clausewitz believed that weighing means and ends is constantly required with each political, strategic, and tactical step that is taken.<sup>284</sup>

Concerning intelligence and plans, *The Art of War* states:

... [T]he enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men [because of] ... foreknowledge ... . What is called "foreknowledge" cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.<sup>285</sup>

<sup>286</sup> (3) The works also share a respect for that which is included in Clausewitz's "Paradoxical Trinity of War," the interaction that occurs between "the people," "the commander and his army," and "the government."<sup>287</sup> A war may be harder to win without

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<sup>283</sup> Griffith, 88.

<sup>284</sup> Handael, 18-19. Handael is wrong when he declares that Sun Tzu did not value on-going evaluations as highly as Clausewitz and attributed that idea to possibly be the result of Sun Tzu's belief in "proper religious ritual," "intelligence," and initial planning. Perhaps planning in China's temples offered balanced advice, a way to motivate a nation's populace, and secrecy for surprise. Perhaps at that time, the Taoist context was considered a "scientific" context. At the same time, Sun Tzu recommends against allowing soldiers to engage in superstitious practices. Ames, 158; Griffith, 71, 137; Thibault, 47.

<sup>285</sup> Griffith, 145.

<sup>286</sup> Sun Tzu wrote from an understanding that change is "constant in war." Ibid., 10, 91, 101.

The first chapter of *The Art of War* states, "... it is not possible to formulate them [the keys to victory] in detail beforehand." Griffith, 70; Hanzhang, 95-96. Certainly in order to, as *The Art of War* recommends, "flow like water for the purpose of holding a defensive line, taking advantage of an offender's weak spot, and reshaping a possible defeat into victory one will have to engage in ongoing evaluations." Ames, 115, 131; Griffith, 85, 93, 101, 102. A high rate of adaptation can be the decisive factor in a struggle. "... [O]ne able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine. Griffith, 113.

Additionally problematic, to some scholars is Handael's notion of a "... pure rational decision-making model ...," which is a misleading positivism because of presuppositions, evidence selection, interpretation of results, and the human mind's finite capacity all limit human reason. Handael, 18. As human beings, we can only do our best.

<sup>287</sup> Handael, 20-21; Hanzhang, 14-16.

the backing of most of the people, a government with continuity in commitment to gaining certain objects at or beneath a certain cost, a military commander of uncommon genius, and a military that is professional.<sup>288</sup>

(4) Both include recognition that, as Clausewitz stated, war is governed by politics, focused on achieving political ends, and is more exactly "... a continuation of political intercourse, carried out by other means."<sup>289</sup> Clausewitz believes that the political objectives of negotiations that continue during a war will change in accord with battlefield success or failure.<sup>290</sup> The first passage of *The Art of War* clearly states that war is for the survival of the state.<sup>291</sup> Sun Tzu's broader view of war encompasses more pre-war considerations that are similar to those weighed in contemporary cost/benefit analysis.<sup>292</sup> Handael admits to the fact that Sun Tzu does not make the mistake of narrowly defining war.<sup>293</sup> However, it would be a book in itself to detail the vastness of Sun Tzu's perspective.

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<sup>288</sup> Handael, 20-21.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid., 13-14.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>291</sup> Griffith, 63.

<sup>292</sup> Ames, 175-176, 183-184; Handael, 9-12; Sawyer, 32. To a degree, Handael notes that Clausewitz overlooks, if not in some cases denies, the importance of weapons production, economics, and general logistics in "prewar" and war. However, concerning "prewar" and war, he does not mention whether Clausewitz fails to detail the use of negotiations as a weapon directed at keeping a neighbor unsuspecting, unprepared, isolated, divided, and stalled.

<sup>293</sup> Handael, 9-11. Handael seems to rationalize for Clausewitz, whose mistakes appear to be a result of his philosophical compartmentalization of the most crude form of combat, shedding blood, as war itself.

Sun Tzu's understanding of "prewar" and war included much more. Sun Tzu declares that in war, general ties to an enemy's country and state should be severed. Ames, 162. *The Art of War* also details that bribery, negotiations, economic production, trade, logistical preparation, and intelligence recruitment are important before and during war since, among other things, many of those elements can be effectively used as weapons. Griffith, 72-74, 120.

More "realistically" Sun Tzu's text seems resolutely focused on the defeat of an enemy state's leadership and if necessary the portion of its military that stands in the way of accomplishing such ends in addition to the integration of the defeated country into the victorious state and country following. This thoroughness may eliminate some future problems by making the victorious state immediately stronger and eliminating a damaged state's ruling house's possible incitement, participation, and/or leadership in future challenges, among other things. In other words, a country and/or a state's politicians and military are to be focused firmly and absolutely on the same thing, victory. This is to be accomplished by out-thinking the enemy. Ames, 175-176, 183-184; Handael, 9-14; Griffith, 73, 79.

(5) Both writers maintain the view that, to better serve the state, some of the misjudgments of and restriction placed by politicians preventing commanders and soldiers from using some battlefield advantage or responding properly to win a conflict must be disregarded. Handael holds that both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu fail to completely clarify when and in what circumstances insubordination and/or initiative are appropriate.<sup>294</sup>

(6) Both works share an understanding of the importance of having inspiring generals with uncommon genius or insight and troops with superior morale and will in addition to both having professional discipline.<sup>295</sup>

(7) Both authors recognize, while nothing quite enables a warrior to do well in war as prior combat experience coupled with good insight (be that intuition, sound reason, and/or uncommon genius), that the uncertainty, variability, and complexity, said to be primarily caused by human interaction, still exist in war, an activity that is said to have no rules but to win.<sup>296</sup> It is believed that both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu would support the notion that in war, every situation, circumstance, and action has a multitude of possible remedying human responses.<sup>297</sup> In other words, both philosopher strategists would likely "... agree on the ... assumption that war is an art."<sup>298</sup>

(8) Both men believe wars in which armies clash and blood is shed need to be made as short as possible.<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> Handael, 14-15. Sun Tzu offers some insight, however, to determine in what cases disobeying a king's order or taking an initiative are acceptable. In *The Art of War*, the criteria for establishing justification for such action (noting that inaction is action also) are as follows: (1) when such is ordered by commissioned officers pursuant to their duty to preserve the state to the best of their ability; Griffith, 58, 63; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 30, 135. (2) in the process of disciplining belligerent soldiers, whose belligerence brings about disorder in the ranks and/or lack of preparedness for war, resulting in an increase in the level of threat to the state on account of weakness; Griffith 58, 126-127; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 30. (3) when it is clear that immediate success in battle and long-term victory in war are both certain with prompt action because of some great advantage that has been taken for granted by a king; Griffith 81-84, 128, 139; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 104, 262-264. (4) and when the loss of a battle and/or war is assuredly to result from obeying a king's command; and when a king orders incorrect travel or deployment on certain forms of terrain that will grant an enemy an advantage or expose one's combatants to ambush. Griffith, 111-113; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 202, 269-271.

<sup>295</sup> Handael, 26-27, 32, 34-35, 38-39, 53-55, 59, 62-67, 69-70.

<sup>296</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid., 6-8.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid., 6.

(9) Both works prefer that, when in war, decisive battles should be employed. In a decisive battle, one adversary is strategically and irreversibly pushed off balance by their adversary's superior concentration of force at the right time and place, regardless of each opponent's overall military strength.<sup>300</sup>

In achieving this result, Clausewitz emphasizes above all the use of numerically superior troop strength focused on annihilating the enemy's troops in a decisive battle and, if possible, annihilating all of the enemy's troop strength in the war. This is not to say that Sun Tzu does not value numerically superior infantries. He qualifies, in fact, his overall recommendations for offensive and defensive strategies to be employed in accord with different ratios comparable to the size of an adversary's army and recommends superior troop concentrations in the proper time and place. Additionally, Sun Tzu recommends the use of anything which provides an advantage to the portion of forces sent out to win a decisive battle, rather than held back to defend. He includes those elements that Clausewitz views as being less significant, such as terrain, maneuver, speed, deception, intelligence, surprise, and psychological operations. Those elements especially include dividing, diverting, and encircling an enemy, but not letting the enemy know that there is no way out.<sup>301</sup>

It is reasonably safe to say that, depending on philosophy and theology, an adversary self-perceived to have superiority in physical strength is more likely to neglect the application of what Handael terms "force multipliers," while an adversary self-perceived to be inferior in physical strength is more likely to employ them. For many

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<sup>299</sup> Ibid., 21-22. Handael fails to detail that the extreme title of the "bloodless battle" was a straw man of Clausewitz's construction. *The Art of War* does not use the term "bloodless battle." It recommends against valuing excessive killing. Sun Tzu understood the fact that long wars make states easy prey for other opportunists inside and outside their country's borders, depleting a state's economic and military resources, over-burdening a populace with excessive taxes, standing in the way of marriage and family togetherness, and by devaluing human life. Ames, 107-108, 169; Griffith, 63, 72-74, 77, 135, 144; Sawyer, 173-174, 231.

While Handael holds that Sun Tzu's promotion of the conservation of human life is a product of Confucianism, it is more likely to be a product of Taoism. Cleary, *The Art of War*, 1-7; Handael, 22-23. The notion that the best leader or general is one who "... subdues the enemy without fighting..." and captures "... all-under-heaven intact ..." is an ideal that should be set. Griffith, 79. It should be set whether for religious reasons or a matter of the preservation of strength.

Although the human condition is imperfect, to not set a high standard invites lower achievement. Consider the path Sun Tzu's family took to power. It should be understood that in a capture, the word "intact" is relative in measurement. While the Chen clan's actions were likely driven by desire for power, the use of deception and even assassination in overthrowing the unjust ruler to establish a new and more just ruler was viewed as acceptable. Griffith, 63, 66, 77-78, 113, 122, 139, 144-148; J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 16-17; Sawyer, 38.

<sup>300</sup> Handael, 31-34.

<sup>301</sup> Griffith, 98, 99, 103; Handael, 26, 30-35, 37-38, 42, 44, 50.



various reasons, however (including the value of human life, importance of victory, and conservation of a nation's resources in order to deal with the unexpected), it is preferred that the "force multipliers" mentioned by Sun Tzu and the superior concentration of force against an enemy's weak points, mentioned by both philosopher strategists, be used together in concert.<sup>302</sup>

On page 60 of Handael's *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared*, one finds a quick and easy table that compares each philosopher strategist's views of, "Command and Control, and the Roles of Intelligence, Surprise, Deception, and Forecasting in War." This table details some distinctions that have been made between the teachings found in *The Art of War* and *On War*. According to the table, Sun Tzu held the following ideas: *analysis* is to be made by the military on all levels of war; dependable *intelligence* is obtainable and important; predicting an outcome is possible with sound planning based on good intelligence data; *command and control* in battle are difficult but possible; the most important weapon in war is *deception*; and success may be achieved by knowing your enemy while your enemy is misinformed. In comparison, Clausewitz held the following ideas: analysis was to be made on the battlefield; *intelligence* is not worth the effort used to gather it and can be misleading; *forecasting in war* is next to impossible because sound decisions must be made; it is necessary to have contingency plans because of chance, uncertainty, and friction; *command and control* in battle are very difficult if not impossible; *deception* is unimportant and counter productively used by the weak; fielding the largest possible force, the concentration of force, the intuition of the military genius, maintaining the initiative and an offensive strategy will allow one to win over an enemy.<sup>303</sup>

Handael holds that both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz make doctrinal mistakes. In his over-reliance on crude "force, improvisation, and the intuition of the military genius," Clausewitz misses the usefulness of intelligence and deception and the extent to which there actually is control over events. In what is said to be an over-reliance on the "availability of intelligence" and "original plans," it is said that Sun Tzu's teachings could lead others to overestimate the extent to which deception is useful and original are feasible.<sup>304</sup>

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<sup>302</sup> Griffith, 144; Handael, 36-37.

<sup>303</sup> Handael, 60.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid. In Sun Tzu's case it is clear that Handael's allegations are not problems in the text, but with the reader. Scholars and generals demonstrate a lack of understanding the balance and comprehensiveness

Handael concluded that, while Sun Tzu and Clausewitz have been thought to be polar opposites, they may be understood to have many similarities. Sun Tzu's analytical focus on upper strategic levels (said to result in an optimistic point of view) and Clausewitz's analytical focus on "lower operational levels" (said to result in a pessimistic point of view) should both be studied for a better understanding of war as a "rational political instrument." Both approaches should be jointly applied.<sup>305</sup>

"The Relevance Of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic and Operational Levels Of War" class is the only class offered at the Marine Corps War College in which Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is studied in depth and in comparison with Clausewitzian theory and Marine Corps doctrine.<sup>306</sup>

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of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* when they overemphasize and are overly dependent intelligence (be it available or not), when they too rigidly bind themselves to original plans, when they inadequately prepare for an enemy who will come owing to the evils of human nature, neglect the importance of constant reassessment, and fail to use proper concentration of force and the right time and place. Ames, 86, 114, 136; Griffith, 9, 10, 66, 70, 87, 91, 101; Hanzhang, 43, 96.

<sup>305</sup> Handael, 72-73. While Handael seems to address related concerns over strategic advantage and the two different doctrines, his analysis is incomplete. Clausewitz comes to the conclusion that if all else is equal, then superior concentration of force in battle (if not, or in addition to, overall superior numbers in war) brings victory. Handael, 30-34, 38. Superior concentration of force at the right time and place, however, to some degree requires greater genius, intelligence, planning, deception, maneuver, speed, and control over troops than the enemy: all things that Sun Tzu values. Otherwise an enemy, especially an equal, would compensate before an assault in order to make that targeted point in his perimeter impenetrable and his interior unknown. Despite the fact that Clausewitz believed surprise almost impossible, if all else were equal, including force, then intelligence, deceit, and surprise could be the deciding factor in a conflict.

Handael has another problem in that he sees the deceit of each adversary as canceling each of their intelligence advantages and, in turn, making surprise nearly impossible. Handael, 25-27, 42-49, 60. Aside from the natural rank of species assigned to organisms by the law of nature and nature's God, very little is ever equal or the same in life, even if it is only separated by time and/or space. Sun Tzu might have replied that if it were not a matter of chance, the most deceitful adversary would win. In war there are no perfect answers to hypotheticals. If leaders are not skilled to the degree that is said by Sun Tzu to be the pinnacle of success, then perhaps their general's and troop's strengths, speeds, and movements may be made deceiving, discouraging, and/or devastating to an enemy. Sun Tzu's understanding that "... warfare is the art of deceit ..." and recommendation that "... the best military policy is to attack strategies ..." may be taken to cover all of that which has been immediately aforementioned. Ames, 111.

<sup>306</sup> Strange, 3, 11-12. "The Relevance Of Sun Tzu & Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic & Operational Levels Of War" class fulfills the same Intermediate Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) requirements as those portions of the Marine Corps' Command and Staff College's Resident and Nonresident "Theory and Nature of War" courses that were relevant to this thesis. Those requirements will be detailed more in footnotes later. Strange, 13. Unfortunately this class's credit hours and the time span those credit hours are fit is unknown. Such information was not provided by the War College in writing. This class's content, however, has been provided. In other words, that which is most important and relevant to this thesis is found in the parts of its syllabus that were provided. If such is not studied in class it may be studied by students independently, and most likely is studied independently because their lives depend on it!

*D. The Marine Corps Command and Staff College:  
Foundation, Purpose, and Structure*

One part of the early tri-part Marine Corps Professional Military Education system, the Field Officers Course (which welcomed its initial class in 1920) has been developed into today's Command and Staff College.<sup>307</sup> Currently within the Command and Staff College there exist three schools/programs. The first two are referred to as Intermediate-level Schools, and include the Nonresident Program, the Resident Program, and the School of Advanced Warfare (SAW). Each school/program has its own courses on a variety of military subjects with a focus on developing upper-level military leadership.<sup>308</sup> As ordered by the Commandant of The Marine Corps, all Marine majors must complete either the CandSC (Command and Staff College) in residence, its sister service/allied nation resident equivalent, or the CandSCNP (Command and Staff College Nonresidents Program).<sup>309</sup>

*E. The Command and Staff College Nonresident Programs:  
Foundation, Purpose, and Structure*

"Consistent with the precepts of *Warfighting* (FMFM 1) CMC's Guidance, and the emphasis of the MEPD [Marine Corps Institute Professional Military Education Department] on high academic standards appropriate to graduate level education, the Nonresident Program has been completely revised. Its approach and course content are the same as resident CandSC [Command and Staff College]: top—down [from theory to tactical application]." In fact, the NP [Nonresident Program] curriculum has been developed to "... parallel the Command and Staff College (CandSC) resident curriculum as much as is possible via a correspondence medium."<sup>310</sup>

According to the USMC Command and Staff College and USMC Institute *Command and Staff College Nonresident Program 1994 Information Brochure*, the

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<sup>307</sup> Pratt, letter to author.

<sup>308</sup> Oliver, interview by author.

<sup>309</sup> USMC Command and Staff College and USMC Institute, *Command and Staff College Nonresident Program 1994 Information Brochure* (Washington, DC: USMC Institute, 1994) 1.

<sup>310</sup> In span, the Nonresident Program should require "450 hours of self-study ... in 3 years (based upon a rate of progression of three hours of study per week)." Ibid.

Command and Staff College Nonresident Program (8700) curriculum has a purpose that is defined in a section titled "Curriculum Goal."

The *intent* of the curriculum is to provide officers with an understanding of the relationship between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war within a joint/combined [joint and combined refer to the degree of cooperation that must occur between the many United States armed services that each have their own special focus and abilities] environment, and by applying MAGTF [Marine Air—Ground Task Force and denotes that the Marine Corps also has its own air support] doctrine and techniques to the changing conditions of warfare, the ability to out-think and outfight any opponent. The *focus* of the curriculum is the development of an officer who understands the capabilities and potential roles of a Marine Air—Ground Task Force [MAGTF] at the operational level of war and how to best task organize, deploy, and employ these forces in any tactical environment across the spectrum of conflict.<sup>311</sup>

Nonresident Program (8700) "Curriculum Objectives" address the following seven areas of concern: (1) "[u]nderstand[ing] the theory and nature of war and its relationship to the application of other elements of national power"; (2) "[t]hink[ing] strategically and recognizing the relationship between national security interests and goals as well as the way military power can be used to serve those interests and goals"; (3) "[a]nalyz[ing] strategic guidance and [t]ranslat[ing] it into operational direction in the form of a campaign plan designed to accomplish military objectives;" (4) "[a]ssess[ing] the relationship between the operational and the tactical levels of war and ... orchestrat[ing] tactical battles and engagements as part of campaigns designed to create military conditions that accomplish strategic goals;" (5) providing innovative and proficient planning and execution of Marine Air—Ground Task Force employment anywhere within the spectrum of conflict and articulate the capabilities of a MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Force) "... within a joint/combined area with the primary focus at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level"; (6) assisting others in the development of skillful conflict evaluation and "sound military judgment"; and (7) "[u]nderstand[ing] joint service subject matter that will prepare graduates for joint duty assignments, and eventual

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<sup>311</sup> Ibid.

nomination for the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) designation by achieving "the Phase I Educational Objectives prescribed in the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff... ." <sup>312</sup>

The Joint Professional Military Education curriculum plays a formative role in the United States military branch's educational curricula, which is divided into four "Learning Areas." Respectively, those areas are as follows: (1) "Joint Forces and the Operational Level of War," which focuses on "... basic knowledge of the characteristics of ... employing joint forces at the tactical level ... including organizing, training, and equipping of US armed forces [in addition to] ... theory and principles of warfare at the operational level ..."; (2) "Organization and Command Relationships," which focuses on the "... basic knowledge of the principles of operational command and logistics support in joint commands, and how the US military is organized to plan, execute, and sustain joint and combined operations"; (3) "Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I)" which focuses on "... the C4I that extends from the strategic, to the operational, to the tactical levels [and] is designed to give basic knowledge of the operational aspects associated with C4 systems and make students aware of national intelligence organizations and their capabilities in acquiring necessary intelligence support for joint commanders"; (5) and "Defense Planning Systems" which focuses on "... basic knowledge of defense planning systems that affect joint operation planning ... such as the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES), the National Security Council (NSC) system and the joint aspects of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)." <sup>313</sup>

The seven courses that compose the Nonresident Program seek to fulfill the objectives and requirements that have been mentioned.

*Theory and Nature of War* (8701) "addresses the evolution of warfare from the 18th century to the present. ... [i]nclud[ing] contributions of noted theorists, [E]astern and [W]estern cultures, the concept of total war and that of revolutionary warfare." It ends with a comparison of the "US way of war" and that of the Marine Corps' doctrine. <sup>314</sup>

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<sup>312</sup> Ibid., 2. The fulfillment of Phase I (Intermediate) Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curriculum goals plays a formative role in the Marine Corps Command and Staff College's nonresident and resident programs' curricula and is further detailed at the end of the Command and Staff College and USMC Institute, *Command and Staff College Nonresident Program 1994 Information Brochure*. Ibid., 7.

<sup>313</sup> Ibid., 7-9.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid., 6.

*Strategic Thought* (8702) "explores the relationship between national interests, the development of national goals/objectives, and the considerations attendant to using military force to accomplish those goals and objectives." This includes how strategies are developed and how the "... capabilities and limitations of military force are used as an element of national power." Particular focus is directed on the following ideas: "... the use of military force as a political instrument, ... recurring concerns of the strategist and policy maker in preparing for and preventing war, ... [the activities of war, and planning for the] successful termination of conflicts."<sup>315</sup>

*Operational Level of War* (8703) "focuses on the analysis of strategic guidance provided by the national command authority and on the translation of that guidance into operational direction in the form of a campaign plan ... examin[ing] the concept of operational (theater level) warfare and the relationship between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels." It also examines from a Marine Air—Ground Task Force (MAGTF) perspective, the considerations associated with "... operational planning in a joint and combined environment."<sup>316</sup>

*MAGTF Education* (8704) "focuses on the concepts, considerations, and procedures attendant to the "... task organization, deployment, and employment of a MAGTF."<sup>317</sup>

*Defensive MAGTF Operations* (8705) examines "... the complexities associated with the Asian and Pacific regions. The focus is on the planning and execution of "... sustained operations ashore for a MAGTF of Marine Expeditionary Force size." Of particular interest is understanding what could possibly be needed for the maintenance of "... stability, balance, and deterrence." Korea is the example listed in this course's description.<sup>318</sup>

*Amphibious and Offensive MAGTF* (8706) explores the "... nature, capabilities, limitations, and characteristics ..." of a MAGTF in an amphibious operation as well as the phases of an amphibious operation, service and command responsibilities, planning considerations, and the termination of operations.<sup>319</sup>

*Operations Other than War* (8707):

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<sup>315</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid.

consists of studying the aspects of military operations ... in an environment other than large-scale combat operations normally associated with conventional war. Previously referred to as Low Intensity Conflict, *Operations Other Than War* is a much broader and evolving conceptualization that also includes ... military operations that do not involve the use or threat of force. The object of this course is a familiarity with the various operations other than war scenarios, the realization that the relevancy and effectiveness of military forces will vary depending on the multifarious factors of the scenario, and the military efforts in support of political objectives must be integrated into the total effort.<sup>320</sup>

Each of those courses that comprise the Nonresident Program (8700) follows its own syllabus and concludes with its own final test.<sup>321</sup> This is not to say those courses are so separate they have nothing in common. Arranged in a logical progression, they are drawn together by "Recurring Themes" enumerated in each syllabus in a way that should help each student build an overall or philosophical understanding of Marine Corps Doctrine.<sup>322</sup> It is likely that more officers take the Command and Staff College Resident Program than the Nonresident Program. However, due to similarities between the Resident and "Nonresident Program Theory and Nature of War" course curricula one might say the officers in each Program's course learn similar lessons.

*F. The Art of War In The "Theory and Nature Of War" Course  
(Command and Staff College Nonresident Program)*

It is known that those individuals from the Marine Corps, Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, National Guard, [and] DOD Civilian [be they Active Duty,] "Selected Reserve, or Individual Ready Reserve who are enrolled in the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Nonresident Program Theory and Nature of War course that is offered by the USMC Institute are required to read much of the Griffith version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*.<sup>323</sup>

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<sup>320</sup> Ibid.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid., 3,5.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid., 6-7.

At the same time, because of the greater specificity of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Resident Program's *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, and an attempt to reduce redundancy in this thesis, the recent study, development, application, and more specific commentary of and on *The Art of War's* basic precepts and contentions found with certain tenets of the Command and Staff Resident and "Nonresident Program Theory and Nature of War" course curricula shall be more specifically detailed in the portion of this thesis focusing on the Resident Program "Theory and Nature of War" course curriculum. This does not, however, eliminate the obligation to compare and comment on the "Nonresident Program Theory and Nature of War" course curriculum in relevant manner.

The lesson in the "Theory and Nature of War" course that first focuses on the Griffith version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is divided into three parts. In respective order, they are "Student Requirements," "Study Questions," and "Relationship to Other Instruction."<sup>324</sup>

In the student requirements for this lesson, one finds an account of those pages in the Griffith version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* that are to be read and a description of some of the finer points that have contributed to this text's popularity:

[*The Art of War*] consists of concise, pithy statements of practical advice on subjects such as the commander and his style of leadership, the importance of psychological elements in war such as deception and surprise, and the use of various 'propaganda' sources to gain support from the local populace.<sup>325</sup>

In this lesson, the study questions that students are required to answer are as follows.<sup>326</sup> "Do Sun Tzu's writings express a relationships between war and politics, political and military objectives? If so, what is their relationship?"<sup>327</sup> While no answer

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<sup>323</sup> USMC Command and Staff College and USMC Institute, *Marine Corps Command and Staff College Nonresident Program Enrollment Form, course 8701: Theory and Nature of War* (Washington, D.C.: USMC Institute, 1994); USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 2.

<sup>324</sup> Ibid.

<sup>325</sup> Ibid.

<sup>326</sup> Ibid.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid.



has been given, one can say *The Art of War* lends itself to the understanding that war is for the survival and opportunistic expansion of the state.<sup>328</sup>

"... [*The Art of War*] is a much shorter work than those of later theorists, yet is widely studied. What qualities does it offer that allow it to draw such interest in the face of later works? ... Do and will technology and progress diminish *The Art of War's* relevance?"<sup>329</sup>

Even though no official answers have been provided, this thesis presents a few. If specifically listing the multiple lessons that may be derived from many of the text's passages and the sum of all of the different combinations of many of those passages, the answer to this question would be rather long. It may be said that *The Art of War* will continue to retain a value over many more "modern" or "fashionable" texts on war, because *The Art of War* is written from a perspective that considers the unchanging parts of human nature, states unchanging principles that may be found at the root of each and every conflict, is wide in the scope of the basic strategic factors considered necessary for victory, is concise, and is easily read.<sup>330</sup>

"Based on your personal knowledge of the general events of *Operation Desert Shield/Storm*, were Sun Tzu's precepts followed by Central Command (CENTCOM) planners? Were there any timeless techniques, tactics, or strategies used by allied forces in these operations?"<sup>331</sup>

Depending on each student's experiences, answers may vary to this question. While no mention of this may be found as an answer after this question, Sun Tzu's influence may be evident considering the general account of the events in each of those operations that is provided in Marine Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr.'s (ret.) book *On Strategy II. A Critical Analysis of The Gulf War*. There exists, however, the problems of having to peruse Summer's Clausewitzian bias and not being able to interview those particular Central Command planners. This shall be further discussed in this thesis's focus on the Command and Staff College Resident Program.<sup>332</sup>

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<sup>328</sup> Griffith, 63-64, 69-70, 79, 149.

<sup>329</sup> USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 2.

<sup>330</sup> Griffith, v-vii.

<sup>331</sup> USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 2.

<sup>332</sup> Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., US Army (ret.), *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992), II, 3.

In its section "Relationship to other Instruction," "... this lesson provides ... a foundation for further study on the development of both Eastern and Western military thought. It is directly related to material introduced during lesson 13, 'Warfighting Theory and Doctrine,' and provides a framework for analysis of revolutionary warfare in lessons 10 and 11."<sup>333</sup>

This course's lessons 10, 11, and 13 are important to this thesis in that they may lead individuals to a better understanding of the depth of insight found in *The Art of War* by demonstrating how many of the text's basic precepts have been more recently studied, developed, applied, and detailed in addition to demonstrating the similarities that exist between the Command and Staff College Resident and Nonresident curricula.<sup>334</sup>

Lesson 10, entitled, "Modern Revolutionary War Theory," opens with two quotes: Karl Marx said, "The philosophers have only integrated the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." Mao Tse-tung's comment follows, "The guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will be confined not solely to China in her present anti-Japanese struggle, but will be worldwide." The introduction to this lesson further states that "Lenin was a great ideologist who applied the political incentive that so radically altered Russian history, but Mao Tse-tung was the first great methodologist ... to produce a systematic study of the tactics of guerrilla warfare." Mao's focus on inciting rural populations and the inspirational influence of his writings on many other revolutionaries are also mentioned.<sup>335</sup>

Lesson 10's educational objectives consist of the following requirements:

Describe the theory of revolutionary war, the political and economic factors, and other characteristics which can effect the development of such a theory  
... . Examine the relationship between revolutionary war and guerrilla

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<sup>333</sup> USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 2.

<sup>334</sup> As noted in the study questions and section "Relationship to other Instruction," this lesson focused on *The Art of War* addresses JPME (Joint Professional Military Education set by the Department of Defense) Phase I (Intermediate) requirements in Area I, Learning Objectives (c) and (e). Ibid.

Those JPME requirements are as follows: "Know selected definitions and basic concepts used in studying the operational level of war," and "Know how to examine military operations at the operational level of war, using lessons learned from the study of classic military writings and significant military campaigns throughout history." USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program Information Brochure*, 8.

<sup>335</sup> USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 29.

warfare . . . . Explain how a conventional military force would theoretically adapt to a revolutionary war.<sup>336</sup>

At this point "revolutionary warfare" may be understood as the innovative employment of ideologically motivated political division, guerrilla (hit and run) tactics, and sometimes terrorism as part of a larger war strategy, while a "revolution" may be understood to be the forceful overthrow of a government that possessed the legitimate right to rule as given it by the people.<sup>337</sup>

The student requirements of Lesson 10 consist of "Required Readings" in "Revolutionary War " by John Shy and Thomas W. Collier as found in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* edited by Peter Paret. It also consists of "Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare" by Samuel Griffith as found in the Marine Corps manual *FMFRP* a manual, and "Supplemental Readings" in the following: *The Conduct of War* by J. F. C. Fuller; "Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society " by Nuemann, Sigmund, and Mark von Hagen, which is found in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* edited by Peter Paret; and further in "Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare" by Samuel Griffith in the Marine Corps manual *FMFRP*.<sup>338</sup>

Lesson 10's study questions seem to challenge students to think about things that are usually taken for granted and give detail to definitions. Those questions are as follows:

- a. Why is revolutionary warfare, as a fully developed concept, a relatively recent phenomenon?
- b. What is revolutionary warfare? Where does it occur and by whom is it waged? For what purpose?
- c. Revolutions are not made by states and their bureaucracies but by raw social energies. What are the conditions that make revolutionary strategy meaningful?
- d. The American and French Revolutions do not seem to meet the concept of modern revolutionary war. Why?
- e. Does modern revolutionary war theory conflict with the theories of war studied thus far? ... similarities and differences?
- f. Which theory, conventional war or revolutionary war, is more likely to lead to

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<sup>336</sup> Ibid.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid.

<sup>338</sup> Ibid., 30.

toward absolute or unlimited war? Why? g. Is modern revolutionary war a separate theory that stands alone or is it another name applied to guerrilla warfare? Can you have a modern revolutionary war without guerrilla war? h. How does a conventional military force adapt to a modern revolutionary war? How does it prepare for this war theoretically? i. What is the American military experience at putting operational forces in the field in a revolutionary war setting? Are our current force structures adequate to combat a foe in this type of warfare? What strategies work or do not work in this type of warfare?<sup>339</sup>

While it is not suggested in this lesson, one may question if "revolutionary warfare" is revolutionary? Holding a position that agrees with this lesson's introductory statements, that "revolutionary warfare" is relatively new, may require one to first omit and/or deny the fact that the justification for war based on survival of various individuals, a nation's people, and/or a government that is found in the beginning of *The Art of War*. This is, most certainly in itself, a philosophical, political and legal argument, whether at any point in history such was and/or is recognized by rulers, leaders, and/or combatants, or even not recognized.<sup>340</sup>

Also, believing that what has been termed "revolutionary warfare" is a relatively new creation may require one to omit and/or deny the truth that: support of a rural population; comparative estimates before and during war; highly innovative plans that harness as many strategic advantages as possible; campaign strategies and tactical plans employing maneuver, speed, surprise, and/or guerrilla warfare; and the importance of acquiring supplies from the enemy are discussed in *The Art of War's* first two chapters.<sup>341</sup> In its section "Relationship to Other Instruction" this lesson enables the further comparison of that which has been defined as "conventional" as opposed to "revolutionary" in "theory."<sup>342</sup>

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<sup>339</sup> Ibid.

<sup>340</sup> Griffith, 63.

<sup>341</sup> Ibid., 63-76, 98-101.

<sup>342</sup> As noted in "JPME Areas/Objectives/Hours," "study questions," and section "Relationship to other Instruction" "Lesson 10" also focuses on the same JPME requirements as the first Nonresident Program Lesson reviewed. USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 29-31.

The introduction to Lesson 11, "Western Views of Modern Revolutionary Wars," begins with a review of some problems that changed the way that the American military executes a war. It may be said, that with their dependence on "conventional warfare styles" and "increasingly sophisticated weapons," western militaries "... have had limited success in dealing with revolutions [and] ... countering a revolutionary style of war [which are] ... normally manifested in an insurgent effort to displace the present government. [A problem exists in the] ... difficulty [of] finding, much less dealing with an elusive insurgent."<sup>343</sup>

The *Nonresident Program Theory and Nature of War Syllabus* shares the following about America's experience in Vietnam:

American problems in addressing modern revolutionary war may stem from what at times may be seems as a total disregard for all military theory. Some valuable lessons may be learned by looking at the American involvement in Vietnam ... . [In Vietnam] two opposing forces (made up of political and military aspects) analyzed and fought from widely divergent theoretical bases. Without closing that gap, without understanding one's self and one's enemy, one cannot surmise enemy intent or devise ways to defeat him. A good foundation in the theory of war will provide a sound basis for understanding modern revolutionary war.<sup>344</sup>

While in this lesson Vietnam is listed as a case of what seems to be a "disregard" for "theory" on the part of the United States military, it is also suggested that proper consideration should be given to *The Art of War*.<sup>345</sup> In gaining insight in this matter, one may consider *The Art of War's* precepts. "All warfare is based on deception."<sup>346</sup> Hide and then strike an enemy where and "... when he does not expect."<sup>347</sup> "Victory is the

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<sup>343</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid. The content of this introduction should be reviewed with an understanding that what establishes what is considered by most to be "conventional" warfare is debatable. Today "conventional" is overly restricted by those who see victory in more than militaristic term. Everything means survival. That which is war always included political, guerilla and espionage.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid. Such seems more likely when considering the earlier mention made of North Vietnamese General Giap.

<sup>346</sup> Griffith, 66.

<sup>347</sup> Ibid., 69, 98-99.

main object in war." Prolonged wars leave troops and countries weak and vulnerable.<sup>348</sup>  
"Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."<sup>349</sup>

Above all, evidence suggesting the introduction to Lesson 11 gives *The Art of War* due consideration is the adoption of *The Art of War's* precept "... know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril" that may be found to conclude this introduction.<sup>350</sup>

This lesson's educational objectives are two-fold: "a. Explain western views on modern revolutionary war. b. Explain the difficulties that western nations have experienced in confronting modern revolutionary war."<sup>351</sup>

Students fulfill those objectives through required readings and study questions.<sup>352</sup> Those readings are in Harry G. Summers Jr.'s *On Strategy*, Harry G. Summer Jr.'s "Clausewitz: Eastern and Western Approaches to War" as found in *Air University Review* and Bard E. O'Neill's "Part Three: The Practice of Strategy, Section C: Insurgency, Introduction" in *The Art and Practice of Military Strategy* published by The National Defense University.<sup>353</sup>

The study questions are as follows:

a. Do the West and the East have different views of revolutionary war theory? Why? What are the differences? b. Does modern revolutionary war theory comprise a separate body of theory, or is it merely an elaboration of the same prior theme of guerrilla or partisan warfare? c. Continuing with the previous lesson's discussions on revolutionary war theory, how well trained are we for war against a revolutionary foe? Have we learned any lessons from our experience with revolutionary war? Is the American military capable of conducting its own revolutionary war?<sup>354</sup>

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<sup>348</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>349</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>351</sup> USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 33.

<sup>352</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>353</sup> Ibid.

In the section, "Relationship to other Instruction," Lesson 11 "... closes the discussion on revolutionary war theory and sets the stage for the final presentation on the American way of war."<sup>355</sup>

The introduction to Lesson 13 begins with a statement of purpose taken from the Marine Corps Manual *Warfighting FMFM I*. "The sole justification for the USMC is to secure or protect national policy objectives by military force when peaceful means alone cannot... .[T]he general basis for all services stems from our *Constitution* and civilian control, *e.g.*, policy continuation."<sup>356</sup>

While that statement of Marine Corps' purpose may differ from *The Art of War's* statements concerning war's importance and studying war in the survival of certain people and a particular state. However, if completely reasoned through, it may, depending on particular conflicts and/or missions, fit within *The Art of War's* parameters. The following ideas are found in *The Art of War*: "War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied."<sup>357</sup>

It is further specified in the introduction to Lesson 13 that "... the Marine Corps' concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver." Because of its distinct abilities, the Marine Corps is focused on fulfilling the need for "expeditionary and amphibious operations." "The Marine Corps concept of war is based on maneuver in time and space ... to gain an advantage of operational tempo by responding more quickly than the opposing force and attacking his vulnerabilities."<sup>358</sup>

Not surprisingly, Lesson 13's educational objectives encourage students to understand that which, through success and failure, contributed to the development of

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<sup>354</sup> Ibid. Each person's answers to those questions depends on how they define revolution, counterrevolution, conventional warfare, unconventional warfare, eastern warfare, and western warfare. While these definitions will be influenced by each person's worldviews and prepositional bias that effect evidence selection and the interpretation of results, perhaps some answers to the study questions may be found in the accounts of activities that took place in ancient China and the American war of 1776.

<sup>355</sup> USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 34.

<sup>356</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>357</sup> Griffith, 63.

<sup>358</sup> USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 39.

Marine Corps doctrine in addition to understanding the benefits of that doctrine. This is a philosophical question. The objectives are as follows:

- a. Compare and contrast the Marine Corps concept of war with the theories of war discussed throughout the course.
- b. Analyze the value of adopting the doctrine of maneuver as the Marine Corps concept of war.
- c. Describe how war based on maneuver is conducted.<sup>359</sup>

Those objectives are accomplished through student requirements in the form of required readings in the manual *Warfighting FMFM 1* and Major R. K. Dobson's "*Maneuver Warfare Articulated* (unpublished article)" in addition to supplemental readings in William Lind's *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*.<sup>360</sup>

Further requirements for this lesson in the form of broad study questions may focus students not only on the application of Marine Corps doctrine but understanding philosophical similarities with and differences to other doctrines.<sup>361</sup> They are as follows:

- a. Does the Marine Corps' concept of war agree with the theories of war discussed thus far?
- b. What is the value of the doctrine of maneuver?
- c. How is war, based on maneuver, conducted?<sup>362</sup>

Even though not stated in this lesson, one may see that while the Marine Corps' contemporary purpose may or may not be as expansive as *The Art of War's* purpose, in application they bear similarities. In *The Art of War* one may find the following ideas: "Having paid heed to the advantages of my plans, the general must create situations which will contribute to their accomplishment. By 'situations' I mean that he should act expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so control the balance."<sup>363</sup>

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<sup>359</sup> Ibid.

<sup>360</sup> Ibid., 39-40.

<sup>361</sup> Ibid., 40.

<sup>362</sup> Ibid.

<sup>363</sup> Griffith, 64.



"... [S]killful warriors first made themselves invincible and awaited the enemy's moment of vulnerability."<sup>364</sup> "... One who sets an entire army in motion to chase an advantage will not obtain it. If he abandons the camp to contend for advantage the stores will be lost."<sup>365</sup> "... [W]hat is difficult about maneuver is to make the devious route the most direct and to turn misfortune to advantage. ... One able to do this understands the strategy of the direct and the indirect."<sup>366</sup> "... [A] skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates."<sup>367</sup> "Thus, while we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged."<sup>368</sup> "Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity .... When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near."<sup>369</sup> "Attack where he is unprepared ...."<sup>370</sup> "Do not be predictable. Never use the same plan twice."<sup>371</sup> Even if a scheme is imperfect remember that "...the momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming, and his attack precisely regulated."<sup>372</sup>

Lesson 13 is an introduction to the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine known as "Maneuver Warfare," part of which is "Marine Air—Ground Task Force Operations."<sup>373</sup> Both that doctrine and its operational approach contain numerous principles distilled from Sun Tzu's teachings. In this correspondence curriculum, the extent to which *The Art of War* is further quoted or paraphrased depends on a student's motivation in the search for enlightenment and answers to questions asked rather than an instructor's lectures. As far as it is known, the extent to which Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and the principles and lessons that may be found therein are studied in the Command and Staff College

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<sup>364</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid., 103.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>368</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid., 98-100.

<sup>372</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>373</sup> USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 40.

Nonresidents Program, reflects what has been observed in the *Nonresident Program Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*.

*G. The "Theory and Nature Of War" Class:  
Foundation, Structure, and Purpose*

At the beginning of the syllabus for the Resident Program's "Theory and Nature of War" course one may find quotes taken from *The Art of War*, *On War*, and *Warfighting* that detail the following ideas: (1) the survival of persons and geopolitical entities mandates the study of war; (2) "theory" and "principles" alone cannot bring victory, but can enable "... insights into ... phenomena and ... relationships ..." on which "actions" may be based to bring victory in a way that makes proper responses almost seem to be a reflex; (3) it is a matter of duty that officers study "... the art and science of war at all levels ... with a solid foundation in military theory, ... knowledge of military history, [and] ... grasp of the unchanging principles of war."<sup>374</sup>

The course overview of "Theory and Nature of War" adds greater specificity to those quotes. Among other aspects of war, this section mentions the following: (1) war's "complexity," (2) the fact that tensions experienced in war are unique, (3) the significance of a "willingness" to sustain a particular measure of loss, (4) the importance of understanding "human relationships," (5) the ability derived from prior fighting "experience," (6) the "evolution" of "technology" and its effects on "warfare," (7) the importance of readiness for a fight, and (8) the "balance" provided by the combined study of "military history" and "military theory."<sup>375</sup>

As part of the course overview, it is admitted that "... most of us have some working definition of military history" and that the Webster's Dictionary definition of military theory can be made more "useful." The overview continues:

... military theory ... aids us in understanding the essential nature of war, in coming to grips with the environment within which military decisions are made and battles are fought, but it cannot provide specific solutions to campaigns or predict their outcomes. Theory can show us the timeless qualities of war, but it must also alert us to the many variables and

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<sup>374</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 1.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-2.

unpredictabilities in the evolution and conduct of war. Theory must not be canned or stagnant ...<sup>376</sup>

One should couple all of that with past and more current experience. As is stated in this section, this course lays an important foundation for further learning.

After the course overview sets the stage, the educational objectives and "Recurring Themes" continue to define and specify the course's purposes. In a memorandum placed before the "Theory and Nature of War" syllabus, however, one finds what seems to be a formal improvement to those two sections titled "Course Objectives and Recurring Themes."<sup>377</sup>

To be emphasized are the following: (1) war's constantly changing or evolving character as seen in the notion that it has evolved from limited to unlimited; examine in depth the multiple relationships between "politics, policy, strategy, operations, and tactics"; (2) "international community and the balance of power"; (3) "[c]ivil-military relations"; (4) "[t]he role of the military" in non-war missions; (5) "[i]nternational and domestic influences on policy/strategy"; (6) "[c]oalition warfare"; (7) motivation and unity on the battlefield; (8) "leadership and ethics (political and military)"; (9) "[p]rinciples of war"; (10) and the "limits of military power." In the memorandum, those objectives and themes are further simplified into three. This course's "major long term" objective is to motivate Marines to study with persistence military history and also general history; "the point that war and politics are inextricably linked at every level of war" must be made crystal clear. Finally, this course lays down foundations for the rest of the Command and Staff College's curriculum by fostering within students a broad concept of war and familiarizing students with wars that will be case-studied further.<sup>378</sup>

The "Theory and Nature of War" syllabus provides a course description specifically listing subjects and cases that are studied in their respective order to convey the Marine Corps Command and Staff College's view of the evolution of war. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are the first to be studied. Each student is required to write one paper focusing on one "key" principle and/or lesson taken from one of their works. The rest of this study is mostly what has been termed "Western" in focus. The syllabus explains that

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<sup>376</sup> Ibid.

<sup>377</sup> Ibid., x, 2-3.

<sup>378</sup> Ibid.

the following ideas will be examined for an understanding of their causes, character, and scope:

... the origins of limited, conventional warfare in the Western world during the seventeenth and eighteenth and again in the nineteenth centuries, two periods separated by an era of total war known as the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon (1789-1815) ... the American Civil War (1861-65) ... German Wars of Unification (1864-71) [with] ... the new German model of military organization ... World War I ... World War II ... and [ending with] the Cold War ... .<sup>379</sup>

The first half of this course concludes with an essay exam where students must demonstrate that they know, understand, can "integrate," and use the strategic philosophies and historical lessons studied.<sup>380</sup>

In the second half of this course students study the following: (1) the "evolution" of, more recent post-Vietnam U.S. Army doctrines, U.S. Navy doctrine and contributing naval philosopher strategists' theories, U.S. Air Force strategies and tactics and contributing airwar philosopher strategists' theories, and Marine Corps doctrine; (2) "'Just War,' 'Revolutionary War,' ... nuclear deterrence, ... the post-Cold War world, ... and the 'Principles of War.'" The course ends with a required essay test and paper.<sup>381</sup>

From the tentative calendar for August and September of 1994, as found in the back of the *Command and Staff College Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, it may be concluded the "Theory and Nature of War" course is conducted in a time and subject intensive manner over a two-month period.<sup>382</sup> Such intensity is also confirmed by two bar graphs detailing the correlation between time and reading requirements for this course's exams and papers.<sup>383</sup>

While this course's calendars and bar graphs are projections, the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* makes it clear that subject material which is not

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<sup>379</sup> Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid., 87, 88.

<sup>381</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>382</sup> Ibid., V-1, V-3.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid., viii, ix.

covered to the depth that the Command and Staff College deems fit, should be read by students on their own. Instructors of this course are also encouraged to focus on "ideas" that will stay with students rather than "factoids" that will be forgotten soon after the course's testing requirements are fulfilled.<sup>384</sup> In the section, "Relationship to other Instruction" found at this lesson's conclusion, it is specifically stated that this "Theory and Nature of War" course is intended to be an introduction that sets the "... foundation ... [for and] ... stimulates ... interest ... [in] continuing professional development."<sup>385</sup>

It is important to note the memorandum details. In addition to increasing this course's historical content starting with the study of "... religious total war ... 1618-1715 [for the purposes of better] ... document[ing] the changeable character of war [that which, in the past, has been called] ... Constitution Day [is now] ... integrated [as a] ... new day on Civil-Military Relations [and] ... beefed up with relevant readings."<sup>386</sup>

#### *H. The Art of War In The "Theory and Nature Of War" Course (Command and Staff College Resident Program)*

Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* plays an important part in the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Resident Program's "Theory and Nature of War" course. In this

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<sup>384</sup> Ibid., vii, x, v-1.

<sup>385</sup> Ibid., 6. In total, those relevant portions of the lessons found in the USMC Command and Staff College Resident Program "Theory and Nature of War" course focus on JPME Intermediate Learning Area 1 Learning Objectives (a) (b) (c) and (e). Each relevant lesson of this resident program course fulfills the same JPME objectives that are fulfilled in each correspondingly relevant lesson of the nonresident program course and vice versa. Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 3, 17-19, 26-27, 31, 90-94, 130, 132-133; USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program Information Brochure*, 7.

<sup>386</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, vii. As stated, upon entering the military a soldier takes an oath to protect the Constitution and defend America from all enemies. The military's purpose is to defend *The Constitution*. That is more than psycho-therapeutic public relations. One may question the words in italics. What is character as opposed to substance as opposed to style? What is the character of war? Does that character change? Why was "Constitution Day" not "integrated" before? Were it and its integration an after-thought? The contemporary notion of a day dedicated to public "Relations" is not the same as building and maintaining a worldview based upon an in-depth understanding of *The Declaration of Independence* and *The Constitution*.

Admittedly the study of *The Declaration of Independence* and *The Constitution* (those documents that shape the American Political Identity) should be mandatory to know exactly what one should defend and the commendable academic pursuit of benevolent statesmen and honorable defenders. One would expect that more than a day be dedicated to that study. Hopefully, those documents are studied by United States servicemen and establish the primary motivation for their fighting, and form the worldview through which they evaluate all missions and orders. The government and people of the United States owe their soldiers the peace of mind and motivation gained from a just cause and sense of moral duty. Fehrenbacher, 244-245.

course's *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* each lesson is marked with its own class card. The only class cards that come before Sun Tzu's are of the "Introduction To The Theory And Nature Of War" course, "The Structure Of Military History," and "Clausewitz's Theory Of War."<sup>387</sup>

Immediately following the class card that demarcates the section of this *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* focusing on *The Art of War*, one may find two often used quotes. Both quotes may be found throughout this thesis: "War is a grave concern of the State: It must be thoroughly studied" and "The best policy is to attack the enemy's plans; the next best to disrupt his alliances, for to subdue the enemy's army without fighting is the acme of skill."<sup>388</sup>

Those quotes, taken with the knowledge that Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* deserves study due to its stated "comprehensiveness and depth" and because it has been studied by our enemies, provide the reasons for this lesson. This introduction further holds "... that modern Western military officers may have [trouble] in perceiving his meaning ..." and therefore the "ideas" and the "values" taught in *The Art of War* should be "... placed ... in their historical context." Students are often able to better understand after a special lecture.<sup>389</sup>

The educational objectives for this class are as follows:

... place Sun Tzu into his historical context ... evaluate Sun Tzu's basic theories and his approach to warfighting ... [and] get the insight into Sun Tzu necessary to appreciate the manner in which the Marine Corps's *FMFM 1: Warfighting* incorporates Sun Tzu's concepts.<sup>390</sup>

Those objectives are partly achieved through a special lecture, related readings, and the review of four "Issues For Consideration." It is required that students attend a lecture on Sun Tzu given by Dr. Authur Waldron, a strategy and policy faculty member at the US Naval War College, and read all but 12 pages of the Samuel Griffith version of *Sun Tzu's*

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<sup>387</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 7, 9, 15, 23.

<sup>388</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>389</sup> Ibid., 23, 24.

<sup>390</sup> Ibid., 24.

*The Art of War*. Reading for this course in Michael I. Handael's *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared* is only supplemental.<sup>391</sup>

The "Issues for Consideration" are more focused questions. In respective order the first three ask: (1) what, if any is the "value in studying *The Art of War* " and how does the special lecture "affect your perceptions"; (2) "[d]o Sun Tzu's writings express a relationship between war and politics, and between political and military objectives? If so, what ..."; and (3) "were Sun Tzu's" principles and/or "... timeless techniques, tactics, or strategies ... used by ..." those who planned and implemented Desert Shield and Storm. The fourth issue proceeds as follows:

[While] Sun Tzu's arguments about winning "bloodless battles," about using clever stratagems, and about exercising patient, long-term strategies are superficially attractive, they raise certain problems: [i]s his "bloodless battle" really war in the sense we are used to it, or merely political machinations short of war? Is a modern democracy capable of his patients schemes? Can open societies with complex military organizations really execute such clever stratagems?<sup>392</sup>

Although arranged in a slightly different order, the "Issues for Consideration" are similar if not the same as the study questions found in the corresponding "Nonresident Program Theory and Nature of War" course lesson that focuses on *The Art of War*, and, to a degree, these questions have been answered already.<sup>393</sup> Throughout the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, a large number of the answers to issues are presented in the form of excerpts taken from course texts.

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<sup>391</sup> Ibid., 24, 25.

<sup>392</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>393</sup> In this lesson of the *Command and Staff College, Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, leading and Bassford's associated commentary seems an attempt to diminish the significance of the depth found in *The Art of War*. This is particularly evident in the fourth of those "Issues For Consideration." Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 25-26; USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 2. Additionally, considering the recent discoveries, research, and translations made of *The Art of War* while noting the Griffith version of *The Art of War*'s copyright date and the *Makers of Modern Strategy*'s failure to adequately review *The Art of War*, there remains a question as to the legitimacy that certain quotes would possess without their having been compared to other versions of *The Art of War*. However, as aforementioned, due to its relative similarity and the extent that it is used by military professionals, the Griffith version of *The Art of War* has been and shall continue to be extensively employed in this thesis.

In the two-part response to the first issue's question it is again stated that students often need Dr. Aurthur Waldron's lecture to understand what is important in *The Art of War*. It is also asserted that Dr. Waldron "... uses Clausewitz as a straw man to demonstrate Sun Tzu's uniqueness, which is useful but can also be confusing. Keep a critical eye on this tendency." In part, this question is also answered by "Other Writers' Views On Sun Tzu." Quotes have been taken from Basil Liddell Hart and Samuel Griffith detailing the economic use of words, historical ground breaking rationality, comprehensiveness in war theory, and the importance of the "... theory of adaptability to existing situations ..." found in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*.<sup>394</sup>

In the answer to the second issue, the very nature of the relationship between politics and war as well as their objectives are questioned. According to Bassford:

This question essentially seeks to draw out the overall similarities in Clausewitz's and Sun Tzu's points of view about war being a continuation of politics ... . Sun Tzu's 'bloodless victories' are, in fact, political, not military, in nature, although the line is often impossible to draw with any precision ... . [W]ar, an integral part of the power politics of the age, had become [important to governmental consistency]. [This] ... required a coherent strategy and tactical theory and a practical doctrine governing intelligence, planning, command, operational, and administrative procedures. The author of the "Thirteen Chapters" was the first man to provide such a theory and ... doctrine.<sup>395</sup>

While not found in Bassford's text, Sun Tzu does not use the terms "bloodless battle" and his concern is not only in the conservation of strength. *The Art of War's* thirteenth chapter does state that those not employing espionage to gain advantage and shorten wars are, among other things, ignorant, inhumane, unprofessional, and eventually losers.<sup>396</sup> Perhaps, the ideal could be stated differently. Because war is for the survival of the state and lives lost may not be replaced, conserving strength in the long run is

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<sup>394</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 25.

<sup>395</sup> Ibid., 25, 26. Many scholars may disagree with such a limiting answer, especially one that seems to distort that which is found in *The Art of War*. Cleary, *The Art of War*, 4-6; Cleary, *Mastering The Art of War*, 5-9; Griffith, 144.

<sup>396</sup> It has been said that Michael Handael believes that the "bloodless battle" is an ideal towards which to be aimed. Handael, 5.



important. Military action should only be taken against enemies in the following conditions: when victory is easy, quick, and assured; when most of what is desired can be taken intact; and when bloodshed on one, if not both sides, can be kept to a minimum.<sup>397</sup>

As for the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus's* notion of "power politics," perhaps Sun Tzu and Clausewitz share that commonality. However, while some traditional preference for Clausewitz are not as evident in this issue's answer, Dr. Christopher Bassford, the author of the USMC Command and Staff College's *Theory and Nature of War Faculty ... AY 1994-1995*, admits to a "notorious" preference for Clausewitz and is attempting to "develop" Clausewitzian theories in this course.<sup>398</sup>

The answers to the third issue are not set by the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*.<sup>399</sup> While the answer to this question depends upon each officer's experience, other information sources do exist. Perhaps evidence that would, suggest to some degree, if not prove, principles and/or lessons learned from *The Art of War* were applied in the planning of the two stated desert operations by those who planned it, may be found in General Shwartzhoff's or General Powell's recently published books. Another possible source could be Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr (ret) *On Strategy II A Critical Analysis of The Gulf War*, dedicated "In Honor Of General Colin L. Powell Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff." However, as discussed, one will find that this book's analysis is mainly Clausewitzian in nature. Although they may not be cause and effect in nature, coincidental if not corollary similarities do exist.<sup>400</sup>

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<sup>397</sup> Ames, 111; Griffith, 63-73, 77-79, 143.

<sup>398</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, xii, 9, 10, 15, 16. There is a difference between those endeavors and attempting to honestly account for similarities that may be found between Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and Clausewitz's *On War*. However, that should not be so alarming as should be the use of a term like "power politics." There is a difference between the following sets of terms: power and authority; governmental consistency and legitimacy; and pragmatism and practicality. While Sun Tzu and Clausewitz may have not seen these points clearly, it is definitely American to see these points clearly. Such is supported by the philosophical and legal arguments that are found in *The Declaration of Independence*.

<sup>399</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>400</sup> Summers, vii, 3, 81. In reviewing operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, coalition forces succeeded through the following actions: (1) a long term sustained threat of a possible amphibious assault; (2) the amassing of armed forces on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border; (3) the elimination of Iraqi air intelligence capability; (4) deep behind the enemy's line special forces reconnaissance and the establishment of support/supply bases; (5) a surprise deep penetration invasion via the far inland Saudi-Iraqi boarder accompanied by the simultaneous shallow penetration invasion along the Saudi-Kuwaiti boarder; (6) a new defensive line deep inside Iraq; (7) the fact that coalition forces turned toward the Iraqi-Kuwaiti boarder and pushed Iraqi forces in the direction of Iran and the Persian Gulf; and (8) massive Iraqi surrenders were accepted as Kuwait was cleared. Summers, xiv, 1.

The fourth issue's answers are presented in the form of excerpts taken from the Griffith version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and modified by Bassford's input as found in italics in the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, but, in this text found between [ ]. This issue's answer has been extensively included in this thesis also to exhibit Bassford's input distinctly from that of Samuel Griffith's.<sup>401</sup>

From Griffith, p. 39 "... Sun Tzu believed that the moral strength and intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war, and that if these were properly applied war could be waged with certain success. [What if your enemy is as smart as you are and reads the same book? Can success in war ever be certain?] Never to be undertaken thoughtlessly or recklessly, war was to be preceded by measures designed to make it easy to win. The master conqueror frustrated his enemy's plans and broke up his alliances. [Meanwhile, they were doing the same thing to him.] He creates cleavages between sovereign and minister, superiors and inferiors, commanders and subordinates. [Sounds like democracy in action] His spies and agents were active everywhere, gathering information, sowing dissension, and nurturing subversion. The enemy was isolated and demoralized; his will to resist broken. Thus without battle his army was conquered, his cities taken and his state overthrown. [Without battle? Is this "war" or "operations short of war"?] Only when the enemy could not be overcome by these means was there recourse to armed force, [If an enemy can not be overcome by these other means, how much promise does force have?] which was to be applied so that victory was gained ... [for each adversary quickly and least expensively in the broadest sense of the terms. However, for the loser such was usually] ... (seldom achieved in Chinese practice)."

"... Sun Tzu realized that an indispensable preliminary to battle was to attack the mind of the enemy ... . Such a commander prizes above all freedom of action. He abhors a static situation and therefore attacks cities only when there is no alternative. [What if the objective in your "limited" war is merely the conquest of those very cities? Isn't Sun Tzu assuming that

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At the very least, from the preceding list some of the many easily identifiable applications of principles that are concerns found in *The Art of War* are the said importance of coalitions, false appearances, intelligence, multiple possibility contingencies, speedy supply delivery, high-speed mobility, and flanking assaults on unprepared positions. Griffith, 66, 69, 70, 72, 78, 91, 98, 102, 102, 144-148.

<sup>401</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 26.

war has certain objectives, including the total overthrow of the enemy?]  
Sieges, wasteful both of lives and time, entail abdication of the initiative."  
(Griffith, p. 41)<sup>402</sup>

While such may not be found in Bassford's commentary, of those hypotheticals that he constructs, two demand special attention. The first scenario of two equally matched opponents and second with the objective of capturing cities, may at a glance seem difficult to answer.<sup>403</sup> Creator-given responsibilities and rights not included, no one is everyone else's equal and everyone makes mistakes. The equal or even superior application of military effort on the part of one opponent or another does not always pay off in equal results. Sun Tzu understood that "[a]lthough I estimate the troops of [my opponent] ... as many, of what benefit is this superiority in respect to the outcome? ... Thus I say that victory can be created. For even if the enemy is numerous, I can prevent him from engaging."<sup>404</sup> Those mistakes that cause or show vulnerabilities are made at different times and places.<sup>405</sup>

Questioning assumptions made about war's objects and goals is important. In addition to being questioned here, the objects and goal of war are more generally discussed in the section of this study that focused on Michael Handael's *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared* and in the next lesson of this particular course. While it is not stated in the official answer, in Chinese literature one may find stories of ruling houses, if

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<sup>402</sup> Ibid.

<sup>403</sup> The first response that comes to mind is, what if the two monolithic opponents were equally matched with respect to Clausewitzian theory? That does not answer the question, however. No one is ever perfectly equally matched. Perhaps at this point it needs to be once again emphasized, as was done in this thesis's focus on Michael Handael's *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared*, that as the title *The Art of War* implies, war is an art in which there are many actors on each side. Griffith, 91; Handael, 6.

<sup>404</sup> Griffith, 100.

<sup>405</sup> It must be understood that all human beings, no matter what authority is vested in them, are mortal, have finite and fallible intellects, experience emotions, and possess their own distinct weaknesses. They are not solely mechanical. Even though two opponents may seem to be equally matched, perhaps one of the two opponents might experience the following: (1) become lax in war preparedness or dependent on foreigners in some way; (2) due to psychological warfare or economic problems, over time lose more favor in the hearts and minds of his own populations to a greater degree than the other; (3) whether based on true or false intelligence, take up the offensive and succeed or himself be caught off balance; and/or (4) make some other advance or mistake. At very least, all of this is implicit in *The Art of War's* discourses on the following: offensive and defensive decision making based on relative advantages and strengths; the importance of psychological strength, weaknesses, and assaults; and the individual's and/or organizational mistakes. Ibid., 68-71, 79-85, 96-98, 113-115, 120-123, 126-129, 135-137.

not individuals, that were deposed and then later attempted to regain their thrones much in the same way that Sun Tzu's clan reportedly did. The true success of a family is multi-generational.<sup>406</sup> *The Art of War* declares that "the main object" of war is to win and that the "... supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."<sup>407</sup> If the overthrow or execution of opposing leaders and/or their houses can bring victory, then such is the most prudent action. Servants and subjects that may change their loyalties need not necessarily be killed. If they resist, however, one may conclude that they would be slain also. At the very least, if a victor is unable to take a city, he may expand his rural land holdings and in turn expand his state.<sup>408</sup> On the other hand Clausewitz states that, "... direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must always be the dominant consideration. We simply want to establish this dominance of the destructive principle."<sup>409</sup>

Whether *The Art of War* recommends against laying siege to cities, a dislike for the following is debatable: (1) being exposed to attack while doing so (2) the increased cost in strength required to take a fortified and easily defended position; some value placed upon human life be it Taoist in origin or not, and/or (3) a combination of all of the aforementioned reasons. As evident in the first verse of *The Art of War* and especially in those seemingly humanitarian reasons given for employing espionage found in *The Art of War's* thirteenth chapter, however, Sun Tzu's "dominant consideration" differs from Clausewitz's significantly.<sup>410</sup>

The use of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is not confined to a single or small area within the Command and Staff College Resident Program's *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*. Discussions of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and the principles and lessons found therein are throughout the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*. A fairly significant number of references to Sun Tzu may be found within the lesson section of this *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* that is titled "History and Theory Seminar." This lesson is designed for the in-depth study of those ideas that students were acquainted within this course's earlier stages. This lesson's

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<sup>406</sup> Perhaps Sun Tzu preferred conquest as opposed to a balance of power because he understood human nature all too well. J. H. Huang and C. J. Phillips, 20, 281, 282; Sawyer, 99.

<sup>407</sup> Griffith, 73, 77.

<sup>408</sup> Ames, 107-111; Griffith, 67-68, 77-79.

<sup>409</sup> Handael, 31, 228.

<sup>410</sup> Griffith, 63, 65, 73, 76, 77, 78, 79, 101, 110, 144.

educational objectives require that students do the following: (1) "... analyze and appreciate the historical and military theoretical ideas which have so far been introduced"; (2) become acquainted with "... key ideas which underlie the arguments of ..." one of this class's foundational texts; and (3) "... explore the relationship between Sun Tzu's and Clausewitz's approaches and arguments." This is accomplished through the required review of previous reading and the reading of portions of Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*.<sup>411</sup>

This lesson's purposes, objectives, and reading are focused through its own set of "Issues for Consideration." The issues of most relevance have been addressed in this thesis. They are:

What are Sun Tzu's key ideas? What relationship do you see between Clausewitz's ideas and Sun Tzu's? What relationship does all of this discussion of history and military theory have to your development as a military or national security professional?<sup>412</sup>

The questions that ask for the "key ideas" of *The Art of War* and the last question concerning personal development have been given no specific answers in the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*. Answers will differ from person to person depending upon each one's own development.<sup>413</sup>

To a large degree, much of that which is discussed throughout this thesis answers the question concerning Sun Tzu's "key ideas." For a number of reasons, including the depth and vastness of *The Art of War*, condensing Sun Tzu's ideas into a paragraph is next to impossible—so much would be left out. If, however, *The Art of War* is read superficially, the topic sentences of the summary paragraphs found in the beginnings and ends of most of *The Art of War's* first thirteen chapters may be instrumental in assisting in that accomplishment. It could read something like this, "A combination of those ideas may be used to create one precept. When he is vulnerable and you maintain a strategically advantageous position with will, innovation, flexibility, speed, accuracy,

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<sup>411</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 29, 30.

<sup>412</sup> Ibid., 30,31.

<sup>413</sup> Ibid., 30,31.

precision, and alliances so strong that your enemy is overwhelmed, attack and destroy your enemy's strategy and take all that is his to strengthen yourself."<sup>414</sup>

Of all of those pertinent issues, only the question regarding the similarities between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu has been assigned a set answer.<sup>415</sup> In answering the issue that focuses on a comparison between Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, the following are taken into account: Michael I. Handael's *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared* is made available to interested Faculty Advisors and Bassford's "... own thoughts on this are in the Article 'Clausewitz and His Works' in which may be found the argument that Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are generally in accord, except that Sun Tzu seems to favor the conqueror, whereas Clausewitz wants to preserve a balance of power." Among the areas where Sun Tzu and Clausewitz have something in common are their views that the relative strength of opponents may be measured and compared by accounting for the moral conviction, political resolution, and military determination each possesses in addition to their understanding that theory is not quite the same as the experience of actual war with the friction therein.<sup>416</sup>

In concluding this answer, Bassford asserts that contrary to what "Liddell Hart would have claimed, [in] Clausewitzian doctrine the object of military action is not annihilation of the enemy's army, the destruction of his cities, and wastage of his countryside." Bassford also couples with that the excerpt, "'Weapons are ominous tools to be used only when there is no alternative'" from *The Art of War* to support his views.<sup>417</sup> However, as aforementioned, Michael Handael's *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared* holds that the two philosopher strategists come from opposite ideals.<sup>418</sup>

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<sup>414</sup> Griffith, 71, 73, 76-77, 84-85, 90, 95-96, 101-102, 110-111, 115-116, 123, 129-130, 140, 149.

<sup>415</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 31.

<sup>416</sup> Ibid.

<sup>417</sup> Ibid.

<sup>418</sup> While, to a degree, this has been discussed in the portion of this thesis addressing Michael Handael's *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared*, it may need to be reviewed. Even if it is accepted theory that the two philosopher strategists have more in common than not, Sun Tzu's and Clausewitz's approaches to enumerating what the goals and/or objects of military action are may lend themselves to the belief (be it true or false, since Sun Tzu made no distinction between power and authority) that great moral differences exist between the two philosopher strategists. At least Sun Tzu seems to come from an ideal that in the dreaded last option of destructive military action, as much as is possible should be captured undamaged and kept alive for the purpose of conquest. Such does not rule out the employment of pre-emptive defensive strikes and assassinations. Clausewitz seems to come from the ideal that a destructive military action should be enacted in the form of what many in contrast refer to as a "conventional war" that decimates the enemy's

For an understanding of historical context, it is noteworthy that the next lesson focusing on Napoleon begins by quoting an Austrian general. "It is not possible to disregard, as much as does this man, Bonaparte, the most essential principles of the art of war!"<sup>419</sup> Bassford believes that, in his career, Napoleon was able to disregard commonly held principles of war because he possessed excesses in politically-dedicated, strong-willed manpower that resulted from revolutionary France's way of raising, supporting, and organizing troops.<sup>420</sup> This is directly related to the question of what makes strategic success possible.

Even though the role given to *The Art of War* in this lesson is small, because of the importance attached to the reasons for victory an expanded commentary on such is proper. It may be found within this lesson's "Issues For Consideration." There are three "purposes" given for the sixth issue that partly asks, "What does Jomini have to offer us?" The second of those "purposes" is to "... discuss the fundamental opposition between a philosophical approach to war (Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and FMFM—1) and a doctrinal cook-book approach (Jomini and much of formal military doctrine)."<sup>421</sup> Most of this "issue" and its "purposes" are not answered by the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*. It is acknowledged, however, that the cookbook approach "...

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military. Because sustaining the ability to carry out that total destruction of the enemy's military without interruption is next to impossible, however, the goals and/or objectives of a military action are not always conquest but may be a different "balance of power." Ibid.; Griffith, 63, 66, 77-78, 113, 122, 139, 144-148; Handael, 4-6, 21, 31.

<sup>419</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 47.

<sup>420</sup> This method has been said to be similar to "universal conscription." Bassford also states that despite France's excesses in highly maneuverable manpower, the French army's practice of living off of occupied lands, and the fact that ascension into officer ranks was open to all French soldiers, Napoleon's forces lost many battles. Napoleon's cookbook form of strategy focused first on massive frontal or rear invasions deep into an opponent's territory, forcing a decisive battle which was then followed up by mop-up operations to eliminate the threat posed by any remnants of the enemy's professional army. Eventually Napoleon over-extended his supply lines, spread his men too thin, for the most part depleted his resources, and fell prey to organized nationalist European populations that used Clausewitzian approaches to strategy. The use of these populations was a factor in his defeat. It was hard for Napoleon to occupy a country in which the common folk were provoked to arms, extensively bolstered their own country's regular armies on the battlefield, and for the most part submitted to the direction of their enemy's generals. Ibid., 47-48, 51-52.

Among a variety of issues that are studied in this lesson, "Napoleonic Warfare," one may find a concern with the following: (1) what are said to be the differences between states and nations; (2) improvements in France's method of raising, supplying, and using troops; (3) factors that contributed to Napoleon's successes and failures; (4) if and why Napoleon would be a good role model; (5) the significance of "Clausewitz's concept of the 'culminating point of the offensive,'" in the Russian campaign and Operation Desert Storm; and (6) the adaptation of Napoleon's enemies to Napoleon's way of war. Ibid., 47-52.

<sup>421</sup> Ibid., 53.

provides the pattern for much of our practical day-to-day doctrine." However, a philosophical approach to war may allow for the development and use of uncommon genius. Such genius limits one's own predictability and can allow greater accomplishment.<sup>422</sup>

Despite the fact that it is not found in the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus's* answer, Sun Tzu was quite clear on this issue. *The Art of War* states "... the strategist's keys to victory, it is not possible to discuss them beforehand."<sup>423</sup> "... [W]hen I have won a victory I do not repeat my tactics but respond to the circumstances in an infinite variety of ways. ... [A]s water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions."<sup>424</sup> *The Art of War* has its own recommended procedures which are a little more philosophical. Those favoring the proverbial "plan in a can" may be aware that *The Art of War* states the following, "It is mandatory that [war] be studied. Therefore appraise it in terms of five fundamental factors and make comparisons of the seven elements...<sup>425</sup> "Now if the estimates made in the temple before hostilities indicate victory it is because calculations show one's strength to be superior to that of his enemy ... . With many calculations, one can win ... ."<sup>426</sup> "Keep him [the enemy] under strain and wear him down."<sup>427</sup> "... [D]ivide him. ... [A]ttack where he is unprepared; sally out

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<sup>422</sup> Ibid. Admittedly, in the appropriate time and place, with or without adequate intelligence data, cookbook patterns or standard operational procedures may allow less in-depth thought and greater speed in accomplishment—be it in combat or not. It is also possible, however, that in another time and place, the overly rigid requirement of using a cookbook approach to military activities reflects the following: (1) an underestimation of and/or a decrease in the capacities, development, and abilities of one's own subordinates; (2) a superior's failure of intellect and/or courage; and/or (3) a lack of decency and respect for others and their lives. It is also possible that the overly rigid requirement of the use of a cookbook approach to military activities may threaten the user's victory because of one's own predictability and/or underestimation of an enemy. Referring to Napoleon's typical method, the influx of huge numbers of soldiers into their enemy's heartland in order to force that enemy to fight from a position of being off balance and in disorder and panic can backfire. Those who are under attack can withdraw and counter attack (with guerrilla warfare and/or what is referred to conventional warfare thrusts) the invader's most dangerous weaknesses. Such will be further studied.

<sup>423</sup> Griffith, 70.

<sup>424</sup> Griffith, 100-101.

<sup>425</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>426</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>427</sup> Ibid., 68.



when he does not expect you."<sup>428</sup> Remember "[v]ictory can be anticipated, but it can not be forced."<sup>429</sup> All of those recommendations are a matter of insight and balance.

The extensive integrated use of the Griffith version of *The Art of War* in this lesson, and those lessons that follow, prompt the expansion of commentary which is considered relevant to the main body of this document. The lesson in the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* titled "Modern Revolutionary War Theory" studies what are said to be recent developments in revolutionary warfare. To a large degree, *The Art of War's* role in this lesson is indirect. In fact, immediately following this section's class card one finds quotes taken from "Karl Marx" and "Mao Tse-tung." In their respective orders those quotes are, "The philosophers have only integrated the world in various ways; the point, however is to change it." and "The guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will be confined not solely to China in her present anti-Japanese struggle, but will be worldwide."<sup>430</sup> Mao Tse-tung, however, has been strongly influenced by Sun Tzu's thought. This is apparent in his works *On Guerrilla Warfare*, *On the Protracted War*, and *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*.<sup>431</sup> "There can be no doubt of Mao's intimate acquaintance with the great military classics of Sun Tzu and lesser Chinese military thinkers."<sup>432</sup>

According to the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, while revolution has been around for some time,

[R]evolutionary warfare ... began to take shape and acquire momentum after Karl Marx and Frederick Engels became its first great ideological strategists ... . They gave it a philosophy, an explanation in history, a program of action, and an outline for the future ... . [T]hey set the stage for leaders like

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<sup>428</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>429</sup> Ames, 115. To accept those quotes placed before the introduction and the introduction to "Modern Revolutionary War Theory," one must accept an evolutionary faith and its dialectical historical view of the nature of man and war that may not be legitimate. If so, to what degree is legitimate? Some may say that human nature, and therefore the basic principles involved in human relationships including those that govern relationships between opponents, are the same as they have always been despite the fact that man has found other ways to apply the "laws of nature and nature's God," which includes the development of technology.

<sup>430</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 127.

<sup>431</sup> Griffith, 45.

<sup>432</sup> Osanka, 133-134.

Lenin, Mao, Ho, and Castro, who further developed and exploited their concepts.<sup>433</sup>

The syllabus further develops this idea, when it says:

Lenin was a great ideologist whose variations on Marx's thoughts ... supplied the political methods by which the Communists ... radically altered Russian society. Mao Tse-tung ... created a new and specifically Communist form of warfare, producing a systematic study of the tactics of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Much of his philosophy and practical behavior were in direct contrast to those of Lenin ... . Mao concentrated on [exciting] the rural masses while Lenin focused on the urban worker population. Mao's revolutionary style of warfare continues to inspire imitators throughout the world, even revolutionaries whose programs are radically different from his ... . Mao's imitators are often creative in adapting his ideas to different environments. ... [T]hey often make creative new mistakes ... .<sup>434</sup>

Despite what seems to be a difference between Sun Tzu's and Mao's views of the presence of ideological foundations in defense,<sup>435</sup> Mao's writings show an understanding of that which is taught in *The Art of War*. Support by a rural population, comparative estimates before and during war, highly innovative plans that harness as many strategic advantages as possible, the importance of acquiring supplies from the enemy campaign strategies, and tactical plans employing maneuver, speed, surprise, and guerrilla warfare are emphasized in *The Art of War's* first two chapters.<sup>436</sup>

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<sup>433</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 127.

<sup>434</sup> Ibid., 129.

<sup>435</sup> The notion that perhaps Sun Tzu understood that the choice to offend or defend is a political choice at root will be further discussed. Regarding the quoted phrase "laws of nature and nature's God," which includes the development of technology, it is taken from the opening of *The Declaration of Independence* and in this case refers most broadly to the laws that govern not only the physical but the metaphysical world. While the use of a particularly innovative strategy and/or tactic may be specific to a particular time and place, those principles on which those actions are based do not change. After reading Ecclesiastics 1 and Romans 1, Christians may say that since creation there is nothing new under the sun.

<sup>436</sup> Griffith, 45, 63-76, 98-101; Osanka, 133-134. In addition to *The Art of War* and the many historically specific Chinese campaign and battle strategies that have been detailed in this thesis thus far,

The educational objectives of "Modern Revolutionary War Theory" are as follows: to "... analyze some theories of revolutionary war and the factors that shaped them," to "... assess the manner in which revolutionary war differs from conventional war as defined by other theorists," to "... examine the relationship between revolutionary war theory and guerrilla warfare," and to "... investigate the ways in which a conventional military force might adapt to a revolutionary war."<sup>437</sup>

Student requirements are established in order to enable the achievement of those objectives. Students attend a lecture titled "Modern Revolutionary War Theory." given by Dr. Paul Godwin, of the National Security Policy Department located at the National War College, in Washington, DC, and a lecture titled "Revolutionary War History" given by Dr. Richard Millett, a Professor of History, at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville. Also for those same purposes, students are required to read John Shy's and Thomas Collier's work "Revolutionary War" as found in Peter Paret's *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Samuel B. Griffith's "Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-Tung" as found in his translation of Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, and Samuel Griffith's translation of Mao Tse-tung's *On Guerrilla Warfare*.<sup>438</sup> The final comments regarding required readings in the Griffith version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* articulate many similarities between the theories held in *The Art of War* and theories held and practiced by Mao.<sup>439</sup>

Among those lessons that may be learned through the careful study of Samuel Griffith's commentaries are as follows. It has been said that under Mao, Chinese Red Army "peasant volunteers" were "treated with decency and justice." The commentary continues:

Physical brutality was outlawed, as were the discriminatory practices and favoritism which chronically plagued the Manchu, Republican, and Nationalist military establishments ... . Mao ... realized the need for a literate and well-indoctrinated force. This concern with morale, [was] traceable in part at least to Sun Tzu's teachings ... . It is possible that the

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certain early American documents and American historical events such as *The Declaration of Independence* and the American War for Independence in particular exhibit a clear understanding of man's role in history. They set forth criteria that define just cause in armed resistance and counter-revolution against tyranny, and help disprove the notion that what has been referred to as "revolutionary warfare" is a recent development.

<sup>437</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 128.

<sup>438</sup> Ibid., 128-129.

<sup>439</sup> Griffith, 47-49.

supposed Red Chinese egalitarian, if not close to egalitarian, treatment of combatants, the left ward ideological leanings of some Nationalists, and the low morale of some of the poorly supplied, equipped, educated, trained, and health Nationalist troops contributed to the numbers of those Nationalist soldiers that left the Chinese Republican Nationalist cause to join Mao's Red Chinese forces.<sup>440</sup>

Mao's military buildup was unsteady; however, he knew what to do with what he had.<sup>441</sup> Consider that the "Long March" made the Red Chinese fighting force smaller, stronger, faster and even more dedicated. After studying what made the march necessary and what resulted from the march, Mao said, "We must not belittle the saying in the book of Sun Tzu, 'Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster.'"<sup>442</sup> If in war, however, as Mao and Sun Tzu detailed "... deception and surprise are two key principles ...," how can anyone truly know his enemies? Both Mao and Sun Tzu overcame this dilemma by observing strategic and tactical tendencies and using spies. Their recommendations and actions show this.<sup>443</sup>

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<sup>440</sup> Griffith, 47-49; Osanka, 147. While it is understood that the extent to which corruption and abuse occurred on each side of the Chinese revolution (or civil war) could be exaggerated or diminished in accord with each historical source's own biases, even if an attempt to increase or maintain one's own power, Mao's said concern for some form of decency and fairness is in accord with *The Art of War's* recommendations that armies seize and maintain geographic advantages, troops be supplied well (particularly concerning food), behavioral standards be uniform, and that a reward or punishment be based on the merits of one's deed and performance. The first chapter of *The Art of War* details that high moral character and just leadership are essential to gaining and maintaining the support of a populace and control over the military when such is needed. Griffith, 64-67, 76, 88, 122-123, 126-127, 134-135.

<sup>441</sup> While such is not detailed in depth in *Guide and Syllabus*, when the Red Chinese were in southern and then central China they underestimated their Republican Nationalist enemies. During and as a result of a number of Republican Nationalist annihilation campaigns and Red Chinese rebellions, Republican Nationalists made reassessments as to why the Red Chinese were successful with poorly trained but increasingly better equipped troops. It was learned that Mao's Red Chinese forces depended mostly on their own mobility and the rural civilian population for communication and supplies. The Reds, therefore, were subsequently deprived of those things that they needed to operate. Osanka, 147-148.

In the fifth Republican Nationalist campaign (1933), a highly coordinated and what, for those days, was a technologically modern effort, Chiang Kai-shek's forces encircled and began decreasing the ground and other resources that were available to Mao Tse-tung's forces by employing a coordinated and meticulous slash, burn, and depopulate policy. Mao's forces made more enemies when they resorted to stealing supplies that, due to fear, were no longer given or sold to them by the scared rural populace. While Mao and his comrades may have been discouraged, they understood that they had to break through Republican Nationalist lines, escape (in this case to the China's northwestern mountains) and obtain support from another supply source (in this case the Russians). Hence Mao's "Long March" was undertaken. Griffith, 50-51; Osanka, 147-151.

<sup>442</sup> Griffith, 50.

<sup>443</sup> Ibid., 53.

In fact, the "Long March" was typical of Mao's regularly employed strategies and tactics. He did not make the same mistake as the Japanese did in the Second World War in trying to hold on to certain costly positions.<sup>444</sup> Speaking humorously of the Red Chinese Army's skill at making quick retreats that usually baited traps, Mao wrote, "Ours are guerrilla tactics. ... Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy. The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue... ." <sup>445</sup> "Mao paraphrases Sun Tzu this way: 'Attack may be changed into defense and defense into attack; advance may be turned into retreat and retreat into advance; containing forces may be turned into assault forces, and assault forces into containing forces.'" <sup>446</sup>

Griffith's *The Art of War* further shows Mao's connection to Sun Tzu:

Later, when Mao was able to better reflect on the lessons of the battles in the south and the Long March, he wrote, in paraphrased elaboration of Sun Tzu: "In general, the shifting of forces should be done secretly and swiftly. Ingenious devices such as making a noise in the east while attacking in the west, appearing now in the south and now in the north, hit-and-run and night action should be constantly employed to mislead, entice and confuse the enemy. Flexibility in dispersion, in concentration and in shifting is the concrete manifestation of the initiative in guerrilla warfare, whereas inflexibility and sluggishness will inevitably land one in a passive position and incur unnecessary losses. But a commander proves himself wise not by understanding how important the flexible employment of forces is but by being able to disperse, concentrate or shift his forces in time according to specific circumstances. This wisdom in foreseeing changes and right timing is not easy to acquire except for those who study with a receptive mind and take pains to investigate and think things over. In order that flexibility may not become reckless action, a careful consideration of the circumstances is necessary." <sup>447</sup>

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<sup>444</sup> Ibid., 177-178.

<sup>445</sup> Griffith, 52; Parets, 840.

<sup>446</sup> Griffith, 53.

<sup>447</sup> Ibid., 10, 51-52, 91, 101.

Evidently, Mao understood that conditions and plans in war constantly change for he detailed that assessments were and are not a one-time obligation in any task. Such is in accord with Sun Tzu's doctrine.

This lesson's discussion of revolution, resistance, and counter-revolution is not limited to Mao. This lesson's educational objectives and student requirements take an integrated broad spectrum approach. To highlight valuable perception-shaping aspects of this class's lectures and texts, with a concern for contemporary application, various "Issues For Consideration" have been set.

Students are required to answer the following.<sup>448</sup> They are asked to define revolution and revolutionary warfare in the context of this lesson.<sup>449</sup> Because "[r]evolutions are not usually made by states and their bureaucracies but by new organizations cast up by dissatisfied elements ... . [w]hat are the conditions that make a revolutionary strategy appropriate? ... Does modern revolutionary war theory conflict with the theories of war studied thus far? Or ... simply require a change in ... frame of reference?" How limited is this form of war?<sup>450</sup> "How does revolutionary war relate to guerrilla warfare?" Can one exist without the other? In adaptation to and in preparation for today's revolutionary warfare what should and what do conventional militaries do?<sup>451</sup> "How likely is it that the United States will get involved in fighting a revolutionary war, and are our forces easily adaptable to wage such a conflict?"<sup>452</sup> All of the issues except the last question have detailed answers. Most of these answers are in the form of quotes taken from this course's texts, particularly Peter Paret's *Makers of Modern Strategy*.<sup>453</sup>

The answers to those question in the "Issues for Consideration" are important for a number of reasons. As stated, we may see Sun Tzu through Mao. Secondly, those answers reflect a generally accepted view of the theory and history known as "revolution,"

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<sup>448</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 129.

<sup>449</sup> Ibid.

<sup>450</sup> Ibid., 130.

<sup>451</sup> Ibid., 132.

<sup>452</sup> Ibid., 133.

<sup>453</sup> Ibid., 129-133.

"resistance," and "revolutionary warfare." Thirdly, their guidance and/or counter points that can be made have merits.

In the first issue's answer, Bassford has defined revolution as a "... radical shift in the location of political power in a society from one distinct social class to another. ... Other definitions may appear in the course of the speakers' presentations." Through excerpts from *Makers of Modern Strategy* it is further detailed that revolutions and guerrilla warfare are able to exist independently. Guerrilla warfare may be employed for reasons other than revolution. Revolutions may employ other than military means, such as economic, social, political, and legal disruption. "Revolutionary wars occur within nations, and have as their aim the seizure of state power."<sup>454</sup> The answer concludes with a quote from Mao that "revolutionary guerrilla movements" have "ideological content" while in most cases "patriotic partisan resistance" does not.<sup>455</sup>

Despite being absent from the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, it is clear that at this point Mao and *The Art of War* differ to some degree. As stated Mao alleged that the presence of an ideology draws a line between revolution and resistance. *The Art of War* does not make such a distinction. *The Art of War* recommends that citizens be enticed to become soldiers and soldiers be motivated to fight by: down-playing dangers at first; offering lucrative rewards; rewarding each individual's actions according to their merits; then developing family-like bonds and courage; and finally allowing soldiers to feel a combination of superiority to and endangerment from the enemy. These forms of motivation, however, are employed to one degree or another by every fighting force's military and civil commands.<sup>456</sup>

At the heart of this matter is the truth that all states are based on some political ideology. The "state" and "survival" are important. The first passage of *The Art of War* explains, "War is of vital importance to the state; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin."<sup>457</sup> Whether they know it or not, people fighting for a particular state are fighting for a particular ideology. It may be argued that fighting to preserve and/or expand a particular state demonstrates a form of consent. It may also be argued that not taking any action against a particular state demonstrates another form of consent.

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<sup>454</sup> Paret, 817.

<sup>455</sup> Bassford, 129.

<sup>456</sup> Griffith, 75, 83, 93, 123, 128-129, 135, 139.

<sup>457</sup> Ibid., 63.

Governments exist to deliver justice. The survival of a government is often closely linked with the survival of a people.<sup>458</sup> Therefore this holds true even with *The Art of War's* requirement that people fight only if they are in danger.<sup>459</sup>

The second issue's answer, a set of four excerpts from this course's readings, begins by stating what was the American revolution of 1776 and what was the French revolution of 1789, and how they set the example for the rest of the world. It is then stated that the American revolution was less of a revolution because much of the crown's power had already been taken by colonial leaders, both sides primarily wanted to employ the conventional warfare of the day, and guerrilla warfare was mostly employed toward the war's end in frontier and southern parts of the colonies.<sup>460</sup> The French revolution, which allegedly started the trend toward a completely politicized and armed populace, is said to not have developed revolutionary guerrilla warfare until secret police death squads were formed to hunt down alleged enemies of the state during "The Terror."<sup>461</sup>

The lion's share of the second issue's answer and part of the third issue's answer focuses on the emotional fervor that not only accompanies but often motivates a revolutionary event and in the right circumstances could become cyclical in increasing intensity.<sup>462</sup> Emotional intensity exhibited by competing parties can be the result of a commitment to a cause, and stem from insecurity as to who holds the majority of support from a populace. The *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* declares that whether forces are labeled bandits, rebels, freedom fighters, or partisans is a matter of power and "... denying the legal status of combatants ..." to one's enemies.<sup>463</sup> The *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* also states, however, that recent revolutionary warfare strategies have become "... more technical ... limited ... intellectual and less emotional" and in turn can sometimes fail to exploit the

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<sup>458</sup> Even *The Declaration of Independence* mentions the "dissolv[ing of] political bands" and "the consent of the governed." *The Declaration of Independence*.

<sup>459</sup> Griffith, 142.

<sup>460</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 130.

<sup>461</sup> Ibid.

<sup>462</sup> Ibid., 130-131.

<sup>463</sup> Ibid., 130.



discontentments and the time window of opportunity that are said to make revolutions possible.<sup>464</sup>

Despite the fact that they are vaguely detailed in this lesson's first and second issues, because of the assertions that most definitely are found in those issues and their answers, there are some similarities and differences between Mao, Sun Tzu, and the American political identity as established by *The Declaration of Independence* and *The Constitution* that need to be detailed both in text and its footnotes.

Mao and Sun Tzu seem to have shared similar if not the same views of power. Sun Tzu's position is put best by the combination of a passage and the commentary that immediately follows that recently discussed passage in the Griffith version of *The Art of War*. It states that those who are "... ignorant both of ... [themselves and their enemies] ... are called 'mad bandits' [and should] ... expect ... defeat." This may provide insight into the distinction drawn between victors and those who are called criminals by *The Art of War* and by socialists also.<sup>465</sup> Mao stated that "[e]very Communist must grasp the truth, 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'" He added, "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution."<sup>466</sup>

The *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus's* definition of revolution might lead one to believe the American understanding of the relationship between power and authority is similar to Sun Tzu's and Mao Tse-tung's views of the relationship between power and authority. To the contrary, revolution is not simply a transfer of power from one class to another.<sup>467</sup> It is American to remember that there is a

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<sup>464</sup> Ibid.

<sup>465</sup> Griffith, 84.

<sup>466</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung* (Beijing: People's Republic of China, 1979) 61.

<sup>467</sup> Revolutions are rebellions. This should be clear to anyone living in a republic intimately attached to a capitalist system i.e. what many people refer to as a free society. In those system, there are no permanent casts. In those systems, individuals gain and lose various forms and amounts of power daily. In the definition of revolution, resistance, and counter-revolution it needs to be understood that there is a distinctions between power and authority. Understanding that moral reason and strategic theory come before the planning and implementation of military action, defining revolution plurally could dangerously cloud determinations of just cause and appropriate response.

As evidence of its counter-revolutionary just cause that was based upon the highest laws, *The Declaration of Independence* states the following:

difference between power and authority. Also there is a difference between motivation primarily derived from concern about the image of God in man and the unalienable Creator-given rights of the individual, and concern over the preservation of a social order, the expansion of the state, and/or the success of a mission. Sometimes, even though they may lose, people must fight because it is a matter of truth and good principled character to do so. A just cause that is higher than man can call forth great will and emotions, inspiring greater achievement.<sup>468</sup>

Bassford correctly stated that the American War of 1776 was not a complete revolution. However, I would argue that his claim is true for reasons other than power distribution. The fact that many Americans held positions of civil and military power and more importantly authority shows that the American Counter Revolution of 1776 was carried out in accord with "John Calvin's Theology Of Resistance" and doctrine of "The Lesser Magistrates from *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1559)."<sup>469</sup>

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When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it . . . . *The Declaration of Independence*.

<sup>467</sup> So that every American can understand, the Declaration defines just cause. It is because God gives all individuals power and authority to govern themselves and in turn each individual gives consent in contract or covenant to allow others to govern them to some degree, then consent, not cohesion permits political authority. Any activity against the individual, individual's rights and restrictions placed on the government in convention are rebellious acts. Rebellions or revolutions amount to movements against the Creator. Considering, therefore, the corruptibility of human nature as it is manifested in a drive to expand powerful governments one way or another into activities and jurisdiction denied to them by the Creator and/or people in convention, the notion that governments and bureaucracies are not usually the perpetrators of revolutions is a false one. In fact, it is through usurptions that they usually become illegitimate. In other words, the American revolution was actually a counter revolution.

<sup>469</sup> Consider *The Declaration of Independence's* list of grievances against and usurpations made by the government of England. It was because of those grievances that the American counter-revolution of 1776 took place! That list was and still is a measure for just cause. There was a blueprint for *The Declaration of Independence*. A justification and procedure for enforcing the law better than the government does may be found in John Calvin's *The Lesser Magistrates* and Michael R. Gilstrap's *John Calvin's Theology of Resistance*. See Gary North, ed., *The Theology of Christian Resistance: A Symposium* (Tyler, Texas: Geneva Divinity School Press, 1983) 176-179; 192-197. If one needs more evidence of a clear and very public ideology behind the actions taken by our founding fathers from 1776 to 1787, *The Federalist Papers* written by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay detail the other benefits resulting from doing what is right.

As far as is known, the most famous use of what the *Guide and Syllabus* mistakenly terms "revolutionary" guerrilla warfare within the sound restrictions of a well articulated counter-revolutionary

While it may not be found in the *Syllabus and Guide*, *The Art of War* explains, "If it is not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you can not succeed, do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight."<sup>470</sup> Sun Tzu's views have further detail. "'Your servant has already received your appointment as Commander and when the commander is at the head of the army he need not accept all the sovereign's orders."<sup>471</sup> "If the situation is one of victory but the sovereign has issued orders not to engage, the general may decide to fight. If the situation is such that he cannot win, but the sovereign has issued orders to engage, he need not do so."<sup>472</sup> "There are some roads not to follow; some troops not to strike; some cities not to assault; and some ground which should not be contested."<sup>473</sup>

Those ideas clearly convey that, in the disciplining of troops and deciding where, when, and how troops should take positions, travel, and attack the enemy, the orders issued by those who hold positions on the higher and the highest levels of a government hierarchy (particularly those without military posts and insight) may be disobeyed, only with the orders from commissioned officers, particularly generals and commanders, for the purposes of: achieving tactical, operational, and/or strategic success and in turn maintaining and/or expanding a political dynasty and its holdings.<sup>474</sup>

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civil covenant doctrine, accompanied by a clearly "just cause" based on an understanding of "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," for the purpose of forming a new geopolitical entity, was during the American Counter Revolution of 1776. Among other discussions of just cause, proper consideration should be given to *Defensive War in a Just Cause Sinless*, written by David Jones. Gary T. Amos, *Inalienable Rights and Liberties* (Virginia Beach, Virginia: Regent University School of Law, 1995) 145-154; North, *The Theology of Christian Resistance*; 218-232; Titus, 41.

<sup>470</sup> Griffith, 142.

<sup>471</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>472</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>473</sup> Ibid., 111.

<sup>474</sup> Ibid., 58, 63, 66, 81, 111, 128, 142. The course of action is based on pragmatically assessed levels of interest, threat, and power for the purposes of "the state." If interpreted liberally, those reasons could be used to excuse much more, even particular domestic policies and coup attempts. *The Art of War's* rationale for disobeying a command is different from disobeying a command for the purposes of fulfilling a vow that was given to uphold the civil covenant of *The Declaration of Independence* and its by-laws, *The Constitution*.

Of further interest in understanding the principles involved in this clash of justifications, may be the Bible stories of Saul and Athaliah, in 1 Samuel 8:5-13:14 and 2 Kings 11:1-16. Despite having violated the separation of his kingly duties from Samuel's priestly duties, King Saul, holding power, strived to maintain his throne. Athaliah, who attempted to retain the throne through murder, repeatedly shouted "treason" as she was removed from office. Be it an attempt to deny legitimacy,

Admittedly, however, while such is not detailed in the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, those two immediately-discussed justifications can be reconciled by explicitly stating and behaving with the understanding that it is the state's best interest to obey the Laws of Nature and Nature's God.

Additionally not found in the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, seemingly due to Bassford's views of revolution and revolutionary warfare and/or perhaps because of basic common sense, it is clear that Sun Tzu had a broad and in-depth understanding of the relationship between emotions and military success. Emotions may help or hinder victories. On this topic, Sun Tzu pays particular attention to the significant importance, responsibilities, and effects of commands on one's own troops and in turn the enemy. Sun Tzu explains, "There are five qualities which are dangerous in the character of a general." They are "recklessness," "cowardice," "volatile temperedness," "... too delicate a sense of honor ...," and an overly "compassionate nature."<sup>475</sup>

*The Art of War* holds that leaders must know, so that actions are fertile rather than futile, that it is important that will and emotion are a result of and guided by reason. *The Art of War* states the following. "[A]pparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength."<sup>476</sup> "In good order they await a disorderly enemy; in serenity, a clamorous one." This is control of the mental factor.<sup>477</sup> "Agitate him [the enemy] and ascertain the pattern of his movement."<sup>478</sup> "Offer the enemy bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him."<sup>479</sup> "Anger his general and confuse him."<sup>480</sup> "Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance."<sup>481</sup> "Keep him under a strain and wear him down."<sup>482</sup> "When he is united, divide him."<sup>483</sup> "... [A]n army may

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harness emotion, and/or something else, denial does not change the fact that rebellion is rebellion no matter where and when it happens, what it is called, and by who it is perpetrated.

<sup>475</sup> Ames, 136; Griffith, 114-115.

<sup>476</sup> Griffith, 92.

<sup>477</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>478</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>479</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>480</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>481</sup> Ibid.

be robbed of its spirit and its commander deprived of his courage.<sup>484</sup> "... [T]herefore those skilled in war avoid the enemy when his spirit is keen and attack him when it is sluggish and his soldiers home sick. This is control of the mental factor."<sup>485</sup> "When the enemy troops are in high spirits, and, although facing you, do not join the battle for a long time, nor leave, you must thoroughly investigate the situation."<sup>486</sup>

It is *The Art of War's* view that effective leadership understands the proper conduct of relationships. "If the army is confused and suspicious, neighboring rulers will cause trouble. This is what is meant by the saying: 'A confused army leads to another's victory.'"<sup>487</sup> "Because ... a general regards his men as infants they will march with him into the deepest valleys. He treats them as his own beloved sons and they will die with him."<sup>488</sup> "If troops are punished before their loyalty is secured they will be disobedient. If not obedient, it is difficult to employ them. If troops are loyal, but punishments are not enforced, you cannot employ them."<sup>489</sup>

*The Art of War* further acknowledges that importance emotions play in the most basic personal combat motivation. *The Art of War* states the following. "... [T]hey [the troops] have no expectation of long life but not because they dislike longevity ... . On the day the army is ordered to march the tears of those seated soak their lapels ... ."<sup>490</sup> "In death ground I ... make it evident that there is no chance of survival ... ."<sup>491</sup> Another passage says:

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<sup>482</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>483</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>484</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>485</sup> Ibid.

<sup>486</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>487</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>488</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>489</sup> Ibid., 122-123.

<sup>490</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>491</sup> Ibid., 133.

Throw the troops into a position from which there is no escape and even when faced with death they will not flee. For if prepared to die, what can they not achieve? Then officers and men together put forth their utmost efforts. In a desperate situation they fear nothing; when there is no way out they stand firm. Deep in a hostility they are bound together, and there, where there is no alternative, they will engage the enemy in hand to hand combat.<sup>492</sup>

In those and other circumstances, "the reason the troops slay the enemy is because they are enraged."<sup>493</sup> For those same reasons, Sun Tzu says, "do not thwart an enemy returning homewards."<sup>494</sup> Additionally, by treating captured soldiers decently one may be able to use the captured and weaken the resolve of those who still present a threat.<sup>495</sup> After considering all that has been omitted by the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* and presented from *The Art of War*, it may be concluded that Sun Tzu understood that in any conflict one may find the guiding factors are a balance of reason, will, and emotion.

Beyond emotions, in revolution, resistance, and counter-revolution, there is the fighting. The *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* takes the position that the earliest employment of politically motivated "people in arms" (more commonly referred to as the militia) and the militia's employment of guerrilla warfare was a French innovation. Owing to the philosophically and historically integrated approach that this course's lesson takes, mentioning such is not beyond the scope of this study. Bassford's belief, however, ignores much of Chinese history in addition to the knowledge that the militia and political motivation were significant parts of the American Counter Revolution of 1776. The Boston Tea Party, a politically motivated and well planned guerrilla action, and resistance at Lexington and Concord (two lessons in gun control) are well known; this does not mean they were exceptions to the norms of the American Counter Revolution of 1776.

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<sup>492</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>493</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>494</sup> Ibid., 109.

<sup>495</sup> Ibid., 76.

General George Washington argued for and used politically motivated "people in arms," and the militia's employment of guerrilla warfare in the war of 1776.<sup>496</sup> The American fighting force maneuvered like water.<sup>497</sup> In a cyclical method, turning attack into retreat and retreat into attack, they would: move quickly and quietly; surprise the enemy; fight using captured resources; and withdraw and evade.<sup>498</sup> Washington positioned his base of operations in the mountains, where he could retreat into the wilderness, descend to cut enemy supply lines, and reach out to attack any of the enemy's encampments.<sup>499</sup> Washington used unpredictability to make it costly and difficult for the British to hold on to any city.<sup>500</sup>

At this point it should be clear that much of what Washington's regular and irregular forces did could be considered very similar to what Mao and the Chinese

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<sup>496</sup> Learning from experiences gained in the French and Indian War, General George Washington argued in favor of and implemented the "Indian" way of war in the American Counter Revolution of 1776. James Thomas Flexner, *Washington: The Indispensable Man* (New York: Nal Penguin, Inc., 1984) 14, 21-25, 92-94.

<sup>497</sup> When the English General, Howe, tried to turn one of the first engagements of the American Counter Revolution into a trap, one evening Washington's forces quietly withdrew "flow[ing] around obstacles and away as easily as a stream of water." *Ibid.*, 82.

<sup>498</sup> Let us not forget Washington's Christmas attack which included the crossing of the Delaware River, a surprise encirclement of the enemy, captures of material and men, and a quick withdraw. Further realizing the speed, maneuverability, and stealth his forces possessed, Washington immediately re-entered Delaware, continuing to employ successful flanking maneuvers: repeatedly catching the English and Hessians off-guard, seemingly coming from nowhere and then repeatedly withdrawing when the tide of battle turned. *Ibid.*, 94-97.

<sup>499</sup> Such was the way Washington operated. After the war was well underway, Washington repositioned his forces and conducted surprise hit-and-run raids at every opportunity from an operations base in the New Jersey highlands near Morristown for an extended time period. It was from that point that he reached out and hammered one British attempt to thrust into (and possibly past) Trenton. From that point, expeditions were sent forth to strike enemy supply and communications lines. If a more detailed study of American counter revolutionary guerrilla activity is interesting one may consider *The Dutch-American Guerrillas of The American Revolution* by William Marina and Diane Cuervo. Flexner, 99; North, *The Theology of Christian Resistance*, 242.

Even though at different times the British held a few cities, including Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Charlotte, North Carolina, it was temporary and they could not safely venture out of those cities. New York was the only stronghold that the English maintained. North, *The Theology of Christian Resistance*, 243-245. While Washington's troops focused on major British movements, farmers (who at night became militia guerrillas, particularly those that operated in New Jersey from positions between the two opposing armies) defended their towns, neighborhoods, farms, homes, and families. At first, these militia guerrillas focused on resisting British, Cession, and Tory foragers. Later, they freely led and conducted raids. Flexner, 130-131; North, *The Theology of Christian Resistance*, 251, 254-257.

<sup>500</sup> In the course of this conflict, after the British captured Charleston, South Carolina, Washington wrote, "The enemy, by attempting to hold conquests so remote, must dissipate their force, and, of course afford opportunities for striking one or the other extremity." Flexner, 139.

communists did and was in agreement with many of *The Art of War's* recommendations. Probably the biggest example is *The Art of War's* position that "... the enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few."<sup>501</sup> Perhaps this can be explained with the knowledge that in undertaking his Long March, repositioning of his Chinese communist forces to China's mountains, and devising and articulating his guerrilla warfare doctrine, Mao Tse-tung sought "association with Chu Teh," another communist strategist and leader. Chu Teh studied both the recommendations of Sun Tzu and the tactics of George Washington.<sup>502</sup>

While Bassford does not say it, with all that has been submitted concerning this lesson's first and second issues, one can state the declared American Counter Revolution 1776-1787 was an ideologically-driven protracted war bearing similarities to other ideologically driven protracted wars.<sup>503</sup> Ideologically-driven revolutionary and counter-revolutionary conflicts in which guerrilla warfare was employed have been present since early recorded history.

The third issue's answer consists of excerpts from *Makers of Modern Strategy* that focus on some of Marx's and Mao's views of desirable productive action, the importance of strategic re-evaluation, and the superiority of "... political over military concerns ...." They lead up to the description of the general vicious cycle of events that many socialist revolutionaries have attempted to create and in many cases have created within various nations en route to world socialism. While many countries, especially superpowers, may not engage in a large scale conventional war because of a fear of mutually assured destruction, they can contribute to each other's political, social, and economic destabilization. In undermining a system, Marx held that conviction, calculation, and courage coupled with efficient use of force against particular government targets is of

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<sup>501</sup> Griffith, 98.

<sup>502</sup> Osanka, 150, 166-167.

<sup>503</sup> Even further, as detailed in *The Dutch-American Guerrillas of The American Revolution*, by William Marina and Diane Cuervo, with closer study one finds that the general strategy of American counter-revolutionary guerrillas (particularly those of Dutch ethnicity and that operated in the north-eastern areas of the United States) bear similarities to the general strategy employed by the Vietcong during Vietnam. North, *The Theology of Christian Resistance*, 251-263. Admittedly, perhaps long ago, they were more implicitly understood rather than explicitly articulated. As will be further discussed, answers as to how the United States military should view and participate in such conflicts can, may, and will be decided only by them and the civilian authorities they are responsible to.



greater importance in winning the favor of the masses than is terrorism. Those who rule would supposedly do anything to disarm those who are labeled "revolutionaries" and the common people, so that they may be pressed into submission and are no longer a threat to those who rule. In turn, the more oppressive a state becomes, the more those revolutionaries and common folk would be driven to fight that particular state, certain laws, and particular policies in order to replace them with others based on "revolutionary" philosophies.<sup>504</sup>

Contrary to that cycle, Bassford states that "... a great many revolutions met little or no resistance, at first ... when the ruling class has simply lost faith in its own legitimacy, in its own ability to rule effectively." Bassford's example is the French Revolution.<sup>505</sup>

An additional problem is addressed in this third issue. When confronted with destabilization sponsored by interest of a non-domestic origin, it becomes tougher to determine if a revolution is a revolution. To enable the understanding of when a war is a revolution, the study of revolution, and how to be victorious therein, distinct analytical systems and techniques have been developed, some of which employ the process of elimination. In other words, "revolutions" and "revolutionary warfare" have been defined by what they are not. In defining, studying, and fighting a revolution, theory is not enough. Of particular importance is knowledge and understanding gained from experience with a particular movement and its actors. In accord with the view of *Makers of Modern Strategy* it may be stated that the victor will be the one that out-adapts the other.<sup>506</sup>

While it may not have been mentioned in this *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, at this point in this lesson it is important to recall the hypothetical that Bassford used to study Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. If you remember, he asked what if two equal Sun Tzuian monolithic opponents opposed each other. *The Art of War* states the following:

Having paid heed to the advantages of my plans, the general must create situations which will contribute to their accomplishment. By 'situations' I

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<sup>504</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 131.

<sup>505</sup> Ibid. With his reliance on the grouping of "class," Bassford may appear to be captive to Marxist thought himself. If one studies the given examples of the French Revolution and the 1917 Soviet Revolution, one will find that some, if not many, of the Czarists who were in particular positions of power and authority may not have taken particular actions for reasons other than classism.

<sup>506</sup> Ibid., 130-131.

mean that he should act expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so control the balance.<sup>507</sup>

It continues, "... [o]ne able to gain the victory by modifying his tactic in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine."<sup>508</sup> The human being that makes the first and/or worst mistake would lose. Depending upon the situational circumstances that mistake could be anything.

Without going into a lengthy discussion as to why, in the third issue's question, the qualifying term "modern" is placed before "revolutionary war theory," other significant concerns raised by that issue and its answer should be addressed. Perhaps, as Bassford suggested, in answering this issue, "... a change in our frame of reference" is necessary.<sup>509</sup>

As mentioned throughout this paper, *The Art of War* seems to present no problems in accepting the fact that war is wide in scope and should be studied in depth. In fact, while it is not found as part of an answer to this issue, *The Art of War* states those who are "skilled" have "infinite" "resources," and possibilities. Those not using those resources to shorten war are inhumane.<sup>510</sup> In *The Art of War*, a wide variety of social, economic, and political, and particularly, military recommendations are made. This is done to improve the relative measurements of advantages and strengths in one's favor, for the purposes of achieving temporary successes and turning temporary successes into overall military victories, while maintaining the health and longevity of a particular people and geopolitical entity.<sup>511</sup>

*The Art of War* is so complete that recommendations are made for the advantageous use of political negotiations, diplomatic gifts, friendly relationships, economic production, free trade, division, diversion, chaos, position, conditions, logistical support,

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<sup>507</sup> Griffith, 66.

<sup>508</sup> Griffith, 101.

<sup>509</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 130. In doing so, one should question what theorist determines what is "limited" as opposed to "unlimited," patriotic as opposed to revolutionary, and conventional as opposed to unconventional are. In order to truly study, know, understand and apply something, one cannot, because of bias, dismiss factors of importance in and principles that govern it as unusual, unlikely, and insignificant.

<sup>510</sup> Griffith, 63, 70-71, 91, 100-101, 144.

<sup>511</sup> Ibid., 64, 66, 68, 73, 76-77, 79-80, 82, 85, 87, 100-101, 113, 128-129, 140.

intelligence, deception, surprise, timing, tempo, speed, maneuver, concentration of force, powerful weapons, and many more factors in addition to the employment of straight forward, guerrilla, division, flanking, entrapping, among other strategies and tactics.<sup>512</sup> Whether one's forces are currently numerous and strong or neither, all possible advantages and strengths should be used in strategies and tactics.<sup>513</sup> "It is sufficient to estimate the enemy situation correctly and to concentrate your strength to capture him. There is no more to it than this. He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him."<sup>514</sup>

As shown in Bassford's answer to this issue, similar to Sun Tzu in many respects, Mao demonstrated his understanding of war's broad scope of activities, that all available strengths and advantages should be used, and that establishments as well as opposition establishments can employ the same methods, when he stated that guerrillas should be fought with guerrilla warfare and political indoctrination.<sup>515</sup>

In the fourth issue's answer, additional emphasis is placed on Mao's doctrine and the *Makers of Modern Strategy's* evaluation thereof. Here again, not only does Mao hold that "revolutionary guerrilla movement" maintains a monopoly on ideology, but also the fighting preparation that occurs before fighting in general and particular during "patriotic partisan resistance" is more of a reflex. In accord with the conduct of guerrilla warfare, Mao mentions the great value of "distracting," "attention," and "concentration" of force in attacking at a time and place "least" expected. Those excerpts from the *Makers of Modern Strategy* (some of which have also appeared earlier in this *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*) hold the following: (1) Mao and his comrades developed a new doctrine of rural common folk based on revolutionary guerrilla warfare; (2) revolutions are power grabs made with the support of many, if not the majority, of the people for political change; (3) many people mistakenly conclude that revolution and guerrilla warfare are the same; (4) guerrilla warfare is not always employed in the service of revolutionary politics; and (5) revolutions can employ not only guerrilla warfare but

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<sup>512</sup> Ibid., 64, 67-69, 72-74, 77-79, 85, 87, 91-93, 95-96, 101-102, 106, 111, 119-120, 123, 128-131, 137, 139-141, 145, 149.

<sup>513</sup> Ibid., 63, 66, 73, 82, 85, 100, 113, 122.

<sup>514</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>515</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 132.

also evasion, concealment, political resistance, social provocation, economic agitation, and more.<sup>516</sup>

Contrary to the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus's* answers as set forth by Mao's views on this issue, while "partisan patriotic resistance" may in certain situational circumstances be a defensive reflex in nature, this following is subject to debate: (1) based upon intelligence, plans and contingencies are not made; (2) in accord with design, equipment, supplies, and training not are obtained; and (3) with due haste pre-emptive, repellant and retaliatory strategies, operations, and tactical actions are not implemented.<sup>517</sup>

Unmentioned in this issue's answer, however, as found in *The Art of War*, using or taking advantage of a politicized rural populace, surprise, diversion, concentration, and particular vulnerabilities are not new innovations, nor are they exclusive privileges of revolutionaries and/or guerrillas.<sup>518</sup> This is because "... numbers alone confer no advantage."<sup>519</sup> Being large as opposed to small, well-equipped as opposed to needy, entrenched as opposed to mobile, among other contrasting states, present different pressures and difficulties to which a force must adapt.<sup>520</sup> Remember that the "... supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."<sup>521</sup> "... [T]he general must create situations which will contribute to their accomplishment. ... [A]ct expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so control the balance."<sup>522</sup> "... [A]s water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions. ... One able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine."<sup>523</sup>

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<sup>516</sup> Ibid.

<sup>517</sup> Griffith, 63, 65-71, 77, 79-80, 84, 100-101, 113-114, 119-120, 144, 149.

<sup>518</sup> Ibid., 64, 66, 68-69, 71, 73-74, 84-85, 96, 98, 100-102, 104-106.

<sup>519</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>520</sup> Ibid., 72, 78-81, 87, 90, 93, 100, 102, 113.

<sup>521</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>522</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>523</sup> Ibid., 101.

Further reflecting its focus on strategy with a reason among *The Art of War's* recommendations, one may find the following: "It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather rely on one's readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack ... ." <sup>524</sup> "Anciently the skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and waited for the enemy's moment of vulnerability." <sup>525</sup> Therefore, "when the enemy presents an opportunity, speedily take advantage of it. Anticipate him in seizing something he values and move in accordance with a date secretly fixed." <sup>526</sup> "He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious." <sup>527</sup>

While acting, remember, "[a]ll war is based on deception." <sup>528</sup> "Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of forces." <sup>529</sup> "Those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him with something he is certain to take ... ." <sup>530</sup> "He wearies them by keeping them constantly occupied, and makes them rush about by offering them ostensible advantages." <sup>531</sup> Sun Tzu's point is, "[h]e who intimidates his neighbor does so by inflicting injury upon them." <sup>532</sup>

In concluding this study's supplementation of the fourth issue's answers, answers neglecting much of *The Art of War's* direct insight for one reason or another, it may be said that offense and defense are rigorous endeavors not accomplished by any party lacking commitment, awareness, uncommon genius, and kinetic energy.

In the fifth issue, it has been stated that solutions for countering this said "new form of warfare," revolutionary guerrilla warfare, are hard to find and only partly successful. Americans and the French learned from their experiences in Indochina that foreign

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<sup>524</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>525</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>526</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>527</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>528</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>529</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>530</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>531</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>532</sup> Ibid., 113.

military assistance must be provided in the proper form, time, place, and amount as detailed by political, strategic, and tactical demands, in respective order. As partly aforementioned, Mao believed guerrillas may be defeated through a combination of political conversion, guerrilla warfare, and creative, bright, and courageous leadership.<sup>533</sup> As is detailed in *Makers of Modern Strategy* with the contribution of United States aid, the government of the Philippines has had very good, but not completely perfect, results in combating a socialist insurgency. Some American leaders now believe that counter-revolutions are winnable, "... correct attitudes and tactics."<sup>534</sup>

Some people might disagree with the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*. Winning any conflict is not simply dependent on "...correct attitudes and tactics." It is also dependent upon just cause, insight, knowledge, understanding, wisdom, commitment, and destructive as well as constructive actions based thereon. In the course of such human events, it is important to build one's own constituency and simultaneously undermine an opponent's constituency in more lasting ways.<sup>535</sup> In order to be instrumental in bringing about a more healthy form of government the liberator must not behave as an oppressor. This requires moral and simultaneously innovative political and military strategies, operations, and tactics.

Admittedly, being motivated by human relationships or a cult of personality is quite different than finding a just cause in something higher than human beings. Note that in *The Art of War's* chapter on "Estimates," the first fundamental to be weighed is the "moral influence." This influence is the degree to which people agree with and support their political leadership, even to the point of dying for that leadership.<sup>536</sup> *The Art of War* also states that, "because ... a general regards his men as infants they will march with him into the deepest valleys. He treats them as his own beloved sons and they will die with

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<sup>533</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 132.

<sup>534</sup> Ibid., 133. Perhaps, at this point, a pragmatist would state that the ends justify the means.

<sup>535</sup> Consider Abraham Lincoln's *Emancipation Proclamation*, *Gettysburg Address*, and reconstruction. Specific political measures were taken in each instance. First, the oppressed were informed that their Creator-given unalienable rights were to be honored. Second, those assisting in the liberation of the oppressed, particularly union soldiers, were educated that their cause was just and that their efforts made the difference. Third, coupled with actions that ended the war, strategically-placed occupying forces were positioned in the formerly rebel-controlled areas to ensure another rebellion was not fomented, to protect the rights of the formerly oppressed, and to re-educate what was once the rebel constituency for generations if necessary. Fehrenbacher, 210-212, 244-245.

<sup>536</sup> Griffith, 63-65.

him."<sup>537</sup> In maintaining support and strength it says, "there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited . . . . Those adept in waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts nor more than one provisioning."<sup>538</sup> For in the event that a country's "... strength [is] ... depleted and wealth consumed, the households in the central plains will be utterly impoverished."<sup>539</sup>

As for the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus's* last issue's answer regarding the likelihood of the involvement and adaptability of American military forces in a revolutionary conflict, Bassford believes this hinges on the willingness of American "political and military leaders" to "... delegate the necessary authority to the people on the ground who really—hopefully—understand what needs to be done in that particular, unique situation."<sup>540</sup>

When wondering how particular conflicts will be fought in the future, conclusions as to what needs to be done will be the result of the worldview and strategic doctrine given faith, reasoned out, felt strongly, and willed by American military commanders, those who advise American military commanders, and those who possess authority over American military commanders. As stated, Bassford believes that in this situation authority needs to be delegated. While doing so he also hinted at the importance of the uncommon genius in and employment of future strategies, operations, and tactics.<sup>541</sup> That is similar to those recommendations made in *The Art of War*.

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<sup>537</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>538</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>539</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>540</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 133. Whether the American military will become involved in revolutionary conflicts in the future is a question of politics. Whether it is in accord or not with those principles that America was founded on, the following would not be outside the scope of possibility: (1) foolish, if not tyrannical, politicians could be elected to public office and then use the American military in foreign countries for activities that are defined by *The Declaration of Independence* and *The Constitution* as un-American, such as global government and gun control; (2) in gaining and maintaining funding, power, and control, various government bureaucracies could use the American military to wage war on the Creator-given unalienable rights of individuals living in the United States of America; and (3) the people and, in turn, the American military could become excessively corrupted through the politics of envy and in turn wage war on the founding documents of the United States and its Creator-given unalienable individual's rights. On the other hand, perhaps the United States Department of Defense could take a more active role in helping the oppressed people of the world throw off the chains of socialist governments by aiding popular counter-revolutionary guerrillas abroad.

<sup>541</sup> It should be noted that in Bassford's *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, this lesson may be found before the lesson entitled "Modern Revolutionary War Theory." Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 133.

While addressing the lesson titled "USMC History and Doctrine" last, it is certainly not the least important. In fact, it is quite proper that this lesson be placed after those questions concerning what will determine future United States military involvement and the type of involvement in what may, by some people, be considered less than conventional conflicts. In what further demonstrates the importance of the USMC's most fundamental text in the conduct of those conflicts, this lesson begins by quoting *Warfighting FMFM 1*.<sup>542</sup> The same words also open the Marine Corps Command and Staff College "Nonresident Program's Theory and Nature of War" course lesson "Marine Corps Warfighting Theory and Doctrine."

Similar to the "Nonresident Program's Theory and Nature of War" course lesson that focuses on Marine Corps fighting doctrine, the introduction to this lesson details that every branch of the United States military is authorized by *The Constitution*; is "under civilian control," and has its own distinct fighting doctrine designed in accord with its own areas of emphasis. "The Marine Corps has a particular emphasis on expeditionary and amphibious operations."<sup>543</sup>

While it is not stated in the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* we may say that as stated and contemporarily applied, the Marine Corps purpose may or may not fall within *The Art of War's* positions. "War is a matter of vital importance to the state; the providence of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied."<sup>544</sup> "If not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you cannot succeed, do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight."<sup>545</sup>

USMC Maneuver warfare is defined as follows:

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In devising that which is innovative and uncommon it is very important to remember that unauthorized and unjust governments, especially those failing to differentiate combatants from noncombatants, tend to motivate the people to resist in one way or another.

<sup>542</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 89; USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 39.

<sup>543</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 89.

<sup>544</sup> Griffith, 63.

<sup>545</sup> Griffith, 142. It should be understood that as stated and/or in practice the Marine Corps purpose may or may not be more expansive than Article I., Section 8 of *The Constitution* with its defensive emphasis on "punish[ing] Piracies and Felonies ... on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations ... War ... Marque and Reprisal." Additionally, considering that the Marine Corps is part of the Navy, it may be arguable that the statement that Congress has the responsibility "To provide and maintain a Navy" permits the Marine Corps existence despite the fact that the same section emphasizes that "money" used to "support" "armies" shall be limited in "appropriation" to "two year terms" for the purpose of preventing this country from having a standing army. *The Constitution*, art. I. sec. 8; *The Declaration of Independence*.



Maneuver is the key, but not merely maneuver in the sense of gaining a position advantage. The Corps seeks to use maneuver in both time and space to gain an advantage of tempo, initiative, and willpower. We achieve a maneuver advantage by responding more quickly than the opposing force and attacking his vulnerabilities.<sup>546</sup>

Omitted from this lesson because of lesson focus, in *The Art of War's* chapter titled "Maneuver," one finds the idea that "[n]othing is more difficult than the art of maneuver. What is difficult about maneuver is to make the devious route the most direct and to turn misfortune into advantage."<sup>547</sup> Elsewhere, one will find the following. "Confirmation of ground is of the greatest assistance in battle. Therefore, to estimate the enemy situation and to calculate distances and the degree of difficulty of terrain so as to control victory are virtues of the superior general."<sup>548</sup> "... [A]t first be as shy as a maiden. When the enemy gives you an opening be as swift as a hare ... ."<sup>549</sup> "The momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming ... ."<sup>550</sup>

As the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus* states the Marine Corps's warfighting doctrine is the result of a combination of the insights of many famous philosopher strategists and that learned through the hard lessons of many a battlefield. Those influences can be observed in the review of that "... uniquely philosophical doctrine[']s most foundational] manual ...," *Warfighting FMFM 1*.<sup>551</sup>

This lesson's purposes as stated in its educational objectives are as follows:

A) ... [A]nalyze the Marine Corps's concept of war and to evaluate its roots in the theories of war discussed throughout this course ... . B) ... [A]nalyze

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<sup>546</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 90.

<sup>547</sup> Griffith, 102.

<sup>548</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>549</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>550</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>551</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 90.

and evaluate the value of the doctrine ... . [and] C) ... [I]ntegrate the concepts of USMC doctrines with those of other services ... .<sup>552</sup>

Students accomplish these objectives by fulfilling requirements which include attending a lecture given by Command and Staff College Professor of History, Lieutenant Colonel, US Marine Corps Reserve, Donald Bittner (ret.); and a lecture given by General A. M. Gray, USMC (ret.) 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps and reading Department of the Navy.<sup>553</sup>

The student requirements are focused through three "Issues for Consideration" which are as follows:

A) What theorists have most influenced Warfighting? Why ... ? How does the manual reconcile different theorist? Does it satisfactorily integrate their key concepts? ... B) Explain the concept of "maneuver warfare." What is the value of this doctrine of maneuver? What is the alternative? ... [and] C) Are current Marine Corps organization, structure, training, and employment compatible with Warfighting doctrine?<sup>554</sup>

Among the answers to this lesson's "Issues for Consideration," the following are detailed: (1) "*Warfighting* is primarily a Clausewitzian document, heavily spiced with Sun Tzu"; (2) "... maneuver warfare ... applies regardless of the nature of the conflict, whether amphibious operations or sustained operations ashore, of low or high intensity, against guerrilla or mechanized foe, in desert or jungle";<sup>555</sup> and (3) the philosophical points of "The Challenge," "Maneuver Warfare," "Philosophy of Command," "Shaping the Battlefield," "Decision Making," "Mission Tactics," "Commander's Intent," "Focus of Effort," "Surfaces and Gaps," and "Combined Arms" shall be "... discuss[ed] throughout

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<sup>552</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 90; Gray, *Warfighting*, 1-88.

<sup>553</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>554</sup> Ibid., 91-92.

<sup>555</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 77.

the year."<sup>556</sup> Jeff Willis, Amphibious Warfare School Tactics Instructor, also confirmed that "... the USMC way of war is closer to the eighteenth century way of war."<sup>557</sup>

### *I. The Art of War and Warfighting FMFM I*

Among other things in the forward of *Warfighting FMFM I*, past Commandant General A. M. Gray USMC states,

This book describes my philosophy on warfighting. It is the Marine Corps' doctrine and, as such provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight. ... [T]his book does not contain specific techniques and procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and values. It requires judgment in application. ... [It] represents ... a way of thinking in general. ... [I]n war and peace, in the field and in the rear, [it] dictates our approach to duty.<sup>558</sup>

*Warfighting FMFM I* is divided into four chapters. Each chapter has its own subchapters, grouped and arranged in a progressive order. In respective order they are: (1) "The Nature of War," which includes "War Defined—Friction—Uncertainty—Fluidity—Disorder—The Human Dimension—Violence and Danger—Moral and Physical Forces—The Evolution of War—Art and Science of War"; (2) "The Theory of War," which includes "War as an Instrument of Policy—Means in War—The Spectrum of Conflict—Levels of Warfare—Offense and Defense—Styles of Warfare—Combat Power—Concentration and Speed—Surprise and Boldness—Exploiting Vulnerability and Opportunity"; (3) "Preparing for War," which includes "Planning—Organization—Doctrine—Leadership—Training—Professional Military Education—Equipping"; and

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<sup>556</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 91-92.

<sup>557</sup> Willis, interview by author. Additionally, as indicated in Educational Objectives and Issues For Consideration, this fulfills the JPME phase I requirements in area I, learning objectives a, b, c, and e. Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 90-92. Requirements c and e were detailed earlier in this thesis. Requirements a and b are as follows respectively: "Know how the roles, missions, capabilities, and limitations of US military forces on air, land, sea, space and special operations affect joint and combined operations" and "know how current doctrine — joint, combined, and service — affect the other Services in joint and combined operations at both the tactical and operational levels of war." USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program Information Brochure*, 8.

<sup>558</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, foreword.

(4) "The Conduct of War" which includes "The Challenge—Maneuver Warfare—Philosophy of Command—Command—Shaping the Battle—Decision Making—Mission Tactics—Commander's Intent—Focus of Effort—Surfaces and Gaps—Combined Arms—Conclusion."<sup>559</sup> At the beginning of each chapter are quotes taken from various philosopher strategists, military leaders, and statesmen.<sup>560</sup> Additionally each chapter's end notes as found at the end of the text are filled with valuable insights.<sup>561</sup>

Despite the fact their actual source citations differ, the majority of *Warfighting's* chapters have been reviewed because of the large extent that they are identified to coincide with portions of *The Art of War*. Those portions most clearly taken from Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* are easily distinguishable because such is stated and/or made evident in footnotes. Additionally, it is important to remember there are many more lessons that may be learned from any text than are found in this thesis.

### *1. The Nature of War*

The opening of Chapter 1, "The Nature of War" contains a quote from Carl von Clausewitz, that friction "... is inconceivable unless one has experienced war." B. H. Liddell Hart adds that, "... human will" is the "chief incalculable ..." and A. A. Vandegrift states that, "[p]ositions are ... lost because ... the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held."<sup>562</sup>

Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* values resolute decisions and will also. "When I wish to give battle, my enemy, even though protected by high walls and deep moats, cannot help but engage me ... . When I wish to avoid battle I may defend myself simply by drawing a line on the ground ... ."<sup>563</sup> "He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious."<sup>564</sup>

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<sup>559</sup> Ibid., unmarked contents page.

<sup>560</sup> Ibid., 1, 17, 39, 55.

<sup>561</sup> Ibid., 79-88.

<sup>562</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>563</sup> Griffith, 97.

<sup>564</sup> Ibid., 83.

## 2. War Defined

"A common view among Marines of the nature of war is a necessary base for the development of a cohesive doctrine. [War is defined as] ... a state of hostilities that exists between or among nations. [In war, each collective will attempts to] ... violent[ly] ... impose itself on the other."<sup>565</sup> "However, absolute war and peace rarely exist in practice." War and peace exist in a relative relationship. War may be anything, between declared and large, to covert and small in action and size.<sup>566</sup>

Similarly the following ideas may be found in *The Art of War*. "War is a matter of vital importance to the state; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin."<sup>567</sup> "... [A]ttack the enemy's strategy."<sup>568</sup> In battle, one must fight intelligently. Tactics must serve operations, operations must serve strategies and strategies must serv policies. For "...to win in battles and take your objectives, but to fail to exploit these achievements ... may be described as a wasteful delay."<sup>569</sup> Do not lose sight that "[v]ictory is the main object of war. If this is delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed."<sup>570</sup> This is why in order to survive and succeed it is important to have a sound doctrine. "By doctrine I mean organization, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to officers, regulation of supply routes, and the provision of principle items used by an army."<sup>571</sup>

## 3. Friction

As *Warfighting* states, a great deal of "friction" is caused and experienced in attempting to force one will over another.<sup>572</sup> It may be metaphysical, physical, "self-

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<sup>565</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 3.

<sup>566</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>567</sup> Griffith, 63.

<sup>568</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>569</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>570</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>571</sup> Ibid., 65.

<sup>572</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 4.

induced," and "external" in origin such as the following: "indecision"; "lack of a clearly defined goal" and "coordination"; overly complex, vague, or confusing "plans," "relationships," and "communications"; "enemy" actions; "terrain" challenges; "weather" conditions; and "chance." Sound reason and even greater will are the solution to conquering "friction" and the enemy through "friction."<sup>573</sup>

By one name or another in one form or another all of those friction-causing competing factors and concerns are also discussed in *The Art of War*.<sup>574</sup> However, it is important to understand that, "... when troops flee, are insubordinate, distressed, collapse in disorder or are routed, it is the fault of the general. None of these disasters can be attributed to natural causes."<sup>575</sup> In the Griffith version of *The Art of War*, one commentator states "Chaos self-induced."<sup>576</sup> This is why relative comparison of those aforementioned factors and concerns should be made in deciding to go to war.<sup>577</sup> Also, because "... as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions," constant reassessments should be made.<sup>578</sup> "[I]t is not possible to discuss them [those particular advantages or mistakes that bring an overall or even sometimes a particular victory] beforehand."<sup>579</sup>

#### 4. Uncertainty

*Warfighting* recognizes a key factor in war and most of life's struggles. Of the causes and types of "friction," "[u]ncertainty ... [stands out as a] ... pervasive trait in war. [In war,] ... at best, we can hope to determine probabilities. ... Actions which fall outside the realm of probability ... often have the greatest impact on the outcome of war." Always re-evaluate the situation at hand. For victory this requires "... simple, flexible

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<sup>573</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>574</sup> Griffith, 63-68, 73-74, 77, 81-84, 90-93, 96-100, 102-104, 106-108, 111, 113, 119-123, 125-129, 131-140, 143-145.

<sup>575</sup> Ibid., 125.

<sup>576</sup> Ibid., 127.

<sup>577</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>578</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>579</sup> Ibid., 79.

plans; ... contingencies; ... standard operating procedures; and fostering initiative among subordinates."<sup>580</sup> While degrees of "risk" are linked to various possible returns, keep in mind "chance" may benefit any opponent.<sup>581</sup>

Likewise, *The Art of War* states, "... a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation."<sup>582</sup> "He who relies on the situation uses his men in fighting as one rolls logs or stones," crushing opponents in the valleys below.<sup>583</sup> "[O]ne able to gain victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine."<sup>584</sup> While some scholars may argue the situation is not entirely man-made, that part which opponents must focus on consists of mistakes made by man. In the conflict, it "... is of supreme importance in war to attack the enemy's strategy. ... [K]eep him under a strain [in order to] wear him down, [and win overall.]"<sup>585</sup>

### 5. Fluidity

"Fluidity" is another trait important in *Warfighting*. Understandably, because of the goals of a war and this world's imperfection, at certain times absolute fluidity is not possible. At certain times and places, positions and objects are given up, held, or advanced in accord with intelligence, planning, supply, re-enforcement, relative strength, and strategic advantage. Because the course of a war is the result of successive thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, it is important for American forces to adapt more quickly than their enemies and thus be or seem to be fluid in action.<sup>586</sup>

Similarly, *The Art of War* holds that:

... [A]n army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids [an enemy's] strength

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<sup>580</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 6.

<sup>581</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>582</sup> Griffith, 93.

<sup>583</sup> Ibid., 94.

<sup>584</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>585</sup> Ibid., 68, 77.

<sup>586</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 8.

and strikes [an enemy's] weakness. ... [A]s water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its own victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy.<sup>587</sup>

## 6. Disorder

*Warfighting* grasps the bigger picture. All of the aforementioned and interconnected "... attributes of the environment of war ..." lend themselves in the direction of disorder. Disorder has always been, is, and will always be part of war.<sup>588</sup> In repeatedly compensating for the expected and unexpected disorder, a fighting force will get pushed off its original strategic course and will arrive at a time and place not completely expected from the start.<sup>589</sup> "The best we can hope for is ... to prescribe the general flow of action rather than try to control each event."<sup>590</sup> "We must ... be able to fight effectively in the face of disorder, [and] ... generate disorder for our opponent."<sup>591</sup>

*The Art of War* makes it clear that, "[i]n the tumult and uproar the battle seems chaotic, but there is no disorder; the troops appear to be milling about in circles but cannot be defeated. ... Apparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength."<sup>592</sup> "Order or disorder depends on organization; courage or cowardice on circumstances; strength or weakness on dispositions."

"... [T]hose skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating the situation to which he must conform ... ."<sup>593</sup>

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<sup>587</sup> Griffith, 101.

<sup>588</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 8.

<sup>589</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>590</sup> Ibid., 9-10.

<sup>591</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>592</sup> Griffith, 92.

<sup>593</sup> Ibid., 93.



## 7. *The Human Dimension—Violence and Danger—Moral and Physical Forces*

*Warfighting* explicitly recognizes the human condition. It is important to give "the human dimension" consideration for "... it is central [and dominant] in war ... [and] infuses war with ... moral factors. War is shaped by human nature and subject to ... human behavior. Since war is an act of violence based on irreconcilable disagreement, it will invariably inflame and be shaped by human emotions." Also, while emotional responses will differ from enemy to enemy, the emotional conditions of combatants are an important consideration.<sup>594</sup> Of those emotional responses it is important to develop and use the strength termed "courage" in overcoming the fear caused by the "violence and danger" of war. While courage can come from "calculation" or "emotion," it may also be developed through "strong," "respected," and "trusted" "leadership"; "self-confidence" and team spirit; "realistic training"; and "combat experience."<sup>595</sup> It is apparent that "moral and physical forces" are at work in war. In this instance, "moral" refers to all that which is psychological. Its influence is greater than that of the physical.<sup>596</sup>

*The Art of War* places a high value on an understanding of the human condition. Of importance in deciding whether to go to war or not is the "... moral influence ... that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril."<sup>597</sup> Decency and benevolence are part of those moral factors. "Because ... a general regards his men as infants they will march with him into the deepest valleys. He treats them as his own beloved sons and they will die with him."<sup>598</sup> "If troops are punished before their loyalty is secured they will be disobedient. If not obedient, it is difficult to employ them. If troops are loyal, but punishments are not enforced, you cannot employ them."<sup>599</sup> Such is a matter of the quality of command. "By command, I mean the general's qualities of wisdom, sincerity,

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<sup>594</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 10 -11.

<sup>595</sup> Ibid., 11-12.

<sup>596</sup> Ibid., 12-13.

<sup>597</sup> Griffith, 64.

<sup>598</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>599</sup> Ibid., 122-123.

humanity, courage, and strictness."<sup>600</sup> At a certain point in training and experience, in addition to time and space, a leader will be able to "... throw them [his troops] into a situation ... [in order to survive]."<sup>601</sup>

#### 8. *The Evolution of War—Art and Science of War*

*Warfighting* recognizes both art and what is said to be science. "The Evolution of War" affects the application of the "Art And Science Of War." "War is both timeless and ever-changing." Employing the newest technology gives a fighting force an edge over their enemies. Technological improvements in technology have been applied in war and, in turn, counter-techniques developed against those technologies. While the use of and protection from new innovations will require technical proficiency and scientific knowledge, this does not replace the "... need for military judgment, the impact of moral forces, the influence of chance, and other similar factors." Therefore, above all, war is an art, for it "... requires the intuitive ability to grasp the essence of a unique battlefield situation, the creative ability to devise a practical solution, and the strength of purpose to execute the act."<sup>602</sup>

*The Art of War* states:

... [T]here are in war no constant conditions ... . Of the five elements, none is always predominant; of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some are long and some are short, and the moon waxes and wanes. ... [O]ne able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine.<sup>603</sup>

While contemporary scholars may acknowledge certain constants in evolution, *The Art of War* discusses certain unchanging principles that govern the relationship named war. It is clear that the use of what in Sun Tzu's day were considered contemporary weapons, swords, lances, shields, chariots, crossbows, spies, and fire not only retain the

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<sup>600</sup> Ibid., 65.

<sup>601</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>602</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 13-15.

<sup>603</sup> Griffith, 101.

same purposes today but also have similar applications to contemporary weapons of grander scale.<sup>604</sup>

In concluding *Warfighting's* first chapter it has been stated that, "... at first glance, war seems a rather simple clash of interests." Due to the various aforementioned aspects and demands, however, it is not.<sup>605</sup>

### *9. The Theory of War*

Chapter 2, "The Theory of War," begins with a quote from Carl von Clausewitz that the "goal [of war is] political." A quote follows from Sun Tzu that says, "Invincibility lies in defense; the possibility of victory in the attack. One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant." The last quote is from Winston Churchill: "Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter."<sup>606</sup>

### *10. War as an Instrument of Policy*

Warfighting holds that in "[h]aving ... a common view of the nature of war, we proceed to develop from it a theory of war. Our theory ... will ... be the foundation for the way we prepare for and wage war."<sup>607</sup>

"War [is] an instrument of policy ... war must serve policy." Its goals should be in accord with the relative ability to achieve them. While those goals may be anything from the total obliteration of the enemy to changing a few of that enemy's policies, the more that political goals are geared toward the destruction of that enemy, the less they will differ from the primary destructive activities of a military in war.<sup>608</sup> Naturally there are other essential coexisting and co-functioning "means in war" that are also derived from

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<sup>604</sup> Ibid., 72, 74, 92, 104-105, 141-144, 149.

<sup>605</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 15.

<sup>606</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>607</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>608</sup> Ibid., 19-20.

various "... elements of national power, including diplomacy, ... economics, ideology, technology, and culture."<sup>609</sup>

*The Art of War* sees war as a political activity. As stated, "[w]ar is a matter of ... vital importance to the state ... the road to survival or ruin."<sup>610</sup> Distinctions are made, however, between those who rule states and those who run wars. "If a general ... heeds my strategy is employed ... . Retain him!"<sup>611</sup> "... [W]hen the army is employed, the general first receives his commands from the sovereign."<sup>612</sup> In fulfilling political demands, however, "[h]e whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious."<sup>613</sup>

### *11. The Spectrum of Conflict—Levels of Warfare*

With a primary concern for the military means, *Warfighting* states it is known that "the spectrum of conflict" may "range" anywhere from "... low intensity, in which the application of military power is restrained and selective [to] ... high intensity, such as nuclear war." The intensity of violence may also be increased or decreased in accord with policy.<sup>614</sup> No matter what the relative intensity, the three most important "levels of war" are the (1) strategic, in which "goals" for specific "theaters" are set; (2) operational, in which campaigns are directed; and (3) tactical, where "particular" "combat" takes place. Understandably, "national policy" and "national strategy" direct all of the elements "of national power," including the military and its strategy towards obtaining certain clear political goals.<sup>615</sup>

*The Art of War* states the following. "[T]he enlightened ruler is prudent and the good general is warned against rash action. Thus a state is kept secure and the army

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<sup>609</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>610</sup> Griffith, 63.

<sup>611</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>612</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>613</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>614</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 21.

<sup>615</sup> Ibid., 22-23.

preserved."<sup>616</sup> "Victory is the main object of war."<sup>617</sup> "Now if the estimates made in the temple before hostilities indicate victory it is because calculations show one's strength to be superior to that of the enemy ... ."<sup>618</sup> "... [A]ttack the enemy's strategy."<sup>619</sup> "... [C]onquer an enemy already defeated." In doing so gain victory quickly for "[w]hen the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice."<sup>620</sup>

In enactment *The Art of War* recommends the following. So that all this is achieved skillfully, fulfill your role in the hierarchy. "When [rulers who are] ignorant of military affairs, they [attempt] to participate in their administration. This causes the officers to be perplexed."<sup>621</sup> "If the situation is one of victory but the sovereign has issued orders not to engage, the general may decide to fight. If the situation is such that he cannot win, but the sovereign has issued orders to engage, he need not do so."<sup>622</sup> While it may be interpreted more broadly remember operationally and tactically, "There are some roads not to follow; some troops not to strike; some cities not to assault; and some ground which should not be contested."<sup>623</sup> Understanding that conditions improve according to wise policy, base your current actions upon comparisons of your relative size and strength to that of your enemy's.<sup>624</sup> Simply said, an opportunist plans, creates, accumulates, and uses all recognized advantages to the state's and/or their own advantage.

## 12. *Offense and Defense—Styles of Warfare*

*Warfighting* acknowledges that in accord with political goals, national strategy, and military strategy, particular "styles of warfare" will be employed and particular "offenses

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<sup>616</sup> Griffith, 142-143.

<sup>617</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>618</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>619</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>620</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>621</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>622</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>623</sup> Ibid., 111.

<sup>624</sup> Griffith, 79-81.

and defenses" will be undertaken. The following categories and "forms" are not "mutually exclusive." In the course of a war, depending on the particular moment and the particular place at an opponent's circumference or within an opponent's territory, warfare will range anywhere between the two styles and extremes of "attrition" (killing and destroying) and "maneuver" (intelligent guided purposeful mobility) and offense and defense. Each adversary will shift between applications as is needed.<sup>625</sup> "Marine Corps doctrine ... is based [more] on warfare by maneuver."<sup>626</sup> Because applications are to a large degree limited by available resources, no adversary can "indefinitely" "sustain" expansion of mass and circumference. Thus each adversary must decide where and when they will concentrate their forces to perforate the enemy's circumference, invade the enemy's territory, and cause the collapse of enemy resistance. The "point" or points at which "defense" is turned into "offense" are referred to as "culminating points." As resources are expended and force "dissipates" the adversary on that offense becomes more "vulnerable" to a "counterattack" directed at what may be termed "the defensive element of the offense."<sup>627</sup>

What has been termed "attrition warfare" by the West would be considered wasteful and indecent by Sun Tzu. *The Art of War* recommends using the proper form of warfare at the proper time and place. While attrition and maneuver are part of every war, winners combine the two activities more effectively. "It is sufficient to estimate the enemy situation correctly and to concentrate your strength to capture him. There is no more to it than this. He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him."<sup>628</sup> The word "captured" is not the same as the word destroyed.

Maneuver is based on insight or intelligence. Commit to memory that *The Art of War* states the following. "One who confronts his enemy for many years in order to

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<sup>625</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 24, 27-28. As mentioned in discussing political purposes it should be understood that the Marine Corps purpose, as it is stated and/or in practice, may or may not be more expansive than Article I., Section 8 of *The Constitution* with its defensive emphasis on "punish[ing] Piracies and Felonies ... on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations ... War ... Marque and Reprisal." Additionally, considering that the Marine Corps is part of the Navy, it may be arguable that the statement that Congress has the responsibility "To provide and maintain a Navy" permits the Marine Corps existence despite the fact that the same section emphasizes that "money" used to "support" "armies" shall be limited in "appropriation" to "two year terms" for the purpose of preventing this country from having a standing army. *The Constitution*, art. I. sec. 8.

<sup>626</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>627</sup> Ibid., 25-26.

<sup>628</sup> Griffith, 122.

struggle for victory in a decisive battle yet who, because he begrudges rank, honors and a few pieces of gold, remains ignorant of his enemy's situation, is completely devoid of humanity. Such a man is no general; no support to his sovereign; no master of victory."<sup>629</sup>

You see "... maneuver is to make the most devious route the most direct and to turn misfortune into advantage."<sup>630</sup> "The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those that I have to fight in any one place will be few."<sup>631</sup> Then "... I attack places he must succor."<sup>632</sup> "... [I]f I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. There I will be numerically superior. Then if I am able to use many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal with will be in dire straits."<sup>633</sup>

In summary it may be said that "[t]he experts in defense conceal themselves as under the nine-fold of earth; those skilled in attack move as from above the nine-fold heavens. Thus they are capable both of protecting themselves and gaining a complete victory."<sup>634</sup>

### *13. Combat Power—Concentration and Speed—Surprise and Boldness—Exploiting Vulnerability and Opportunity*

This leads *Warfighting* to a more specific discussion of attacks and "combat power." "Combat power is the total destructive force we can bring to bear on our enemy at a given time." It includes a vast number of "factors" that may or may not be easily recognized let alone "measured." Accounting for all or even relying on a universal formula derived from that accounting in laying plans is not "desirable."<sup>635</sup> Among these

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<sup>629</sup> Ibid., 144.

<sup>630</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>631</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>632</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>633</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>634</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>635</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 30.

factors, however, it is important to maintain superiority in the following: proper "concentration and speed" of force at the right "time and place" while maintaining the "... pattern ... [to] disperse, concentrate, disperse again ..." and avoiding wasting energy; using the "power" "multipliers" "surprise and boldness" in a manner that, "the enemy" is unable "to react effectively", "temporary" "advantages" are "exploited", and reflects commitment to serious effective action not "recklessness"; and effectively recognizing and "exploiting vulnerability and opportunity," of the most "critical" "weakness" in an order to bring ultimate victory.<sup>636</sup>

Similarly *The Art of War* recommends the following. Concerning "... estimates made in the temple before hostilities ... examine the situation and the outcome will be clearly apparent." However, when considering "... the strategist's keys to victory, [remember] it is not possible to discuss them beforehand."<sup>637</sup> Both before and during action "... the wise general in his deliberations must consider both favorable and unfavorable factors."<sup>638</sup> "... [V]ictory [may be gained] by modifying ... tactics ... ." <sup>639</sup>

It is important to adapt to the enemy. "... [I]f he [the enemy] prepares to the front his rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be fragile. If he prepares to the left, his right will be vulnerable and if to the right, there will be few on his left."<sup>640</sup> "Attack where he is unprepared ... when he does not expect you."<sup>641</sup> "... [I]f I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. There I will be numerically superior. Then if I am able to use many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal with will be in dire straits."<sup>642</sup>

If you "[k]now the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."<sup>643</sup> At the same time be careful to avoid predictability. "... [W]ar is based on

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<sup>636</sup> Ibid., 31-35.

<sup>637</sup> Griffith, 71.

<sup>638</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>639</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>640</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>641</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>642</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>643</sup> Ibid., 84.



deception. Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of forces." "When campaigning, [carrying out a sequence of actions,] be as swift as the wind ... ."644 "... [T]he momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming, and his attack precisely regulated."645 "Troops thrown against an enemy as a grindstone against eggs is an example of a solid acting on a void."646 Harness your short-lived gains for a strategic victory. "Now to win battles and take your objectives, but to fail to exploit these achievements is ominous and may be described as 'wasteful delay.'"647

#### *14. Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act*

All of that mentioned in chapter two of *Warfighting* and similarly by Sun Tzu is dependent on quick, clear thought followed by quick, effective action. Of particular interest are *Warfighting's* references to the "observe, orient, decide, and act" process, more commonly known as the "(OODA) Loop." Despite the fact that the "OODA Loop" is discussed only in *Warfighting's* end notes, it is still of great importance.<sup>648</sup> As pointed out first by the man who best articulated it, Colonel John Boyd (ret.), the importance is while retaining one's own effectiveness to complete the loop in a fraction of the time that it takes your enemy to do the same. Better stated, in effectively adapting to the situation, possess a "faster rhythm" than your enemy.<sup>649</sup> As shown by its placement in the end note that immediately follows the explanation of the "OODA Loop" the desired effectiveness is also dependent upon the formula "[f]rom basic physics, momentum is the product of mass and velocity:  $M = mv$ ."650

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<sup>644</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>645</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>646</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>647</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>648</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 84.

<sup>649</sup> Colonel John Boyd USAF (ret.) educator, interview by author, 7 April 1995, Delray Beach, Florida.

<sup>650</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 84.

*The Art of War* states it this way. "It is sufficient to estimate the enemy situation correctly and to concentrate your strength to capture him. There is no more to it than this. He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him."<sup>651</sup> "... [T]he general must create situations which will contribute to their accomplishment. ... [A]ct expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so control the balance."<sup>652</sup> "... As water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions. [For this reason] ... one able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine."<sup>653</sup>

"Concentrate your forces against the enemy and from a distance of a thousand *li* you can kill his general. This is described as the ability to attain one's aim in an artful and ingenious manner."<sup>654</sup> However in this concentration remember that in order to "[t]ake advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness ... [s]peed is the essence of war."<sup>655</sup> In striking "[w]hen torrential water tosses boulders, it is because of its momentum. When the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because of timing. Thus the momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming, and his attack precisely regulated. His potential is that of a fully drawn crossbow; his timing, the release of the trigger."<sup>656</sup> While *The Art of War* contains no streamlined description of the OODA loop, it clearly makes recommendations that military actions be conducted in accord with that loop.

### *15. Preparing for War*

In *Warfighting's* second chapter's conclusion, it is said that in large part maneuver warfare theory breaks with America's traditional way of war in its dependence on "... vast numerical and technological superiority." We must do more with less more quickly.<sup>657</sup>

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<sup>651</sup> Griffith, 122.

<sup>652</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>653</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>654</sup> Ibid., 139.

<sup>655</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>656</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>657</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 37.

Chapter 3, "Preparing for War" begins with a quote from Hans von Seeckt that says, "[w]ill, rooted in character ..." and coupled with "intellect" is "essential" in committing to, preparing for, and carrying out action. Next, Erwin Rommel says, "[t]he best form of welfare for the troops is first class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties." Finally, George S. Patton Jr. adds, "Untutored courage [is] useless in the face of educated bullets."<sup>658</sup>

## 16. Planning

"During times of peace the most important task of any military is to prepare for war. ... [T]he Marine Corps must maintain itself ready for immediate employment in any clime and place and in any type of conflict. All peacetime activities should focus on achieving combat readiness. This implies a high level of training, flexibility in organization and equipment, qualified professional leadership, and a cohesive doctrine."<sup>659</sup>

"Planning [is] ... important ... in the preparation for war ... . The key to any plan is a clearly defined objective, in this case ... readiness. We must identify a level of readiness and plan a campaign to reach it. A campaign is a progressive sequence of attainable goals to gain the objective within a specified time."<sup>660</sup>

*The Art of War* agrees and makes the following recommendations. "It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely on one's readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack, but rather to make one's self invincible."<sup>661</sup> "When the enemy presents an opportunity, speedily take advantage of it. [Be prepared.] Anticipate him in seizing something he values and move in accordance with a date secretly fixed."<sup>662</sup> "... [T]he skillful commander ... misses no opportunity to master his enemy."<sup>663</sup>

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<sup>658</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>659</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>660</sup> Ibid.

<sup>661</sup> Griffith, 114.

<sup>662</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>663</sup> Ibid., 87.

## 17. Organization

As detailed in *warfighting* the organization of the Marine Corps is two fold. Marines in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) provide security for the United States Navy and are ready to be employed for immediate response. "Missions in sustained high-intensity warfare will require augmentation from the Reserve establishment." As structured in accord with the needs of each challenge, both the FMF and Reserves are divided into "Marine Air—Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's)."<sup>664</sup> Through guided "... habitual relationships ... supported and supporting units ... develop operational familiarity ..." for the most part.<sup>665</sup>

*The Art of War* recognizes that "[a]nciently the skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and awaited ... [T]he enemy's vulnerability ..." is his own mistake.<sup>666</sup> Then at that time and place, "the potential of troops skillfully commanded in battle ..." is great.<sup>667</sup> There and then, "generally, in battle, use the normal force to engage; use the extra-ordinary to win."<sup>668</sup> Yet while all of that requires transporting equipment and supplies remember, "those adept in waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts nor more than one provisioning."<sup>669</sup>

## 18. Doctrine

Being ready physically and mentally is important in *Warfighting*. Marine Corps warfare "doctrine" is the compound of "... the Marine Corps [view of the] ... nature and theory ... preparation and conduct ..." of war. It continues:

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<sup>664</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 42.

<sup>665</sup> Ibid., 43.

<sup>666</sup> Griffith, 85.

<sup>667</sup> Ibid., 95.

<sup>668</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>669</sup> Ibid., 72-73.

Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting, a philosophy for leading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism, and a common language. ... [I]t establishes the way we practice our profession. ... [p]rovid[ing] the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding.<sup>670</sup>

As "made official" by the "Commandant" of the Marine Corps and "established in this manual," that doctrine is "authoritative ... not prescriptive."<sup>671</sup>

Similarly *The Art of War* holds that "... the general is the protectorate of the state. If this protection is all-embracing the state will be strong ... ." <sup>672</sup> His troops should understand that their own security is intimately linked to the security of the state.<sup>673</sup> If his "... troops are united in purpose [they] will be victorious."<sup>674</sup> Accomplishing this requires clear purposeful doctrine, just discipline, and military professionalism.<sup>675</sup>

### 19. Leadership

*Warfighting* points out that in the Marine Corps leadership includes, "professional competence," "men of action and of intellect both," "resolute and self-reliant ... decisions, ... energetic and instant ... execution." "Officers particularly are expected to be students of the art and science of war at all levels ... with a solid foundation in military theory and a knowledge of military history and the timeless lessons to be gained from it."<sup>676</sup> Leaders must have a strong sense of the great responsibility of their office; the resources they will expend in war are human lives." "Initiative" and "boldness" are to be rewarded. All this is only possible in an atmosphere of "competence," "trust,"

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<sup>670</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 43.

<sup>671</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>672</sup> Griffith, 81.

<sup>673</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>674</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>675</sup> Ibid., 65-66.

<sup>676</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 44.

"confidence," "honesty and frankness." "Ready compliance for the purpose of personal advancement ... will not be tolerated."<sup>677</sup>

Many of those leadership traits are listed as important in *The Art of War*. Among other things, generals should possess, "... wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness."<sup>678</sup> He must "... be serene and inscrutable, impartial and self-controlled."<sup>679</sup> In creating victory, leaders must be trustworthy, lawful, and just with their subordinates. They should be educated concerning important factors in weighing situations in addition to informed of their own as well as their enemy's strength, weaknesses, and directions. Leaders must be ruggedly independent and permitted to take the initiative, to be innovative and to readily adapt to changing situations. They should be good stewards of state resources and power, especially lives, and they should be able to use the talents and knowledge of troops, spies, and local guides; and elusive if not unpredictable in their plans and actions.<sup>680</sup> If a general is "reckless," "cowardly," "quick-tempered," easily "[dis]honor[ed]," or overly gentle in nature, he is endangered.<sup>681</sup>

The general is to expect, however, that his superiors behave reasonably also. "... [T]he enlightened ruler is prudent and the good general is warned against rash action. Thus a state is kept secure and the army preserved."<sup>682</sup> "... [T]he general who in advancing does not seek personal fame, and in withdrawing is not concerned with avoiding punishment, but whose only purpose is to protect the people and promote the best interests of his sovereign, is the precious jewel of the state ... ."<sup>683</sup> In other words, he is not to be a "yes man." "If the situation is one of victory but the sovereign has issued orders not to engage, the general may decide to fight. If the situation is such that he cannot win, but the sovereign has issued orders to engage, he need not do so."<sup>684</sup>

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<sup>677</sup> Ibid., 45-46.

<sup>678</sup> Griffith, 65.

<sup>679</sup> Ibid., 136-137.

<sup>680</sup> Ibid., 63, 66, 73, 76-79, 83-84, 88, 93, 100-102, 104, 123, 128, 139, 144, 149.

<sup>681</sup> Ibid., 114-115.

<sup>682</sup> Ibid., 142-143.

<sup>683</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>684</sup> Ibid.

## 20. Training

*Warfighting* makes it clear that "[t]he purpose of" "[t]raining" before and during a war is to "win in combat." "... [E]ntry-level training ... a socialization process ... provides all Marines a common experience, a proud heritage, a set of values, and a common bond of comradeship."<sup>685</sup> All Marines learn both individual and small team "basic combat skills" in an order of "progressive" complication to enable the fulfillment of their primary purpose in MAGTF combat. In order to "... achieve proficiency at their [respective] levels ..." "subordinates commanders" and "subordinates" must be permitted enough "... time and freedom to conduct the training ..." "they believe appropriate." Micro-management and centralized training is not conducive to this end. "Senior commanders" are to set clear "goals," "standards," and "... focus of effort for training ..." and then "junior leaders" are to "develop" through taking the "initiative" in the "accomplish[ment]" of those.<sup>686</sup> With a focus on understanding the reasons for the cause and effect of particular "actions" taken, two forms of "collective training" are to be employed and evaluated by all those involved in their employment. "Drills" are to stress uniformity, "speed, and coordination" in certain "techniques and procedures." "Exercises" are to require the implementation of innovative solutions in overcoming a dedicated and active enemy in "battle" during "simulated combat conditions."<sup>687</sup>

In considering training, *The Art of War* places an emphasis on command relationships. Weighing "[w]hich has the better trained officers and men" is an important factor in determining the relative strength of opponents.<sup>688</sup> "To cultivate a uniform level of valor is the object of military administration."<sup>689</sup> "Because ... a general regards his men as infants they will march with him into the deepest valleys. He treats them as his own beloved sons and they will die with him."<sup>690</sup> "If troops are punished before their

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<sup>685</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 46.

<sup>686</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>687</sup> Ibid., 48-49.

<sup>688</sup> Griffith, 66.

<sup>689</sup> Ibid., 136.

<sup>690</sup> Ibid., 128.

loyalty is secured they will be disobedient [and] ... difficult to employ ... . If troops are loyal, but punishments are not enforced, you cannot employ them."<sup>691</sup> "Thus, command them with civility and imbue them uniformly with martial ardor and it may be said that victory is certain. ... If orders which are consistently effective are used in instructing the troops, they will be obedient." If not, then the opposite will take place.<sup>692</sup>

"He [the general] prohibits superstitious practices and so rids the army of doubts. Then until the moment of death there can be no troubles."<sup>693</sup> Troops must be trained and then motivated by their survival instinct to work as a team, and teams "... both large and small [must] ... mutually cooperate."<sup>694</sup> "Generally, management of many is the same as management of few. It is a matter of organization. ... And to control many is the same as to control few. This is a matter of formations and signals."<sup>695</sup> And it is by proper use of the ground that both shock and flexible forces are used to the best advantage."<sup>696</sup> "... [A] skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates."<sup>697</sup> "He selects his men and they exploit the situation."<sup>698</sup> "Therefore when troops flee, are insubordinate, distressed, collapse in disorder or are routed, it is the fault of the general. None of these disasters can be attributed to natural causes."<sup>699</sup>

## *21. Professional Military Education*

In *Warfighting* "Professional Military Education" is essential in developing military leaders at all levels. Through the study of: the works of various philosopher strategists, historical events, and their own specialty, including new theories and techniques therein,

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<sup>691</sup> Ibid., 122-123.

<sup>692</sup> Ibid., 123.

<sup>693</sup> Ibid., 136-137.

<sup>694</sup> Ibid., 133.

<sup>695</sup> Ibid., 90.

<sup>696</sup> Ibid., 136.

<sup>697</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>698</sup> Ibid.

<sup>699</sup> Ibid., 125.



military leaders develop their artistic creativity and scientific proficiency. Advanced education is a lifelong struggle in which that currently being studied and learned should enable an individual and leader to survive and succeed on the next level of advancement.<sup>700</sup> According to Gray:

His goal is to become an expert. ... [H]e should understand the interrelationship between his field and all the other fields within the Marine Corps. He should be an expert in tactics and techniques and should understand amphibious warfare and combined arms. At the senior levels he should be fully capable of articulating, applying and integrating MAGTF warfighting capabilities in *The Art of War* at all levels. This responsibility and more belongs to the education establishment, ... the commander and the individual.<sup>701</sup>

Commanders are to be mentors and "... should see the development of their subordinates as a direct reflection on themselves."<sup>702</sup>

While emphasizing the fact that war itself is a form of training, *The Art of War* also states that "... order and disorder depends on organization; courage or cowardice on circumstances; strength and weakness on dispositions."<sup>703</sup> Generals must allow troops to win by ordering action when it is most advantageous and letting their own troops know when they are in danger, by taking essential enemy positions and supplies to fulfill the needs of their troops, and by preventing enemy mobility and concentration while isolating enemy troops.<sup>704</sup> "Pay heed to nourishing the troops; do not unnecessarily fatigue them. Unite them in spirit; conserve their strength. Make unfathomable plans for the movements of the army."<sup>705</sup> "... [B]e capable of keeping ... officers and men in

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<sup>700</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 49.

<sup>701</sup> Ibid., 50.

<sup>702</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>703</sup> Griffith, 93.

<sup>704</sup> Ibid., 133-134.

<sup>705</sup> Ibid., 134.

ignorance of his plans."<sup>706</sup> Let them know what they need to know when they need to know it. "Throw the troops into a position from which there is no escape and even when faced with death they will not flee. For if prepared to die, what can they not achieve?"<sup>707</sup> In that time and place their adaptability and flexibility are important to success.<sup>708</sup> "Thus, such troops need no encouragement to be vigilant. Without extorting their support the general obtains it; without inviting their affection he gains it; without demanding their trust he wins it."<sup>709</sup>

## 22. *Equipping*

*Warfighting* acknowledges that while a Marine's most important weapon is his mind, there is equipment that enhances the implementation of a Marine's will. Proper "equipping" is important. "Equipment should be easy to operate and maintain, reliable, and compatible with other equipment. Further, equipment should be designed so that its usage is consistent with established doctrine and tactics. Primary considerations are strategic and tactical lift [and] ... mobility ... ." <sup>710</sup>

"Equipment that permits overcontrol of units in battle is in conflict with the Marine Corps' philosophy of command and is not justifiable."<sup>711</sup> "In order to minimize research and development costs and fielding time, ... exploit existing capabilities—'off-the-shelf' technology—to the greatest extent possible."<sup>712</sup> Equipment "aquisition should be" in accord with "long term" need and based on "obvious usefulness" and "develop[ment] ... specifically to exploit" "critical enemy vulnerabilities."<sup>713</sup>

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<sup>706</sup> Ibid., 136.

<sup>707</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>708</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>709</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>710</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 52.

<sup>711</sup> Ibid.

<sup>712</sup> Ibid.

<sup>713</sup> Ibid.

*Warfighting* details that equipment's "enhancement" of "combat effectiveness" "must justify" its adoption, "support," and "employment." "As much as is possible, employment techniques and procedures should be developed concurrently with equipment to minimize delays ... . [I]nitial operator training should precede equipment fielding." However, do not allow "overreliance on technology" and "... attempts to remove man from the process of waging war."<sup>714</sup>

*The Art of War* places a significant emphasis on equipping. "Generally, operations of war require one thousand fast four-horse chariots, one thousand four-horse wagons covered in leather, and one hundred thousand mailed troops."<sup>715</sup> The weapons used in the text, swords, lances, shields, chariots, crossbows, and fire, are not necessarily high-tech yet they do require advancement, manufacture, and upkeep.<sup>716</sup> Costs are also involved. "When provisions are transported for a thousand *li* expenditures at home and in the field, stipends for the entertainment of advisors and visitors, the cost of materials such as glue and lacquer, and chariots and armor, will amount to one thousand pieces of gold a day. After this money is in hand, one hundred thousand troops may be raised."<sup>717</sup>

However, because of the requirements of transportation breakdowns and combat, resources stockpiled and used last only so long.<sup>718</sup> "When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice."<sup>719</sup> "When your weapons are dulled and ardor dampened, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, neighboring rulers will take advantage of your distress. Even though you have wise counselors, none will be able to lay good plans for the future."<sup>720</sup> A partial answer to strains on production and shortages may be found in using the enemy's resources, equipment, and soldiers.<sup>721</sup>

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<sup>714</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>715</sup> Griffith, 72.

<sup>716</sup> Ibid., 72, 74, 92, 104-105, 141-142.

<sup>717</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>718</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>719</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>720</sup> Ibid.

<sup>721</sup> Ibid., 74, 76.

*The Art of War* also emphasizes the necessary use of communications. "He who knows the art of the direct and the indirect approach will be victorious. Such is the art of maneuvering."<sup>722</sup> "The Book of Military Administration says, As the voice cannot be heard in battle, drums and bells are used. As troops cannot see each other clearly in battle, flags and banners are used."<sup>723</sup> "Now gongs and drums, banners and flags are used to focus the attention of the troops. When the troops can be thus united, the brave cannot advance alone, nor can the cowardly withdraw. This is the art of employing a host."<sup>724</sup> "In night fighting use many torches and drums, in day fighting many banners and flags in order to influence the sight and hearing of our troops."<sup>725</sup>

*The Art of War's* focuses on communications with the purpose of unifying efforts and striking fear in enemy hearts, but this does not promote the micro-management of tactical actions. "[Rulers who are] ignorant of military affairs, [attempt] to participate in their administration. This causes the officers to be perplexed."<sup>726</sup> It is important for commanders to understand that "[t]here are some roads not to follow; some troops not to strike; some cities not to assault; and some ground which should not be contested."<sup>727</sup>

*The Art of War* also details that delegation is important. "He selects his men and they exploit the situation."<sup>728</sup> Hopefully those officers are successful with their delegated responsibilities. "In the tumult and uproar the battle seems chaotic, but there is no disorder; the troops appear to be milling about in circles but cannot be defeated." "Apparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength."<sup>729</sup>

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<sup>722</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>723</sup> Ibid.

<sup>724</sup> Ibid.

<sup>725</sup> Ibid., 107.

<sup>726</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>727</sup> Ibid., 111.

<sup>728</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>729</sup> Ibid., 92.

In the concluding *Warfighting's* third chapter, "preparing for" and "conducting...war" are said to be the only "two" "justifiable" "activities" for the military.<sup>730</sup>

### 23. *The Conduct of War*

*Warfighting's* fourth chapter, "The Conduct of War" opens by quoting Sun Tzu:

Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness ... . Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions.<sup>731</sup>

Sir William Slim is quoted next:

Many years ago, as a cadet hoping some day to be an officer, I was poring over the 'Principles of War,' listed in the old Field Service Regulations, when the Sergeant-Major came up to me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. 'Don't bother your head about all them things, me lad,' he said. 'there's only one principle of war and that's this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him the most, when he ain't lookin'!<sup>732</sup>

### 24. *The Challenge*

As stated in *Warfighting* "[t]he sole justification for the USMC is to secure or protect national policy objectives by military force when peaceful means alone can not." Marine Corps doctrine and philosophy answers the question of "how" this is "accomplish[ed]." In other words "[t]he challenge ... is to identify and adopt a concept of

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<sup>730</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 54.

<sup>731</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>732</sup> Ibid.

warfighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war and the realities of the modern battlefield."<sup>733</sup>

*The Art of War's* justification and challenge are very similar to that which has been stated by the Marine Corps. "War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life and death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be studied."<sup>734</sup> "Now the general is the protector of the state. If this protection is all-embracing, the state will surely be strong; if defective, the state will certainly be weak."<sup>735</sup> "And for this reason, the wise general in his deliberations must consider both favorable and unfavorable factors."<sup>736</sup> "[B]y taking into account the favorable factors, he makes his plans feasible; by taking into the favorable and unfavorable, he may resolve the difficulties."<sup>737</sup> However, "[i]f not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you cannot succeed do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight."<sup>738</sup>

## 25. *Maneuver Warfare*

*Warfighting's* primary doctrinal concerns are very simple. "Maneuver Warfare," "... the Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions[,] is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver." With proper consideration given to maneuver in "... time and space ... an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority."<sup>739</sup>

"This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On the contrary, the suppressive effects of firepower are essential to our ability to maneuver. Nor do we mean to imply that we will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We will

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<sup>733</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>734</sup> Griffith, 63.

<sup>735</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>736</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>737</sup> Ibid.

<sup>738</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>739</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 58.

concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits into our larger purposes."<sup>740</sup>

General Gray explains:

The greatest value of firepower is not physical destruction —the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly—but the moral dislocation it causes. By our actions, we seek to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and faster than the enemy can keep up with ... . The enemy must be made to see his situation ... deteriorate at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.<sup>741</sup>

In other words, maneuver warfare harnesses: (1) "... speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of combat, and keep the enemy off balance, and thereby increasing his friction. Through ... greater tempo and velocity, we seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain;"<sup>742</sup> (2) "violence, not so much as a source of physical attrition but as a source of moral dislocation. Toward this end, we concentrate strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when and how it will cause the greatest damage to our enemy's ability to fight. ... [A]dvantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly. We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness, against which we will direct all available combat power"; and (3) "surprise," an important "weapon." "By studying our enemy we will attempt to appreciate his perceptions. Through deception we will try to shape his expectations. Then we will dislocate them by striking at an unexpected time and place."<sup>743</sup>

Similarly *The Art of War* details that "... victory [may be gained] by modifying ... tactics ... ." <sup>744</sup> Hence, "... the wise general in his deliberations must consider both favorable and unfavorable factors."<sup>745</sup> This includes "... measurements of space ...

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<sup>740</sup> Ibid., 59.

<sup>741</sup> Ibid., 60.

<sup>742</sup> Ibid.

<sup>743</sup> Ibid., 61.

<sup>744</sup> Griffith, 101.

derived from the ground ..." which are of importance in out maneuvering an enemy.<sup>746</sup> This can be defined by the ideas that, "... maneuver is to make the most devious route the most direct and to turn misfortune into advantage."<sup>747</sup> Because "... war is based on deception. Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of forces."<sup>748</sup>

The enemy creates their own weaknesses. This is why "[t]he enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those that I have to fight in any one place will be few."<sup>749</sup> "... [I]f he [the enemy] prepares to the front his rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be fragile. If he prepares to the left, his right will be vulnerable and if to the right, there will be few on his left."<sup>750</sup> Then "... I attack places he must succor."<sup>751</sup> "Attack where he is unprepared ... when he does not expect you."<sup>752</sup>

In other words "... if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. There I will be numerically superior. Then if I am able to use many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal with will be in dire straights."<sup>753</sup> Attack with "overwhelming" "momentum" as if "releas[ing] ... the trigger" on a "crossbow."<sup>754</sup> "Troops thrown against an enemy as a grindstone against eggs is an example of a solid acting on a void."<sup>755</sup>

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<sup>745</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>746</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>747</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>748</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>749</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>750</sup> Ibid.

<sup>751</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>752</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>753</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>754</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>755</sup> Ibid., 91.



## 26. Philosophy of Command

*Warfighting* makes it clear that the "Philosophy of Command" employed "must support" "maneuver warfare."<sup>756</sup> "Individual initiative and responsibility are of paramount importance." "[S]ubordinate commanders," "... understanding ... their senior's intent ..." are likely to know what their specific combat situation requires. Leaders must possess and encourage others in "... boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, and imagination."<sup>757</sup> With "shared philosophy," language, and "experience," Marines are to use "familiarity and trust" to develop "mutual understanding" and "implicit communication" and thus essential communication will require less time and words. This type of communication includes "how we talk." Thus, it requires "firsthand" in person transmission when possible.<sup>758</sup>

To be able to communicate properly and direct, understanding what and when particular actions must be taken, a "commander" will have to operate "from [a] well [near] forward" combat location providing "personal leadership" in "shared" hardship to "... gain the trust and confidence of his subordinates"; "coping" with and using the "... chaos, uncertainty, constant change, and friction" of war against his foes; and at the same time not micro-managing "subordinates" in any "mission."<sup>759</sup>

*The Art of War* also details the importance of training, communication, relationships, and delegation. "Because ... a general regards his men as infants they will march with him into the deepest valleys. He treats them as his own beloved sons and they will die with him."<sup>760</sup> At the same time, however, "... a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates."<sup>761</sup> "He selects his men and they exploit the situation."<sup>762</sup> Troops that have been treated well, trained well, and given various other strategic advantages "... need no encouragement to be vigilant.

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<sup>756</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 61.

<sup>757</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>758</sup> Ibid., 62-63.

<sup>759</sup> Ibid., 63-65.

<sup>760</sup> Griffith, 128.

<sup>761</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>762</sup> Ibid.

Without extorting their support the general obtains it; without inviting their affection he gains it; without demanding their trust he wins it."<sup>763</sup> As a result, "[i]n the tumult and uproar the battle seems chaotic, but there is no disorder; the troops appear to be milling about in circles but cannot be defeated." This is why it is said that "[a]pparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength."<sup>764</sup>

## 27. *Shaping the Battle*

In *Warfighting's* maneuver warfare, "shaping the battle" is important since "[o]ur goal is not just the cumulative attrition. ... [I]t follows that we must have some scheme for how we may expect to achieve victory. ... [B]efore anything else, we must conceive our vision of how we intend to win."<sup>765</sup>

As partly discussed *The Art of war* states, "[v]ictory is the main object of war."<sup>766</sup> "Now if the estimates made in the temple before hostilities indicate victory it is because calculations show one's strength to be superior to that of the enemy ... ." <sup>767</sup> Remember "... attack the enemy's strategy."<sup>768</sup> "... [C]onquer an enemy already defeated."<sup>769</sup>

It is made clear in *Warfighting* that "shaping the battle" requires recognition of the following: (1) clear cut goals and the methods to be employed in achieving them; (2) the enemy's greatest weaknesses and the order that those weaknesses should be taken advantage of; and (3) the enemy's perception of our weaknesses and how to use that enemy's actions against him. "Ideally when the moment of engagement arrives, the issue has already been resolved: through our orchestration of the events leading up to the

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<sup>763</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>764</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>765</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 66.

<sup>766</sup> Griffith, 73.

<sup>767</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>768</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>769</sup> Ibid., 73.

encounter, we have so shaped the conditions of war that the result is a matter of course ... to our advantage."<sup>770</sup>

*The Art of War* states the following. "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."<sup>771</sup> "... [T]he general must create situations which will contribute to their accomplishment . ... [A]ct expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so control the balance."<sup>772</sup> "... [T]he wise general in his deliberations must consider both favorable and unfavorable factors. ... [B]y taking into account the favorable factors, he makes his plan feasible; by taking into account the unfavorable, he may resolve the difficulties."<sup>773</sup> "The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those that I have to fight in any one place will be few."<sup>774</sup> "... [I]f he [the enemy] prepares to the front his rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be fragile. If he prepares to the left, his right will be vulnerable and if to the right, there will be few on his left."<sup>775</sup> "Attack where he is unprepared ... when he does not expect you."<sup>776</sup> "... [A]ttack places he must succor."<sup>777</sup>

In *Warfighting* it is understood that in order to "shape the battle," a commander must from what he believes to be "forward in time and space" devise general contingencies and plans, not itineraries with strict "timetables."<sup>778</sup> General Gray explains:

... [W]e attempt to shape the general conditions of war; we try to achieve a certain measure of ordered disorder. Examples include canalizing enemy

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<sup>770</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 66.

<sup>771</sup> Griffith, 84.

<sup>772</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>773</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>774</sup> Ibid.

<sup>775</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>776</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>777</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>778</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 66.

movement in a desired direction, blocking or delaying enemy reinforcements so that we can fight a piecemeal enemy rather than a concentrated one, shaping enemy expectations, or attacking a specific enemy capability to allow us to maximize a capability of our own—such as ... air defenses ... . We should ... try to shape events ... a way that allows us several options ... hav[ing] not restricted ourselves to only one course ... .<sup>779</sup>

The Art of War includes significant implication of and commentary on this common understanding. They should be understood with the knowledge that "[h]e who knows when he can fight and when he can not will be victorious."<sup>780</sup> "When I wish to give battle, my enemy, even though protected by high walls and deep moats, cannot help but engage me for I attack a position he must succor. ... When I wish to avoid battle I may defend myself simply by drawing a line on the ground; the enemy will be able to attack me because I divert him from going where he wishes."<sup>781</sup> To defeat the enemy, one should know when and where to divide him, strain and wear him down, attack him, engage him, withdraw, elude him, and distract and weary him.<sup>782</sup> All of that requires planning.

In *Warfighting* it is understood that because "[t]he further ahead we think, the less our actual influence becomes, ... the further ahead we consider, the less precision we should attempt to impose ... . As events approach and our ability to influence them grows, we have already developed an appreciation for the situation and how we want to shape it."<sup>783</sup> Simultaneously, however, the higher the "... command, the greater is our sphere of influence and the further ahead in time and space we must seek to impose our will."<sup>784</sup>

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<sup>779</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>780</sup> Griffith, 82.

<sup>781</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>782</sup> Ibid., 68-69, 79-80, 114.

<sup>783</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 67.

<sup>784</sup> Ibid.

As the title *The Art of War* implies making relative estimates and devising plans for war are not sciences.<sup>785</sup> While in implementing plans, "[s]peed is the essence of war. [One expects to] take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness ... ." However, such may not always be completely achieved.<sup>786</sup> This is partly because, "... as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions. [For this reason,] ... one able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine."<sup>787</sup> Understand that, "[w]hen the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice. ... Those adept at waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts nor more provisioning."<sup>788</sup> "When campaigning, be as swift as the wind."<sup>789</sup>

## 28. Decision Making

*Warfighting* agrees with the view that in "Maneuver Warfare," "action" and inaction are based on "Decision Making" and/or the failure thereof.<sup>790</sup> "Decision making requires the intuitive skill to recognize and analyze the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. This ability is the product of experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character."<sup>791</sup> In maneuver warfare, it is important to have the "will" to make necessary sound decisions more and more quickly and thus speeding the tempo and keep the "initiative." Those decisions must be made with respect for an "... enemy's anticipated reactions and counter-actions."<sup>792</sup> "We should base our decisions on awareness rather than on mechanical habit."<sup>793</sup>

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<sup>785</sup> Griffith, 70-71.

<sup>786</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>787</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>788</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>789</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>790</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 68.

<sup>791</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>792</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>793</sup> Ibid., 69.

*The Art of War* recommends that "[w]hen the enemy presents an opportunity, speedily take advantage of it. Anticipate him in seizing something he values and move in accordance with a date secretly fixed."<sup>794</sup> If you "... determine the enemy's plans and you will know which strategy will be successful and which will not."<sup>795</sup> Use spies to study and misinform the enemy.<sup>796</sup> Sun Tzu continues:

Agitate him and ascertain the pattern of his movement ... . Determine his dispositions and so ascertain the field of battle ... . Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient ... . The ultimate in disposing one's troops is to be without ascertainable shape. The most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you ... . Therefore, when I have won a victory I do not repeat my tactics but respond to circumstances in an infinite variety of ways.<sup>797</sup>

## 29. Mission Tactics

"Mission Tactics" are a very important part of "Maneuver Warfare." In *Warfighting* General Gray clearly explains:

Mission tactics are just as the name implies: the tactic of assigning a subordinate mission without specifying how it must be accomplished. We leave the manner of accomplishing the mission to the subordinates, thereby allowing him the freedom—and establishing the duty—to take what ever steps he deems necessary based on the situation. The senior prescribes the method of execution only to the degree that is essential for coordination. ... That permits the high tempo we desire. Uninhibited by restriction from above, the subordinate can adapt ... . He informs his commander what he has done, but does not wait for permission.<sup>798</sup>

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<sup>794</sup> Griffith, 140.

<sup>795</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>796</sup> Ibid., 144-147.

<sup>797</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>798</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 71.

With that, it is important to "... provide unity, or focus, to the various efforts ... not through imposed control, but through harmonious initiative and lateral coordination."<sup>799</sup> As shall be seen, *The Art of War* also balances "Mission Tactics" with the "Commanders Intent."

### 30. Commander's Intent

In "Maneuver Warfare," to a large degree that "harmonious initiative" arises from an understanding of the "desired result" from a particular "action." That "desired result" is the "Commander's Intent." While the particular course of action called for will change according to changes in conditions and opportunities the "intent is predominant" and "more permanent."<sup>800</sup> "In order to maintain our focus on the enemy, we should try to express intent in terms of the enemy. [When possible] the intent should answer the question: What do I want to do to the enemy? ... The intent should convey the commander's vision." This is more specific than simply stating the intent is victory. It requires commanders to communicate. "Subordinates" need to understand "... their commander[s] ... thinking ... the intent of the commander two levels up."<sup>801</sup>

It has already been detailed that in the cultural context where *The Art of War* was written harmony was and still is highly valued. Additionally *The Art of War* states that political leaders should commission military personnel and set the political goals of military actions but should not interfere in the military's achievement of those goals.<sup>802</sup> While "... a skilled commander [exercises control as he] seeks [military and in turn political] victory from the situation ... [when He] selects his men and they exploit the situation," that commander shows a relative belief in the professional competence of those he commands.<sup>803</sup> Implicit in the statement that "[t]here are some roads not to follow; some troops not to strike; some cities not to assault; and some ground which should not be contested" is the understanding that those on the operational and tactical

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<sup>799</sup> Ibid.

<sup>800</sup> Ibid.

<sup>801</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>802</sup> Griffith, 81-84, 102, 112-113, 142-143.

<sup>803</sup> Ibid., 93.

scene know best what to do in order to win.<sup>804</sup> As a result of training and situational advantages "[i]n the tumult and uproar the battle seems chaotic, but there is no disorder; the troops appear to be milling about in circles but cannot be defeated."<sup>805</sup> Perhaps this relationship is summed up by stating "... elements both large and small ... mutually cooperate; for the good troops to succor the poor and for superiors and subordinates to support each other."<sup>806</sup>

*The Art of War* makes it clear that "... as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions." That is the reason why generals, commanders, officers, and troops should be authorized by their superiors to "... gain the victory by modifying ... tactics in accordance with the enemy situation ... ." <sup>807</sup> In adapting, improvising, and overcoming on their own levels of war all soldiers in a particular military would have to know, to some degree, what direction their superiors need them to proceed. However, discouraging that disclosure *The Art of War* recommends that generals should keep their plans secret. Perhaps disclosure is related to how detailed or close in time the enactment of a plan is. Perhaps such is related to one's rank and security clearance as may be implicit with the use of the titles "multitudes," "troops," "wise" and "spies."<sup>808</sup> It may be difficult to maneuver troops into advantageous positions if they are aware of specific dangers or if the enemy knows your plans.<sup>809</sup> Therefore, we can say that secrecy is relative to design.

### 31. Focus of Effort

In *Warfighting* it is said that "Maneuver Warfare" may use "Focus of Effort" to create unity.<sup>810</sup> In the course of achieving a particular goal, with proper consideration of conditions, the "critical enemy vulnerability[.]" and the particular actions necessary "[a]ll

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<sup>804</sup> Ibid., 111.

<sup>805</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>806</sup> Ibid., 91, 133.

<sup>807</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>808</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>809</sup> Ibid., 100, 135.

<sup>810</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 72.



other efforts must support ..." those actions.<sup>811</sup> "Normally, we designate the focus of effort by assigning one unit responsibility for accomplishing that effort. ... [A]ll other units in the command ... must support that unit's efforts. Faced with a decision, we ask ourselves: 'How can I best support the focus of effort?'"<sup>812</sup> "Each Commander should establish a focus of effort for each mission. As the situation changes, the commander may shift the focus of effort, redirecting the weight of combat power ..." where it is most advantageous.<sup>813</sup>

While *The Art of War* recommends that among other things loyalty to the state and survival instinct be used to unify military efforts to adapt to the enemy and his situation, this does not make it significantly different in application from "Focus of Effort" as it is defined in *Warfighting*. *The Art of War* says "The general is the protector of the state. If this protection is all-embracing, the state will surely be strong ...".<sup>814</sup> "Victory is the main object of war."<sup>815</sup> "... [A]ttack the enemy's strategy."<sup>816</sup> "One who confronts his enemy for many years in order to struggle for victory in a decisive battle yet who [intentionally] ... remains ignorant of his enemy's situation is ... devoid of humanity. Such a man is no general; no support to his sovereign; no master of victory."<sup>817</sup> In further conserving the strength and maintaining the state, *The Art of War* holds "generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact [and] ... to capture the enemy's army ...".<sup>818</sup> All of those actions are directed by how one may best preserve the state and a particular administration. It is self-evident that dedication to each step of and in that preservation is essential.

As stated in *The Art of War*, "Focus of Effort" is important on lower hierarchical levels also. Despite the recommendation to "set the troops to their tasks without

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<sup>811</sup> Ibid., 72-73.

<sup>812</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>813</sup> Ibid.

<sup>814</sup> Griffith, 81

<sup>815</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>816</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>817</sup> Ibid., 145.

<sup>818</sup> Ibid., 77.

imparting your designs; use them to your advantage without revealing the dangers involved" it is made clear that when in danger they will work together.<sup>819</sup> "... [T]he troops of those adept in war are used like the 'Simultaneous Responding' snake ... . When struck on the head its tail attacks; when struck on the tail, its head attacks, when struck in the center both head and tail attack."<sup>820</sup> Yes "'troops [are] ... capable of such instantaneous coordination' ... . [A]lthough the men of Wu and Yeuh mutually hate one another, if together in a boat tossed by the wind they would cooperate as the right hand does with the left."<sup>821</sup> "That the army is certain to sustain the enemy's attack without suffering defeat is due to [cooperative] operations of the extraordinary and the normal forces. [Perhaps with the use of] ... normal forces to engage [and] ... extraordinary to win," normal forces may have to operate in support of the extraordinary force's efforts to punch a hole through some weak point in enemy lines.<sup>822</sup>

### 32. *Surfaces and Gaps*

In *Warfighting's* "Maneuver Warfare" part of the criteria establishing where it is most advantageous to attack is established by a distinction between "Surfaces and Gaps." "Put simply, surfaces are hard spots—enemy strengths—and gaps are soft spots—enemy weaknesses ... . [F]ocus[ing] our efforts on enemy weaknesses [as we do] ... reduces [our possible] ... casualties and is more likely to yield decisive results. Whenever possible, we exploit existing gaps. Failing that, we create gaps."<sup>823</sup>

"Gaps may ... be physical ... dispositions, but they may also be any weakness in time or space ... ."<sup>824</sup> "[A] surface may be an actual strong point, or ... any enemy strength ... ."<sup>825</sup> That which is a gap at one time or for one application may be a surface

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<sup>819</sup> Ibid., 139, 134, 135.

<sup>820</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>821</sup> Ibid., 135-136

<sup>822</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>823</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 74.

<sup>824</sup> Ibid.

<sup>825</sup> Ibid.

in and for another, and vice versa.<sup>826</sup> Keep in mind that gaps may and are likely to be disguised as surfaces, and vice versa.<sup>827</sup> In searching for gaps one may find surfaces. However, once through "continuous and aggressive reconnaissance" a sure gap has been found it "must" be "exploit[ed]" by "... pull[ing] combat power through ..." it with "flexibility and speed ... ." "Commanders must rely on the initiative of subordinates to locate the gaps and must have the flexibility to respond quickly to opportunities rather than following predetermined schemes."<sup>828</sup>

Similarly *The Art of War* contains chapters on "Dispositions," "Weaknesses and Strengths," "terrain," and the advantageous employment of troops there on and against.<sup>829</sup> "It is sufficient to estimate the enemy situation correctly and to concentrate your strength to capture him. There is no more to it than this. He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him."<sup>830</sup>

It is important to "... learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient."<sup>831</sup> In learning this remember that strengths and advantages are more than physical; they are also metaphysical. One example may be found in the recommendations based on the knowledge that "... an army may be robbed of its spirit and its commander deprived of his courage."<sup>832</sup> Because of that, among many other reasons, one may conclude that "[i]n war, numbers alone confer no advantage. [This is why you should] ... not advance relying on sheer military power."<sup>833</sup>

"... [W]hen the enemy presents you with an opportunity [a true opportunity], speedily take advantage of it."<sup>834</sup> By being well appraised and having cooperation it may be possible to "... concentrate while he [the enemy] divides, I can use my entire strength

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<sup>826</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>827</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>828</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>829</sup> Griffith, 85, 96, 124, 130.

<sup>830</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>831</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>832</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>833</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>834</sup> Ibid., 140.

to attack a fraction of his. There I will be numerically superior. ... [I]f I am able to use many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal with will be in dire straights."<sup>835</sup>

Take tactical actions that serve strategic purposes.<sup>836</sup> "... [A]gainst those skilled in attack, an enemy does not know where to defend; against the experts in defense, the enemy does not know where to attack."<sup>837</sup> "The experts in defense conceal themselves as under the nine fold of earth; those skilled in attack move as from above the nine fold heavens. Thus they are capable both of protecting themselves and gaining a complete victory."<sup>838</sup> Therefore, "... know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the whether; your victory will be total."<sup>839</sup>

As explained thus far, by taking advantage of enemy weaknesses, lives and other resources may be conserved.<sup>840</sup> "... [T]hose skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations."<sup>841</sup> Even though conservation in war is a relative measurement of one's own and one's enemy resources and expenditures, victory with relatively low expenditures results from taking advantage of a multitude of strategic weaknesses.

### 33. *Combined Arms*

The final aspect of *Warfighting's* "Maneuver Warfare" that is covered in this chapter is "Combined Arms." "Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that in order to counteract one, the enemy must make himself more vulnerable to another ... [in] a no-win situation."<sup>842</sup> "We accomplish combined arms through the

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<sup>835</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>836</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>837</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>838</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>839</sup> Ibid., 129.

<sup>840</sup> Ibid. 77, 144.

<sup>841</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>842</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 75.

tactics and techniques we use at the lower levels and through task organization at higher levels. In doing so we take advantage of ... complementary characteristics. [Two examples include] ... the complementary use of the automatic weapon and grenade launcher"; and the combination known as the Marine Air—Ground Task Force which includes shock troops, infantry, artillery, close air support, and deep air support among other things. Combined arms "enhances mobility and firepower."<sup>843</sup>

*The Art of War* makes significant mention of and recommendations for the use of normal, extraordinary, and shock forces in addition to swords, lances, shields, chariots, crossbows, and fire in a combined manner.<sup>844</sup> In fact "normal forces [should be used] to engage; [and] ... extraordinary [should be used] to win." For the skilled military leader "their combinations are limitless."<sup>845</sup> It is very likely that the number of creative applications of combinations of arms to the multitude of varying situations are equally limitless. Specifically mentioned by Sun Tzu is the use of chariots with infantry.<sup>846</sup>

Chapter twelve of *The Art of War* is dedicated to the wise use of fire with troops. "When fire breaks out in the enemy's camp immediately coordinate your action from without. But if his troops remain calm bide your time and do not attack."<sup>847</sup> Additionally, among the various forms of attack is the use of flaming arrows.<sup>848</sup> Perhaps, as chariots may be compared to tanks, so flaming bombardments may be compared to artillery and some forms of modern aviation support.<sup>849</sup>

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<sup>843</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>844</sup> Griffith, 72, 74, 91, 92, 104-105, 141-142.

<sup>845</sup> Ibid., 91, 92.

<sup>846</sup> Ibid., 120.

<sup>847</sup> Ibid., 141-143.

<sup>848</sup> Ibid., 141.

<sup>849</sup> Ibid., 142. Interestingly, and probably indicative of an understanding of the devastating advantages of the integrated use of fire and other weapons, there is an acknowledgment that destruction is different than capture; there are concerns that people and states that are killed can not be revived; and there are recommendations that the military not be employed if the state, people, or leaders are not in danger.

### 34. Conclusion

It may be said that similar to *The Art of War*, *Warfighting's* "maneuver warfare" is not a specific plan or standard operational procedure. "[It] ... is a way of thinking ... that should shape our every action ... a philosophy for 'fighting smart.'"<sup>850</sup> We could say that it is a philosophy focused on defeating an enemy's strategy.

#### *J. The Art of War and Campaigning FMFM 1—1*

Past Commandant General A. M. Gray USMC (ret.) wrote in the foreword of *Campaigning FMFM 1—1*, that "Tactical success ... does not guarantee victory in war ... this book discusses ... [the] operational level which links strategy and tactics, describing the military campaign as the primary tool of operational warfare." Within *Warfighting's* strategic philosophy, "*Campaigning* ... establishes the authoritative doctrinal basis for military campaigning in the Marine Corps, particularly as it pertains to a Marine Air—Ground Task Force (MAGTF) conducting a campaign or contributing to a campaign by higher authority." The lessons taught by this text through specific "historical examples" are to be applied by Marine leaders in all of the different types and sizes of activities that they may, in the service of "policy", become involved in. This includes, "war, crisis response, peacekeeping, nation building, counter-insurgency, counter terrorism, or counter narcotics operations ... . I expect all officers to read and reread this book, understand its message, and apply it. Duty demands nothing less."<sup>851</sup>

*Campaigning FMFM 1—1* is divided into four chapters. The first three chapters have their own subchapters, which are mainly logically grouped and arranged in a logically progressive order. Respectively they are: (1) "The Campaign" which in "a conceptual discussion" includes "Strategy—Tactics—Operations—Strategic—Operational Connection—Tactical—Operational Connection—Interaction of the Levels—Campaigns—Battles and Engagements—Strategic Actions—The Marine Corps and Campaigning"; (2) "Designing the Campaign" which in a description of essential "mental process[es]" and "strategic vision" includes "Strategic Aim, End State and Operational Objectives—Identifying Critical Enemy Factors—The Concept—Conceptual, Functional, and Detailed Design—Sequencing—Direction—Campaign

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<sup>850</sup> Gray, *Warfighting*, 77.

<sup>851</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, foreword.

Plan"; (2) "Conducting the Campaign" which in essential "operational considerations" includes "Strategic Orientation—Use of Combat—Perspective—Maneuver—Mobility—Tempo—Intelligence—Surprise—Logistics—leadership"; and (3) "Conclusion."<sup>852</sup> Each chapter begins with relevant quotes taken from various philosopher strategists, military leaders, and statesmen.<sup>853</sup> Additionally, each chapter's end notes are filled with valuable insights.<sup>854</sup>

Despite the fact their actual source citations differ, the chapters of *Campaigning* have been reviewed because of the large extent that portions coincide in principle with portions of *The Art of War*. Those portions most clearly taken from Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* are easily distinguishable. Additionally, as stated, there are many other lessons learned from this text.

### *1. The Campaign*

*Campaigning's* first Chapter, "The Campaign" begins with a quote from Baron Henri Jomini, in which he says that militaries "... have been destroyed by strategic operations without ... battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs." Liddell Hart adds, "For even if a decisive battle be the goal, the aim of the strategy must be to bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances. And the more advantageous the circumstances, the less, proportionately, will be the fighting. The perfection of strategy would be, therefore, to produce a decision without any serious fighting." Field-Marshal Bernard Montgomery concludes, "It is essential to relate what is strategically desirable to what is tactically possible with the forces at your disposal. To this end it is necessary to decide the development of operations before the initial blow is delivered."<sup>855</sup>

*The Art of War* states "Those skilled in war conquered an enemy easily conquered [and] ... he wins his victories without erring ... [W]hatever he does insures his victory ... [H]e conquers an enemy already defeated."<sup>856</sup> This is why "... the general must create

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<sup>852</sup> Ibid., foreword, unmarked contents page.

<sup>853</sup> Ibid., 1, 31, 53, 85.

<sup>854</sup> Ibid., 89-103.

<sup>855</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>856</sup> Griffith, 87.

situations which will contribute to their accomplishment ... [and] act expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so control the balance."<sup>857</sup> "By taking into account the favorable factors, he makes his plan feasible; by taking into account the unfavorable, he may resolve the difficulties."<sup>858</sup> Hence it is understandable that *The Art of War* recommends only retaining generals that follow Sun Tzu's advice and places great emphasis on the training of troops.<sup>859</sup> While in reality it may be a relative measurement of violence, *The Art of War* holds that "[t]hose skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without fighting. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operation. ... Your aim must be to take all under heaven intact. Thus your troops are not worn out and your gains will not be complete. This is the art of offensive strategy."<sup>860</sup>

## 2. Strategy—Tactics—Operations

*Campaigning* categorizes and defines, "Strategy," "Tactics," and "Operations."<sup>861</sup> Politics establishes and guides "national" or "grand strategy" which establishes and guides "military strategy." The military, restraints put on the military, and goals set for and by the military work in coordination with other "elements of national power." "We can describe military strategy as the discipline of winning wars. Its ways are the strategic concepts devised for the accomplishment of its end, the policy objective."<sup>862</sup> "Military strategy is the province of national policy makers, their military advisors, and the nation's senior military leadership—seemingly far beyond the professional concern of most Marines."<sup>863</sup>

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<sup>857</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>858</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>859</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>860</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>861</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 3, 4, 6.

<sup>862</sup> Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>863</sup> Ibid., 4.



"The tactical level of war is the world of combat. The means of tactics are the various components of combat power. ... In our case tactics [are] founded on maneuver." Among those other components are, "... the application and coordination of fire, the sustaining forces ... the immediate exploitation of success ... the combination of different ... weapons, the gathering and dissemination of pertinent combat information, and the technical application of combat power within a tactical action."<sup>864</sup> Winning a particular battle not always wins the campaign, but winning a particular battle can cause the delay or loss of the campaign.<sup>865</sup> The two examples listed are: Robert E. Lee's "costly tactical victory" at Antietam in 1862 that "... compelled him to abort his offensive campaign into the North" and the American experience in Vietnam.<sup>866</sup>

"The operational level of war consists of the discipline of conceiving, focusing, and exploiting a variety of tactical actions to realize a strategic aim. ... The basic tool by which the operational commander translates tactical actions into strategic results is the campaign." A campaign is a planned and directed succession of various numerous particular actions and battles.<sup>867</sup>

### 3. *Connection of the Levels*

Between the three previously mentioned levels of warfare there are two proper bi-directional communication connections and a third emergency bi-directional communication connection emphasized in *Campaigning*.<sup>868</sup> The "Strategic-Operational Connection" is important, because, among other reasons "[in accord with political goals] ... strategy must be clearly understood to determine the conduct of all military actions [and] ... strategy must adapt to operational circumstances."<sup>869</sup> In addition to setting aims, "strategy" "... allocates resources, and imposes conditions on military action." Strategic guidance, "the enemy," and the geography set "the parameters of operations."<sup>870</sup>

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<sup>864</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>865</sup> Ibid., 5-6.

<sup>866</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>867</sup> Ibid., 6-7.

<sup>868</sup> Ibid., 8, 10, 12-13.

<sup>869</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>870</sup> Ibid.

"Strategic aims" must be reasonable and understood. It is the "operational commander's" duty to inform "strategists" beforehand if they are not. Additionally while required to "... pursue the established aim," operational commanders must keep "strategists" informed of "associated risk" and required resources.<sup>871</sup> Various limitations may be put on the military. A result of politics, these legal and strategic limitations must be honored. "When limitations ... are so severe as to prevent the attainment of the established aim ...," it is the duty of military leaders to request a lessening of "... the aims or the limitations." "However, no senior commander can use the conditions imposed by higher authority as an excuse for military failure."<sup>872</sup>

The "Tactical-Operational Connection" is important in that, without the shaping and utilization of strategic advantages through operational direction and coordination, "tactical actions" yield lesser results that are judged primarily through a "relative" comparison of "attrition."<sup>873</sup> "Therefore" Sun Tzu said, "... a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates."<sup>874</sup> With vision and flexibility, strategic aims shape operational frameworks which shape "tactical results" and vice versa.<sup>875</sup> Whenever "strategic objectives" are sought, however, if the military is being utilized, it is directed and coordinated "at the operational level."<sup>876</sup> Despite the multi-level knowledge of being in the service of politics and "Interaction Of The Levels, ...the levels of war form a definite hierarchy."<sup>877</sup> There is an interactive hierarchy of factors and list of priorities on each level also.<sup>878</sup>

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<sup>871</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>872</sup> Ibid., 9-10

<sup>873</sup> Ibid., 10-11.

<sup>874</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>875</sup> Ibid.

<sup>876</sup> Ibid., 11-12.

<sup>877</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>878</sup> Ibid., 12-13.

#### 4. Interactions of the Levels

Among the examples of hierarchical interaction on and between levels, *Campaigning* mentions the following: the superiority of "... the needs of tactical combat [over] ... the technical application of combat power"; "... a commander's concerns and actions not only with and on his own level but that one beneath him"; factors that create unity and fervor, which include the moral components of just cause (although the terms "just cause" are not found here) in defense of principle, home, family, and self and that will which comes from understanding effective retreat is not possible; and that "[b]rilliance at one level may to some extent overcome shortcomings on another, but rarely, can it overcome incompetence." Many significant and well-known historical examples are listed in the illustration of these points. Included are the following: "British reprisals in the Carolinas in 1780 fanned the dying embers of [American Counter] revolution"; militia successes in the American counter-revolutionary battle at Cowpen; Second World War German operational and tactical excellence as opposed to strategic incompetence; and Communist Vietnamese strategic successes.<sup>879</sup>

Similarly *The Art of War* states, "Victory is the main object of war."<sup>880</sup> Committing to war, therefore, is a serious matter that, in respective order, must be considered by sovereigns and generals on the strategic level of war, by generals and officers on the operational level of war, and by officers and troops on the tactical level of war. "If not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you cannot succeed do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight."<sup>881</sup> Those recommendations are to be holistically considered. After a threat is perceived, comparisons of advantages and strengths are made, and plans have been formed the following should take place.<sup>882</sup>

On the strategic level, "... when the army is employed, the general first receives his commands from the sovereign. He assembles the troops and mobilizes the people. He blends the army into a harmonious entity and encamps it."<sup>883</sup> "If the situation is one of victory but the sovereign has issued orders not to engage, the general may decide to fight.

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<sup>879</sup> Ibid., 13-15.

<sup>880</sup> Griffith, 73.

<sup>881</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>882</sup> Ibid., 63, 71.

<sup>883</sup> Ibid., 102.

If the situation is such that he cannot win, but the sovereign has issued orders to engage, he need not do so."<sup>884</sup> "On the day the policy to attack is put into effect, close the passes, rescind the passports, have no further intercourse with the enemy's envoys and exhort the temple council to execute the plans."<sup>885</sup> Be aware that an enemy envoy's words match enemy actions.<sup>886</sup> "Those adept at war do not require a second levy."<sup>887</sup>

On the operational level, "He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious. ... [causing] [R]ulers ... when ignorant of military affairs, to participate in their administration. This causes the officers to be perplexed ... . Keep him [the enemy] under a strain and wear him down."<sup>888</sup>

On the tactical level of war, "[t]roops slay the enemy because they are enraged."<sup>889</sup> It is important, however, to be perceptive and reasonable. "There are some roads not to follow; some troops not to strike; some cities not to assault; and some ground which should not be contested."<sup>890</sup>

Implicit in those excerpts one may find distinct responsibilities separated by, and communication lines maintained between, the various levels of war. Intelligence, direction, concentration, dispersion, deception, surprise, maneuverability, coordination, timing, speed, tempo, and various combinations of force and weaponry are advantages and factors mentioned in *The Art of War* in addition to being clearly valuable on all levels of war.

### 5. Grant Versus Lee: a Case Study

"A Comparative Case Study: Grant Versus Lee" is of particular interest and length in reinforcing *Campaigning's* first lessons and more. As the northern leader, Abraham Lincoln was faced with the "political problem" of reasserting "... authority over a vast

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<sup>884</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>885</sup> Ibid., 139-140.

<sup>886</sup> Ibid., 119-120.

<sup>887</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>888</sup> Ibid., 68, 81, 83.

<sup>889</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>890</sup> Ibid., 111.

territorial empire ..." that was too large "... to be completely occupied or thoroughly controlled." When appeasement failed and the war began, Lincoln understood that his best course was: in order to maintain "popular" support; a quick victory, "... the unconditional surrender of the South"; and the unfettered (this excludes the stated time constraints) employment of General Grant.<sup>891</sup>

Many of *The Art of War's* recommendations parallel that historical account. Before, during, and after war, a general "... wearies them [the enemy] by keeping them constantly occupied, and makes them rush about by offering them ostensible advantages" and profits.<sup>892</sup> At some point in this relationship it may be necessary to engage in violence against the enemy.

At that point *The Art of War* makes it clear that "[v]ictory is the main object of war. If this is delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted."<sup>893</sup> "When your weapons are dulled and ardor dampened, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, neighboring rulers will take advantage of your distress. And even though you have wise counselors, none will be able to lay good plans for the future."<sup>894</sup> As a result of a prolonged conflict, an administration and state may become vulnerable to attack from elements within and from outside of its borders.<sup>895</sup> Therefore it is important to understand from the very beginning of a war, that "[h]e whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious."<sup>896</sup>

In *Campaigning*, "The Wilderness to Appomattox: Grant, 1864-65" is an excellent illustration of indirect campaigning strategies. In this historical account, Northern operational excellence in campaigning is quite clear. Grant's successive flanking "maneuvers" in what seemed to be attempts to take the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, compelled Lee to fight multiple pitched battles. In turn, Lee exhausted his men,

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<sup>891</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 16.

<sup>892</sup> Griffith, 114.

<sup>893</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>894</sup> Ibid.

<sup>895</sup> Ibid., 73, 84.

<sup>896</sup> Ibid., 84.

depleted his resources, and surrendered. Grant accomplished his strategic aim of "... the destruction of Lee's Army."<sup>897</sup>

Despite Confederate President Jefferson Davis's desire (partly based on an understanding of the "South's relative weakness") to tire northern resolve for the war through increased cost and duration as a result of a strategy of military "withdraw" and "dispersal," General Lee kept his forces concentrated in time and space as he attempted to carry out offensive invasions and then defend Richmond, Virginia.<sup>898</sup> Lee's costly tactical success in his attempts to invade the North did not make up for his operational and strategic failures.<sup>899</sup>

Many of *The Art of War's* recommendations could be used to support Grant's campaign strategy. "... [A]ttack the enemy's strategy."<sup>900</sup> "Those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought by him."<sup>901</sup> When deep in enemy territory have alternate plans, improvise when needed, and fight.<sup>902</sup> "Do not advance relying on sheer military power."<sup>903</sup> "Make the devious route the most direct and turn misfortune into to advantage."<sup>904</sup> "Appear at places to which he [the enemy] must hasten; move swiftly were he does not expect you."<sup>905</sup> "When ... wish[ing] to give battle, ... [the] enemy, even though protected ... cannot help but engage [if he is] ... attack[ed at] a

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<sup>897</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 23.

<sup>898</sup> Ibid., 18-19, 23.

<sup>899</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>900</sup> Griffith, 77.

<sup>901</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>902</sup> Ibid., 111; Ames, 135.

<sup>903</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>904</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>905</sup> Ibid., 96.

position he must succor."<sup>906</sup> "Keep him under a strain and wear him down."<sup>907</sup> "An army may be robbed of its spirit and its commander deprived of his courage."<sup>908</sup>

*Campaigning* makes it easy to see that Lee could have learned a lesson from his colleague Johnston. In the western part of the confederacy, General Joseph Johnston effectively "protracted conflict" through "opportuni[stic]" "defensive maneuvers." He required Sherman to expend large amounts of resources including men and time for minimal advances in space. When necessary, he quickly withdrew from one strategically advantageous position to the next, avoiding "being outflanked or entrapped," requiring the enemy to waste resources in frontal attacks, and rolling over "exposed" portions of enemy forces. In these ways, he was attempting to prolong the overall conflict.<sup>909</sup>

*The Art of War* may provide useful insights into Johnston's early successes and Sherman's early failures during the civil war. "If I know that my troops are capable of striking the enemy, but do not know that he is invulnerable to attack, my chance of victory is but half."<sup>910</sup> "Know your enemy and know your self; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."<sup>911</sup>

Do not attack an enemy's strength. "In war, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance relying on sheer military power."<sup>912</sup> "If equally matched you may engage him. ... [I]f weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing"; "[A]nd if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him."<sup>913</sup> "Determine the enemy's plans and you will know which strategy will be successful and which will not."<sup>914</sup>

Position yourself so as to require an attacker to pay a high price. "The skillful commander takes up a position in which he cannot be defeated and misses no opportunity

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<sup>906</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>907</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>908</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>909</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 19, 22.

<sup>910</sup> Griffith, 129.

<sup>911</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>912</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>913</sup> Ibid., 80.

<sup>914</sup> Ibid., 100.

to master his enemy."<sup>915</sup> "... [T]hose skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought by him."<sup>916</sup> "A skillful commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it from his subordinates."<sup>917</sup>

In order to win you must provide your soldiers with the maximum number of advantages possible. "It is because of disposition that a victorious general is able to make his people fight with the effect of pent-up waters which, suddenly released, plunge into a bottomless abyss."<sup>918</sup> "The art of employing troops is that when the enemy occupies high ground, do not confront him; with his back resting on hills, do not oppose him."<sup>919</sup> "Fight downhill; do not ascend to attack."<sup>920</sup>

As *The Art of War* recommends, avoid helping your enemy recognize the advantages that he may have or acquire in a particular time, place, and action. "Do not press an enemy at bay."<sup>921</sup> One may use to one's favor the knowledge that "[w]hile we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a cleaver operation prolonged. ... For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited."<sup>922</sup>

## 6. Campaigns—Battles and Engagements

After *Campaigning's* discourse on the Civil War, it should be understood that not only may different campaigns be undertaken simultaneously, but also smaller campaigns, or subcampaigns, are often components of larger campaigns.<sup>923</sup> Additionally, the *Campaigning* manual defines "Battles and Engagements" separately according to relative

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<sup>915</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>916</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>917</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>918</sup> Ibid., 88-89.

<sup>919</sup> Ibid., 109.

<sup>920</sup> Ibid., 116.

<sup>921</sup> Ibid., 110.

<sup>922</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>923</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 24.



size. For the most part, this thesis has referred to battles, engagements, and tactical actions, be they classified as normal or special, interchangeably since they establish that which is the lowest or most direct component of war's hierarchy.<sup>924</sup> A campaign, however, may be characterized as much by a lack of battle; for example, General Nathanael Greene versus Lord Cornwallis in North Carolina in 1781. "For six weeks Greene led the eager Cornwallis on a weary chase through the North Carolina countryside." Finally when they fought, the British won, but were then so tired and fatigued that they withdrew to the coast.<sup>925</sup>

*The Art of War* may be used to understand Greene and Cornwallis. "Keep him [the enemy] under a strain and wear him down." <sup>926</sup> A general "... wearies them [the enemy] by keeping them constantly occupied, and makes them rush about by offering them ostensible advantages" and profits.<sup>927</sup> "If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing ... and if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him."<sup>928</sup> The enemy may expend his strength in pursuit. "One who sets an entire army in motion to chase an advantage will not attain it. ... If he abandons the camp to contend for advantage the stores will be lost. ... When one rolls up their armor and sets out speedily, stopping neither day nor night and marching at double time [for a great distance many of their leaders will be] ... captured. For the vigorous troops will arrive first and the feeble strangle along behind [and] ... only [a fraction] of the army will arrive."<sup>929</sup> If the short-lived benefits of a particular tactical victory cannot be used for strategic victory, intercepting a force and defeating it in battle is wasteful of precious limited resources.<sup>930</sup>

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<sup>924</sup> Ibid., 24-25.

<sup>925</sup> Ibid., 25-26.

<sup>926</sup> Griffith, 68.

<sup>927</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>928</sup> Ibid., 80.

<sup>929</sup> Ibid., 103.

<sup>930</sup> Ibid., 142.

## 7. Strategic Actions

"As we have seen, tactical actions gain strategic significance only when placed in the construct of a campaign." The exception is "Strategic Actions" which "... are normally conceived at the national level, at which they may also be directed. However, planning and execution may also be delegated to the theater or task force level." As in the normal course of other operations, these actions may be carried out by any type or number of forces matched to the situations and "... specific objectives of strategic significance."<sup>931</sup>

If kept in proper perspective *The Art of War's* recommendations may also include "Strategic Actions." "Now if the estimates made in the temple before hostilities indicate victory it is because calculations show one's strength to be superior to that of the enemy ... ."<sup>932</sup> "... [A]ttack the enemy's strategy."<sup>933</sup> "On the day the policy to attack is put into effect, close the passes, rescind the passports, have no further intercourse with the enemy's envoys and exhort the temple council to execute the plans."<sup>934</sup> "Anticipate him in seizing something he values and move in accordance with a date secretly fixed."<sup>935</sup> In doing so, gain victory quickly for "[w]hen the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice."<sup>936</sup>

## 8. The Marine Corps and Campaigning

As detailed in *Campaigning*, "The Marine Corps and Campaigning" fit together with the combined utilization of specialized capabilities. Such is represented in the concepts of the Marine Air—Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and the Joint Task Force (JTF). Because of their foundational integration, the ground and air elements of a MAGTF are educated to be complementary in function and have the same tactical or

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<sup>931</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 27, 28.

<sup>932</sup> Griffith, 71.

<sup>933</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>934</sup> Ibid., 139-140.

<sup>935</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>936</sup> Ibid., 73.

lower level commander. Thus, without expending excessive effort integrating those forces, operational and higher level commanders may focus more on harnessing the gains that those forces make for the advance of campaigns and then strategies. Professionalism, efficiency, and an understanding of a MAGTF's abilities are also essential when other branches of the United States military work together with the Marine Corps in a JTF. If a MAGTF commander is the JTF commander, all the better. If he is not, then he better be able to communicate that particular MAGTF's capabilities and best use to the JTF commander from the other service.<sup>937</sup>

Concerning pre-war preparations, *The Art of War* makes it clear that readiness in the form of transportation vehicles, combat support craft, and troops must be balanced. "Generally, operations of war require one thousand fast four-horse chariots, one thousand four-horse wagons covered in leather, and one hundred thousand mailed troops."<sup>938</sup> Prevalent to the degree of technological discovery of its day, one may find that in *The Art of War*, the use of different weapons and occupational specialties has been most naturally integrated in one army. Weapons used in the text — swords, lances, shields, chariots, crossbows, fire, guides, and spies — are used together with one another for the purposes of gaining the maximum in favorable results.<sup>939</sup>

*The Art of War* makes it clear communications are important in using maneuver to gain the desired results. "He who knows the art of the direct and the indirect approach will be victorious. [Such is the art of maneuvering.] As the voice cannot be heard in battle, drums and bells are used. As troops cannot see each other clearly in battle, flags and banners are used. ... Now gongs and drums, banners and flags ... focus the attention of the troops."<sup>940</sup> "In night fighting, use many torches and drums, in day fighting, many banners and flags in order to influence the sight and hearing of our troops."<sup>941</sup> Therefore, "[i]n the tumult and uproar, the battle seems chaotic, but there is no disorder; the troops appear to be milling about in circles but cannot be defeated. ... Apparent confusion is a

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<sup>937</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 28-29.

<sup>938</sup> Griffith, 72.

<sup>939</sup> Ibid., 72, 74, 92, 104-105, 141-142, 144-149.

<sup>940</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>941</sup> Ibid., 107.

product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength."<sup>942</sup>

While one army and its elements may communicate and work with another and its elements, this does not mean that micro-management by sovereigns and generals who are distant from tactical actions should take precedence over the decisions of commanders and officers at a particular tactical action, so long as those commanders and officers are working toward the directions and ends demanded by sovereigns and generals.<sup>943</sup>

### *9. Designing the Campaign*

*Campaigning's* second chapter, "Designing the Campaign," begins with a quote by Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, The Elder. He says, "No plan survives contact with the enemy." Carl von Clausewitz adds, "By looking on each engagement as part of a series, at least insofar as events are predictable, the commander is always on the high road to his goal." Lastly, Liddell Hart adds, "To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy's ability to frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be varied to fit the circumstances met; to keep such adaptability, while still keeping the initiative, the best way is to operate along a line which offers alternatives."<sup>944</sup>

If taken in sum, *The Art of War* makes similar recommendations. Concerning "... estimates made in the temple before hostilities ... [it requires that one,] ... examine the situation and the outcome will be clearly apparent."<sup>945</sup> Then, "[w]hen the enemy presents an opportunity, speedily take advantage of it. Anticipate him in seizing something he values and move in accordance with a date secretly fixed."<sup>946</sup> It states further that, "... for this reason, the wise general in his deliberations must consider both favorable and unfavorable factors."<sup>947</sup> Other recommendations include: "... by taking into account the favorable factors, he makes his plans feasible; by taking into the favorable and

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<sup>942</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>943</sup> Ibid., 83, 93, 111-112, 128, 135-136.

<sup>944</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 31.

<sup>945</sup> Griffith, 71.

<sup>946</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>947</sup> Ibid., 113.

unfavorable, he may resolve the difficulties"<sup>948</sup>; "[a] skilled commander seeks victory from the situation"<sup>949</sup>; "[t]hose skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating the situation to which he must conform"<sup>950</sup>; and "... [o]ne able to gain victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine."<sup>951</sup>

As stated, *The Art of War* says "War is based on deception. Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of forces ... . When campaigning, be as swift as the wind ... ."<sup>952</sup> When deep in enemy territory, have alternate plans, improvise when needed, and fight.<sup>953</sup> Avoid being predictable. "When I have won a victory I do not repeat my tactics but respond to circumstances in an infinite variety of ways."<sup>954</sup>

#### *10. Strategic Aim, End State and Operational Objectives— Identifying Critical Enemy Factors*

*Campaigning* was written from a perspective that understands human limitations. While the "... Strategic Aim, End State, and Operational Objectives ..." guide and may change each other, to a degree each is still distinct. The Civil War provides an excellent example again. Abraham Lincoln resolutely established the strategic aim of the Union to be the unconditional surrender of the Confederacy. In compliance, Grant realized that, in this case, the way to achieve that strategic aim was through the end state of "... the destruction of Lee's armies and the capture of Richmond." This desired end was accomplished through the combination of a number of operational objectives, among which included, "... the defeat of Joseph Johnston and the capture of Atlanta."<sup>955</sup>

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<sup>948</sup> Ibid.

<sup>949</sup> Ibid., 93

<sup>950</sup> Ibid.

<sup>951</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>952</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>953</sup> Ibid., 111; Ames, 135.

<sup>954</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>955</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 33-35.

Because an enemy's ability to resist the imposition of our will must be overcome and diffused, "identifying critical enemy factors" is important in achieving aims, states, and objectives. "Economy demands that we focus our efforts toward some object or factor of decisive importance in order to achieve the greatest effect at the least cost. The most effective way to defeat our enemy is to destroy that which is most critical to his success in the theater... [W]e should focus our efforts against an object of strategic importance since this will have the greatest effect. Failing ... that we focus against objective of operational importance. In other words, we should strike him where and when we can hurt him the most, or, as Sun Tzu said, 'Seize something he cherishes and he will conform to your desires.'" In cases where possible, focus against your enemy's vulnerabilities or that which "... he can not do without ... ." On all levels of war's hierarchy, expect the enemy to hide his weaknesses and search out our weaknesses.<sup>956</sup>

### *11. The Concept—Conceptual, Functional, and Detailed Design*

In planning, scheming, or developing "the concept" it is with a knowledge, understanding, and possession of military history. It also requires largely uncommon artistic "creativity," and "boldness" that strategists, planners, and commanders seek to allow the "ruthless," "economically," and "most effective" application of combat science and technology against the enemy's weaknesses. Coexisting and sequential situational advantages are used in a plan. This plan is vague enough to allow the unpredictable and hopefully overwhelming implementation of many different, but more specific, contingencies in campaigns, subcampaigns, and tactical actions during each strategic phase.<sup>957</sup>

This largely makes the degree of specificity inverse to the level of hierarchy. In other words, for the most part, in supply, transportation, fighting, and other associated concerns that which is "... conceptual, functional, and detailed [in] design..." corresponds to that which is strategic, operational, and tactical in respective order.<sup>958</sup>

*The Art of War* makes it clear that "[w]hen the army is employed, the general first receives his commands from the sovereign. He assembles the troops and mobilizes the

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<sup>956</sup> Ibid., 35-37.

<sup>957</sup> Ibid., 38-39.

<sup>958</sup> Ibid., 40.

people. He blends the army into a harmonious entity and encamps it."<sup>959</sup> Further, "On the day the policy to attack is put into effect ... exhort the temple council to execute the plans."<sup>960</sup> In fulfilling political demands and executing plans, "[h]e whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious."<sup>961</sup> While political leaders establish the desired results, military leaders should act prudently in accord with situations, for "... as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions."<sup>962</sup>

Most necessarily emphasized again, it is important to understand "[w]ar is based on deception" and therefore, one must "[m]ove when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of forces ... . Attack where [the enemy] ... is unprepared ... when [the enemy] is not expect[ing it] ... ."<sup>963</sup> In conflict, "[h]e whose advance is irresistible plunges into his enemy's weak positions; he who, in withdrawal cannot be pursued, moves so swiftly that he cannot be overtaken ... . [T]he use of guides and spies may help you to gain the advantage. Expect the enemy, however, to attempt to do the same."<sup>964</sup> In summary, the expert "wins victories without erring; ... whatever he does insures his victory; he conquers an enemy already defeated."<sup>965</sup>

## 12. Sequencing—Direction

By definition *Campaigning* holds that within a strategy, the proper "sequencing" of various campaigns, subcampaigns, and tactical actions is an important form of construction as the notion of "phases" or steps toward a "strategic aim" implies.<sup>966</sup> "Phases [themselves] are a way of organizing the extended and dispersed activities of the

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<sup>959</sup> Griffith, 102.

<sup>960</sup> Ibid., 139-140.

<sup>961</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>962</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>963</sup> Ibid., 69, 106.

<sup>964</sup> Ibid., 97, 104-105, 144, 149.

<sup>965</sup> Ibid., 86, 87.

<sup>966</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 41, 44.

campaign into more manageable parts ... . Phases ... are event-oriented rather than time-oriented ... . Phases may occur simultaneously as well as sequentially."<sup>967</sup> The further ahead of the initial planning a sequence and phase is "the less certain" that sequence and phase will be. It is important to maintain "flexibility in execution."<sup>968</sup>

The notion of "phases" or steps toward a "strategic aim" also implies that "direction" is important in strategies, campaigns, subcampaigns, and "tactical actions."<sup>969</sup> Put simply, "aim" sets "direction" and direction unifies actions. Direction does not refer to geographic orientation and movement only.<sup>970</sup> Quite often the quickest, easiest, and most direct path to a particular strategic aim is through campaigns, subcampaigns, and tactical actions that are, or may seem to be, indirect.<sup>971</sup> "Where possible, we should select a variable direction which offers multiple options, or branches, thus providing flexibility and ambiguity to our actions."<sup>972</sup>

After General Sherman took Atlanta, he conducted the rest of his campaign through Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina with flexible direction, always keeping two or three options open and attacking those cities that were easiest to take. Sherman's adversaries were so unsure of the direction that he would go that at one time they divided their forces in an attempt to protect two separate cities. As a result, Sherman by-passed both cities. In respective order, his options were "Macon or Augusta," "Augusta or Savannah," "Augusta, Charleston, or Columbia," "Charlotte or Fayetteville," and "Raleigh or Goldsboro." In respective order, his tactical conquests were: Atlanta, Savannah, Columbia, Fayetteville, and Goldsboro.<sup>973</sup>

"A single operational direction does not mean that we must concentrate our forces in a single direction tactically as well. In fact, multiple tactical thrusts that are mutually

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<sup>967</sup> Ibid., 44, 45, 47.

<sup>968</sup> Ibid., 45, 41.

<sup>969</sup> Ibid., 41, 47.

<sup>970</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>971</sup> Ibid., 47, 48.

<sup>972</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>973</sup> Ibid., 48, 22.



enhancing increase the speed and ambiguity of our operations." The example cited and illustrated is that of the German blitzes into Poland and France in 1939.<sup>974</sup>

It is believed that "[t]he general must create situations which contribute to their accomplishment ... ."<sup>975</sup> *The Art of War* further holds that the "... expert ... wins victories without erring ... . [W]hatever he does insures his victory; he conquers an enemy already defeated."<sup>976</sup> When that definition of an expert is coupled with an understanding of the importance of planning for war, preparing for war, a recommended procedure for the day hostilities start, improvising as situations change, and campaigning with great speed, it is undeniable that the sequencing phases of a campaign in a direction that ensures strategic victory is an integral part of *The Art of War's* philosophical doctrine.<sup>977</sup>

In campaigning, keep as many options for action open, in order to take advantage of whatever situation arises. In *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu understood the importance of this maxim when he says, "if [the enemy] ... prepares to the front his rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be fragile. If he prepares to the left, his right will be vulnerable and if to the right, there will be few on his left. "Attack where he is unprepared ... when he does not expect you ... . He who relies on the situation uses his men in fighting as one rolls logs or stones ... crushing opponents in the valleys below ... . One is able to gain victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation [and] may be said to be divine."<sup>978</sup> Put simply, when deep in enemy territory, have alternate plans, improvise when needed, and fight hard. Remember, "... to win battles and take your objectives, but to fail to exploit these achievements is ominous and may be described as a 'wasteful delay.'"<sup>979</sup> Even a general's subordinate officers need delegated power and authority. *The Art of War* makes states that the "... skilled commander seeks victory from the situation ... . He selects his men and they exploit the situation. Expedient action and improvisation are provided with desired direction when 'troops are united in

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<sup>974</sup> Ibid., 48-49.

<sup>975</sup> Griffith, 66.

<sup>976</sup> Ibid., 86, 87.

<sup>977</sup> Ibid., 71, 83, 101, 106, 111, 128, 139-140.

<sup>978</sup> Ibid., 69, 94, 98, 101.

<sup>979</sup> Ibid., 142.

purpose.' [They may not, then, lose the sight that] ... victory is the main object of war."<sup>980</sup>

Additionally, one should never forget that deception is central to war. "[One should] move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of forces."<sup>981</sup> By being "... subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace."<sup>982</sup> Avoiding predictability is important for winning. "Therefore, when I have won a victory I do not repeat my tactics but respond to circumstances in an infinite variety of ways."<sup>983</sup>

### *13. Campaign Plan*

*Campaigning* concludes chapter two by stating that a commander should consider the factors and relationships that have been detailed in this chapter when devising a "campaign plan."<sup>984</sup> "That campaign plan should be concise [and not detailed in] ... its phases intactical detail. Rather, it provides guidance for developing the operations plans and orders which will in turn provide the tactical design for those phases."<sup>985</sup>

### *14. Conducting the Campaign*

Chapter Three of *Campaigning*, "Conducting the Campaign," begins with a quote from Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." A quote from Stonewall Jackson follows, "We must make this campaign an exceedingly active one. Only thus can a weaker country cope with a stronger; it must make up in activity what it lacks in strength." Carl von Clausewitz adds, "A prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his

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<sup>980</sup> Ibid., 73, 83, 93.

<sup>981</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>982</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>983</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>984</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 50.

<sup>985</sup> Ibid., 51.

resources, doing neither too much nor too little . . . . There still exists a distinction between the general phases or states of 'design' (before war) and 'conduct' (war itself) despite the fact that during war plans are adjusted to harness advantages or in other words 'design and conduct are interdependent.'"986

Those quotes may be easily summed up. "Reduced to its essence, the art of campaigning consists of deciding who, when, and where to fight for what purpose. Equally important, it involves deciding who, when, and where not to fight."987

### *15. Strategic Orientation—Use of Combat*

"Strategic Orientation," the ability to recognize and take a particular course of action that contributes in a valuable way to the achievement of strategic aims, may only be gained if all Marine leaders on and beneath the theater-strategic level have been "clearly" told and understand the particular "... aims, resources, and limitations established by strategy."988 This includes "tactical commanders."989

*Campaigning* says "[f]ighting, or combat, is central to war. But because tactical success of itself does not guarantee strategic success, there is an art to the way we put combat to use." In addition to the "Use Of Combat," there are a wide variety of additional tactical "action" options among which include "... refusal to give battle, interdiction mission, and feint[ing]." All tactical actions that are taken, however, must be chosen based on an understanding of how they will be part of a larger operational and strategic scheme.990 Because combat is costly, "... economy thus dictates that we fight wisely . . . . We do this first by fighting when it is to our advantage to do so—when we are strong compared to the enemy or we have identified some exploitable vulnerability in our enemy—and avoiding battle when we are at a disadvantage."991

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986 Ibid., 53, 55.

987 Ibid., 55.

988 Ibid., 55, 56.

989 Ibid., 56.

990 Ibid.

991 Ibid., 57.

Similarly *The Art of War* makes it clear that when choosing to carry out hostilities one should be clear in thought "...for while an angered man may again be happy, and a resentful man again be pleased, a state that has perished cannot be restored, nor can the dead be brought back to life."<sup>992</sup> "Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this ... . To capture the enemy's army is better ... . Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."<sup>993</sup> Attacking strategy is also important for "[w]hen the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice."<sup>994</sup> This can lead to defeat. "Those adept in waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts nor more than one provisioning."<sup>995</sup> *The Art of War's* recommendation's are quite clear on this.

He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious.<sup>996</sup>  
 Anciently the skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and waited for the enemy's moment of vulnerability<sup>997</sup> He whose advance is irresistible plunges into his enemy's weak positions.<sup>998</sup> Concentrate your forces against the enemy and from a distance of a thousand *li* you can kill his general. This is described as the ability to attain one's aim in an artful and ingenious manner.<sup>999</sup>  
 While striking the enemy remember the importance of both speed and tempo.  
 When torrential water tosses boulders, it is because of its momentum ... .  
 When the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because of timing...  
 . Thus the momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming, and his attack

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<sup>992</sup> Griffith, 143.

<sup>993</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>994</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>995</sup> Ibid.

<sup>996</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>997</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>998</sup> Griffith, 97.

<sup>999</sup> Ibid., 139

precisely regulated . . . . His potential is that of a fully drawn crossbow; his timing, the release of the trigger.<sup>1000</sup>

*Campaigning* holds that as a rule, this applies tactically, operationally, and strategically. It can provide the rationale for a drive to require or refuse a particular combat engagement, the conduct of conventional and guerrilla warfare campaigns, and strategies that combine aspects of that immediately stated. While all of the examples listed in this subchapter of *Campaigning* deserve closer study for the ways they demonstrate this rule, those that seem most significant follow.<sup>1001</sup>

To list one example, Lee's short-sightedness may have been demonstrated in his responses to Grant. "... [T]actical victory can bring operational failure, as for Lee at Antietam." <sup>1002</sup> Despite being at an overall disadvantage in strength, throughout the Civil War, Lee allowed Grant to compel him to engage his forces in pitched battles.<sup>1003</sup>

The Vietnam conflict largely demonstrates the communist Vietnamese employment of a protracted guerrilla warfare strategy, thus compensating for their relative weakness.<sup>1004</sup> The rare exception to their usual mode of confrontation was the head-on Tet Offensive. While in the terms of battle that offensive was a very costly tactical loss, it was "a strategic victory." Some scholars believe that it "... struck a serious blow against American resolve."<sup>1005</sup>

"Ideally, the operational commander fights only when and where he wants to. His ability to do this is largely a function of his ability to maintain the initiative and shape the events of war to his purposes. [This is] ... largely the product of maintaining a higher operational tempo."<sup>1006</sup> Considering, however, that those commanders are restricted by different entities or conditions, in varying ways, and to relative degrees, when it seem that strategically preferred tactical actions can or are not yielding adequate or better results, it

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<sup>1000</sup> Ibid., 92

<sup>1001</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 57.

<sup>1002</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>1003</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>1004</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1005</sup> Ibid., 59.

<sup>1006</sup> Ibid., 59.

is possible that, if built upon properly, less preferred tactical actions can be made to yield adequate or better strategic results.<sup>1007</sup>

## *16. Perspective*

Operational commanders must have a "perspective" from which they see further in time, space, and action than that which is "immediate and tactical."<sup>1008</sup> This expanded view is important to Marine Air—Ground Task Force commanders. They must use the complementary abilities of their Task Force's elements. For example, air support extends the "range" and effectiveness of ground forces by: providing intelligence on enemy operations; delaying or destroying enemy re-enforcements; destroying, if not damaging, essential enemy capabilities; and deceiving the enemy.<sup>1009</sup> It should be understood that the concern over the further projection force requires a more generalized view of geography.<sup>1010</sup> This does not represent, however, an absolution of responsibility. It is still detailed that, "Napoleon carried with him maps of the entire continent of Europe, thus enabling consideration of operation of wherever they suited his purposes." Furthermore, Hannibal was "compelled" to withdraw from Italy, when Scipio in 204 B.C. "... open[ed] a new front in Africa."<sup>1011</sup>

Implicit in the notion of an expanded perception of what, where, how, when, who, and why to fight (understanding the appropriate actions to take) for higher levels of war's hierarchy is the importance of those higher levels. The importance of an attack on and the exploitation of an enemy weakness and vulnerability is proportional to the level at which that weakness and vulnerability is found in war's hierarchy.<sup>1012</sup>

*The Art of War* values the application of uncommon genius in campaigning also. In reference to disposition and strategy, *The Art of War* makes it clear.

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<sup>1007</sup> Ibid., 58-60.

<sup>1008</sup> Ibid., 60, 62.

<sup>1009</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>1010</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>1011</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>1012</sup> Ibid., 64.

[A]nciently, those called skilled in war conquered an enemy easily conquered ... . He [the skilled one] wins victories without erring. 'Without erring' means that whatever he does insures his victory; he conquers an enemy already defeated. Thus a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle; an army destined to defeat fights in hope of winning.<sup>1013</sup>

Sun Tzu later adds, "... [T]herefore those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him."<sup>1014</sup>

In accomplishing this, "... speed is the essence of war. [One should] ... take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions."<sup>1015</sup> "Appear at places to which he must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you."<sup>1016</sup> "... [A]ttack a position he must succor."<sup>1017</sup> In engagements "the momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming."<sup>1018</sup> It is clear that "he whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious."<sup>1019</sup> The initiator of a conflict and his subordinates must look forward to make tactical successes serve operational directions for strategic benefit. "Now to win battles and take your objectives, but to fail to exploit these achievements is ominous and may be described as 'wasteful delay.'"<sup>1020</sup>

## *17. Maneuver*

*Campaigning* makes the intimacy of a multitude of factors and their relationships to immediate and overall success quite clear. "Maneuver is the employment of forces to secure an advantage—or leverage—over an enemy to accomplish the mission. Tactical

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<sup>1013</sup> Griffith, 87.

<sup>1014</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>1015</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>1016</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>1017</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>1018</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>1019</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>1020</sup> Ibid., 142.

maneuver aims to gain an advantage in combat. Operational maneuver ... aims to reduce the amount of fighting necessary to accomplish the mission [referring to campaign results]."<sup>1021</sup> Maneuver, however, is more than "movement and fire." It can also be an attempt to disassociate an opponent with his "base of popular support," as was the case in the American "pacification" campaigns in Vietnam 1965.<sup>1022</sup>

Among the many other examples of campaign maneuvers mentioned in this subchapter, two stand out and are illustrated. The first points out that in the American Civil War, between Chattanooga and Atlanta, when Confederate General Johnston attempted to "compel" Union General Sherman "... to make frontal assaults against prepared defensive positions," Sherman "repeatedly" attempted to out "flank" Johnston.<sup>1023</sup>

The second example details General Sir Edmund Allenby's success in Turkish-held Palestine and Syria in 1918. This success started with the "Battle of Megiddo."<sup>1024</sup> Allenby broke through Turkish lines just northwest of Jerusalem. Instead of turning east and taking Nablus, his forces traveled north, parallel to the Mediterranean coast. Deep in enemy territory, he split his "Desert Mounted Group" in two. One force continued northeast along the Mediterranean coast, not stopping even after having taken Haifa and Beirut. The other force turned east, taking Nazareth, Samakin, and Dara. After being joined by Lawrence of Arabia's forces, together they proceeded north, taking Damascus and continuing on.<sup>1025</sup>

"In 38 days, Allenby advanced 360 miles, destroyed three Turkish armies, took 76,000 prisoners, and knocked Turkey out of the war." As he caused the implosion of the First World War middle eastern Turkish military machine, Allenby demonstrated the harnessing of tactical victory to achieve operational and then strategic success.<sup>1026</sup>

"Carried to its perfect extreme, operational maneuver would, in Liddell Hart's words, 'produce a decision without any serious fighting.' ... Therefore, the 'true aim is

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<sup>1021</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 64.

<sup>1022</sup> Ibid., 65.

<sup>1023</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>1024</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>1025</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>1026</sup> Ibid., 67.



not so much to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this."<sup>1027</sup>

"... [W]hat is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."<sup>1028</sup> In the opening of *The Art of War's* chapter titled "Maneuver," one finds the recognition that "... nothing is more difficult than the art of maneuver." It goes on to say, "What is difficult about maneuver is to make the devious route the most direct and to turn misfortune into advantage."<sup>1029</sup> "... [T]hose skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him."<sup>1030</sup> This is why "... my enemy ... cannot help but engage me, for I attack positions he must succor."<sup>1031</sup> "When I wish to avoid battle I may ... divert him from going where he wishes."<sup>1032</sup> "... [W]hen the experienced in war move, they make no mistakes; when they act, their resources are limitless."<sup>1033</sup>

*The Art of War's* ideal is the same as Liddell Hart's preference "... [T]hose skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations."<sup>1034</sup> "Your aim [the ideal] must be to take all-under-heaven intact."<sup>1035</sup> It is important to "... weigh the situation, then move."<sup>1036</sup> "... [W]hen the enemy occupies high ground, do not confront him; with his back resting on hills, do not oppose him."<sup>1037</sup> This "... makes it impossible for the enemy to concentrate [and] ... prevents his allies from joining."<sup>1038</sup> Attack the enemy's

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<sup>1027</sup> Ibid., 70.

<sup>1028</sup> Griffith, 77.

<sup>1029</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>1030</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>1031</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>1032</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1033</sup> Ibid., 129.

<sup>1034</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>1035</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1036</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>1037</sup> Ibid., 109.

<sup>1038</sup> Ibid., 138.

supply sources and lines and use what you liberate.<sup>1039</sup> "When campaigning, be as swift as the wind; in leisurely march, majestic as the forest; in raiding and plundering, like fire; in standing, firm as the mountains. As unfathomable as the clouds, move like a thunderbolt."<sup>1040</sup>

### *18. Mobility—Tempo*

*Campaigning* details that maneuver and "mobility" are not identical. "If the classic application of maneuver is relational movement, then superior mobility—the capability to move from place to place while retaining the ability to perform the mission—becomes a key ingredient. The object is to use mobility to develop leverage by creating superiority at the point of battle or to avoid altogether disadvantageous battle."<sup>1041</sup> While "[t]actical mobility [refers to] ... speed and acceleration over short distances, of protection, agility, and the ability to move cross-country [in combat] ... operational mobility [refers to] ... range and sustained speed over [the] distances between engagements."<sup>1042</sup> "Tactics demand movement cross-country, but operational movement, for speed and volume, relies on existing roads, rail, or river networks."<sup>1043</sup>

In the text, two possibilities are of particular interest. A MAGTF can be transported by "amphibious shipping," from which they may locate enemy "vulnerabilities" or disrupt the use of "coastal" "roads" and thus create enemy "vulnerabilities" as part of a "landing" and campaign. Also, in regard to landing, helicopters may be used for greater operational mobility.<sup>1044</sup>

Speed is important on all levels of war's hierarchy. Of the different types of speed at this point of particular interest is "tempo," the rate of activity. While "tactical tempo" refers to measurement "within engagements," "operational tempo" refers to measurement in "between engagements."<sup>1045</sup> These are relative measurements. What matters is that

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<sup>1039</sup> Ibid., 76-77, 103-104, 141.

<sup>1040</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>1041</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 70, 71.

<sup>1042</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>1043</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1044</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>1045</sup> Ibid.

through greater tempo we take and maintain the initiative without sacrificing effectiveness.<sup>1046</sup> Superior tempo is gained and maintained through the following: "... multiple, simultaneous tactical actions ..."; "... anticipating tactical results and developing sequels in advance ..."; "... a command system based on decentralized decision-making ..."; and "avoiding unnecessary combat."<sup>1047</sup>

When *The Art of War* states that "... [w]ater has no constant form" it implies many things.<sup>1048</sup> While because of the typical historical method of rule in China, such is not likely indicative of a preference in decentralized almost republican authority, it most certainly implies the importance of maintaining stealthy headquarter and operations bases when necessary. Stealth includes hidden and/or mobile. In addition to maneuverability, to be as water, one must possess superior mobility.<sup>1049</sup>

When *The Art of War* states that "generally, operations of war require one thousand fast four-horse chariots, one thousand four-horse wagons covered in leather, and one hundred thousand mailed troops" it is very clear that mobility is important in readiness before war and the conduct of war.<sup>1050</sup> Additionally, concerning mobility in shipping and transportation, while lines may be made self-protecting, feeding off of an enemy's supplies may help a force penetrate even further in enemy territory.<sup>1051</sup> In enemy territory and battle, unity, organization, and resolve may be enhanced by eliminating the mobility needed to retreat.<sup>1052</sup>

In *The Art of War's* chapters "The Nine Variables," "Marches," "Terrain," and "The Nine Varieties of Ground," there is more to increased mobility than equipment and pilfering.<sup>1053</sup> In these chapters, a multitude of recommendations are made for the purposes of maximizing the benefits of speed, movement, and position, dynamics in a variety of encounters and on a variety of terrains.<sup>1054</sup> In addition to relative degrees in the

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<sup>1046</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>1047</sup> Ibid., 73, 74.

<sup>1048</sup> Griffith, 101.

<sup>1049</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>1050</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1051</sup> Ibid., 135-137.

<sup>1052</sup> Ibid., 137.

<sup>1053</sup> Ibid., Contents.

<sup>1054</sup> Ibid., 116-140.

depth of penetration in one's own and one's enemy's country, this includes recommendations for action in, rivers, swamps, forests, valleys, hills, mountains, and more.<sup>1055</sup>

Among those many recommendations one may find the following ideas. "Fight downhill; do not ascend to attack."<sup>1056</sup> Remember on terrain with features that are constricted, a few troops may hold off and crush many.<sup>1057</sup> "Now the crux of military operations lies in the pretense of accommodating one's self to the designs of the enemy."<sup>1058</sup> "When the enemy presents an opportunity, speedily take advantage of it. Anticipate him in seizing something he values and move in accordance with a date secretly fixed. Therefore at first be as shy as a maiden. When the enemy gives you an opening be swift as a hare and he will be unable to withstand you."<sup>1059</sup> "Thus the momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming ... ."<sup>1060</sup>

This is why "[c]onformation of the ground is of the greatest assistance in battle. To estimate, therefore, the enemy situation and to calculate distances and the degree of difficulty of the terrain so as to control victory are virtues of the superior general. He who fights with full knowledge of these factors is certain to win; he who does not, will surely be defeated."<sup>1061</sup>

### *19. Intelligence—Surprise*

As *Campaigning* recognizes, "intelligence" is important in distinguishing necessary from unnecessary activities. The "scope" of intelligence is proportional to its corresponding level of war's hierarchy.<sup>1062</sup> While "tactical intelligence" is more concerned with "immediate" and "imminent," conditions, "capabilities," actions, and the

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<sup>1055</sup> Ibid., 116-118, 130-140.

<sup>1056</sup> Ibid., 116.

<sup>1057</sup> Ibid., 131.

<sup>1058</sup> Ibid., 139.

<sup>1059</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>1060</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>1061</sup> Ibid., 127-128.

<sup>1062</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 74.

"impacts" thereof, "operational intelligence" is focused on "schemes and intentions" within a larger perspective of time, space, and action.<sup>1063</sup> Because Operational commanders have strategic aims and for the most part MAGTFs "assets" focus on tactical intelligence, MAGTF commanders must often rely on other outside sources for intelligence of operational and in turn necessarily strategic significance.<sup>1064</sup>

There is a relationship between surprise and intelligence. "Surprise is a state of disorientation which is the result of unexpected events and which degrades ability to react effectively. Surprise can be of decisive importance."<sup>1065</sup> "Tactical surprise ... affects the outcome of combat; it is of relatively immediate and local nature. Operational surprise catches the enemy in such a way as to impact on the campaign."<sup>1066</sup> Surprise is harder and more rewarding to achieve operationally than tactically. It results from "deception," "confusion," and "ignorance." The first of the three is the most challenging and "potentially" rewarding to achieve, for it requires the enemy's faith in "false information" and hopefully results in that enemy's "movement."<sup>1067</sup> (This does not strictly refer to physical movement in a geographic direction.)

Strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence are important in *The Art of War*. In fact, "[t]here is no place where espionage is not used."<sup>1068</sup> Such is important because "[t]hose called skilled in war conquered an enemy easily conquered."<sup>1069</sup> "For he [the conqueror] wins his victories without erring. 'Without erring' means that what ever he does insures his victory; he conquers an enemy already defeated."<sup>1070</sup> "Thus a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle ... ."<sup>1071</sup>

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<sup>1063</sup> Ibid., 74-75.

<sup>1064</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>1065</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1066</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>1067</sup> Ibid., 76, 77.

<sup>1068</sup> Griffith, 147.

<sup>1069</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>1070</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1071</sup> Ibid., 144.

It is important to consider your constituency and motivate those who will help you enact your designs. "One who confronts his enemy for many years in order to struggle for victory in a decisive battle yet who, because he begrudges rank, honors and a few pieces of gold, remains ignorant of his enemy's situation, is completely devoid of humanity. Such a man is no general; no support to his sovereign; no master of victory."<sup>1072</sup> "Now there are five sorts of secret agents to be employed. These are native, inside, doubled, expendable, and living."<sup>1073</sup> "He who is not sage and wise, humane and just, cannot use secret agents. And he who is not delicate and subtle cannot get the truth out of them."<sup>1074</sup> "And therefore only the enlightened sovereign and the worthy general who are able to use the most intelligent people as agents are certain to achieve great things. Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move."<sup>1075</sup>

"One ignorant of the plans of his neighboring states cannot prepare alliances in good time; if ignorant of the conditions of mountains, forests, dangerous defiles, swamps and marshes he cannot conduct the march; if he fails to make use of native guides he cannot gain the advantages of the ground. A general ignorant of even one of these three matters is unfit to command the armies of a Hegemonic King."<sup>1076</sup> Because of the constant changes that occur in war and the fact that no plan is perfect, "... there are occasions when the commands of the sovereign need not be obeyed."<sup>1077</sup> "And for this reason, the wise general in his deliberations must consider both favorable and unfavorable factors."<sup>1078</sup> "... [B]y taking into account the favorable factors, he makes his plan feasible; by taking into account the unfavorable, he may resolve the difficulties."<sup>1079</sup>

Information obtained from those individuals who are in the field and therefore in the know is of the utmost importance in those considerations. "Those who do not use

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<sup>1072</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1073</sup> Ibid., 145.

<sup>1074</sup> Ibid., 147.

<sup>1075</sup> Ibid., 149.

<sup>1076</sup> Ibid., 138.

<sup>1077</sup> Ibid., 112.

<sup>1078</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>1079</sup> Ibid., 138.

local guides are unable to obtain the advantages of the ground."<sup>1080</sup> The purpose of these in-field considerations is to harness various combinations of weapons, operational specialties, tactical advantages, and tactical successes for operational and then strategic successes. For "...to win battles and take your objectives, but to fail to exploit these achievements is ominous and may be described as 'wasteful delay.'"<sup>1081</sup>

Further enabling the use of intelligence and secrecy for the purposes of surprise, *The Art of War* makes the following additional recommendations. As much as it is possible, one should "... agitate him [the enemy] and ascertain the pattern of his movement." Base plans on those tendencies.<sup>1082</sup> Remember, however, "... the ultimate in disposing one's troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you."<sup>1083</sup> "It is the business of a general to be serene and inscrutable, impartial and self-controlled."<sup>1084</sup> "He should be capable of keeping his officers and men in ignorance of his plans."<sup>1085</sup> "He changes his methods and alters his plans so that people have no knowledge of what he is doing."<sup>1086</sup> "He alters his camp-sites and marches by devious routes, and thus makes it impossible for others to anticipate his purpose."<sup>1087</sup> "Set the troops to their tasks without imparting your designs; use them to gain advantage without revealing the dangers involved. Throw them into a perilous situation and they survive; put them in death ground and they will live. For the army is placed in a situation it can snatch victory from defeat."<sup>1088</sup> Let them know what they need to know when they need to know it.

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<sup>1080</sup> Ibid., 104.

<sup>1081</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1082</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>1083</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1084</sup> Ibid., 136.

<sup>1085</sup> Ibid., 137.

<sup>1086</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1087</sup> Ibid., 139.

<sup>1088</sup> Ibid.

## 20. Logistics

*Campaigning* also holds a that proper "logistics" are also important in avoiding weakness and vulnerability. A fighting force's strength and speed are reduced by: long and slow supply lines that require protection; attempting to carry unnecessary supplies; and carrying not enough supplies.<sup>1089</sup> In the Civil War, when his support lines became too long, General Sherman reduced the size of his force, cut his communications, and operated on supplies liberated from Georgia.<sup>1090</sup> On all levels of war's hierarchy, particularly the operational level, commanders must, with concern for conditions, speed, quantity, and security, evaluate the delivery systems at their disposal (ships, planes, trains, trucks, etc.) and then accordingly construct networks for the distribution of "war materials" to those who need them.<sup>1091</sup>

"Strategic logistics" consists of "developing," "stocking," and sending "war materials" to the "theaters" of concern.<sup>1092</sup> "Operational logistics" consists of: receiving those "war materials"; as is necessary, arranging for the capture of the enemy's "war materials" that are within reach; as is necessary, requesting and accepting "war materials" from the other armed services and "host nation"; and then dividing, "rationing," and distributing those materials to "tactical commanders" in the portions necessary to carry out the tactical actions deemed necessary for the campaign.<sup>1093</sup> In "tactical logistics," "tactical commanders" must make sure that the supporting accompaniment of their "combat unit" has been provided with that which is imminently necessary and that those materials are then distributed within that "combat unit" in accord with the immediate needs of tactical action.<sup>1094</sup>

MAGTF's are primarily supported through "tactical logistics." Generally, "... depending on the nature and scope of operations, ..." [this will require] "MAGTF commanders" to utilize "external sources" for support the further they proceed past a

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<sup>1089</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 79-81.

<sup>1090</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>1091</sup> Ibid., 79-80.

<sup>1092</sup> Ibid., 78.

<sup>1093</sup> Ibid., 78-79.

<sup>1094</sup> Ibid., 78.



breakthrough point in a campaign or as their Marine Corps support elements run out of supplies.<sup>1095</sup>

*The Art of War* details that preparation is important. "It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely on one's readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack, but rather to make one's self invincible."<sup>1096</sup> "Generally, operations of war require one thousand fast four-horse chariots, one thousand four-horse wagons covered in leather, and one hundred thousand mailed troops."<sup>1097</sup> Have them ready and remember that there are other costs involved. "When provisions are transported for a thousand *li* expenditures at home and in the field, stipends for the entertainment of advisors and visitors, the cost of materials such as glue and lacquer, and chariots and armor, will amount to one thousand pieces of gold a day. After this money is in hand, one hundred thousand troops may be raised."<sup>1098</sup> "As to government expenditures, those due to broken-down chariots, worn-out horses, armor and helmets, arrows and crossbows, lances, hand and body shields, draft animals and supply wagons will amount to sixty per cent. of the total."<sup>1099</sup> Have the ability to obtain resources needed to repair that equipment.

Remember, however, "[t]hose adept in waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts nor more than one provisioning."<sup>1100</sup> "Thus, while we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged."<sup>1101</sup> "When the army engages in protracted campaigns, the resources of the state will not suffice."<sup>1102</sup> "When a country is impoverished by military operations it is due to distant transportation; carriage of supplies for great distances renders the people destitute."<sup>1103</sup> "When your weapons are dulled and ardor dampened, your strength

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<sup>1095</sup> Ibid., 80.

<sup>1096</sup> Griffith, 114.

<sup>1097</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>1098</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1099</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>1100</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>1101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1103</sup> Ibid., 74.

exhausted and treasure spent, neighboring rulers will take advantage of your distress. And even though you have wise counselors, none will be able to lay good plans for the future."<sup>1104</sup> Therefore "[w]hen campaigning, be as swift as the wind ... ." <sup>1105</sup> "... [T]he momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming, and his attack precisely regulated."<sup>1106</sup>

In addition to being prepared, travelling light is important also. "My officers have no surplus of wealth but not because they disdain worldly goods ... ." <sup>1107</sup> "They [competent troops] carry equipment from the homeland; they rely for provisions on the enemy. Thus the army is plentifully provided with food."<sup>1108</sup> Supplies are used in transportation and shipping. "[T]he wise general sees to it that his troops feed on the enemy, for one bushel of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of his; one hundredweight of enemy fodder to twenty hundredweight of his."<sup>1109</sup> "Pay heed to nourishing the troops; do not unnecessarily fatigue them. Unite them in spirit; conserve their strength."<sup>1110</sup> "Plunder fertile country to supply the army with plentiful provisions."<sup>1111</sup> The importance of captures includes equipment. "... [W]hen in chariot fighting more than ten chariots are captured, reward those who take the first. Replace the enemy's flags and banners with your own, mix the captured chariots with yours, and mount them."<sup>1112</sup> In fact, plans on all levels of war should include advantages that may be derived from captures. "Seize something he cherishes and he will conform to your desires."<sup>1113</sup>

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<sup>1104</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>1105</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>1106</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>1107</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>1108</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>1109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1110</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>1111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1112</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>1113</sup> Ibid., 134.

"... [W]hen he prepares everywhere he will be weak everywhere."<sup>1114</sup> "... [A]ttack[ing] a position he must succor" may include supply.<sup>1115</sup> Those "... skilled in war make it impossible for the enemy to unite his van with his rear; for his elements both large and small to mutually cooperate; for the good of the troops to succor the poor and for superiors and subordinates to support each other."<sup>1116</sup> "When the enemy is at ease, be able to weary him; when well fed, to starve him; when at rest, to move him."<sup>1117</sup> Expect your enemy to attempt to do the same to you. It is important, therefore, to remember "... the army is certain to sustain the enemy's attack without suffering defeat due to [cooperative] operations of the extraordinary and the normal forces."<sup>1118</sup> "... [T]he troops of those adept in war are used like the 'Simultaneous Responding' snake ... . When struck on the head its tail attacks; when struck on the tail, its head attacks, when struck in the center both head and tail attack."<sup>1119</sup> "...[T]roops [are] ... capable of such instantaneous coordination."<sup>1120</sup> Whatever minimal supply lines are maintain should be capable of protecting themselves and being protected.

## 21. Leadership

Leadership plays an important role in the accomplishment of all that has been stated here by *Campaigning*. While "charisma and strength of personality" are important, good upper-level leadership produces greater "understanding," "commitment," and "unified efforts" among distant and different parts of a military for the purpose of achieving set "goals." Not being able to be everywhere at one time, an upper-level leader must choose where and when his observed presence among his troops will best serve those purposes, while avoiding micro-management.<sup>1121</sup>

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<sup>1114</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>1115</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>1116</sup> Ibid., 133.

<sup>1117</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>1118</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>1119</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>1120</sup> Ibid.

With some distinction, it is also stated that, "[l]eadership at the operational level requires clarity of vision, strength of will, ... extreme moral courage" and "the ability to communicate these traits clearly and powerfully through numerous levels of command"; the "... establish[ment of] a climate of cohesion among the widely dispersed elements of his command and with adjacent and higher headquarters"; and the "... mutual trust and an implicit understanding ..." of and with those delegated authority underneath his level.<sup>1122</sup>

In the conduct of operations "theater operations" "MAGTF commanders" have the additional duties of maintaining effective relationships with, coordinating with, and gaining consensus-based cooperation and support from external participants both American and foreign in "nationality" and government.<sup>1123</sup>

## 22. Conclusion

With the removal of paragraph-sized spaces, the writing in the final chapter of *Campaigning* could be reduced to two pages.<sup>1124</sup> The conclusion begins with one quote from Sun Tzu:

Those who know when to fight and when not to fight are victorious. Those who discern when to use many or few troops are victorious. Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious. Those who face the unprepared with preparation are victorious. Those whose generals are able and are not constrained by their governments are victorious.<sup>1125</sup>

The conclusion has a balanced perspective of human beings and professionalism. A fighting force's bloodlust is useful.<sup>1126</sup> However, "[t]actical competence can rarely attain victory in the face of outright operational incompetence, while operational ignorance can squander what tactical hard work has gained. As the price of war is human

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<sup>1121</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 82.

<sup>1122</sup> Ibid., 82, 83.

<sup>1123</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>1124</sup> Ibid., 85-88.

<sup>1125</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>1126</sup> Ibid., 87.

loss, it is incumbent on every commander to attain his objective as economically as possible. This demands the judicious and effective use of combat, which in turn demands a skill for the conduct of war at the operational level."<sup>1127</sup>

Similarly *The Art of War* holds that the relative value and success of rulers, generals, commanders, and officers is in accord to what they do and don't do. One particular recommendation comes to mind. "If a general who heeds my strategy is employed he is certain to win. Retain him. ... [O]ne who refuses to listen [to Sun Tzu's advice] ... is certain to be defeated. Dismiss him."<sup>1128</sup> One particular restriction comes to mind. "He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious."<sup>1129</sup> Considering the distinction made between kings and their generals, it may be said that "... the general is the protector of the state. If this protection is all-embracing the state will surely be strong; if defective, the state will certainly be weak."<sup>1130</sup> If a general is "reckless," "cowardly," "quick-tempered," easily "[dis]honor[ed]," or overly gentle in nature, a leader is a liability.<sup>1131</sup> In contemporary terms it may be said that upper-level management is ultimately responsible for delivering desired results.

Sovereigns and generals must be educated. An integral part of any education is character training. In order to fulfill their responsibilities generals must have "... wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness."<sup>1132</sup> They are to have an educated professional concern for important factors in the weighing of situations. Among other things this includes being able to "... appraise it in terms of the five fundamental factors and make comparisons of the seven elements ... ." Five of those factors are: "... moral influence; ... weather; ... terrain; ... command; ... doctrine."<sup>1133</sup> They must be

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<sup>1127</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>1128</sup> Griffith, 66.

<sup>1129</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>1130</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>1131</sup> Ibid., 114-115.

<sup>1132</sup> Ibid., 65.

<sup>1133</sup> Ibid., 63.

continually aware of their own as well as their enemy's strength, weaknesses, and directions.<sup>1134</sup>

It is important for generals to be law abiding, just with their subordinates, and worthy of trust in the orders that they issue.<sup>1135</sup> When it comes to being trustworthy the "... skilled commander seeks victory from the situation ...".<sup>1136</sup> "He selects his men and they exploit the situation."<sup>1137</sup> "He who relies on the situation uses his men in fighting as one rolls logs or stones crushing opponents in the valleys below."<sup>1138</sup>

At the same time, generals must be permitted to be ruggedly independent and take the initiative.<sup>1139</sup> "...[T]he general who in advancing does not seek personal fame, and in withdrawing is not concerned with avoiding punishment, but whose only purpose is to protect the people and promote the best interests of his sovereign, is the precious jewel of the state ...".<sup>1140</sup> "If the situation is one of victory but the sovereign has issued orders not to engage, the general may decide to fight. If the situation is such that he cannot win, but the sovereign has issued orders to engage, he need not do so."<sup>1141</sup> It is important for commanders to understand that "[t]here are some roads not to follow; some troops not to strike; some cities not to assault; and some ground which should not be contested"<sup>1142</sup> "And for this reason, the wise general in his deliberations must consider both favorable and unfavorable factors."<sup>1143</sup> "... [B]y taking into account the favorable factors, he makes his plan feasible; by taking into account the unfavorable, he may resolve the difficulties."<sup>1144</sup>

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<sup>1134</sup> Ibid., 63, 84, 104, 128.

<sup>1135</sup> Ibid., 66, 123, 139.

<sup>1136</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>1137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1138</sup> Ibid., 94.

<sup>1139</sup> Ibid., 83, 93.

<sup>1140</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>1141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1142</sup> Ibid., 111.

<sup>1143</sup> Ibid., 113.

To keep the initiative, generals must innovatively improvise in shaping conflict and adapting to changes in situations without losing subtlety, unpredictability, and surprise.<sup>1145</sup> "... [T]hey are capable both of protecting themselves and of gaining a complete victory."<sup>1146</sup> "... [T]he general must create [these] situations that which contribute to their accomplishment ... ."<sup>1147</sup>

In campaigning, the general keeps as many options for action open as possible, to take advantage of every situation. For "... if [the enemy] ... prepares to the front his rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be fragile. If he prepares to the left, his right will be vulnerable and if to the right, there will be few on his left."<sup>1148</sup> "Attack where he is unprepared ... when he does not expect you."<sup>1149</sup> When deep in enemy territory have alternate plans, improvise when needed, and fight.<sup>1150</sup> "Thus, ... [o]ne able to gain victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine."<sup>1151</sup> Then "... when I have won a victory I do not repeat my tactics but respond to circumstances in an infinite number of way."<sup>1152</sup>

In accomplishing all of that generals must be "... serene and inscrutable, impartial and self-controlled."<sup>1153</sup> "He should be capable of keeping his officers and men in ignorance of his plans."<sup>1154</sup> He lets people know what they need to know.

It is a matter of survival that generals be good stewards of state resources and power, especially lives.<sup>1155</sup> "Anciently those called skilled in war conquered an enemy

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<sup>1144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1145</sup> Ibid., 100-102, 139-140.

<sup>1146</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>1147</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>1148</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>1149</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>1150</sup> Ames, 135; Griffith, 111.

<sup>1151</sup> Griffith, 101.

<sup>1152</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>1153</sup> Ibid., 136-137.

<sup>1154</sup> Ibid., 136.

easily conquered."<sup>1156</sup> "For he [the conqueror] wins his victories without erring. 'Without erring' means that what ever he does insures his victory; he conquers an enemy already defeated."<sup>1157</sup> "Therefore the skillful commander takes up a position in which he can not be defeated and misses no opportunity to master his enemy."<sup>1158</sup> "Thus a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle ... ."<sup>1159</sup>

Generals must, through the delegation of certain responsibilities, use the talents and knowledge of troops, spies, and local guides.<sup>1160</sup> "... [O]nly the enlightened sovereign and the worthy general who are able to use the most intelligent people as agents are certain to achieve great things. Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move."<sup>1161</sup>

This is important for "[O]ne ignorant of the plans of his neighboring states cannot prepare alliances in good time; if ignorant of the conditions of mountains, forests, dangerous defiles, swamps and marshes he cannot conduct the march; if he fails to make use of native guides he cannot gain the advantages of the ground. A general ignorant of even one of these three matters is unfit to command the armies of a Hegemonic King."<sup>1162</sup> Information obtained from those individuals who are in the field and therefore in the know, is of the utmost importance in those considerations. "Those who do not use local guides are unable to obtain the advantages of the ground."<sup>1163</sup> The purpose of these in-field considerations is to harness various combinations of weapons, tactical advantages, and tactical successes for operational and then strategic successes.

To a large degree, *The Art of War* focuses on what is required of upper- level leadership; in that focus one may also find what is expected from middle- and lower-level

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<sup>1155</sup> Ibid., 73, 76-79.

<sup>1156</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>1157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1160</sup> Ibid., 93, 104, 144, 149.

<sup>1161</sup> Ibid., 149.

<sup>1162</sup> Ibid., 138.

<sup>1163</sup> Ibid., 104.



leadership. *The Art of War* details the importance of training, communication, relationships, and delegation of responsibility.

"To cultivate a uniform level of valor is the object of military administration. And it is by proper use of the ground that both shock and flexible forces are used to the best advantage."<sup>1164</sup> "Because ... a general regards his men as infants they will march with him into the deepest valleys. He treats them as his own beloved sons and they will die with him."<sup>1165</sup> Therefore the "... skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it from his subordinates."<sup>1166</sup> "He selects his men and they exploit the situation."<sup>1167</sup> As a result, "[i]n the tumult and uproar the battle seems chaotic, but there is no disorder; the troops appear to be milling about in circles but cannot be defeated." This is why it is said that "[a]pparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength."<sup>1168</sup> "Order and disorder depend on organization; courage or cowardice on circumstances; strength and weakness on dispositions."<sup>1169</sup>

One can allow troops to win by doing the following: ordering action when most advantageous and letting your own troops know when they are in danger, taking essential enemy positions and supplies to fulfill the needs of your own troops, and by preventing enemy mobility and concentration while isolating enemy troops.<sup>1170</sup> One should then "... throw the troops into a position from which there is no escape and even when faced with death they will not flee. For if prepared to die, what can they not achieve?"<sup>1171</sup> "He [the general] prohibits superstitious practices and so rids the army of doubts. Then until the moment of death there can be no troubles."<sup>1172</sup> "... [A]lthough the men of Wu and Yueh

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<sup>1164</sup> Ibid., 136.

<sup>1165</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>1166</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>1167</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1168</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>1169</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>1170</sup> Ibid. 133-134.

<sup>1171</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>1172</sup> Ibid., 136-137.

mutually hate one another, if together in a boat tossed by the wind they would cooperate as the right hand does with the left."<sup>1173</sup> "Thus, such troops need no encouragement to be vigilant. Without extorting their support the general obtains it; without inviting their affection he gains it; without demanding their trust he wins it"<sup>1174</sup>

"He whose ranks are unified in purpose will be victorious."<sup>1175</sup> It has been stated that "... the reason the troops slay the enemy is because they are enraged."<sup>1176</sup> One should motivate his men to make captures through rewards and "... treat captives well and care for them."<sup>1177</sup> One should be decent with prisoners of war and thus be able to use them.<sup>1178</sup>

It is important for leadership to understand that certain principles apply on all levels of war's hierarchy. First and foremost this extends to the reasons for fighting. "A sovereign cannot raise an army because he is resentful. For ... a state that has perished cannot be restored, nor can the dead be brought back to life."<sup>1179</sup> "If not in the interests of the state do not act. If you cannot succeed, do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight."<sup>1180</sup> Secondly, it must be ingrained in leadership that tactical action must serve operational designs, operational designs must serve strategic goals, and strategic action must harness tactical and operational gains. That is campaigning. For "... to win battles and take your objectives, but to fail to exploit these achievements is ominous and may be described as 'wasteful delay.'"<sup>1181</sup>

As partly stated, however at this point necessarily emphasized again, the foundational principles that guide war fit within the structure of those two principles.

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<sup>1173</sup> Ibid., 136.

<sup>1174</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>1175</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>1176</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>1177</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>1178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1179</sup> Ibid., 142-143.

<sup>1180</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>1181</sup> Ibid.

"Victory is the main object of war."<sup>1182</sup> "All warfare is based on deception"<sup>1183</sup> "Know the enemy and know yourself ... ."<sup>1184</sup> "... [A]ttack the enemy's strategy."<sup>1185</sup> "... [T]he resources of those skilled in the use of extraordinary forces are as infinite as the heavens and the earth ... ."<sup>1186</sup> Generally, management of many is the same as management of few. It is a matter of organization.<sup>1187</sup>

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<sup>1182</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1183</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>1184</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>1185</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>1186</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>1187</sup> Ibid., 90.

## CONCLUSIONS ON THE USES OF *THE ART OF WAR* IN THE EDUCATION OF MARINE CORPS OFFICERS

Within the Marine Corps' philosophy and doctrine, the only significant rival to Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is Clausewitz's *On War*. While its use may not be as distinct and pronounced as when Commandant Gray designated *The Art of War* his book of the year, *The Art of War* remains a significant part of officer training. It is an important contributor to the Marine Corps' philosophy and doctrine. Every Marine and Marine officer comes in contact with lessons from *The Art of War* through the *Warfighting* and *Campaigning* manuals. *Warfighting* has 59 endnotes, of which: two cite Sun Tzu; one cites Hart (who studied *The Art of War* and wrote *The Strategy of The Indirect Approach*); and 18 cite Clausewitz. *Warfighting's* other 38 endnotes cite various Department of Defense texts, scholars' papers, historical examples, and philosophers' works. *Campaigning* has 110 endnotes, of which: four cite Sun Tzu; 11 cite Hart; and five cite Clausewitz. *Campaigning's* other 90 endnotes cite various Department of Defense texts, scholars' papers, historical examples, and philosophers' works.<sup>1188</sup>

*Warfighting* and *Campaigning* are General Gray's philosophy and doctrine. His beliefs and thoughts on how to achieve victory in war come after a long and distinguished career which included tactical, operational, and strategic experience in addition to the study of military philosophy and history. While many various Department of Defense texts, scholars' papers, historical examples, and philosophers' works have been cited in each text's endnotes, *Warfighting* and *Campaigning* were written after Gray's theoretical framework was most likely well constructed and tested. Many of those Department of Defense texts, scholars' papers, historical examples, and philosophers' works may amount to recommended readings chosen to be endnotes for the principles that they teach and to give Marines a more detailed understanding of how to apply those principles. One may also investigate the role, if any, that Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* had in the writing of those materials. Research into Hart's work would certainly prove rewarding.

Allen R. Millett detailed in his book *Semper Fidelis*, "... the Commandant never wavered in his view that Marine officers needed to think more creatively. ... *Warfighting* (FMFM 1) and *Campaigning* (FMFM 1—1) ... [with] concise distillations of operational

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<sup>1188</sup> Gray, *Campaigning*, 89-103; Gray, *Warfighting*, 79-88.

concepts (mostly Gray's) bore some resemblance to the works of Sun Tzu and Mao ... [and] proved more readable and thoughtful than the manuals they replaced."<sup>1189</sup>

In studying the Marine Corps' most foundational manuals, *Warfighting* and *Campaigning*, it may seem as though Marine Corps philosophy and doctrine is more similar to Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* than it is a direct product of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. While it may appear that *The Art of War's* contributions are greater than most people recognize, one must admit that the only irrefutable proof from which a measurement can be made, of those contributions that *The Art of War* makes to USMC philosophy and doctrine, must be found in official manuals, published lists, and standardized lessons.

In one of the three quotes that introduces *Warfighting's* second chapter, "The Theory of War," Sun Tzu says, "Invincibility lies in defense; the possibility of victory in the attack. One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant."<sup>1190</sup> Every adversary's defenses have a weakness somewhere.

*Campaigning's* subchapter on the "Tactical-Operational Connection" details the importance of fighting the right battles to make gains of strategic importance and avoid attrition.<sup>1191</sup> In order to understand what battles should be fought operational commanders must: locate their operational headquarters near the tactical combat areas; listen to intelligence and suggestions from those tactical combat areas; and be able to improvise, adapt, and overcome themselves. "Therefore" Sun Tzu said, "... a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates."<sup>1192</sup>

When, in another subchapter, discussing the importance of "Identifying Critical Enemy Factors," *Campaigning* quotes *The Art of War*. "Economy demands that ... [t]he most effective way to defeat our enemy is to destroy that which is most critical to his success in the theater... . [W]e should focus our efforts against an object of strategic importance ... . Failing ... that we focus against objective of operational importance. ... [A]s Sun Tzu said, 'Seize something he cherishes and he will conform to your desires.' ... [F]ocus against your enemy's vulnerabilities or that which ... he can not do without ...

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<sup>1189</sup> Millett, 634.

<sup>1190</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>1191</sup> Ibid., 10-11.

<sup>1192</sup> Ibid., 11.

. On all levels of war's hierarchy, expect the enemy to hide his weaknesses and search out our weaknesses."<sup>1193</sup>

Taking the understanding of strategic considerations to its highest level, Chapter Three of *Campaigning*, "Conducting the Campaign," begins with a quote from Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."<sup>1194</sup> Then, *Campaigning's* fourth chapter and conclusion connects a number of considerations in a summary of Gray's balanced philosophical doctrine. That begins with a quote from Sun Tzu:

Those who know when to fight and when not to fight are victorious.  
Those who discern when to use many or few troops are victorious. Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious. Those who face the unprepared with preparation are victorious. Those whose generals are able and are not constrained by their governments are victorious.<sup>1195</sup>

Marine officers and Marines come into contact with Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* through other sources. Included in the Marine Corps' recommended reading lists, which are readily supplied by the Marine Corps Association, *The Art of War* is undoubtedly read by many Marines and Marine officers.<sup>1196</sup>

Commissioned Marine officers study Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* in the Marine Corps War College War, Policy, and Strategy Course's "The Relevance Of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic, and Operational Levels Of War" class, the Command and Staff College's "Nonresident Program's Theory and Nature Of War" course, and the Command and Staff College's "Theory and Nature Of War" course for residents.<sup>1197</sup>

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<sup>1193</sup> Ibid., 35-37.

<sup>1194</sup> Ibid., 53, 55.

<sup>1195</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>1196</sup> Commandant of the USMC. *Marine Corps Professional Reading Program*, 2, 4.

<sup>1197</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 23, 24; USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 2; Strange, 3, 4.

In the Marine Corps War College War Policy and Strategy Course's "The Relevance Of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz To The Political, Strategic, and Operational Levels Of War" class, designed for particularly intelligent commissioned officers, Marine officers study: the Communist General Tao Hanzhang's version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* as translated by Yuan Shibing, Clausewitz's *On War*, Michael I. Handael's *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared*, and the Marine Corps manuals *Warfighting and Campaigning*.<sup>1198</sup>

Even if it were only justified by the principle that to "... know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril," it may be said that Communist General Tao Hanzhang's version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* as translated by Yuan Shibing is an excellent text for Marine officer education.<sup>1199</sup> As stated, Marine officers and Marines need to understand the American political identity, particularly the reasons for the execution of their oath of office, in addition to the most prudent method to execute their oath of office. At the right time and place, prudence may include countering what may be said to be a Chinese Communist perspective of the application of those eternal principles that Sun Tzu recognized govern war.

While some of its conclusions may be contestable, Michael I. Handael's *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared* remains a valuable text because it provides insight into what many military professionals have come to believe are the differences and similarities between *The Art of War* and *On War*, i.e., what in the way of warfare is considered traditional to the "Orient" and to the "West." At the same time, in war, type-casting and being predictable are dangerous mistakes. In particular, strategies, operations, and tactics, the under-reliance or if it is possible, over-reliance, upon intelligence and surprise is a leader's and/or a soldier's fault.

In the Command and Staff College Resident and Nonresident Programs' "Theory and Nature Of War" courses, Marine officers study Samuel Griffith's version of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, Clausewitz's *On War*, the Marine Corps manuals *Warfighting and Campaigning*, and the works of a number of other historians, philosophers, and strategists.<sup>1200</sup> Those "Theory and Nature Of War" courses proceed from the view that war has evolved from limited form to unlimited form. As a part of that view, Mao Tse-tung's and the United States Marine Corps' philosophies and doctrines on war are held to

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<sup>1198</sup> Strange, 4-6.

<sup>1199</sup> Griffith, 84.

<sup>1200</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, v, vi; USMC Institute, *Nonresident Program, Theory and Nature of War Syllabus*, 2, 39-40.

be creatures of newer development. However, it is clear that *The Art of War* has made substantial contributions to those philosophies and doctrines and that in true principle war does not change.<sup>1201</sup>

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<sup>1201</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, vii, 3, 4. This belief that principles do not change is based upon an understanding of Ecclesiastics 1, the laws of nature and nature's God mentioned in *The Declaration of Independence*, and human nature observed through the actions of self and others. Admittedly, because man is limited in mental capacity, influenced by presuppositions, and often deceptive in conflict it should be understood that the broad spectrum study of the works of many war philosophers, historians, and strategists may help the natural law and policy governing the USMC and its conduct of war better reflect the laws of nature and nature's God that truly govern the conduct of war.



## APPENDICES

### *A. The Concern*

From the readings and interviews for this study one may conclude that there is a doctrinal struggle taking place within the Marine Corps. "Maneuver warfare" is the Marine Corps' philosophical doctrine. The struggle is between a preference for what is currently thought to be Clausewitzian, and a preference for what is Sun Tzuian, within "maneuver warfare." While at very least Sun Tzu approaches war from the higher standard of attempting to capture and use everything rather than destroy it (an ideal that may be more compatible with the American understanding of human rights), Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and Clausewitz's *On War* both fail to explicitly detail the differences between power and authority.

A military command's view of what and who it serves shapes a military's overall view of its purposes and actions. It is important for the Marine Corps to have an honest understanding of: *The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America*; *The Constitution of the United States of America*; just cause; and military history. The distinction between power and authority is foundational: to the American political identity; and for maintaining a decent society.

If a military command has a disrespectful view of the common people it may lead to a disrespectful view of the Marine officers and Marines that fight on the operational and tactical levels of war. In addition, wrongful orders might be issued and carried out. That could endanger achieving victory in addition to threatening *The Constitution of the United States of America*. This is because "maneuver warfare" requires an environment in which the authority to act quickly and responsibly with uncommon genius is delegated to those Marine officers and Marines fighting on the operational and tactical levels of war.

### *B. The Worldview Observed in The Marine Corps' Command and Staff College Literature*

The Marine Corps' University's Command and Staff College's generally accepted worldview, analytical structure, and their supporting presuppositions and accompanying biases may be understood through a thorough reading of the introductory sections in the Resident Program's *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*. The following excerpts and commentary are a selection of those that could be discussed.

The course overview could be renamed the "Course Justification." The overview states:

To the lay public, war often seems a simple matter ... . War is a difficult, complex, frustrating state of affairs that often defies description or definition ... the nature of any given war is determined not by the will or desire of any one actor but by the complex interaction between opposing sides—and even between the different players on either side—as they determine their objectives and how much they are willing to sacrifice in order to achieve them ... [I]t has become ever more dangerous with advancing technology. Today, war can approach the point of absolute, unrestrained, mindless violence and be without purpose or limits, or it can be very limited in its scope and objective.<sup>1202</sup>

That quote says a great deal. It is wrong for Bassford (the author of the Command and Staff College Resident Program's *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*) to engage in emotionalism that as a public servant he serves and protects. Contrary to what he holds, wars are not mindless, unrestrained, or even too complex to be understood by most people. Whether such is explicitly detailed in writing, speech, or not, it is self-evident, if not common sense, that wars have purpose and are planned. This is because human beings are cognitive, reasoning, and rational creatures. In a war, disagreements between opposing political forces within and outside of a particular geopolitical entity are the result of different philosophies, evidence selections, and conclusions. Some other self-evident truths that transcend cultures are that distinctions exist between the just and unjust, those who start a war and those who finish it and exactly what greater goals and lesser objectives will be attained.

It has been further stated that:

Given its complexity, the profession of arms ... denies its practitioners much opportunity to actually practice their craft before being required to translate their knowledge into action. The most adept practitioners of warfare in the past have capitalized on vicarious experience gained in times of peace. Therefore, a solid intellectual foundation—based on the study of and

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<sup>1202</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 1.

reflection on the evolution of warfare and military theory—is necessary to fully understand the concepts of war. Properly studied, an analysis of the past and present offers professionals a basis for understanding how their own activities fit within the wider patterns of national and human affairs.<sup>1203</sup>

In reality, war is not studied solely because of its complexity or increasing complexity. It is studied because of the importance of winning justice. The basic principles governing war are the same today as they were thousands of years ago. There are offenders, defenders, struggles, and deaths. With respect to these matters, war has not and does not evolve. Man has simply applied particular laws of nature and nature's God differently. The changes in the application of those laws include the development and use of technology. The winner is the one who, with God's grace, out thinks, out wills, and out performs his enemy.

The "Course Overview" continues with the understanding that "... most of us have some working definition of 'military history'" and that the *Webster's Dictionary* definition of theory is made more "useful." It is further defined as follows:

Military theory ... aids us in understanding the essential nature of war, in coming to grips with the environment within which military decisions are made and battles are fought, but it cannot provide specific solutions to campaigns or predict their outcomes. Theory can show us the timeless qualities of war, but it must also alert us to the many variables and unpredictabilities in the evolution and conduct of war. Theory must not be canned or stagnant; it must require us to integrate our own [ideas] ... with an appreciation of the forces of evolution to explain current warfare and support future operations. Leaders should not make the mistake of 'preparing for the last war,' but they should also avoid focusing exclusively on change. A balance is needed, and a good grasp of military history and theory can do much to provide such a balance.<sup>1204</sup>

It is a point of concern that while this section uses the terms "timeless qualities," many of which are mentioned in *The Art of War*, it falls short of calling those qualities

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<sup>1203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1204</sup> Ibid., 2.

principles or laws. Admittedly due to the fact that the natural law or even what is deemed to be a principle may be imperfect because it is based on man's often flawed yet best understanding of the Laws of Nature and Nature's God, it may seem that war is evolving. Despite the fact that experience and new technology may allow various advantages, war is not evolving. Many Americans (those people who take the arguments of *The Declaration of Independence* seriously) would contend that, in some respects, man's understanding and application of some of those eternal laws that govern the universe are simply being improved, as evident in technology and the artistic application thereof. Understandably those who employ artists make certain requirements of and place certain restrictions on them.

Concluding the introductory section of the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide And Syllabus*, a memorandum says in addition to increasing this course's historical content, currently starting with "... religious total war ... 1618—1715 ... [to better] ... document the changeable character of war, [what has been called] ... Constitution Day [is now] ... integrated [into] ... new day on Civil—Military Relations [and] ... beefed up with relevant readings."<sup>1205</sup>

Understanding, however, that American military artists are restricted to upholding *The Constitution*, one may question why and if "Constitution Day" was "integrated" into the curriculum as an afterthought. Instead of being an afterthought, "Constitution Day" should have been the foremost thought. *The Declaration of Independence* and *The Constitution* are to be studied by every Marine, establish the primary motivation for their fighting and form the worldview through which all military philosophies, doctrines, missions, and orders are evaluated by the Marine Corps, Marine Corps officers, and every Marine. In accord with the oath of office all Marine and Marine officers take, the unchanging<sup>1206</sup> principles and particularly the laws set forth in *The Declaration of Independence* and *The Constitution* are to be enforced with religious fervor and through arms when required.

The oversight of American foundations may become more of a concern upon reading what Bassford has written responding to a question about the political nature of war in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*:

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<sup>1205</sup> Ibid., vii.

<sup>1206</sup> Admittedly, the term "unchanging" is redundant to principles. However, it has been used here because in practice, many people seem to have forgotten that policies change while natural laws are fixed.

This question essentially seeks to draw out the overall similarities in Clausewitz's and Sun Tzu's points of view about war being a continuation of politics ... . Sun Tzu's "bloodless victories" are, in fact, political, not military, in nature, although the line is often impossible to draw with any precision ... . War, an integral part of the power politics of the age, had become ... important to governmental consistency. This required a coherent strategy, tactical theory and a practical doctrine governing intelligence, planning, command, operational, and administrative procedures. Sun Tzu ... was the first man to provide such a theory and ... doctrine.<sup>1207</sup>

The "bloodless victory" concept is a Clausewitzian strawman. Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* recommends that one employ superior political and military strategies in order to secure various advantages. Those various advantages will allow one to capture and keep as much as possible intact.<sup>1208</sup>

As stated, while *The Art of War* may draw some distinctions between political leadership as opposed to military leadership, times of war as opposed to times of peace, and the merciful and conservative use of force as opposed to waste, the book fails to distinguish between power and authority.<sup>1209</sup> As principle, history, and law show, the failure to make the distinction between power and authority was not contributory to governmental legitimacy and/or consistency, despite and possibly in some cases as a result of Sun Tzu's doctrine. While termed by some as the contemporary American culture's political identity crisis, if that explanation was rejected as being understood by Marine officers and Marines, Griffith's and Bassford's term of "power politics" would be problematic.

Perhaps the root of *The Art of War's* problem concerning the distinction between power and authority may be found in understanding that Sun Tzu speaks of life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and defense as nature or tendencies rather than as Creator-given "unalienable Rights" as they are defined in *The Declaration of Independence*.<sup>1210</sup> In a phone interview, Sergeant Major Bennington, the Director of the Staff Noncommissioned

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<sup>1207</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 25, 26; Griffith, 25.

<sup>1208</sup> Handael, 21-22.

<sup>1209</sup> Griffith, 66, 72-74, 77-79, 83, 132, 139-140, 144-145.

<sup>1210</sup> Ames, 183-184; Griffith, 63, 123, 135, 142-144; *The Declaration of Independence*.

Officers Academy, stressed that Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is outdated in many ways. He said Sun Tzu partly considered civilians to be targets and if Marines were to implement many of Sun Tzu's suggestions they would be court marshaled for war crimes.<sup>1211</sup> As just on example of a problematical proposition, Sun Tzu states that "... the worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative."<sup>1212</sup> The question is whether or not this reference refers to the costs involved in toppling castle walls, or the difficulties of urban warfare, or the principle of attacking only government officials.

Concerning the means and ends of war, when referring to the best way the Marine Corps could deal with future conflicts against revolutionaries, Bassford states this matter is dependent upon if "... political and military leaders will be willing to delegate the necessary authority to people on the ground who really—hopefully—understand what needs to be done in that particular situation."<sup>1213</sup> Despite wording it vaguely in that passage, at the very least Bassford used the word "authority" with reference to the chain of command. While it may not be this course's purpose to teach the American political identity, that quote may be evidence of a respect for that identity and duty.

As reflected in the sources for this study, the Marine Corps University's worldview embraces the following. To the common person war may seem so violent that it lacks purpose. War has a purpose and must be studied. As war evolves and becomes more technical, complex, and wide in scope, we must keep up with new developments, while not forgetting its "timeless qualities." While there may be no "bloodless battles," using strength economically helps a military protect a country more thoroughly over a longer period of time. While it is important to achieving victory for civil leaders to allow military leaders and military leaders to allow their subordinates to act economically, the study of civil—military relations deserves its own day, even if considered outside of the scope of some courses on the nature of war, war theory, and the relevance of various philosophies of war to today's way of war.

It was alarming to find that: the common people (who grant the government power and authority in convention) may be thought of as being less than understanding of the necessity for war; "Constitution Day" was an afterthought that has been renamed "Civil—Military Relations Day" (sounding almost Confucian); the laws of nature and nature's God in addition to principles of war are referred to as "timeless qualities"; and that an

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<sup>1211</sup> Bennington, interview by author.

<sup>1212</sup> Griffith, 78.

<sup>1213</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 133.

understanding of *The Declaration of Independence* and *The Constitution* (why the Marine Corps exists and fights coupled with what the Marine Corps may do) are not completely and explicitly integrated with the approach to the most foundational studies of war. That needs to change.

### *C. The USMC Worldview: Restrictions*

The *Marine Corps War College Academic Catalog AY 1994-1995* makes it clear that within reason, academic freedom is the norm in War College courses.<sup>1214</sup> It is important, however, to understand that even within what is deemed relevant military study, one's creativity will reflect the presuppositions that one in faith adopts as foundations to one's own worldview, reasoning, theoretical frameworks, and even the reassessments of those elements.

In the purposeful construction of a Marine's psyche, it is most likely that Marine Corps officers, the Marine Corps in general, and the colleges, schools, and programs of the Marine Corps University specifically, greatly influence, if not determine, the particular presuppositions, worldviews, reasoning processes, and theoretical frameworks that Marine officers adopt both personally and professionally. In turn it is likely that those officers influence their subordinates' adoption of particular presuppositions, worldviews, reasoning processes, and theoretical frameworks.<sup>1215</sup>

As has been demonstrated in the last chapter of this thesis, the needed similarities in presuppositions, worldviews, reasoning processes, and theoretical frameworks within the Marine Corps are far more than simply acknowledging the oath that is taken to uphold *The Constitution* and the notion that all Marines are primarily infantrymen. This may be seen by considering, in the light of the War College's purpose, some of the language found within the War College's Academic Catalog for the 1994-1995 academic year, beginning with the phrase "pragmatic intellectual foundation."<sup>1216</sup>

Consider some of the problems of pragmatism while keeping in mind that pragmatism is not the same as practicality. The phrase "pragmatic intellectual" may be an

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<sup>1214</sup> USMC War College, *Marine Corps War College Academic Catalog*, 3.

<sup>1215</sup> All people adopt certain presuppositions that shape their own perception. Others can influence the adoption of particular presuppositions. Each profession has its own generally accepted paradigm. Herbert Schlossberg, *Idols for Destruction: The Conflict of Christian Faith and American Culture* (Wheaton, Illinois: Corssway Books, 1990) 49-51.

<sup>1216</sup> USMC War College, *Marine Corps War College Academic Catalog*, 2.

oxymoron. Pragmatists, however, claim to base their decisions and actions on "what works" while not knowing the future. Even if one does what worked in the past, any response to any problem at hand or on the horizon is always based on some principle taken from some conceptual system. Typically, despite the visibility of various principles founded on an honest and natural understanding of the Laws of Nature and Nature's God, political loyalties to legislation being passed can change with whatever way fashionable acceptance turns. Soldiers lacking the moral motivation and strong will to take and/or hold a correct and principled position at the right time and place can jeopardize an entire country.<sup>1217</sup>

Additionally alarming, consider the phrase "... global context of national security issues."<sup>1218</sup> That phrase differs quite significantly from the clauses in Article I. Section 8 of *The Constitution* that say, "... punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations, ... War ... Reprisal, and ... Capture." Nor does it keep in mind the traditional definition of "the Militia" or the commitment to "... execute Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." All of such action was couched in *The Constitution's* preamble's emphasis on defense.<sup>1219</sup> Because of today's political fashions, the phrase "... global context of national security issues" may be interpreted in a quite expansive way, possibly even past that which is constitutional. While some may argue that treaties and resolutions have made the use of the national security excuse legal, Article VI of *The Constitution* makes it clear that *The Constitution* as the "Supreme Law" cannot be voided by a treaty. Congress, therefore, may not be absolved from its duties as detailed in Article I Section 8 and 9 to declare war and martial law.<sup>1220</sup>

The phrase "... evolution of the American way of war ..." is also problematic.<sup>1221</sup> While we have developed technology (learned to better apply the laws that govern the physical world), the principles governing the wartime use of that technology remain the

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<sup>1217</sup> Schlossberg, 49-51.

<sup>1218</sup> USMC War College, *Marine Corps War College Academic Catalog*, 2.

<sup>1219</sup> *The Constitution*, art. I. sec. 8; *The Declaration of Independence*.

<sup>1220</sup> Robert F. Turner, *Repealing the War Powers Resolution: Restoring the Rule of Law in US Foreign Policy* (Riverside, New Jersey: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1991) 47-52; *The Constitution*, art. I. sec. 8, 9; *The Declaration of Independence*.

<sup>1221</sup> USMC War College, *Marine Corps War College Academic Catalog*, 5.



same. War has not evolved. The elegance of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is that it enumerates the unchanging principles that underlie all war.

Look at the phrase "... understanding of the relationship of key elements of national power."<sup>1222</sup> It is important to note that emphasis is placed on "national power." While Machiavelli may have disagreed with the recognition that power does not grant authority, perhaps at this point an explanation of the importance of competent authority and the sovereignty of the people should be mentioned in the text. No power may be used unless the people authorize it. That is due to the fact that *The Constitution* was "... ratified in Convention ... ." <sup>1223</sup>

Lastly, consider the phrase: "Recurring themes maintain student orientation and focus ... [and make clear] relationships between diverse aspects of individual courses and objectives of the curriculum."<sup>1224</sup> In order to have "recurring themes," or an orientation, one must be able to determine the largely uniform view and its presuppositional foundations which guide instruction. How that view is transmitted to students will affect the academic freedom to study and debate different approaches to war.

While the aforementioned excerpts from Marine Corps documents, footnotes, and insights provide evidence that a philosophical and doctrinal worldview is held in common by the Marine Corps, USMC University, USMC Command and Staff College, and USMC War College, stereotyping that worldview under one scholar's name could be misleading because, as stated, it is the result of the combination of the works and teaching of many scholars. It is clear that the existing philosophical and doctrinal worldview: is commonly known and probably held by most Marine officers and Marines; may contain an evolutionary pragmatic paradigm that establishes a changing foundation for deciding exactly what military concerns and studies are relevant; and may condone activities stretching the limits traditionally considered within the scope of the United States military's responsibilities.

#### *D. The USMC Worldview: Conclusions*

Some agreement may be found with Bassford of The Command and Staff College in that,

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<sup>1222</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>1223</sup> *The Constitution*, art. VII.

<sup>1224</sup> USMC War College, *Marine Corps War College Academic Catalog*, 7.

Everyone has a theory or set of theories about war ... . The problem is, few of us explicitly understand our own theories, much less those of our leaders, peers, and subordinates. It is the major purpose of doctrinal schooling to insure that all of our national security professionals share a common set of theoretical concepts—not so that they will all see the world the same way, but rather so that they can communicate their differing views more easily to one another. The Command Staff College Curriculum provides that necessary common ground.<sup>1225</sup>

Some disagreement, however, may also be found. It needs to be stated that all Marines, especially officers, are not so lacking in insight, education, or wisdom that they fall into the category of failing to "... explicitly understand our own theories, much less those of our leaders, peers, and subordinates." Additionally, "... shar[ing] a common set of theoretical concepts ..." requires faith in the view from which they originate.<sup>1226</sup>

The notion that many Marine leaders and Marines will not, knowingly or unknowingly, partly or fully adopt the philosophical worldview that supports the Marine Corps' theoretical framework through which they are taught to communicate is faulty. In expanding on the earlier-mentioned theme of the development of the Marine psyche, if Marine leaders and Marines have not defined their own "theoretical concepts," do not hold intellectually inferior "theoretical concepts," or are repetitively required to use the Marine Corps "theoretical concepts," then those Marines and Marine leaders are likely to eventually adopt those Marine Corps "theoretical concepts," much like learning the language of the country that one lives in. Furthermore, it may seem to be common sense that, Marine Corps theoretical concepts, together as a system, were chosen for use because they are considered the best framework developed and available at this time. If another framework becomes viewed as superior according to Department of Defense criteria, it will be adopted by the Marine Corps. An important question is how criteria controls the selection of the military instructional framework chosen.

Knowingly or unknowingly, all human beings have some theoretical framework through which they may define that which is around them and get things done. When an individual has enough faith in a theoretical framework to adopt it for making sense of

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<sup>1225</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 8.

<sup>1226</sup> Ibid.

reality, then that individual also adopts, implicitly or explicitly, the presuppositions or axioms, worldview, and reasoning that supports that specific theoretical framework. If that were not the case, then defining one's surroundings and achieving within it could not only be harder than need be, but also many, if not all, conclusions drawn could be subject to an extremely high level of doubt. Marine Corps Officer training emphasizes quick, strong decision making in the accomplishment of a mission, in which doubt could be fatal.

It would be wrong to believe the USMC and any of the Marine Corps' University's colleges, schools, or programs institutionally hold or train their Marine officers and Marines to hold presuppositions, worldviews, reasoning processes, and theoretical frameworks that differ significantly. Such disunity would be dangerous to a fighting force for rather obvious reasons, some of which would be confusion concerning that fighting force's overall purpose, restrictions, and immediate goals. While union of vision is necessary for a military, micro-management is not. Micro-management by strategic commanders of Marine officers and Marines on the operational and tactical levels of war could deter the duty-bound application of American military artistic proficiency to a degree that greatly jeopardize a country.

*E. The Slowing Effects of Bureaucracy vs. The Importance of  
the Progression of Commandant Gray's Reforms*

Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* makes it quite clear that a command's particular view and training of its troops is at the root of success. In order to gain the best result, soldiers are to be treated as sons and provided with strategic advantages. Success and failure is the burden of command.<sup>1227</sup> One must also consider that, since Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine plans on the use of smaller, faster forces against a larger enemy, a Marine is only as victorious as his mind is developed and God's providence allows him to creatively out think and out fight his enemy. Hence, it is important to require extensive study, allow academic freedom, and foster communication in the Marine Corps University.<sup>1228</sup> It would be distressing to find that anything other than uncommon genius and open communication of resulting insights is expected from Marine leaders.

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<sup>1227</sup> Ames, 150; Griffith, 123, 125, 128, 134-135.

<sup>1228</sup> Wyly, interview by author.

In correspondence and interviews with: Ex. Vice President of the Marine Corps University under General Gray, Colonel Wyly USMC (ret.), Professor of history at the American Military University of Manassas, Virginia; Ex. Instructor at the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, Major Jim Etter USMC (ret.), Founder and CEO of the American Military University of Manassas, Virginia; and Educator, Bruce I. Gudmundsson at the Institute for Tactical Education of Quantico, Virginia, and who, in respective order, envisioned, participated in, and witnessed the Marine Corps University's 1989 reformation, it has been made clear that while the 1989 reformation may have been completed, it may have not been entirely maintained. A number of factors may be in competition with the importance of military educational responsibility in various colleges at the Marine Corps University. In the case of completing the transition to maneuver warfare doctrine, not only must new ways be learned but old ways must be unlearned. In some cases it may need to be understood that universities are not commands that exist for the purposes of passing time or obtaining promotions by undermining necessary educational reforms and facilitating what may be termed by some as the expansion of the body of knowledge. Adapting to change to secure victory requires extra effort. As will be further discussed, any failure to maintain or advance Commandant Gray's reformation may result in relative losses of academic freedom at, and Corps-wide influence on the part of, The Marine Corps University.<sup>1229</sup>

It is possible that Bruce Gudmundsson is correct when he says that, "When General Gray left office in 1991, the reading program was ignored. It is still on the books, but no one is pushing it. Thus the notion of 'required reading' doesn't really exist anymore."<sup>1230</sup> Bassford's assessment that educators in the Command and Staff College's "Theory and Nature of War" course should not have to "... turn soldiers into scholars" and that there is a need to "... teach soldiers to make practical use of scholars' honest products" is partly true. It is interesting that the word "honest" seems to be inserted in the passage for the sake of drawing a distinction between actual history with as little a bias as is humanly possible, as opposed to fictional or revisionist history.<sup>1231</sup>

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<sup>1229</sup> Gudmundsson, letter to author; Major Jim Etter USMC (ret.), Ex. Instructor, Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, Founder and CEO, American Military University, interview by author, 5 April 1995, Manassas Park, Virginia; Millett, 634; Wyly, interview by author.

<sup>1230</sup> Gudmundsson, letter to author.

<sup>1231</sup> Bassford, *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, 12.

It arguable the differentiation between "scholars" and "soldiers" is not as distinct as Bassford, the author of the *Theory and Nature of War Faculty Guide and Syllabus*, attempts to make it appear. A soldier is a scholar and a scholar is a soldier. Any Marine or Marine leader who wants to survive and be victorious will undoubtedly spend great time and effort studying those things which have made other warrior leaders victorious or dead. Marines and Marine leaders should possess the desire and will to turn themselves into scholars. Even though the reading may not, therefore, be required of all Marines or Marine leaders, it is most likely that aspiring Marine Corps officers, current Marine Corps officers, and others who take the duty of being a Marine most seriously have read, are reading, or plan to read Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, not only because *The Art of War* is still on the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) recommended reading list, but because it may quickly enable Marines to win in battle. If not required, it is possible that a training and combat experience may prompt individual reading.<sup>1232</sup>

The importance of the aforementioned points has not been overstated. Excessive restrictions on the academic freedom to explore and debate other approaches to strategy, operations, and tactics may be or may become restrictions on communication and other forms of action throughout a system. This jeopardizes that system's possession of superiority in cause, tempo, and initiative. A clear example of this importance in tempo and initiative may be observed in the success of the German Army's Blitzkrieg and the failure of the Italian Army's use of the same type of strategies. Among the factors that made the Blitzkrieg successful were some recommendations shared by Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and maneuver warfare doctrine's OODA loop. Those similarities are as follows: having good information on all that is around you, especially your enemy; gaining strategic advantage through emplacement and orientation; and striking with such speed that your enemy does not have time to respond properly.<sup>1233</sup>

It is said that the Second World War German Army was a people's army (i.e., very democratic). To a large degree their lightning speed was maintainable by the ability of soldiers to communicate with their superiors and in turn take action based on battlefield judgments.<sup>1234</sup> In other words, there was a good interface between their battlefield and their headquarters.<sup>1235</sup> Many German successes, even in France, were achievable because

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<sup>1232</sup> Commandant of the USMC. *Marine Corps Professional Reading Program*, 2, 4.

<sup>1233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1234</sup> Ibid.

they made successive strategic moves so quickly that their opponents were pushed off and kept off balance. The Italian Army failed because its own bureaucracy inhibited lateral communication as well as the expression of uncommon genius on the battlefield, both of which stood in the way of lightning-fast strategic adaptation.<sup>1236</sup>

As *The Art of War* states and may be found throughout this thesis, "... as water has no constant form, there are, in war, no constant conditions, [and] ... [o]ne able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine."<sup>1237</sup>

We know and understand that "... the general must create situations which will contribute to their accomplishment . ... [A]ct expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so control the balance."<sup>1238</sup> "... [B]y taking into account the favorable factors, he makes his plan feasible; by taking into account the unfavorable, he may resolve the difficulties."<sup>1239</sup> However, on their own levels of war's hierarchy, his officers must be delegated that authority also.

When *The Art of War* states that the "... skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates,"<sup>1240</sup> it is clear that "[h]e selects his men and they exploit the situation."<sup>1241</sup> "It is sufficient to estimate the enemy situation correctly and to concentrate your strength to capture him. There is no more to it than this. He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him."<sup>1242</sup> It may be said that in most cases capture and use does have advantages over destruction and waste.

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<sup>1235</sup> The importance of the interface between the battlefield and headquarters was emphasized in the phone interview with Major Jeff Willis at the AWS. Willis, interview by author,.

<sup>1236</sup> Wyly, interview by author.

<sup>1237</sup> Griffith, 101.

<sup>1238</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>1239</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>1240</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>1241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1242</sup> Ibid., 122.

## *F. The Conclusion*

While the political reasons for fighting may not be discussed in their pages, it may be said that together *Warfighting* and *Campaigning* are a balanced philosophical doctrine of war. Among many other philosophers, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu have made significant contributions to the Marine Corps' way of war. However, the over emphasis of what is thought to be Clausewitzian over the contributions of Sun Tzu and Hart could be self-defeating. With its ideal being "total war" and its goal being the "total destruction," of (among other things) the enemy's military, Clausewitz has traditionally been thought to support "attrition warfare." While some people may say a mentality of the crude application of force and direct frontal attack accompanies the adoption of Clausewitzian philosophies, considering recent breakthroughs in the understanding of Clausewitz, this may or may not be true. However, it may certainly be said that Clausewitzian philosophies depends less on delegating authority within a common vision and more on the singular control of a military by a higher ranking military genius. This is dangerous. No one has a monopoly on insight. Everyone makes mistakes.

The Marine Corps has traditionally been referred to as a brotherhood. The Marine Corps' motto is "Semper Fidelis" (always faithful). It is that spirit and character of cooperation and dependability that makes the philosophical doctrine of "maneuver warfare" particularly well suited to the Marine Corps. Every Marine officer and Marine who understands his duties also understands that Marines must develop as scholars in order to have the mental ability to be victorious at the right time and place on their respective levels of war's hierarchy. However, if there is a lack of trust in the judgment of subordinates: the proper authority that is needed in order to accomplish in war will not be delegated to those subordinates; intelligence gathered by those subordinates will not be well used; and there would be significantly less economy of effort. "Attrition warfare" is the most expensive form of warfare.

Being a Marine officer and a Marine is about working with other Marine officers and Marines in order to overcome adversity and adversaries. Marine officers and Marines are serious about their survival and success. Commanders will get what they expect from Marine officers. Marine officers will get what they expect from Marines. If the philosophical balance of Gray's reformation is maintained then Commanders, Marine officers, and Marines will be morally motivated, self-respecting, uncommonly bright, quickly adaptable, and devastatingly effective in hostilities (war and other conflicts not quite considered war). If not, then the inverse will be true.

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## VITA

Born in Roto Spain on a United States Naval base, Harry David Candela has lived in and traveled to many places. Understanding that thought is put into action and action is part of everyone's life, like everyone else, Harry David Candela has seen and done many things. The best in his life was and continues to be believing in Jesus Christ and accepting His mercy, or as John Calvin would say, being chosen. Through God's grace Harry David Candela: compensated for dyslexia; fought the effects of a broken home; learned to love life and people; earned a merit scholarship for demonstrated good work and study ethics in undergraduate school; and graduated from West Virginia Wesleyan College in Buckhannon, West Virginia with a triple major Bachelor of Science Degree in biology, chemistry, and government. With the 1998 publication of this thesis, he completed a Master of Arts in Public Policy from Regent University in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Currently he teaches high school and college English through a cross discipline approach for Korea's Ministry of Education in Pusan, Korea. Harry David Candela may be quoted as saying that "all education is about character."